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ABSTRACT
This thesis is divided into four parts. The first examines the social background of mineiro entrepreneurs and 
the source of their capital. The second assesses the structural development of mineiro firms. The third 
investigates the process of technology transfer in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, the dependence of various 
firms on foreign technical knowledge, and the limits to the development of indigenous technology. The 
fourth examines capital-labour relations and the formation of the labour market in Minas Gerais. The 
objective of the research is to consider - and extend - the debate in the literature about patterns of 
development in backward economies. According to the "historical determinist" approach, the history of 
advanced countries traces out the road of development for less developed economies. Opposing this view, 
the "economic backwardness" approach points out that the development of backward countries differs 
considerably from the advanced countries in terms of the speed of development and the productive and 
organizational structures of their economies. This thesis uses the concept of "economic backwardness" to 
investigate the formation of a "spirit of capitalism" in Minas Gerais and how far the Brazilian economy was 
able to close the development gap with the more advanced economies. This thesis also contributes to the 
study of Brazilian economic history by looking specifically at the process of development of the 
state/province of Minas Gerais. The economic historiography of Brazil on the nineteenth century is heavily 
based on evidence drawn from Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and overlooks important socio-economic 
differences between the various sub-regions.
As this thesis demonstrates, the rate and character of the development of Minas Gerais were to a large extent 
determined by its degree of backwardness, intellectual climate and natural potentialities, and accordingly the 
course of development of the mineiro economy differed considerably from process observed in more 
advanced countries. In addition, comparison between Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro shows 
important differences among these three economies, mainly in sources of entrepreneurship and labour.
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INTRODUCTION
The nineteenth century witnessed the consolidation of industrial capitalism and the widening of the 
development gap between the first industrial countries and latecomer economies such as Brazil. However, 
the question of underdevelopment was overlooked by many contemporary economists, who assumed that 
the historical experience of countries such as England would repeat itself elsewhere. It was only more 
recently that the problem of the development of latecomer economies began to be studied as a problem in 
its own right. Economic development in backward countries was not only an unique and specific process, 
but also did not necessarily followed the same path taken by the more advanced economies. In other words, 
differences were observed in the pace and substance of development in latecomer economies in contrast to 
the first industrial countries and it was recognised that these were due to the distinct nature of the historical 
process of development of backward countries. Hence, it is important to ask to what extent the process of 
economic development of nineteenth-century Minas Gerais repeated the historical experience of the more 
advanced economies and in which respects was the mineiro experience peculiar and unique?
Furthermore, for much of the nineteenth century the Brazilian economy has been generally regarded 
as a coffee export economy. Indeed, the coffee sector was by far die most dynamic in Brazil during this 
period and has commanded the attention of many economic historians. Coffee was not only the main 
Brazilian cash crop, but coffee capital also financed to a large extent the early process of industrialization, 
the construction of the infrastructure, and many other businesses such as banking and trade. Consequently, 
the major coffee-growing areas of the country, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, have tended to be the subject 
of most studies dealing with the economic development in Brazil. This has led to a tendency to over­
generalize from the experiences of the coffee sector, a process which neglects (or minimizes) important 
socio-economic differences amongst regional economies in southern and central Brazil during the nineteenth 
century. Minas Gerais, for example, had a much more varied economy than Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo 
with areas dedicated to m ining, ranching, manufacturing, the production of foodstuffs for internal 
consumption, as well as the production of coffee for export in the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, some 
questions pose themselves: how distinct was the business environment in Minas Gerais from that of Sao 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro? How far can generalizations based on the experiences of the two principal coffee 
provinces/states be applied to the case of Minas Gerais? Very little attention has been given to these 
questions and very little has been written on the business environment in Brazil to date. In providing 
answers to these questions this research will make a contribution to a better understanding of the overall 
historical process of development in Brazil.
The purpose of this dissertation is to make a contribution to the study of the process of economic 
development and business formation in latecomer economies by studying the formation of a business 
environment in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. The focus of the work is on non-agricultural enterprises. 
Business environment is defined as the conditions or circumstances in which people make production and 
commercial decisions about their businesses. Thus, it is possible to say that different periods of human 
history witnessed different business environments, such as the feudalist, mercantilist, or capitalist. Yet,
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within these specific modes it is possible to identify different business environments for each stage of 
development, for example, competitive capitalism of the beginning of the nineteenth century and mature or 
monopolist capitalism at the end of the century. Finally, regarding place, different business environments 
can be distinguished from region to region or from country to country.
As Gerschenkron has pointed out, many nineteenth-century classical economists had faith in a
perfectly comprehensible past whose flow was determined by simple and general historical laws. John Stuart
Mill, for example, has spoken of the slavery of antecedent circumstances' and Karl Marx predicted that:
"The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the 
image of its own future"2.
This "historical determinist" approach has dominated the debate about the process of development of
backward countries. Even more recently authors such as Rostow have tried to identify:
"the particular factors of reality which appear to run through the story of the modem 
world since about 1700"3
Moreover, Rostow has described - and attempted to homogenize - the historical development of countries 
as distinct as late eighteenth-century Britain and Nasser's Egypt, locating these countries within the same 
five-stage pattern of economic growth4.
Studying latecomer countries in Europe, Gerschenkron observed considerable differences in the 
nature of their processes of economic development and rejected the "historical determinist" approach. 
According to the Gerschenkron, industrial development in backward countries differred not only with regard 
to the rate of growth but also with regard to the productive and organizational structures. Differences in the 
speed and nature of development were the result of the application of institutional instruments - by banks 
or the state - which had no counterpart in the more developed economies. Furthermore, the intellectual 
climate within which development proceeded was quite distinct among advanced and backward economies. 
Finally, the character of economic development was also dependent on the degree of backwardness and the 
natural potentialities of each country5.
Applying a similar set of ideas to the analysis of the process of development and economic 
dependence of Latin America, Cardoso and Faletto also reject die "historical determinist" approach. 
According to these authors, the interpretations inspired by this approach has always assumed that the
1 A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essavs. (1962),
p.5.
2 K. Marx, Capital. (1976), I, p.91.
3 W.W. Rostow, The Stases of Economic Growth: A Non-commnnist Manifesto. (New York, 3rd. 
ed. 1990), pp. 1-2.
4 See Ibid., chapter 2.
5 Gerschenkron, on.cit.. p.7.
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relations of the political, social and economic systems in the USA and Western Europe anticipate the future 
of the underdeveloped societies. Yet these interpretations also maintain that underdeveloped countries are 
late in the development of some aspects of their structure though not in others6. However, as Cardoso and 
Faletto point out, the differences between developed and underdeveloped economies were not only with 
regard to the nature of the productive system, but more importantly with regard to the position of the latter 
within the international economic structure of production and distribution. From the beginning, the process 
of capitalist development determined one type of relationship between the central economies themselves and 
another with peripheral economies. Thus, different stages of capitalist development assigned a different role 
to die periphery in the international economic system of production. The process of industrial expansion in 
England, for example, required from the peripheral economies a certain degree of dynamism and 
development to supply raw materials and to consume manufactured goods. Furthermore, to understand the 
process of development in Latin America in all its complexity the pure economic analysis proved to be too 
narrow. It is necessary to take into account the relationship between the economic, social and political 
dimensions of the process. In other words, it has to take into account the broader environment within which 
economic phenomena take place. As the authors pointed out, in Latin America development in a context of 
dependency has produced a dynamic and differentiated process7.
Over the years there has been several attempts to explain Brazil's relative historic backwardness, 
giving birth to an economic historiography which is, however, largely based on the experience of Sao Paulo 
and Rio de Janeiro. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, climate, culture, laws, race and religion 
were blamed for Brazil's underdevelopment8. Only after the Second World War has Brazilian economic 
history been studied in a more serious and systematic manner9. The structuralist theory, which took shape 
under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) just after the Second World 
War, was mainly concerned to explain and remedy Latin America's perceived slow industrial growth. 
Focusing on internal bottlenecks and structural crisis in the world economy, cenalistas stressed the historic 
limits of export-led growth and observed that the gains from economic specialization and participation in 
a relatively open world trade system were not as predicted by conventional liberal theory. Differing income 
elasticities of demand for primary and secondary products, the cumulative consequences of cyclical 
instability in the international system, and imperfect factor markets in the industrialized economies resulted 
in the concentration of productivity gains in the so-called central, industrialized economies, and in the
6 F.H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Denendencia e Desenvolvimento na America Tsarina: Bnsaio de 
Interprets cao Sociologica. (Rio de Janeiro, 6th ed. 1981), p. 19. See also the English version Dependency 
and Development in Latin America. (1979).
7 Ibid., pp.9-34.
8 S. Topik, "Recent Studies on the Economic History of Brazil", in Latin American Research 
Review. XXIII (1988) No.l, p. 176.
9 Ibid., p. 176.
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deterioration of terms of trade for peripheral, primary producing economies10. The solutions envisaged by 
cepalistas were various: (1) import-substituting industrial expansion and export diversification, to be 
accomplished with government assistance; (2) agrarian reform; and (3) regional integration11. The main 
contribution of the cenalista approach to the Brazilian business historiography is the general assumption 
underpinning much of its work that there was a fund of entrepreneurs waiting the right circumstance to seize 
economic initiatives12.
For Furtado, one of the main exponents of the cenalista approach in the Brazilian economic 
historiography13, up to the twentieth century Brazil's growth was based upon a succession of export staples. 
Until the emergence of coffee as the main cash crop in the second half of the nineteenth century, subsistence 
predominated and the Brazilian economy remained as an archipelago of loosely linked export enclaves. The 
earlier mono-product booms had fostered anti-progressive, seigniorial attitudes amongst the local oligarchies, 
which led to the consolidation of a conservative, patrimonial state. Only with coffee production in the 
province of Sao Paulo after the 1860s, a new social and economic configuration emerged creating a more 
propitious environment for business development and economic diversification. There is now an extensive 
literature devoted to coffee and development, but much of it is mainly based on the experiences of Sao 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro14.
During the 1960s, the shortcomings of the cepalista development model and school of historical 
analysis provoked radical criticism. The distorted nature of Latin American industrialization, particularly the 
failure to promote an autonomous industrial development, the dominant position of foreign-owned
10 C.M. Lewis, "Historia Economica y Historia Empresarial: Tendencias recientes en la Literatura 
Brasilena, c. 1850-1945", (Mimeo., paper presented at XXVII Asemblea CLADEA, La Gerencia en la 
America Latina: Experiencias Comparativas, Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Octubre 21 a 24 de 1992), 
pp.2-3.
11 C. Abel and C.M Lewis, "General Introduction", in Latin America: Economic Imperialism and 
the State, ed. C. Abel and C.M Lewis, (1991), p.4.
12 Lewis, Historia Economica v Historia Empresarial. p.3.
13 For the Cepalista approach as applied to Brazil, see C. Furtado, Formacao Economica do Brasil. 
(Sao Paulo, 16th ed. 1979) and M.C. Tavares, Da Substituicao de Importacoes ao Capital ism o Financeiro: 
Ensaios sobre Economia Brasileira. (Rio de Janeiro, 11th ed. 1983).
14 See among others T.H. Holloway, The Brazilian Coffee Valorization of 1906: Regional Politics 
and Economic Dependence. (Madison, 1975); E.A. Cardoso, "Desvalorizagoes Cambiais, Industria e Cafe: 
Brasil, 1862-1906", Revista Brasileira de Economia. XXXV, (1981), No.2, 85-106; A. Delfim Netto, O 
Prohlema do Cafe no Brasil. (Sao Paulo, 1959); J.H. Lima, Cafe e Industria em Minas Gerais. 1870-1920. 
(Petropolis, 1981); S.J. Stein, Vassouras: A Brazilian Coffee Countv. 1850-1900. (Cambridge, Mass. 1957); 
W. Dean, Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System. 1820-1920. (Stanford, 1976); O. Nogueira de Matos, 
Cafe e Ferrovias: A Evolucao Ferroviaria de Sao Paulo e o Desenvolvimento da Cultura Cafeeira. (Sao 
Paulo, 1974); R.H. Mattoon, "Railroads, Coffee and the Growth of Big Business in Sao Paulo, Brazil", 
HAHR. LVII, (1977), No.2,273-92; W. Cano, Raizes da Concentracao Industrial em Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo, 
3rd. ed. 1990); F.A.M. Saes, A Grande Empresa de Servicos Publicos na Economia Cafeeira. (Sao Paulo, 
1986); J.E. Sweigart. Coffee factorage and the Emergence of a Brazilian Capital Market. 1850-1888. (1987); 
and S. Silva, F.xpansao Cafeeira e Origens da Industria no Brasil. (Sao Paulo, 1976).
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transnational corporations, and continuing social inequity, became the main focus of the dependency debate15. 
This scholarship portrayed dependence as in part a function of internal and institutional structures which 
frustrated or distorted development in Latin America. The "dependency" approach is also critical of the 
economicism of early cepalista analysis and its failure to address political issues and stress effectively the 
need for social reforms. Cenalistas had naively assumed that economic development would solve social 
inequities and sectoral imbalances. For some participants in the dependency debate, Latin America's 
economic and social problems were the result of a legacy of backwardness and a growing imbalance, dating 
from the colonial period, in the region's relations with the metropolitan economies. For others, the focus 
upon the efficacy or appropriateness of contemporary policy is not superfluous, but it lacks centrality16.
The modem debate about dependency emerged mainly with the works of Frank and Cardoso and 
Faletto which devoted substantial attention to Brazil17. Frank, who drew upon Marxian analysis to explain 
underdevelopment in Latin America, argued that development in Brazil had been hindered by an early 
(external) form of capitalist penetration which had maintained pre-modem, anti-developmental social 
structures. These conservative forces inhibited local capital accumulation, restricted the growth of the internal 
market, and prevented the Brazilian bourgeoisie and proletariat from fulfilling their historical role. Cardoso 
and Faletto, as mentioned above, combined an analysis of the internal and external dimensions of the 
problem offering a more dynamic and differentiated account of Latin American development. For them, the 
main question was how to build a national capitalism within an environment dominated by international 
capital. Cardoso and Faletto stressed the ability of the nineteenth-century paulista elite to control economic 
resources and the willingness of planters to divert coffee profits into other sectors, mainly infrastructure and 
manufacturing. If this process was partly explained by the nature of coffee production and the position of 
Brazil in the international economy, die result was the replacement of a narrow concentration upon 
agricultural enterprise, said to be characteristic of oligarchies elsewhere in Brazil, by a more pragmatic 
approach to investment and the inculcation of an ethos of profit maximization.
During the 1980s, a number of works dealing with the pre-Second World War period, and enriched 
by the mutual antagonism of much dependency and structuralist scholarship, constituted what may be 
properly described as the "Campinas School". Despite its large impact on the Brazilian economic
15 The main exponents of the "dependency" approach as applied to Brazil are A.G. Frank, 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical studies of Chile and Brazil. (New York, 
1967); and Cardoso and Faletto, op.cit.. Among the main authors contributing to marxist and nationalist 
strands of the dependency debate are H. Jaguaribe, Desenvolvimento Economico e Desenvolvimento Politico. 
(Rio de Janeiro, 1962); F. Oliveira, A Economia Brasileira: Critica a Razao dualista. (Petropolis, 1988) and 
A Economia da Dependencia Imperfeita. (Rio de Janeiro, 1980); T. Santos, Deoendencia v Cambio Social. 
(Mexico, 1970); O. Ianni, Industrializacao e Desenvolvimento Social no Brasil. (Rio de Janeiro, 1963); N.W. 
Sodrd, Histdria da Burguesia Brasileira. (Rio de Janeiro, 1964); and P. Evans, Dependent Development: the 
Alliance of Multinational. State and Local Capital in Brazil. (Princeton, 1979).
16 For a more detailed account of the origin and evolution of the dependency debate and the nature 
of the links between cepalista and dependency, see Abel and Lewis, op.cit.. pp. 10-20.
17 Frank, op.cit.: Cardoso and Faletto, op.cit..
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historiography, much of this literature is narrowly concerned with industrialization, but devotes a great deal 
of attention to policy issues, if largely based on the experience of Sao Paulo. Its main exponents are 
Suzigan, Cardoso de Mello and Cano. Suzigan investigates Brazilian industrial development in the pre- 
Second World War period in order to determine the nature and extent of the process. Through the 
construction of a proxy for industrial investment from capital goods imports, he concludes that investment 
in industry up to 1913, and to a lesser extent up to 1929, was directly related to the performance of exports. 
The industries developed during this period were complementary and dependent of the export sector (mainly 
coffee). Moreover, during this period economic policy was basically concerned with the performance of the 
export sector. It was only after 1930 that industrial growth was more directly linked to the internal market 
and favoured by a policy of import substitution18. Cardoso de Mello develops Gcrschenkron's ideas about 
institutional substitutability in late industrializing economies and opportunities or constraints deriving from 
the international setting19. Cano investigates the roots of industrial concentration in Sao Paulo. According 
to Cano, this process goes back to the last two decades of the nineteenth-century when the formation of what 
he calls die paulista coffee economic complex began. This complex was well established by the 1930s, when 
the paulista economy consolidated its predominant position within the Brazilian economy20.
Many of the debates in the Brazilian economic historiography reviewed above have shaped and 
stimulated the study of business history in Brazil. Among the several themes that can be identified in the 
Brazilian historiography for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries period, none have had a larger 
impact upon business history than controversies about entrepreneurship. The modem origin of the 
controversy dates from Dean's study of paulista industrial expansion21. Dean's work contained the assertion 
that in pre-Second World War Brazil the industrial entrepreneurial was of foreign origin. According to him, 
industrialists were drawn exclusively from the ranks of overseas merchants. This view has been successfully 
challenged by exponents of the cepalista and the Campinas school and among the best examples are the 
works of Cano and Mello on Sao Paulo, and Giroletti, Lima, Arantes, and Vaz on Minas Gerais22. New 
works on Minas Gerais extend the challenge to Dean by cautioning against over-generalization from the case 
of Sao Paulo. Following Campinas scholars, these authors have acknowledged the importance of immigrants 
for mineiro industrial growth, but at the same time stressed the significance of native entrepreneurship. In
18 W. Suzigan, Industria Brasileira: Origem e desenvolvimento. (Sao Paulo, 1986).
19 J.M. Cardoso de Mello, O Caoitalismo Tardio: Contribuicao a Revisao Critica da Foimacao e 
Desenvolvimento da Economia Brasileira. (Sao Paulo, 1982).
20 Cano op.cit..
21 W. Dean, A industrializacao de Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo, 1971).
22 Cano, op.cit.: Z.M.C. Mello, Metamorfoses da Riaueza: Sao Paulo. 1845-1895. (Sao Paulo, 
1985); D.A. Giroletti, A Industrializacao de Juiz de Fora: 1850-1930. (Juiz de Fora, 1988); A.M. Vaz, Cia. 
Cedro e Cachoeira: Historia de uma Hmprpsa Familiar. 1883-1987. (Belo Horizonte, 1990); Lima, op.cit.: 
L.A.V. Arantes, "As Origens da Burguesia Industrial em Juiz de Fora, 1858/1912", Universidade Federal 
Fluminense, Unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Niteroi, 1991.
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emphasising the autonomous nature of early industrial growth in up-country regions, they point to a process 
that was less export-driven than the paulista. Until the turn of the century, manufacturing in Minas Gerais 
was largely divorced from the foreign trade sector which played such an important role in Sao Paulo and 
Rio de Janeiro. Larger accounts of government macroeconomic policy also contain a great deal of 
information about the general environment within which business operated and about connexions between 
business and the state23. Many sectoral and regional studies have also contributed to Brazilian business 
history. On agriculture, Dean's earlier work about paulista planters, the pioneering micro studies on the 
mechanics of plantation enterprises on coffee counties in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo by Stein and Dean 
respectively, Eisenberg's account of the paulista coffee lobby in the late 1870s, and Szmrecsanyi's 
informative work on sugar production and processing in Sao Paulo, are important contributions24. There are 
also a number of works on railways providing information about inter-corporate rivalries and strategic 
planning of individual firms, profitability at firm level, technology transfer, management and shareholding, 
and conflict amongst state, local private and foreign owned companies25. Finally, there is an extensive 
bibliography on manufacturing, ranging from Stein's study on the cotton textile industry26 to the more 
regional and sub-sectoral recent works27. These works have pointed to many of the issues to be pursued by
23 Reference points for this discussion are the works of Evans, op.cit: Topik, op.cit.: and A. 
Villanova Villela and W. Suzigan, Politica do Govemo e Crescimento da Economi Brasileira. 1889-1945. 
(Rio de Janeiro, 1973).
24 Stein, Vassouras: Dean, Rio Claro: W. Dean, "The Planter as Entrepreneur: The Case of Sao 
Paulo", HAHR. XXXVI, (1966), No.2, pp.138-52; P.L. Eisenberg, A Mentalidade dos Fazendeiros no 
Congresso agricola de 1878. (Sao Paulo, 1990); T. Szmrecsanyi, "Agrarian Bourgeoisie, Regional 
Government and the Origins of Sao Paulo's Modem Sugar Industry", paper presented at the Symposium on 
Elites and Economic Management in Latin America, XIX and XXth Centuries, 47th International Congress 
of Americanists, Tulane 1990.
25 See Nogueira de Matos, op.cit: F.A.M. Saes, As Ferrovias de Sao Paulo. 1870-1940. (Sao Paulo, 
1981) and A Grande Hmpresa de Servicos Publicos: C.M. Lewis, Public Policy and Private Initiative: 
Railway Building in Sao Paulo. 1860-1889. (1991); A.C. El-Kareh, Filha Branca de Mae Preta: A 
Companhia de Estrada de Ferro D. Pedro II. 1855-1865. (Petropolis, 1982); and R.H. Mattoon, op.cit.. 
Similar issues are raised by Giroletti on his work about the Uniao e Industria turnpike, D.A. Giroletti, "A 
Companhia e a Rodovia Uniao e Industria e o Desenvolvimento de Juiz de Fora, 1850 a 1900", Universidade 
Federal de Minas Gerais, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1980.
26 S.J. Stein, Origens e Evolucao da Industria Textil no Brasil. 1850-1950. (Rio de Janeiro, 1979).
27 J.A. Paula, "Dois Ensaios sobre a Genese da Industrializacao em Minas Gerais: a Siderurgia e 
a Industria Textil", in Amis do n  Seminhio sobre a Economia Mineira. Belo Horizonte, 1983, pp. 19-73; 
Silva, op.cit.: Cano, op.cit.: D.A. Giroletti, Industrializacao de Juiz de Fora. 1850-1930. (Juiz de Fora, 1988); 
and C. Castro, As Empresas Estrangeiras no Brasil. 1860-1913. (Rio de Janeiro, 1979). These works are 
attempts to emulate Dean's thesis on Sao Paulo and project a larger regional analysis of industry. A.M.F.C. 
Monteiro, "Empreendedores e Investidores em Industria Textil no Rio de Janeiro: 1878-1895", Universidade 
Federal Fluminense, Unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Niteroi, 1985; Vaz, op.cit.: R.B. Martins, "A Industria Textil 
Domestica de Minas Gerais no Seculo XIX", in Anais do II Seminario sobre a Economia Brasileira. Belo 
Horizonte, 1983, pp.77-94; E.V.D. Weid and A.M.R. Bastos, O Fio da Meada: Estratdgia de Expansao de 
uma Industria Textil. Companhia America Fabril - 1878/1930. (Rio de Jnaeiro, 1986); E.V.D. Weid and 
A.M.R. Bastos, O Fio da Meada: Estrategia de Fxpansao de uma Industria Textil - 1878/1930. (Rio de
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business historians and set the agenda for the recent development of the Brazilian business historiography.
As Lewis argues, there is now a growing body of clearly recognizable business history, but to date 
few works are firmly anchored to what may be considered core theoretical business history analysis28. In 
addition to texts on entrepreneurial formation mentioned above, there are a limited number of biographies29, 
memoirs30, and works which specifically address questions of entrepreneurial status (social and political), 
training and competence31. The already mentioned works by Mattoon, Mello and Vaz represent important 
studies of risk-taking portfolio diversification and corporate investment. Together they extend the discussion 
initiated by Dean and taken up by the Campinas school and other scholars studying distinct Brazilian 
regions.
Labour is another subject of over-riding importance and issues such as supply, training and 
discipline have been the subject of the attention of, among others, Eisenberg and Lamounier on Sao Paulo, 
and Libby and Giroletti on Minas Gerais32. A related important field of research is the problem of access
Janeiro, 1986); and L.C. Soares, A Manufatura na Formacao Economica e Social Escravista no Sudeste: Um 
Estudo das Atividades Manufatureiras na Regiao Flnminense. 1840-1880. (Niteroi, 1980). These works are 
solidly researched accounts on the textile industry in a number of provinces/states.
28 Lewis, "Historia Economica y Historia Empresarial", pp. 13-4.
29 See the works of Faria on Maua, Martins on Conde Matarazzo, and Mascarenhas on Bernardo 
Mascarenhas. A. Faria, Maud. (Rio de Janeiro, 1926); J. Souza Martins, Empresario e Empresa na Biografia 
do Conde Matarazzo. (Rio de Janeiro, 1967); and N.L. Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas: o Surto 
Industrial de Minas Gerais. (Rio de Janeiro, 1954).
30 See W.L. von Eschwege, Pluto Brasiliensis. (Berlin, 1833; reprinted Belo Horizonte/Sao Paulo,
1979).
31 F.H. Cardoso, Empresario Industrial e desenvolvimento Economico. (Sao Paulo, 1964); F.C. 
Prestes Motta, Emoresarios e Hegemonia Politica. (Sao Paulo, 1979); E. Diniz, Empresario. Estado e 
Canitalismo no Brasil. 1930-45. (Sao Paulo, 1978); D.A. Giroletti, "A Formacao do Empresario Industrial", 
Universidade Federal de Minas Geiais, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1991; Souza Martins, op.cit.: V.C. Piccini, 
"Deve-se Formar Empresarios?", in Anais da IX Renniao da ANPAD. (Florianopolis, 1985); F.H. Cardoso, 
Ideoloeias de la Burgesia Industrial en Sociedades Denendientes (Argentina v Brasil). (Mexico, 1971). One 
of the few historians to inject elements of modem "business science" into the study of businessmen is L.C. 
Bresser Pereira, Emnresarios e Administradores no Brasil. (Sao Paulo, 1974); more diffuse is the compilation 
Historia Empresarial Vivida. ed. Cleber Aquino (Sao Paulo, 1987).
32 The works of Eisenberg on Sao Paulo and Libby on Minas Gerais capture the concerns of 
modernizing employers with the problem of supply and quality of the labour force. Lamounier's work 
examines the supply of immigrant labour for the coffee plantations of Sao Paulo, while Giroletti's and 
Libby's studies on Minas Gerais provide an example of how industrialists conceived and resolved the 
problem of training and die inculcation of work discipline in the native non-slave labour force. See 
Eisenberg, op.cit.: D.C. Libby, Trabalho Escravo e Capital Estrangeiro no Brasil: O Caso de Morro Velho. 
(Belo Horizonte, 1984) and Transformacao e Trabalho em uma Rconomia Escravista: Minas Gerais no 
S6culo XIX. (Sao Paulo, 1988); M.L. Lamounier, "Between Slavery and Free labour: Experiments with Free 
Labour and Patterns of Slave Emancipation in Brazil and Cuba c. 1830-1888", University of London, 
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1993; D.A. Giroletti, Fabrica Convento Disciplina. (Belo Horizonte, 1991).
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to skilled personnel and equipment faced by pioneer firms33. Finally, business environment has been the 
subject of few works. Arguably, the work of Ridings is one of the very few which approach this issue 
directly34.
These and many other issues in the Brazilian business history still requires much more research and
attention. In this respect, this thesis represents an important contribution to the Brazilian literature since it
addresses many of the issues listed above. As already mentioned, this work extends existing bibliography
on business environment in nineteenth-century Brazil. More specifically, it examines and elaborates die
debate about entrepreneurial formation, corporate investment, marketing strategies, firm structural
organization, production, technology transfer, and capital-labour relations in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais.
* * * * * *
The thesis is divided into an introductory chapter and four sections. The introductory chapter 
reviews Brazilian and mineiro economic history in the nineteenth century. It provides a general background 
for the diesis. Section I examines the social background of mineiro entrepreneurs and the source of their 
capital. Chapter 2 analyses the evolution of the concept of the entrepreneur, the nature of entrepreneurship 
in different economic environments, and the debate about the emergence of the entrepreneur in the Brazilian 
economic historiography. With foreigners constituting a smaller proportion of its population compared with 
that of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and coffee very much confined to the southern regions of Minas 
Gerais, chapter 3 investigates the social and ethnic background of mineiro entrepreneurs and the origin of 
their capital.
Section II assesses the degree of structural development of mineiro firms in the nineteenth century 
and relates it to the prevailing business environment. Chapter 4 reviews the literature on organization theory 
with an emphasis on the study of different forms of "corporate" structures, their origins and implications 
for the business environment. Chapter 5 examines the scale and scope of activities and the administrative 
structure of several mineiro firms in order to assess their degree of organizational maturity.
Section III investigates the process of technology transfer to Minas Gerais, the reliance on foreign 
technical knowledge, and restrictions on the development of native technology. Chapter 6 reviews the 
literature on technological progress. It investigates the nature of technical change and the importance of 
technological progress for the process of economic development of less developed countries such as Brazil. 
As production of new technologies during the nineteenth century was limited to a small number of more 
advanced countries, less developed regions such as Brazil relied heavily on imported technology to promote
33 For the nineteenth century, the works of Vaz on the mineiro textile industry, Giroletti on 
turnpikes and Mattoon on paulista railways provide a good idea of the extent of these problems, whereas 
Eakin demonstrates that the diffusionist function of highly successful individual enterprises could be limited. 
See Vaz, op.cit.: Mattoon, op.cit.: Giroletti, "A Companhia e a Rodovia Uniao e Industria"; and M.C. Eakin, 
The St. John d'El Rev Mining Company and the Morro Velho Gold Mine. (Durham, 1989).
34 E.W. Ridings, "Business Associationalism, the Legitimation of Enterprise, and die Emergence 
of a Business Elite in Nineteenth-Century Brazil", in Business History Review. 63, (Winter 1989), pp.757- 
96.
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economic development. Therefore, chapter 7 examines the process of technology transfer in nineteenth- 
century Minas Gerais. It discusses the dependence of various firms on imported technical knowledge and 
the limits to the development of an indigenous technology during this period. It also discusses how mineiro 
entrepreneurs managed to absorb and modify these technologies.
Section IV examines capital-labour relations and the formation of a labour market in Minas Gerais. 
The provision of labour was considered one of the most acute problems faced by Brazilian businessmen 
during the last century and its solution was one of the priorities of both businessmen and politicians. Slavery 
was the main source of labour for most of the period and its legacy poisoned the relationship between non­
slave workers and employers. Therefore, non-slave Brazilians were reluctant to replace slave hands because 
they feared to be treated like slaves. Moreover, employers saw non-slave Brazilians workers as unreliable. 
Only Sao Paulo was successful in attracting a large number of foreigners and other parts of Brazil had to 
rely basically on non-slave "national" labour. Thus, chapter 8 examines the main forces in the shaping of 
the Brazilian labour market and the formation of the working class, while chapter 9 examines the main 
sources of labour in Minas Gerais.
* * * * * *
The material used in this thesis is derived from a variety of manuscript and printed sources. For 
the analysis of the origins of entrepreneurs, largely printed sources were used, namely books, almanacks, 
contemporary newspapers, genealogical studies, family histories and biographies and other publications 
dealing with the history of specific cities. The Biblioteca Nacional (Rio de Janeiro) also contains valuable 
data on individual entrepreneurs. Other sections of the thesis are based primarily on the rich documentation 
produced mainly by the companies. Annual company reports, annual accounts, statutes, correspondence, 
proceedings of shareholders' meetings and so forth, provide data on the commercial and productive activities 
of firms, on their administrative structure, and on their labour force. For the iron industry, information was 
gathered mainly from the memoirs of W.L. von Eschwege and the works produced by the Escola de Minas 
de Ouro Preto during the nineteenth century. Much of this material is located in private libraries and at the 
Arquivo Publico Mineiro (Belo Horizonte). The collection of documents of the Arquivo Publico Mineiro 
also provided useful information about textile companies in Minas Gerais, as did die archives of the 
Companhia de Tecidos Santanense, Companhia Cachoeira dos Macacos, and Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira. 
The archive of the latter company, Museu Decio M. Mascarenhas (Caetanopolis), has an impressive amount 
of material including thousands of letters. Material about the Sociedade Andnima Industrial Machadense was 
gathered at the archive of the Fundagao 18 de Margo (Machado) and at the Arquivo Publico Machadense 
(Machado). Most of the material about the Companhia Uniao e Industria was found at the Instituto Histdrico 
e Geografico Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro) and at the Museu Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage (Juiz de Fora). 
Contemporary newspapers were found in the archives of the Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina 
(Cataguazes) and Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, which also contained material about the Companhia 
Mineira de Eletricidade. Finally, the archives of the British Library (London) and of the British Library of 
Political & Economic Science (London) were important sources of official publications used in several parts
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of the thesis.
Much of the material used in this thesis is scattered in several different locations throughout the 
state of Minas Gerais and the city of Rio de Janeiro. Most of the archives are poorly organized and access 
is not easy. The material is of good quality although there are gaps for large periods of time. There are very 
few sources of material about the private life of entrepreneurs, although information about finance, 
management and production is much more abundant As there was no set of laws regulating capital-labour 
relations, information about workers is very scarce. Data on the iron industry is also very scarce even though 
the Mining School of Ouro Preto dates to the 1880s.
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Chapter 1 - NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRAZILIAN AND MINEIRO 
ECONOMIC HISTORY
Introduction
During the nineteenth century, Brazil went through a number of social and political changes which 
had a great impact on the economic structure of the country. During this period, Brazil became independent 
from Portugal, slavery was abolished, and the Republic was proclaimed. At the same time, a new economic 
pole based on coffee-growing emerged in the centre-south region - replacing the north-eastern sugar 
economy as Brazil's main economic centre. This change had a profound impact. Meanwhile, Minas Gerais 
became largely an agro-pastoral economy after the gold-mining boom, which had characterized its economy 
for most of the eighteenth century, faded.
This chapter identifies changes in the social, institutional, and economic structures of Brazil and 
Minas Gerais which have a bearing upon the "business environment". Brazil started the nineteenth century 
as a Portuguese colony, whose main export, sugar, was produced mainly in the north-eastern region. At the 
beginning of that century, the mineiro economy was depressed and in contrast with the rich and sumptuous 
recent past there was misery and poverty. At the end of the nineteenth century, coffee was Brazil's main 
cash crop and it had come to serve as a basis for die development of capitalism. Minas Gerais, however, 
was fragmented, each sub-region developed in a different way - the north was backward and the south 
developing rapidly.
1.1 - Nineteenth-Century Brazil
From the discovery of Brazil in 1500 to its independence in 1822 the promotion of exports was the 
central concern of the Portuguese crown because exports were the principal means by which monopoly 
profits were extracted from the colony. Brazil was thus transformed into an agricultural colony supplying 
tropical products, with the exception of the century-long gold rush which began shortly before 1700. Timber 
(mainly Pau Brasil) was the first main export, followed by sugar. Sugar remained Brazil's main cash crop 
throughout the colonial period, although from the late seventeenth century onwards sugar exports fell in 
value and Brazil lost her virtual monopoly of world production. By the end of the eighteenth century, 
Portugal stimulated the diversification of production in her colonies with some success. As a result, and 
partly due to interruptions in the Caribbean trade between 1776 and 1815, sugar revived and export of other 
commodities grew significandy1.
The Brazilian economy, at the beginning of the nineteenth century might be described as a series 
of economic systems or, to quote Furtado, an archipelago2. The main areas - the sugar and the gold
1 W. Dean, "Economy", in Brazil: Empire and Republic. 1822-1930. ed. L. Bethell, (Cambridge, 
1989), p.218.
2 C. Furtado, Formacao Economica do Brasil. (Sao Paulo, 16th. ed. 1979), p.90.
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economies - were mutually connected whereas the others were nearly isolated. Connected with the sugar 
nucleus was the cattle-breeding economy of the north-east. The mining nucleus was linked with the southern 
cattle-breeding hinterland, the latter spreading from Sao Paulo to Rio Grande do Sul. These two systems 
were in turn loosely connected by the Sao Francisco river. There were two autonomous centres, Maranhao 
and Para, in the northern region of the country. The former had enjoyed the initial advantage of careful 
attention from the Portuguese government, which had established a highly capitalized trading company 
responsible for financing the development of die region. The latter lived exclusively on die forest-extractive 
economy organized by die Jesuit fathers - which decayed after the Portuguese persecution of them in the 
last decades of the eighteenth centuiy - and was based on exploitation of the Indian labour force. Although 
Maranhao constituted an autonomous system it was connected with the sugar nucleus by the cattle-breeding 
periphery. Thus, whereas Para existed as a totally isolated nucleus, the three main economic nuclei - the 
sugar nucleus, the mining nucleus and Maranhao - were linked by the vast catde-breeding hinterland3.
With the French invasion of Portugal in 1808, the Portuguese court was transferred to Rio de 
Janeiro, a fact which represented a major stage in the evolution of Brazil towards independence. Of even 
greater significance was the end of the monopoly of colonial trade and the elimination of Lisbon as an 
entrepot for Brazilian imports and exports. On his arrival in Brazil, Dorn Joao - the Prince Regent - opened 
Brazil's ports to direct trade with all friendly nations, which in practice, at least until the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars, meant trade with England. He also revoked all decrees prohibiting manufacturing in the 
colony, exempted industrial raw materials from import duties, encouraged the invention or introduction of 
new machinery, and offered direct subsidies to the cotton, wool, silk and iron industries4. However, in 1810, 
as the price for British protection of what remained of the Portuguese colonial empire, Britain was granted 
the position of a privileged power with extraterritorial rights and preferential tariffs at extremely low levels. 
For much of first half of the nineteenth century, the 1810 treaties seriously hampered the autonomy of the 
Brazilian government in the economic sector mainly by reducing its capacity to generate revenue from taxing 
imports5.
With the liberation of Portugal and the end of the war in Europe the then King Dom Joao VI was 
soon forced to return to Portugal, leaving his son Dom Pedro I behind in Rio as Prince Regent 
Independence in 1822, was the result of a conflict of interests between the Brazilian landowning class and 
the Portuguese overseas merchants, but produced few innovations in the economic structure of the country. 
Thus, colonial structures (like slavery and plantations) and with them the dependent nature of the export 
trade, remained largely intact. The landowning class strengthened its power, while English merchants 
replaced the Portuguese in the international trade sector though not necessarily in domestic commerce. At
3 Ibid., pp.89-92.
4 L. Bethell and J.M. Carvalho, "1822-1850", in Brazil: Empire and Republic. 1822-1930. ed. L. 
Bethell (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 14-20.
5 Furtado, Formacao Economica do Brasil, pp.93-4.
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the same time several revolts erupted, challenging the authority of the central government. These revolts 
were reactions against the socially and economically disaggregative effects of neocolonialism6. They also 
reflected the weakness of the new Brazilian government in both political and economic terms. In political 
terms, the various sub-groups of the Brazilian elite could not agree how to best organize die country. Those 
linked to the Rio economy advocated a more centralized system, whereas the long-established rural 
oligarchies fought for provincial power. Furthermore, independence in 1822 was incomplete, since the 
movement for independence from Portugal was led by a Portuguese prince, whose commitment to sever all 
family and dynastic ties with the formal colonial power was doubted by many leading Brazilian figures. In 
economic terms, Brazil lacked a cash crop which would give her a stronger and wider economic basis, and 
the price paid for independence proved too expensive. Political stability was only finally achieved in the 
1840s, when the country enjoyed certain prosperity based on exports of coffee and the dominant class 
reached relative agreement on fundamental issues7.
After independence, the new Brazilian government also faced increasing financial difficulties caused 
mainly by the unequal commercial treaty of 1810, renewed in 1827, which was the price that Britain exacted 
for the recognition of Brazilian independence. Until the middle of the 1840s, economic policy in Brazil was 
marked by a struggle against constant deficits in the balance of payment and scarcity of fiscal resources. 
As indicated above, according to the commercial treaties of 1810 and 1827, England was granted 
extraterritorial rights and a general 15% ad valorem customs tariff. This situation created serious difficulties 
for the Brazilian government since the taxing of imports was the usual means whereby primarily producing 
countries, like Brazil, collected their basic revenues. As a fiscal apparatus to collect any other form of taxes 
(such as income and property) was almost non-existent, the only alternative was to tax exports. However, 
in a slave-based economy this would have meant a reduction in the profits of the great landlords and the 
new (post-independence) government was pledged to abandon "mercantilist" taxes that had been used to 
finance administration during the colonial period. Thus, restricted to customs duties as the sole source of 
revenue and means of sustenance and without any further means of increasing its revenue, the central 
government found itself in serious financial difficulties until the denunciation of the treaties with England 
in 1844, when the increasingly irksome and economically debilitating commercial treaties expired, liberating 
tariff policy and strengthening the government's revenues8.
When Brazil became independent from Portugal, it had an overwhelmingly rural population of 
between four and five million. This relatively small population was scattered over a vast territory, but was 
heavily concentrated in the coastal provinces - from the provinces of the north-east (with 40-45% of the total 
population) to the provinces of the south, including Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. The only inland province 
with a large population was Minas Gerais as a result of the gold rush in the first half of the eighteenth
6 Dean, "Economy", p.219.
7 Bethell and Carvalho, op.cit.. pp.45-112.
8 Furtado, Formacao Economica do Brasil, pp.96-8.
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century. At this time, the mineiro population still accounted for 20% of total population, though it was 
mostly located in die south of the province adjoining the province of Rio de Janeiro. Less than a third of 
Brazil's population was white, the majority being black or mulatto. At least 30% were slaves, of whom 
three-quarters were concentrated in only five of the eighteen provinces - Maranhao, Pernambuco, Bahia, 
Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. In many of these areas slaves constituted the majority of the population9.
For the greater part of the history of Brazil, African slavery was die dominant form of labour. 
Brazil imported more Africans than any other colony or country in the New World. Brazil received around 
38% of the 9.6 million Africans brought to die American continent during the history of die Atlantic slave 
trade. For almost the whole colonial period (1500-1822), the number of slaves surpassed that of the non­
slave population. In the middle of the eighteenth century, slaves made up more than 60% of the total 
population, a percentage which decreased to about a third around 1800, as shown in Table 1.1. During this 
period slaves constituted almost all die workers in die important regional systems of production of primary 
products for export, these systems characterizing this phase of the Brazilian economic history, i.e. sugar in 
the northeast in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and gold panning and diamond mining in Minas 
Gerais and Goias in the eighteenth century10.
Table 1.1 - Slave Population in Relation to the Total Population in Brazil, 1800-1900.
Years Slaves Total Population
1800 *1,000,000 *3,000,000
1823 1,147,515 3,960,866
1850 2,500,000 8,020,000
1872 1,510,806 10,112,061
1887 723,419
1890 14,333,915
Source: C. Prado Junior. Historia Economica do Brasil. (Sao Paulo. 36th ed. 1988). p.358.
* Estimated
In the nineteenth century (until the abolition of slavery in 1888), although slaves lost their absolute 
and relative importance in the total population, slavery continued to dominate the main economic activity 
of the century, coffee-growing on die farms of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo11. 
Furthermore, slaves were to be found throughout rural Brazil in stockraising, in cereal production, in the 
cultivation of basic staples for local consumption, and in subsistence agriculture12. Slaves were also 
employed in technical positions on sugar and coffee farms and in sugar mills - i.e., as "factory" hands. In
9 Bethell and Carvalho, on.cit. pp.45-6.
10 P.C. Mello and R.W. Slenes, "Analise Economica da Escravidao no Brasil", in Economia 
Brasileira: IJma Visao Histdrica. ed. P. Neuhaus, (Rio de Janeiro, 1980), p.91.
11 Ibid., p.91.
12 Bethell and Carvalho, op.cit.. p.46.
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addition, several industrial enterprises (shipyards, textile industries, metal industries, candle factories, etc.)
also employed a considerable number of slaves13. In Minas Gerais, for example, slaves could be found
working in the iron industry, as weavers in textile mills, in British-owned gold mines, and in the
construction of roads14. Slaves were also widely employed as domestic servants. In the urban areas, for
example the city of Rio de Janeiro (the major slave-owning city on the entire American continent during
the nineteenth century), slaves were employed in diverse functions as stevedores and porters in the docks,
as water and refuse carriers, as transporters of people, and as masons and carpenters. There were also slave
prostitutes and some were even beggars15. Religious houses and hospitals owned slaves. The State owned
and hired slaves for the building and maintenance of public works16. The Emperor himself had slaves on
his estate in Santa Cruz, as a British woman travelling in Brazil in 1823 observed:
"After dinner I walked about a little in the village of the negroes. There are, I believe, 
about fifteen hundred in the estate, the greater part of whom belong to the outlying farms 
or feitorias, (...) The negroes of Santa Cruz are not fed or clothed by the Emperor, but 
they have their small portions of land; and they have half of Friday, all Saturday and 
Sunday, and every holiday, to labour for themselves; so that they at most work for their 
master four days in return for their house and land; and even some of the external marks 
of slavery are removed, as the families feed and clothe themselves without the master's 
interference."17
Furthermore, the report of the Minister of Agricultura, Commercio e Obras Publicas of 1863 listed 38 slaves 
who belonged to that Ministry18. Until the first serious efforts were made to end the African slave trade, in 
the late 1840s, slaves were both available and cheap19.
13 Mello and Slenes, op.cit.. p. 109.
14 For a detailed analysis of the employment of slave labour in the iron, textile, and gold-mining 
industries in Minas Gerais in the period 1830-89 see D.C. Libby, Transformacao e Trabalho em lima 
Economia Escravista: Minas Gerais no Seculo XIX. (Sao Paulo, 1988), pp.134-344; D.C. Libby, Trahalho 
Escravo e Capital Estrangeiro no Brasil: O Caso de Morro Velho. (Belo Horizonte, 1984); and M.C. Eakin, 
The St. John d'El Rev Mining Company and the Morro Velho Gold Mine. (Durham, 1989). For the use of 
slaves in the construction of the Uniao e Industria turnpike see D.A. Giroletti, "A Companhia e a Rodovia 
Uniao e Industria e o Desenvolvimento de Juiz de Fora, 1850 a 1900", Universidade Federal de Minas 
Gerais, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1980.
15 L.C. Soares, "Urban Slavery in Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro", University of London, 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1988, pp. 145-273.
16 Bethell and Carvalho, op.cit.. p.46.
17 M.D. Graham, Journal of a Vovage to Brazil and Residence There. During Part of the Years 
1821. 1822. 1823. (1824), p.286.
18 According to the report of 1863,10 slaves were working in die telegraph service, 13 in the Tijuca 
woods, 4 in the carpentry shop as apprentices, 5 at several tasks in the Ministry, 3 were youths, 2 were blind 
and one too old to work. Ministerio da Agricultura, Commercio e Obras Publicas, Relatorio da Renarticao 
dos Neeocios da Agricultura. Commercio. Obras Publicas: Relatorio da Inspeccao Geral das Obras Publicas 
do Mnnicipio da Corte. (Rio de Janeiro, 1862), Table 12.
19 Bethell and Carvalho, op.cit.. p.46.
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Table 12 - Slave Imports into Brazil, 1831-1855.
Years Slaves Years Slaves Years Slaves
1831 138 1840 20,796 1849 54,061
1832 116 1841 13,804 1850 22,856
1833 1,233 1842 17,435 1851 3,287
1834 749 1843 19,095 1852 800
1835 745 1844 22,849 1853 0
1836 4,966 1845 19,453 1854 0
1837 35,209 1846 50,324 1855 90
1838 40,256 1847 56,172
1839 42,182 1848 60,000
Source: L. Bethell and J.M. Carvalho. * 1822-1850". in Brazil: Empire and Republic. 1822-1930. ed. L. 
Bethell, (Cambridge, 1989), p.95.
The trans-Atlantic slave trade was declared illegal by treaty with Britain in 1826, effective from 
1830. During the three years 1827-30, in anticipation of the abolition of die trade, 175,000 slaves were 
imported. As a consequence, in the years immediately after 1831, very few slaves entered the country as 
the market was glutted; demand and prices fell off. However, the temporary end of the slave trade coincided 
with the rapid expansion of coffee plantation in the Parafba Valley, where coffee farms were worked by 
slaves. Moreover, slave mortality was so high in Brazil that regular new supplies from Africa were required. 
Soon the demand for slaves revived, especially in the coffee regions of the centre-south, and the slave trade 
was gradually reorganized after 1830. In 1839, the British government adopted tougher measures to curb 
the Brazilian slave trade which was then growing very quickly. During this year, more than 40,000 slaves 
entered the country, as shown in Table 1.2. Therefore, from 1839 to 1842 - partly as a result of these 
initiatives and partly as a result of the temporary glut on the market following the huge slave imports of the 
late 1830s - imports into Brazil fell to less than a half of their previous level. Even so, in the second half 
of die 1840s the slave trade began to revive once again after several years of reduced activity. During the 
three years 1846-9 at least 50-60,000 slaves per annum were imported into Brazil, as shown above in Table 
1.2. Nevertheless, by the early 1850s the trans-Atlantic slave trade was finally brought to an end, as a result 
of strong British pressure and the enforcement of the Eusebio de Queiroz law of 4 September 1850, which 
declared the slave trade equivalent to piracy20.
After the suppression of the slave trade in 1850 the slave population began to decline, mainly 
because of the continuing high rate of mortality. It is probable that the reduction in die supply of Africans 
and their rising prices had led to an intensification in the utilization of the slave labour, thus causing further
20 Ibid., pp.94-109. For further discussion about the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade to 
Brazil see L. Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade. Britain and the Slave Trade Question. 
1807-1869. (Cambridge, 1970); R. Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery: 1850-1888. (Berkeley, 
1972), chapter 2; and R. Conrad, World of Sorrow: The African Slave Trade to Brazil. (Baton Rouge, 1986).
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depletion of the slave population. Nevertheless, the decline in slave numbers in coffee districts was at first 
offset by an internal traffic. Slaves were sold from the less productive north-eastern sugar provinces and 
from urban areas to the coffee-growing areas in south-eastern Brazil21.
By the middle of the century, coffee had become the main Brazilian export and its participation in 
the value of the major Brazilian exports increased from then onwards, as shown below in Table 1.3. At the 
same time, die price of sugar continued to fall and its participation in exports decreased steadily. It is the 
differences in the fate of these two commodities (coffee and sugar) which basically explains the shifting
distribution of the slave population from the northern to the southern part of the country22. 
Table 13 - Value of Major Brazilian Exports in Relation to Total Exports, 1821-1900 (%).
YEAR COFFEE
(1)
SUGAR
(2)
COTTON
(3)
RUBBER
(4)
Total of 
(l)+(2)+(3)+(4)
1821/30 18.4 30.1 20.6 0.1 69.2
1831/40 43.8 24.0 10.8 0.3 78.9
1841/50 41.4 26.7 7.5 0.4 76.0
1851/60 48.8 21.2 6.2 2.2 78.4
1861/70 45.5 12.3 18.3 3.1 79.1
1871/80 56.6 11.8 9.5 5.5 83.4
1881/90 61.5 9.9 4.2 8.0 83.5
1891/00
o '_■ .  t A - r r ,
64.6
T e n — 777* -------—r r
6.0 2.7 15.0 88.2
Source: L.C.T.D. Prado, "Commercial capital, domestic market and manufacturing in imperial Brazil: the 
failure of Brazilian economic development in the XlXth century", University of London, unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, 1991, p. 60.
Although it had been introduced into Brazil at the beginning of the eighteenth century, coffee 
acquired commercial importance only at the end of that century with the disorganization of production in 
the French colony of Haiti23. The climate and soil of south-eastern Brazil were very suitable for coffee- 
growing and coffee beans were easy to transport and store. Furthermore, there was no need for complex 
industrial processes to prepare them for the market24. When coffee became commercially important its 
production was concentrated in the hilly regions around the city of Rio de Janeiro, where there was a 
relatively abundant supply of labour and, given the proximity of the port, there were no transport problems25. 
During the early decades of the nineteenth century, coffee cultivation spread up the Parafba Valley. By the
21 Dean, "Economy", p.255.
22 Furtado, Formacao Economica do Brasil, p. 114.
23 Ibid., p. 113.
24 A.P. Canabrava, "A Grande Laboura", in Historia Geral da Civilizacao Brasileira - II. O Brasil 
Monarqnico- ed. S.B. Holanda (Sao Paulo, 4th. ed. 1985), VI, pp.87-102.
25 Furtado, Formacao Economica do Brasil, p. 113.
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middle of the century, it started to move towards the north of the province of Sao Paulo26.
In the first decade of Brazil's independence, coffee already accounted for 18% of exports by value, 
taking third place after sugar and cotton, as shown in Table 1.3. In the 1830s coffee moved into die lead, 
comprising more than 40% of the country's exports by value. In the 1850s, coffee was responsible for nearly 
half of all Brazilian export earnings. At the same time, Brazil's share of world coffee output rose from a 
little under 20% in the 1820s to over 40% in the 1840s, when the country became by far the world's largest 
producer. From then on, Brazilian coffee production accounted for around 50% of world coffee output 
during the third quarter of die last century and for 75% at the beginning of the twentieth century, as shown 
below in Table 1.4. The growth in coffee demand from the middle of die nineteenth century onwards was 
the consequence of the appearance of a mass market in Western Europe and the USA, where a taste for 
coffee developed in the expanding urban centres, especially among die middle classes. Furthermore, 
Brazilian coffee was cheaper than that of other areas, since it was chiefly low grade. Minimal care was 
devoted to the cultivation and harvesting of the crop27.
Table 1.4 - Participation of Brazilian production in world coffee output, 1820-1904.
PERIOD PERCENTAGE PERIOD PERCENTAGE
1820-1829 18.18% 1870-1879 49.09%
1830-1839 29.70% 1880-1889 56.63%
1840-1849 40.00% 1890-1894 59.70%
1850-1859 52.09% 1895-1899 66.68%
1860-1869 49.07% 1900-1904 75.64%
Source: V.N. Pinto. "Balanco das Transformacoes Economicas no Seculo XIX". in Brasil em Perspectiva. 
ed. C.G. Mota, (Rio de Janeiro, 17th ed. 1988), p. 139.
The second half of the nineteenth century was a period of great transformation in Brazilian 
economic history. The first half of the century was a period of adjustment to the new situation created by 
independence from Portugal. The economic, financial, social, and political crisis, which began with the 
transfer of die Portuguese crown in 1808 and independence in 1822, lasted until the end of the first half of 
the century. However, the seed of transformation sowed during this period would mature and produce its 
fruits only in the second half of the nineteenth century28. Thus, during the last part of the century several 
important phenomena changed the social and economic structure of the country: the building of the railway 
network, which began in 1852 and which by the end of the century had expanded to more than 9,000 
kilometers of line; die abolition of slavery in 1888 and the arrival of a large number of immigrants in the 
southern parts of the country; the proclamation of die Republic in 1889; and the beginning of the process
26 R. Graham, "1850-1870". in Brazil: Empire and Republic. 1822-1930. ed. L. Bethell (Cambridge, 
1989), p.116.
27 Bethell and Carvalho, op.cit.. p.85.
28 C. Prado Junior, Historia Economica do Brasil. (Sao Paulo, 36th ed. 1988), p. 192.
31
of industrialization29.
In the 1850s, Brazil enjoyed a period of economic prosperity (which lasted until the financial crisis 
of 1857). As a consequence of die end of the slave trade and the resultant transfer of funds from this trade 
to the domestic economy, the more liberal monetary policy applied since the beginning of the decade, and 
a good export performance due to increasing international demand for tropical products, the economy grew 
rapidly30. Furthermore, in 1850 Brazil was given her first commercial code, which updated and integrated 
a variety of laws and regulations dating back to the colonial period. By newly codifying commercial 
relations regarding partnerships, contracts and bankruptcies, business activity was boosted31. A large number 
of new companies were established during the 1850s including 62 factories, 17 banks, 20 shipping 
companies, 8 railways, 8 mining enterprises, 4 colonization companies, 23 insurance companies, 2 gas 
companies, and 3 urban transport companies32. Not long afterwards, the government began to guarantee 
interest on capital invested in railways, bolstering the efforts of the planters to link Brazil more closely to 
the overseas markets33.
In the early 1860s, Brazil faced a greater crisis than that of 1857. This crisis was a result of the 
more restrictive monetary policy implemented by the conservative Cabinet then in government. In the 
aftermath of the crisis of 1857, the liberal administration failed to create an adequate financial structure to 
support economic growth either in the rural or in the manufacturing sectors. The financial chaos that 
followed created die conditions for the take-over by the so-called metallists, conservative politicians who 
advocated rigid monetary control34. During the same period a more restrictive commercial code was adopted, 
forcing all would-be companies to obtain preliminary government approval35. The 1864 crisis was followed 
by the Paraguayan War36. The cost of the war was greater than could have been predicted. Sustaining the
29 E. Viotti da Costa, Da Monarauia a Republica: Momentos Decisivos. (Sao Paulo, 1987), pp.210-
1.
30 L.C.T.D. Prado, "Commercial Capital, Domestic Market and Manufacturing in Imperial Brazil: 
The Failure of Brazilian Economic Development in the XlXth Century7', University of London, unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, 1991, p.217.
31 Graham, "1850-1870", p.146.
32 Prado Junior, op.cit.. p. 192.
33 C.M. Lewis, Public Policy and Private Initiative: Railway Building in Sao Paulo. 1860-1889. 
(1991), pp.4-13.
34 Prado, op.cit.. pp.234-71.
35 Graham, "1850-1870", p.148.
36 The Paraguayan War is the war in which Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay waged against Paraguay 
for 5 years (1865-1870), and which was the most serious international crisis in Brazilian history. The war 
turned out to be long and tough, demanding a large amount of resources. In the end, Brazil won the war, 
but paid a high price for it. Moreover, Paraguay could not pay even a small part of the war debt. Prado 
Junior, op.cit.. pp. 193-4. For further details about the Paraguayan War see, N.W. Sodrd, Formacao Hist6rica
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war effort more than doubled public expenditure between 1864/65 and 1866/67 and the money supply 
rapidly increased. Nevertheless, war-time inflation stimulated die domestic economy which had been flat 
since the early 1860s37. The ten-year period 1870-1880 was one of the most prosperous in Brazilian history. 
The number of industrial, commercial, and - most of all - agricultural enterprises increased rapidly. The 
number of banks and all sorts of financial institutions also multiplied and die State - and to a lesser extent 
foreign capital - invested in large enterprises, such as railways, ports, and the urban infrastructure38.
The first population census taken in Brazil in 1872 shows that there were approximately 10 million 
inhabitants. Slaves represented just over 15% of the total population, in sharp contrast to the situation at the 
end of the eighteenth century when they represented more than half of the total population39. Furthermore, 
in the following decades they were to be more and more concentrated in coffee provinces of the south-east 
(Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais). However, from 1870 onwards the supply of slaves, who in 
1872 constituted about 20% of economically active population and about 70% of plantation labour, was 
certainly precarious and the labour issue called for an urgent solution40. As growth in Brazil consisted merely 
of increasing utilization of the available factor - land - through the incorporation of greater quantities of 
labour, the supply of slaves was a key factor. However, alternatives to slave labour were very limited41.
The growing free Brazilian population appeared to be a great potential source of labour. In most 
provinces, free people had outnumbered slaves since the early nineteenth century42. In Sao Paulo, where 
there was an absolute increase in the slave population triggered by the expansion of coffee plantation, slaves 
represented little more than 18% of the whole population in 187243: even in the coffee-growing regions, the 
free population was in a majority. Furthermore, Brazilian free workers, white and coloured, participated in 
various activities in the export sector. Small holders usually constituted a source of part-time labour for 
coffee plantations and independent workers were also recruited as private police force, administrators, or 
foremea In addition, they were employed to clear forest, to build roads, to cart, to assist at harvest time,
do Brasil. (Rio de Janeiro, 10th ed. 1979), pp.228-34; Graham, "1850-1870", pp. 150-8; and A. Sousa Junior, 
"Guerra do Paraguai", in Historia Geral da Civilizacao Brasileira. ed. S.B. Holanda (Sao Paulo, 1985), VI, 
pp.299-314.
37 Prado, oo.cit.. pp.271-2, 285-7.
38 Prado Junior, op.cit.. pp. 194-5.
39 Directoria Geral de Estatistica, Relatorios e Trabalhos Estatfsticos. (Rio de Janeiro, 1872).
40 Dean, "Economy", p.235.
41 Furtado, Formacao Economica do Brasil, pp. 117-22.
42 M.L. Lamounier, "Between Slavery and Free Labour: Experiments with Free Labour and Patterns 
of Slave Emancipation in Brazil and Cuba c. 1830-1888", University of London, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
1993, pp. 183-4.
43 Diretoria Geral de Estatistica, Relatorios Annexo ao do Minsiterio dos Negocios do Imnerio de 
1876. (Rio de Janeiro, 1877), p.8.
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and to grow subsistence crops for the plantation. In other words, although not fully available for regular 
work, the free Brazilian population constituted a potential source of occasional labour. Nevertheless, despite 
the fact that Brazilian workers (white and coloured, free and freed) were perceived by many as a viable 
alternative of labour, their wide and large scale employment demanded complex reforms in the law, which 
were very controversial and of uncertain political and economic costs44.
Difficulties in recruiting domestic free labour on a large-scale and growing certainties about the end 
of slavery stimulated attempts to attract immigrants. At the beginning of the 1880s, it was obvious that the 
abolition of slavery was imminent. Growing external and internal pressure resulted in several laws which 
would gradually ended slavery. Thus, in 1871 all newly-bom children of slaves were declared free. In 1885, 
all slaves over 65 years old were freed. In 1888, slavery was finally abolished45. What was feared by the 
large landowners as an economic catastrophe - after the failure of the earlier experiments in immigrant 
labour many southern farmers predicted a a chronic shortage of labour and economic ruin for themselves 
after abolition - eventually proved to be a smooth transition from slave to free labour. Most freed slaves 
accepted wage and sharecropping contracts on nearby or even on the same estates. There was also a great 
migration to the new zones of large-scale exploitation for export, such as southern Bahia (cacao) and the 
western Amazon (rubber)46. More significantly, in the last quarter of the century European immigrants began 
to come to Brazil in increasing numbers. During this period, immigration amounted to more than 800,00047. 
At the beginning of the 1880s an immense wave of Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese workers began to 
migrate to Brazil. They went mainly to the coffee-growing regions, subsidized by state and federal 
governments48. Sao Paulo was the state which absorbed the larger number of immigrants: nearly 52% of the 
300,000 immigrants who came to Brazil between 1888 and 1890, and 64.9% of the 1,129,315 of those who 
entered the country between 1891 and 1900 went to Sao Paulo49. Until the First World War die number of 
immigrants entering into Brazil was kept as high as possible because they often tended to move from 
agriculture to other activities after a while or to return to their home countries50.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, coffee was by far the most successful Brazilian 
product in the international market. The second and third quarters of the century were basically the period
44 Lamounier, op.cit. pp. 184-98.
45 Viotti da Costa, Da Monarouia a Republica. pp.243-4.
46 Dean, "Economy", pp.235-236.
47 Sodrd, op.cit.. p.251.
48 Dean, "Economy", pp.235-236.
49 B. Fausto, "Society and Politics", in Brazil: Empire and Republic. 1822-1930. ed. L. Bethell 
(Cambridge, 1989), pp.257-8.
50 Dean, "Economy", pp.236-7.
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of early growth for the coffee economy51.
Table 1.5 - Annual Average Export of Coffee from Rio de Janeiro by Province in Relation to Total 
Exports, 1858-59 (%).
PROVINCES PER CENT
Rio de Janeiro 78.62
Minas Gerais 7.80
Sao Paulo 11.10
Bahia 0.42
Espirito Santo 2.60
Total 100.00
Source: Parliamentary Papers. Consular Reports. LXIII. (1861). p.462.
In die late 1850s, coffee production in Rio de Janeiro accounted for the greatest part of Brazilian 
coffee export. As shown in Table 1.5, Rio de Janeiro exported more than 78%, while Minas Gerais, Sao 
Paulo, Espirito Santo, and Bahia, together accounted for less than 22% of the total. In the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, the great fertile plateau of Sao Paulo became the main source of coffee production. The 
arrival of the railway, the input of foreign investments in the decade after 1885, and the cheap money of 
the Republican provisional government stimulated new planting in Sao Paulo, doubling the number of the 
Brazilian coffee plantations52. By 1901 exports had reached 888,000 tons53. From 1822 to 1907 coffee prices 
went through three cycles, 1857-1868,1869-1885 and 1886-1906, ending each time with prices near to US$ 
0.15 per kilogram54. Low prices discouraged potential competitors and Brazil supplied more than half of the 
coffee sold in die international market. As Brazil's other exports did not enjoy similar success in world trade 
the Brazilian economy, until the 1930s, was characterized by a very high dependence on the performance 
of the price of a single export product: coffee55.
It is striking that although Brazil had a relatively large export capacity, and an immense territory, 
and was richly endowed with varied natural resources, throughout the nineteenth century she participated 
in the international market essentially as an exporter of a single crop. The explanation of this does not 
depend entirely on the external facts. In certain circumstances natural disadvantages were beyond remedy 
as, for example, geographical problems encountered by Brazilian sugar producers while Cuban planters 
enjoyed more suitable, flatter terrain, and closer proximity to the consumer markets. In other circumstances,
51 Furtado, Formacao Economica do Brasil, p. 114.
52 Lewis, op.cit.. pp.35-51.
53 Dean, "Economy", p.226.
54 C.M. Pelaez, Economia Brasileira Contemporanea: Origens e Coniuntura Atual. (Sao Paulo, 
1987), p.29.
55 Dean, "Economy", p.226.
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it seems that the solution was within Brazil's reach but was incompletely applied, as in the case of cotton. 
Even though short-staple cotton had been introduced into the country in the 1860s, Brazil lost her overseas 
markets56. In the period 1780-1820, Brazil became an important supplier of cotton to the British textile mills. 
Although demand for raw cotton increased enormously during the nineteenth century, Brazil's share of 
British raw cotton imports declined in the period 1820-1860 owing to the preference for cheaper US cotton. 
At the time of the Civil War in the USA, Brazilian cotton was again briefly competitive. However, the end 
of the American Civil War and the revival of the cotton trade, represented the collapse of the Brazilian 
cotton boom due to the low price of this commodity coupled by the precarious and high costs of inland 
transport in Brazil57. Thus, successful international trade was limited to products with enormous comparative 
advantages to offset high costs of production and commercialization and high internal taxes. It is true that 
improvements in die conditions of production and in organization of marketing depended on scarce capital 
resources. Nevertheless, various government schemes, providing guarantees and even funding, although ill- 
conceived or incompletely executed, proved that these resources were not totally unavailable58. Even when 
capital resources were generated in quantities sufficient for providing funds for improvement of productivity 
on a large scale, as in the case of the coffee economy, emphasis was placed upon price maintenance rather 
than upon competitiveness59.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Brazilian government became engaged in the 
enormous task of stabilizing the price of its main product in the world market In the late 1890s, coffee 
prices were depressed and the Brazilian coffee growers faced the effects of the internal deflationary policy 
that was imposed by die funding loan of 189860. Between 1901 and 1904 coffee export revenue in Brazilian 
currency fell at the rate of 5.92% a year. Facing the possibility of bankruptcy, Brazilian coffee growers 
organized themselves into a powerful pressure group and compelled the government to intervene in the 
international coffee market61. In 1906, the three of the main coffee-producing states - Sao Paulo, Minas 
Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro - and the federal government agreed to support coffee prices, but the federal and 
state governments of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais withdrew leaving Sao Paulo to act alone. Coffee 
producers from Minas and Rio were not as adevrsely affected by the coffee crisis as their naulista 
counterparts. Furthermore, the financial risks for both states (Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro) to participate
56 Ibid., pp.228-9.
57 S.J. Stein, Orieens e Evolucao da Industria Textil no Brasil. 1850-1950. (Rio de Janeiro, 1950),
pp.57-8.
58 Dean, "Economy", pp.228-9.
59 For a detailed dicussion of the Brazilian coffee valorization schemes see T.H. Holloway, The 
Brazilian Coffee Valorization of 1906: Regional Politics and Economic Dependence. (Madison, 1957) and 
Pelaez, Economia Brasileira Contemnoranea. pp.39-52.
60 Dean, "Economy", pp.228-30.
61 Pelaez, Economia Brasileira Contemporanea. p. 37.
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in the scheme would be proportionally greater due to their smaller budgets. The so-called "valorization" 
scheme involved the raising of funds to purchase surplus of coffee at a price remunerative for Brazilian 
producers. Coffee was then stored and stocks used to regulate prices. The whole operation was financed by 
European and US banks through the intercession of coffee importers®. Later, the federal government finally 
agreed to guarantee the loans, and prices did begin to rise again. However, this policy diverted resources 
from other sectors of the economy, ignored the issue of productivity, and encouraged foreign competitors 
to expand their production63.
If in the past die Brazilian economy had relied on sugar and gold to promote its economic 
development, for much of the nineteenth century it relied heavily and almost exclusively on coffee. 
However, if in the former cases the result was economic stagnation after each specific economic boom, in 
the latter the result was the economic modernization. The coffee economy became the centre of a rapid 
process of capital accumulation, and it was as part of this process of accumulation that Brazilian industry 
was bom64. In Sao Paulo, for example, coffee capital created the "coffee export complex", which included 
the production and processing of coffee, the transport system (railways, ports, etc.), the export and import 
trade, and the banking system65. Thus, the coffee economy created the fundamental prerequisites for the 
emergence of industrial capital and large-scale industry. These conditions include capital accumulation for 
investment in the industrial sector, the formation of a free-labour market, the creation of an internal market 
for industrial goods, and the capacity to import wage goods, raw materials and machinery66. As Pelaez puts 
it, the coffee trade constituted the engine of growth as it provided the social capital for infrastructure, the 
exchange to purchase industrial equipments, the market for the new manufactures, and the supply of skilled 
immigrant labour for the coffee farms. In other words, it created the basis for industrial development in 
Brazil67.
Although the emergence of the first industries date to the 1860s and 1870s, the first industrial up­
surge took place only between 1880 and 1890. From its origin, Brazilian industry developed unevenly 
through the various regions of the country and tended to concentrate in the coffee region; especially in Rio 
de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Minas Gerais68. The very first products to be manufactured were those whose 
weight-to-cost ratio was so high that even with the most rudimentary technique they cost less to produce
62 Holloway, op.cit.. p.37, 56-61.
63 Dean, "Economy", pp.228-30.
64 S. Silva, Expansao Cafeeira e Orieem da Industria no Brasil. (Sao Paulo, 1976), pp.77-81.
65 W. Cano, Raizes da Concentracao Industrial em Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo, 3rd. ed. 1990), pp.69-86.
66 J.M. Cardoso de Mello, O Caoitalismo Tardio: Contribuicao a Revisao Critica da Formacao e 
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in Brazil than to buy from Europe. At least until the 1920's, with very few exceptions, only those goods that 
were quite bulky and intrinsically low in value were being produced. Furthermore, they were fashioned 
either from local raw materials or from semi-processed imported materials which would have been much 
builder if fully transformed before shipment. Nevertheless, even this rudimentary stage of pre-1920 
industrialization involved a wide range of goods. Almost every kind of construction material was 
domestically produced by 1920, as well as shoes, beer, soft drinks, furniture, pots and pans, flour, boilers, 
hats, stonework, and coarse textiles69. Furthermore, most of the industries which emerged in the period 
previous to the First World War were mainly complementary or subsidiary to the export sector - from whom 
they also depended for the import of raw materials and other inputs such as machinery and equipment 
especially coffee70. Their activities included the processing of coffee, cotton, meat and oil seeds, the milling 
of sugar, small mechanical workshops for maintenance services, the packing, assembling and finishing of 
goods, or the adapting of foreign products to the local market, and the production of textiles71.
During the twenty-year period 1850-70, landowners and merchants together still played a dominant 
role in the political system, despite the growth of the cities. Before 1870, manufacturers were not an 
important nor an independent political force and many were themselves merchants or landowners. The vast 
majority of the population, constituted by the non-propertied (slave and free), exercised little influence upon 
the State. Brazil was under the rule of a constitutional monarch, Dom Pedro II (1825-91). He succeeded his 
father Dom Pedro I (1798-1834), who had abdicated in 1831. Parties at this time were merely parliamentary 
agglomerations lacking unity and not depending on disciplined electorates, or representing ideologically 
defined movements72.
In 1889, the monarchy was overthrown as the result of the concerted action of three groups: coffee 
planters from western Sao Paulo, members of the urban middle class, and a faction of the military73. During 
the first half of the century, the Brazilian monarchy was established and consolidated by a coalition between 
high-ranking bureaucrats, sectors of the landowning class (mainly in Rio de Janeiro, but to a lesser extent 
in Bahia and Pernambuco), and merchants established in the main cities and anxious to contain urban social 
and political unrest Opposition to political and administrative centralization, which characterized the early 
decades of the Empire, reappeared in the later decades of the nineteenth century. In the new areas of 
economic expansion, particularly the coffee-growing regions of Sao Paulo, a movement emerged in favour 
of a federal republic, with a greater degree of provincial autonomy which would enable them to levy taxes,
69 W. Dean, A Industrializacao de Sao Paulo. 1880-1945. (Sao Paulo, 1971), pp. 15-6.
70 W. Suzigan, Industria Brasileira: Orieens e Desenvolvimento. (Sao Paulo, 1986), p.349.
71 C. Furtado, Analise do "Modelo" Brasileiro. (Rio de Janeiro, 7th. ed. 1982), p. 16.
72 Graham, "1850-1870", pp.138-45.
73 E. Viotti da Costa, "1870-1889", in Brazil: Empire and Republic. 1822-1930. ed. L. Bethell 
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to formulate their own immigration programme, to create their own military force, and to contract foreign 
loans74. Thus, the overthrow of the Empire led to the institution of an extremely decentralized economic and 
political structure.
During the first years of the Republican regime, the country enjoyed an economic boom, which was 
sustained until 1895. As a result of the extraordinary monetary expansion, the exchange rate collapse. The 
monetary expansion was the result of a financial reform, which more than doubled die monetary base in the 
first two years of the new government. The collapse of the exchange rate was also the result of a sudden 
interruption in 1890 of the large inflow of foreign capital of the late 1880s and the higher levels of import 
caused by the demand-generating effects of the credit expansion75. Thus, the Republican provisional 
government which took power in 1889 aggressively promoted economic growth through a highly liberal 
economic policy. In the ebullient transitional period, known as the encilhamento (the stock market bubble 
of the early 1890s), numerous initiatives - such as banks of emission and joint stock companies - were 
launched in a vary speculative way. Despite the impressive business growth during this period the 
provisional government was overcome by inflation and the accumulation of foreign debt, and in 1894 was 
toppled. The following republican governments were much less interventionist and put constraints on internal 
development. They were much more concerned with their credit-worthiness with the attitude of foreign 
banters as early republican administrations had produced even more fiscal deficits than those of the Empire. 
These deficits were covered through foreign loans which were often accompanied by conditions that 
interfered directly in the policy-making. The deflationary programme imposed by the funding loan in 1898, 
for example, remained the centrepiece of government policy until 1905, no matter how depressive it was 
upon production and employment76.
To sum up, during the nineteenth century Brazil became independent from Portugal, the Republic 
was proclaimed, slavery was abolished, European immigrants entered the country in large numbers and a 
free-labour market emerged, coffee became the main export, the economy diversified and the coffee 
economy created the basis for the development of industry in Brazil. Nevertheless, the process of social and 
economic development of each Brazilian region differred in varied degrees and respects from the general 
pattern described in this section. Thus, the next part of this chapter will examine the social and economic 
history of Minas Gerais during the nineteenth century, pointing out those changes that have a bearing upon 
the "business environment".
12 - Nineteenth-Century Minas Gerais
Minas Gerais is a landlocked territory the size of France, with a variety of landscapes. Its frontiers 
do not define a coherent geographical region and Minas Gerais was not a natural economic unit The rivers
74 Fausto, op.cit.. p.265.
75 W. Fritsch, External Constraints on Economic Policy in Brazil. 1889-1930. pp.4-5.
76 Dean, "Economy", pp.220-2.
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MAP 2 - MINAS GERAIS: ZONES
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Source: D.C. Libby, Transformacao e Trabalho em uma Economia Escravista: Mims Gerais no Seculo XIX. 
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form several disconnected systems, and there are several mountain ranges which divide sub-regions, 
imposing huge barriers to communications and transport. Thus, during the last century Minas had a 
disarticulated pattern of growth which was largely determined by geographical considerations. The Triangulo 
- which was juridically linked to Sao Paulo until 1816 - and the South zones were logical extensions of the 
Sao Paulo hinterland, to which they were linked economically and culturally. Most of the northern region 
of Minas Gerais is geographically part of the Brazilian sertao, stretching into Ceara in north-eastern Brazil. 
It was formerly administered from Salvador, the capital of Bahia, until the middle of the eighteenth century 
and all of its exports passed through Salvador until this century. The western region was part of the colonial 
cattle-frontier, extending from Bahia to Goias. The Mata zone, in south-eastern Minas, was linked 
economically with the port of Rio de Janeiro and was part of Rio de Janeiro's hinterland from the coffee 
boom of the 1830s. The central part of Minas was die seat of provincial and later state government, whose 
authority over the other zones was weakened until the 1930s by poor communications and lack of economic 
influence. Thus, the more developed regions in the southern part of Minas Gerais (Triangulo, Mata, and 
South) were historically linked to Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, whereas the less developed northern part 
was a backwater of Bahia77.
The occupation of the territory was directly linked to the discovery of gold at the end of the 
seventeenth century, mainly in the central part of Minas Gerais. Gold production reached its peak around 
the 1760s and after that began to decline slowly78. In the 1800s, production was less than half the level of 
the 1760s, and in the 1820s the decay of the gold-mining economy was beyond doubt Several different 
factors contributed to the decay of eighteenth-century mineiro gold economy: production was restricted to 
alluvial gold deposits because of the requirements or difficulties of underground gold- mining; lack of slave 
labour; heavy duties levied on goods entering Minas Gerais making the cost of living very expensive; and 
the low standards of the prevailing methods of production79. With the progressive decay of the gold-mining 
economy during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the economy of Minas Gerais went through a 
great transformation. During this period, there was an important expansion of craft production, mainly of 
textiles and iron. However, this incipient production had its development hindered by the Portuguese colonial 
government, which prohibited it in 1785. Furthermore, a large proportion of the population of the decaying 
gold-mining area turned to subsistence activities, moving from the central part of Minas towards the northern 
and western parts - where a cattle-raising economy emerged -, and towards the southern parts - where dairy 
production developed80.
77 J.D. Wirth, Minas Gerais in the Brazilian Federation. 1889-1937. (Stanford, 1977), pp. 1-5.
78 P.I. Singer, Desenvolvimento Economico e Evolucao Urbana: Evolucao Economica de Sao Paulo. 
Bhimenan. Porto Alegre. Belo Horizonte e Recife. (Sao Paulo, 1968), pp. 199-203.
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With the arrival of the Portuguese royal family in Brazil in 1808, there were several attempts to 
revive the economy of the central part of Minas Gerais by the establishment of an iron industry. Although 
the attempt to produce iron on a large scale in the Metalurgica zone failed, mainly because of restricted 
markets, several small iron foundries of limited economic importance emerged. Their production was small 
and the greater part of output was consumed locally81. Nevertheless, during the first years of the nineteenth 
century agriculture replaced gold as the main economic activity of Minas Gerais. Rural production, either 
for the mineiro or for the Brazilian and international markets, increased in importance. Gradually agriculture 
shifted from a predominantly subsistence to market orientated activities. The main products of this period 
were coffee, com, sugar, tobacco, cotton, rice, manioc, and beans82.
Coffee spread into the Mata and die South zones, where it adapted very well to the soil and the 
climate. It became an important mineiro item of trade for the first time in 1819, when more than 95% of 
the output was produced in Marias Barbosa, a district situated in the Mata zone, close to Juiz de Fora83. In 
1842/43, coffee was the third largest mineiro item of trade by value84. From the 1850s onwards, coffee 
became die main mineiro item of trade. In the 1850s, coffee represented 56.1% of exports (to other 
provinces) by value, and by the end of the century 84.6%85. The rapid expansion of production until the 
beginning of the 1860s was helped by three factors: the availability of labour being released by the declining 
gold-mining economy, the availability of suitable soil, and the high prices of coffee. In the 1860s, the 
construction of the Uniao e Industria turnpike, and later of the D. Pedro II railway (EFDPII), helped to open 
up new areas for coffee, guaranteeing the expansion of production86.
Nevertheless, coffee production was not very representative of the economic life of Minas Gerais 
as a whole. Throughout the Empire (1822-1889), coffee production was confined mainly to a relatively small 
part of the Mata zone close to the border with the province of Rio de Janeiro. Until the early 1870s, the 
mineiro coffee economy employed less than 15 % of the non-slave population and only a quarter of the slave 
population. Furthermore, the area covered by coffee plantation did not represent more than 4% of the 
territory of the province. In the 1880s, the South zone became a coffee-growing area. However, it was only 
after the disorganization of coffee production in the Mata zone, as a result of the abolition of slavery in 
1888, that coffee production in the South zone became important. More representative of the mineiro 
economic life was the production of non-coffee products in the huge area outside the coffee-growing where
81 Ibid., pp.206-7.
82 Iglesias, "Minas Gerais", pp.368-9.
83 J.H. Lima, Cafe e Industria em Minas Gerais. 1870-1920. (Petropolis, 1981), p. 13.
84 Singer, op.cit.. p.209.
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Seminario Sobre a Economia Mineira. (Diamantina, 1982), Sept., p. 117.
86 Lima, op.cit.. p. 14.
42
the majority of the slave and non-slave population lived87.
Cattle-raising, for example, was the second traditional economic activity in Minas Gerais, and was 
well adapted to extensive ranching specially in the northern part and in the Triangulo zone. The techniques 
and the organization of ranching were introduced by Bahians in the seventeenth century and, combined with 
a favourable environment, produced Brazil's largest herd of beef cattle88. After the decay of the eighteenth- 
century gold economy, cattle-raising became the most important economic activity in Minas Gerais until die 
1840s when it was surpassed by coffee-growing89. From then onwards, beef on the hoof, meat, and animal 
products were the second largest item of trade of the province90.
As mentioned above, until the end of the eighteenth century the establishment of industries was 
prohibited by the Portuguese colonial government. When the Portuguese crown was transferred to Brazil in 
1808 this legal impediment was revoked. However, obstacles of a different nature then became obvious such 
as, lack of capital and credit, lack of suitable means of transport, small and scattered markets, and lack of 
a large and reliable work-force. These factors hindered the industrial development of Minas Gerais91. 
Nevertheless, a few industrial sectors, such as mining, iron-working, textiles, and food industries, did 
develop during the nineteenth century, and were concentrated mostly in the developed southern half of 
Minas Gerais92.
Although the gold-mining boom was over at the beginning of the last century, hopes of new 
discoveries persisted. During the first decades of the nineteenth century the primitive and disordered gold- 
mining activity of the end of the eighteenth century was replaced by foreign mining companies using "state 
of the art" technology. Some of these foreign mining companies, such as the British-owned Saint John Del 
Rey Mining Company and the Imperial Brazilian Mining Association, became large scale enterprises93. The 
former, which exploited the mine at Morro Velho, was the largest single industrial employer in Minas Gerais 
until the 1930s and the only one to survive among the 9 Brazilian and foreign-owned gold-mining companies 
active in 1900. Furthermore, prospecting for diamonds and semiprecious stones still provided a precarious 
livelihood for a few thousand people94.
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The isolation of Minas Gerais and the high price of imports allowed the mineiro iron industry to 
develop numerically and geographically for six decades after the 1820s. Initially, changes in the process of 
gold-mining boosted the industrial production of iron, underground gold mines constituting important 
consumers of iron goods during this period. Later on, the consumer market for iron products grew and the 
agricultural sector and muletrains became important consumers. In the 1880s, the industry suffered two lethal 
blows: the end of its geographical isolation with the arrival of the railway in the central part of Minas Gerais 
and die abolition of slavery, die latter depriving the small foundries of their major competitive advantage 
against foreign competition95. With the proclamation of the Republic the small foundries disappeared and 
a few major ironworks were built but with litde success. Minas was doomed to await until die 1930s, when 
iron and steel products led the second mineiro industrial boom and several chaorcoal-based steel plants 
began produc ion96.
The first sustained industrial upsurge in Minas Gerais began with the establishment of the textile 
industry97. However, the development of this industry was preceded in the first half of the last century by 
a flourishing domestic textile production, a legacy of the colonial times98. It was only in the 1870s that the 
first successful textile mills began to emerge in response to a set of favourable conditions: expanding local 
markets, exchange devaluations, cheap raw materials, high import tariffs, and high freight rates99. The 
mineiro textile industry grew rapidly until the late 1920's. In 1907 it was the largest mineiro industrial 
sector, contributing 40.2% of the total value of industrial production, accounting for 62.9% of capital 
invested in mineiro industry, and employing 50% of the mineiro industrial work-force100.
In 1907 the food industry was the second largest industrial sector, accounting for 32.6% of the 
value of industrial production, 18.9% of the capital invested in the mineiro industry, and 17.3% of the 
mineiro industrial work-force. Nevertheless, the industry was made up of small factories employing on 
average 6 people101. Another important economic sector in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais was transport. 
In the late 1850s, the Companhia Uniao e Industria built 144 kilometres of carriageway linking the southern 
part of Minas Gerais to the province of Rio de Janeiro. The construction of the turnpike pre-dated railways.
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It was a time when the bulk of the transport of people and goods was made on the back of animals102. 
During this period, Juiz de Fora grew and became a large coffee entrepot in Minas Gerais103.
The first phase of railway construction in Minas Gerais began in the 1870s. In 1869, the EFDPII 
(later Central do Brasil) reached the Mata zone, and in die late 1880s arrived in the central part of the 
province104. Several other small lines were built during this period in the Mata zone. All these early railways 
received concessions (guaranteed interest payments on invested capital) from the provincial and Imperial 
governments. Several of these railways were built by coffee planters either by themselves or in conjunction 
with British capitalists. Between 1875 and 1899, a total of 3,500 kilometers of track was laid in Minas 
Gerais, most of it in the south. Nevertheless, by the late 1890s several of these private lines were taken over 
by the government, as coffee prices declined and could no longer support the high freight rates these 
railways needed to work profitably. Later, 21 railways of the Mata zone were incorporated into the British- 
owned Leopoldina system. From 1900 onwards, the federal government dominated railway construction until 
the 1920s, when the state government became actively involved105.
It is important to point out that despite all of its economic transformation during the nineteenth 
century, Minas Gerais at the end of this period continued to be divided into disarticulated and autonomous 
sub-regions, each having developed in a different way, with particular histories and specific problems106. In 
the 1880s, the Triangulo became a modem agro-pastoral economy. In contrast, the northern region, with the 
exception of a diamond rush which was over by 1830, followed the tracks of a seventeenth-century ranching 
economy and its cities stagnated on the margins of vast latifundia until the arrival of the railway at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. The cattle trade was the main activity of the western region, whose 
towns had been linked by ancient cattle trails and later by railways. The Mata and South zones developed 
a coffee-based agriculture, which financed their mid-nineteenth-century rise. After the proclamation of the 
Republic these two zones became the most important regions in terms of wealth, population, and political 
power. Throughout the nineteenth century, the central part of Minas lost ground to both the Mata and the 
South zones. The long decline of the central region only came to an end in the 1920s, when the growth of 
consumer industries, banks, and commerce gave the new political capital (Belo Horizonte) an economic 
base107.
Compared with the southern half, the backward north - with the exception of the Triangulo zone - 
lagged behind in towns and transport The south had a well-articulated network of towns and transport
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103 Singer, op.cit.. p.210.
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routes, which were created mainly during the great coffee boom and railway-construction phase in 1850- 
1900. With large population and a good transport system, the Mata and the South were the most urbanized 
zones of Minas Gerais. Nevertheless, most mineiros lived in isolated rural areas. In 1920, only 11% of the 
mineiro population lived in urban centres: if cities smaller than 5,000 are left out, the urban population falls 
to 5%108.
Table 1.6 - Total population of Minas Gerais and Brazil according to the estimates of 1808,1823,1830, 
and 1854, and the census of 1872,1890,1900, and 1920.
YEARS MINAS GERAIS PERCENTAGE BRAZIL
1808 350,000 14.5% 2,419,406
1823 640,000 16.2% 3,960,866
1830 930,000 17.4% 5,340,000
1854 1,300,000 16.9% 7,677,800
1872 2,102,689 20.8% 10,112,061
1890 3,184,099 22.2% 14,333,915
1900 3,594,471 20.8% 17,318,556
1920 5,888,174 19.2% 30,635,605
Sources: Adapted from Mmisterio da Agricultura, Industria e Commercio, Directoria Geral de Estatistica, 
Recenseamento do Brazil realizado em 1 de Setembro de 1920: Resnmo Historico dos Inaueritos Censitarios 
Realizados no Brazil. (Rio de Janeiro, 1922), I, pp.403-23.
As shown in Table 1.6, throughout the nineteenth century Minas experienced a rapid demographic 
growth and was one of the most densely populated regions in Brazil until 1920. In the first half of the last 
century the minp.iro population represented around 16% of the Brazilian population, a percentage which 
increased to around 20% in the second half. Furthermore, a large proportion of the mineiro population was 
made up of slaves. In the eighteenth century, negroes made up over one-third of the mineiro population109. 
During 1831-40 and 1854-57, slaves accounted for 31% and 25% of the total population respectively110. 
According to the census of 1872, there were 1,510,806 slaves in Brazil, of whom nearly a quarter were to 
be found in Minas Gerais, as shown in Table 1.7. Of the estimated 723,000 Brazilian slaves shortly before 
the abolition of slavery in 1888, nearly 27% were in Minas Gerais, more than in any other province in 
absolute terms111. After abolition, social mobility remained difficult for coloured people, and whites 
continued to control the high-status positions in the hierarchical and agrarian-based mineiro society. 
Although priding themselves on having a tolerant attitude towards race, the minp.iro elite had a low 
estimation of the coloured. Moreover, most of the surviving Indian tribes had long since migrated into Goias 
to avoid being hunted and enslaved by settlers or catechized by missionaries. Thus, choosing to ignore the
108 Ibid., pp.23-4.
109 Ibid., pp. 14-6.
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coloured, and having expelled most of the Indians, the mineiros directed their attentions towards European 
immigrants for labour supply. But immigrants who, in turn, preferred Sao Paulo and the southern parts of 
Brazil to Minas112.
Table 1.7 - Brazilian population in 1872 per province and divided by nationals and slaves.
POPULATION
PROVINCES NATIONALS SLAVES TOTAL
Alagoas 312,268 35,741 348,009
Amazonas 56,631 979 57,610
Bahia 1,211,792 167,824 1,379,616
Ceara 689,773 31,913 721,686
Rio de Janeiro* 226,033 48,939 274,972
Espirito Santo 59,478 22,659 82,137
Goias 149,743 10,652 160,395
Maranhao 284,101 74,939 359,040
Mato Grosso 53,750 6,667 60,417
Minas Gerais 1,669,276 370,459 2,039,735
Pari 247,779 27,458 275,237
Paraiba 354,700 21,526 376,226
Parana 116,162 10,560 126,722
Pernambuco 752,511 89,028 841,539
Piauf 178,427 23,795 202,222
Rio de Janeiro 490,087 292,637 782,724
Rio Grde. do Norte 220,959 13,020 233,979
Rio Grde. do Sul 367,022 67,791 434,813
Santa Catarina 144,818 14,984 159,802
Sao Paulo 680,742 156,612 837,354
Sergipe 153,620 22,623 176,243
Brazil 8,419,672 1,510,806 9,930,478
Source: Ministerio da Agricultura. Industria e Commercio. Recenseamento do Brazil Realizado em 1 de 
Setembro de 1920: Resnmo Historico dos Inoueritos Censitarios Realizados no Brazil. (Rio de Janeiro, 
1922), I, p.414.
* The city of Rio de Janeiro.
Foreigners as a group were relatively unimportant, although in the 1860s German colonists turned 
artisans were the original pool of talent for Juiz de Fora's entrepreneurial class113. Moreover, the South zone 
was the major area of Italian immigration in the late ninteenth century and Italian rural workers turned 
craftsmen and merchants provided urban services for the South's small cities, as well as for Juiz de Fora, 
Sao Joao del Rei, and Barbacena. Nevertheless, immigration was a failure and between 1900 and 1920 there 
was a net out migration of foreigners from Minas Gerais114. Despite all the efforts (such as state-subsidized
112 Wirth, op.cit. pp. 14-6.
113 L.A.V. Arantes, "As Origens da Burguesia Industrial em Juiz de Fora, 1858/1912", Universidade 
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passages and agricultural colonies), Minas Gerais could neither attract nor hold immigrants during the phase 
of major population transfer from the Old to the New World (1880-1920)115. In the 1890s, around 50,000 
immigrants came to Minas at the expense of the state, whereas more than 700,000 went to Sao Paulo116. The 
failure to bring European labourers drew the attention of the mineiro elite to the native labour force made 
up of ex-slaves and caboclos, who traditionally were thought to lack motivation, reliability, and skill. Poor 
but happy, the caboclo had long been thought to live a carefree existence off the land. His image improved 
with the need for his labour117.
Thus, during the nineteenth century the mineiro economy was transformed into agro-pastoral 
economy after the decay of eighteenth-century gold-mining economy. In the 1830s, the gold-mining industry 
became dominated by foreign-owned large-scale enterprises exploring underground mines. Until the coffee 
boom of the middle of the last century, cattle-raising was the main economic activity in Minas Gerais. From 
the 1850s onwards, coffee became the main mineiro item of trade. Nevertheless, the coffee economy was 
restricted to the southern part of the province, adjoining Rio de Janeiro, and its impact on the mineiro 
economy as a whole was not comparable to that of the coffee economy in Sao Paulo. The abolition of 
slavery in 1888 forced the entrepreneurial class to resort to the native labour force, since European 
immigration was a failure. In the last quarter of the century, the first industries began to emerge, mainly the 
textile industry which was the largest industrial sector until the 1920s, just as in the rest of Brazil. It was 
during this period also that the first phase of railway construction took place. Nevertheless, nineteenth- 
century Minas Gerais was sharply divided into two halves: the developed south and the backward north. The 
central part was the seat of the provincial - and later the state - government, but exerted very little influence 
over the rest of Minas Gerais. Most of the other sub-regions were more closely linked, economically and 
culturally, to Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, or Bahia.
115 Igldsias, Pohtica Economica do Govemo Provincial Mineiro. p. 129.
116 M.T.S. Petrone, "Imigragao", in Histdria Geral da Civilizacao Brasileira. ed. S.B. Holanda (Sao 
Paulo, 4th. ed. 1985), IX, pp.104-21.
117 Wirth, op.cit.. pp. 14-6.
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PART I - THE ENTREPRENEUR
Introduction
This section is divided into two chapters. The first examines the evolution of the concept of the 
entrepreneur, the nature of entrepreneurship in different economic environments, and the debate about the 
emergence of the entrepreneur in the Brazilian economic historiography. This analysis establishes the 
theoretical framework for die second chapter which, in examining the social background of mineiro 
entrepreneurs and the origin of their capital, contributes to an investigation of the business environment in 
nineteenth-century Minas Gerais.
The analysis of the mineiro entrepreneur reveals that there was a great deal of entrepreneurial 
initiative in ninteenth-century Minas Gerais and that the general social attitude towards entrepreneurship was 
on the whole positive. It also shows that in contrast with their counterparts in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, 
mineiro entrepreneurs were mainly recruited from die local elite constituted basically by Brazilians. 
Furthermore, although the sources of capital (mainly agriculture and trade) used by mineiro entrepreneurs 
were not very distinct from that used by their Paulista and carioca counterparts, they differred in their nature 
with coffee and import-export activities playing a smaller role.
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Chapter 2 - A BRIEF REVIEW ON THE LITERATURE ON THE 
ENTREPRENEUR
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first addresses the concept of the entrepreneur in the 
economic literature. The second examines the emergence of the Brazilian entrepreneur during the nineteenth 
century and considers debate about the social and economic origins of the Brazilian industrialist as a prelude 
to the analysis of the formation of mineiro entrepreneurial class in the nineteenth century.
2.1 - The Concept of the Entrepreneur
The authors reviewed here are either leading authorities on the subject or those whose works have 
indirectly influenced the study of the entrepreneur. Several other authors could have been included but 
because of the scope of this work and the lack of relevance of their work to the study of nineteenth-century 
business environment they have not been included1.
Even though there is no established theory of the entrepreneur, die subject has been extensively 
discussed by economists, political scientists, and sociologists2. The entrepreneurial function in society is 
probably as old as the institutions of barter and exchange and many economists would probably agree that 
the entrepreneur is a central figure in economic life. Despite his pivotal importance in economic activity, 
the entrepreneur has been a shadowy and elusive figure. His actions have more often been attributed to 
faceless institutions or impersonal market structures. Nevertheless, entrepreneurship has been traditionally 
associated with the activities of businessmen3.
The term entrepreneur is of French origin which until the end of the twelfth century encompassed 
the functions of inventor, planner, architect, builder, manager, employer, and supervisor, but not those of 
capital provision and risk-taking. It was only with the emergence of capitalism that a clearer distinction 
emerged between those who performed artistic and technical functions, and those who undertook the 
commercial aspects of any enterprise. It was Richard Cantillon, an eighteenth-century businessman and 
financier, who first used the concept obtrusively and infused it with precise economic content. Cantillon 
suggested that the entrepreneur is someone who has the foresight and willingness to assume risk and takes 
the action requisite to making a profit. This self-interested and daring activity has important social 
consequences: it is the actions of entrepreneurs reacting to changes in prices that brings about a balance
1 For a further discussion of the concept of the entrepreneur and its historical evolution in the 
economic theory see R.F. Hubert and A.N. Link, The Entrepreneur Mainstream Views and Radical 
Critiques. (New York, 1982); M. Casson, The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory. (Oxford, 1982); H. 
Barreto, The Entrepreneur in Microeconomic Theory: Disappearance and Explanation (New York, 1989); 
M. Binks and P. Vale, Entrepreneurship and Economic Change. (1990); and H. Lydall, The Entrepreneurial 
Factor in Economic Growth. (1992).
2 Casson, op.cit.. p.9.
3 Hebeit and Link, op.cit.. pp.7-9.
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between supply and demand in specific markets. In other words, the entrepreneur is described as the 
equilibrating mechanism in a market economy. Furthermore, Cantillon suggests that the entrepreneur is a 
capitalist, but to a very limited extent4.
It is easy to see how foresightness, a willingness to assume risk and to act as described by 
Cantillon, was a requisite for entrepreneurial activity in the backward economic environment of nineteenth- 
century Minas Gerais. The obstacles posed by die lack or inadequacy of some of the basic requirements 
conducive to normal business could only be overcome by particularly adventurous individuals who had 
initiative and were willing to take risks.
Among the French writers, the distinction between capitalist and entrepreneur was common until 
the physiocrats introduced new shades of meaning to the term5. Quesnay, for example, described the 
entrepreneur as a mere patron who supervised the labour process but did not participate in it directly. 
Quesnay envisaged an analytic system, grounded in agrarian capitalism, that featured three economic classes. 
The participation of each in the economy was related to, and determined by, the economic function of its 
members. The propertied class owned land and leased it to the farmers who in turn produced the raw 
materials demanded by a sterile class of artisans. Thus, farmers constituted the only productive class in the 
system while landlord-proprietors advanced capital to enterprising farmers6. Baudeau, a follower of Quesnay 
and a physiocrat himself, described the entrepreneur as someone motivated by profits, a decision-making 
individual who bears risk because of the nature of his activities and also invents or innovates in order to 
reduce costs and thereby raise profit. Baudeau went beyond Cantillon in emphasizing the importance of 
ability - the entrepreneur need for information and knowledge. Because the agricultural entrepreneur carried 
on production at his own risk for his own account, he had to have the capacity to exercise control over 
productive processes, i.e., to act in an entrepreneurial way. In order to do this the entrepreneur has to be an 
innovator7. Turgot, another physiocrat, did not make any distinction between the capitalist and the 
entrepreneur. For him, the entrepreneur is a capitalist who employs labour in a productive process either in 
agriculture or in manufacturing. Thus, the same person supplies the capital and employs the labourers and 
makes production possible8.
It is interesting to point out that both Turgot and Cantillon described the entrepreneur as pivotal 
to the market system, although they differed in their assessments about the nature of entrepreneurship. As 
mentioned above, Turgot assumed that the entrepreneur was a capitalist and for Cantillon ownership of 
capital was not an essential prerequisite. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that whereas Quesnay
4 See R. Cantillon, Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en General. (1931), Part I, Chapter XIII.
5 Hebert and Link, op.cit.. p.24.
6 F. Quesnay, Ouesnav's Tableau feconomiaue'. (1972).
7 Hebert and Link, op.cit.. pp.25-7.
8 A.R.J. Turgot, Reflexions on the Formation and the Distribution of Riches. (New York, 1971).
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and Baudeau described the entrepreneur as a wealthy farm operator who plans, organizes, and takes risks, 
Turgot described him as a rich merchant or industrialist who advances capital and plans or supervises 
production in a effort to accumulate more wealth.
Although die economic context observed by these authors differed in several and important respects 
from that of nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, the most general aspects of their descriptions of the nature 
of entrepreneurship applies to the mineiro entrepreneur. Thus, the mineiro entrepreneurial class was mainly 
composed of wealthy men - farmers, merchants, and, towards the end of the century, industrialists - who 
planned, organized and supervised production, employing labour, advancing capital, and taking risks.
Jean-Baptiste Say also attributes to the entrepreneur a vital role in economic life. According to Say, 
the productive process is divided in three distinct stages: the first is die scientific stage whereby knowledge 
about the nature and purpose of any product must be acquired before it can be produced; the second stage - 
the entrepreneurial one - concerns the application of this knowledge to a useful purpose; the last stage is 
the actual manufacture of the product. Thus, the entrepreneur has a pivotal role because, although all three 
stages of the productive process are necessary, it is the entrepreneur who combines them all. Furthermore, 
to be an entrepreneur requires certain qualities - sound judgement, perseverance, and knowledge of business. 
The entrepreneur needs to be able to estimate, with some accuracy, the importance of a specific product, 
probable demand, and the means for its production. In other words, entrepreneurial activity is synonymous 
with management, which does not necessarily include ownership of capital. Although both functions can be 
combined in the same person, entrepreneurial and capitalist functions are separated. The entrepreneur- 
manager is an expert in organization and administration, whereas the capitalist is just the lender of money. 
Furthermore, contrary to authors mentioned earlier, the entrepreneur in Say is not necessarily a risk-taker9.
What does Say contribute to the study of the mineiro entrepreneur? It is interesting to point out that 
in a economic environment such as nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, where technological production was 
virtually non-existent, the nature of entrepreneurship differed slightly from that observed in advanced 
economies: it had less to do with the application of technology to a useful purpose and more to do with the 
successful transfer of the technologies devised elsewhere. Furthermore, management ability, stressed by Say, 
proved to be an extremely important requisite for the mineiro entrepreneur. Because enterprises were neither 
large nor complex enough to have a developed managerial capability, businessmen had to manage firms 
themselves, with little or no help. Thus, they needed sound judgement to estimate probable demand for their 
their products, and the means for producing them.
Classical economists did not attribute to the entrepreneur any special role in economic life. Smith, 
for example, failed to separate the entrepreneur from the various kinds of industrious people in the economy, 
as if each business was practically run by itself. There were passing references to the merchant or 
undertaker, who accumulated capital and merely hired workers who did the rest. There are also references 
to the fact that the capital of die undertaker was exposed to risk, but his function was merely the supervision
9 J.B. Say, Tratado de Economia Pohtica. (Sao Paulo, 1983).
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of his business in order to guarantee his profits10. Ricardo does not use the term entrepreneur. Neither does 
he conceive of businessmen as agents of change, rather he refers to them as shadowy bearers of 
technological improvements11. Mill's main contribution was his analysis of business income. According to 
Mill, businessmen receive wages of superintendence - as a return for their skill and ability as managers - 
a premium for risk-taking, and interest on the part of their own capital that they employed. Mill is not 
precise about whether or not risk bearing is an entrepreneurial task along with management. Furthermore, 
he failed to distinguish the entrepreneur from the capitalist and said nothing about the entrepreneur as 
innovator12.
This classical legacy was bequeathed to Karl Marx who also did not distinguish the functions of 
the capitalist from those of the entrepreneur. According to Marx, the capitalist is the possessor of money 
which is used in the process of circulation with the intention of making more money. However, the capitalist 
exists only as a potential purchaser of labour and becomes a real capitalist only when the worker submits 
to the commands of capital. The purpose of the capitalist is the appropriation of ever more wealth. He 
achieves it by turning his money into commodities which serve as the building materials for a new product 
and as factors in the labour process, and by incorporating labour, transforming value into capital. Moreover, 
due to the very nature of the labour process, the command of capital develops into a requirement, into a real 
condition of production. The unification of wage-labourers into one single productive body, and the 
establishment of a connection between their individual functions, lies on the competence of the capitalist 
who brings them together and maintains them in that situation. Thus, the function of the capitalist becomes 
the work of directing, superintending, and combining factors of production. However, as soon as the 
capitalist's stock of capital has reached a critical threshold, he is relieved from actual labour and transfers 
the task of direction and supervision to a special kind of wage-labourer, managers, foremen, and overseers 
who command the labour process in the name of capital. The work of supervision becomes their established 
and exclusive function. Nevertheless, to act as a capitalist means to supervise and direct the process of 
capital's valorization, which is wider than the supervision of the labour process and includes the purchase 
of the means of production, the sale of the labour's products, and so on13.
Thus, the Marxian entrepreneur is a capitalist and an employer of factors of production. The latter 
function includes the supervision and management of the productive process, reinforcing the managerial side 
of the entrepreneurial activity, pointed out by Say, a contribution which also applies to the study of the 
mineiro entrepreneur.
10 A. Smith, Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of the Nations. (Harmondsworth, 
1970), pp.201-47, 459-75.
11 See D. Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. (Cambridge, 1992), Chapter VI..
12 J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy With Some Other Applications to Social Philosophy. 
(New York, 1987).
13 K. Marx, Capital. (1988), I.
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At the end of the nineteenth century the study of the entrepreneur was greatly influenced by the 
work of German historians and sociologists, who believed that to understand man's economic behaviour and 
the institutions which constrained such behaviour, a thorough analysis of the historical process was 
necessary. Schmoler, for example, began to analyse historical economic behaviour and discovered that a 
central factor present in all economic activity was the spirit of enterprise, or the entrepreneur. Sombart and 
Weber extended Schindler's ideas. Sombart introduced the idea of a new leader (the entrepreneur) who 
animates the entire economy through creative innovation, whereas Weber described the entrepreneur as a 
deviant who breaks way from the old methods of production and creates new ones14.
Webers main concern was to explain how a social system evolved from a stable form to a another 
type of society. A static society does not require the activity traditionally associated with the entrepreneur 
and the ordinary routine work is done either by workmen or managers. However, this stable and self- 
perpetuating state is at some point altered and this change have been historically associated with charismatic 
leaders of an entrepreneurial nature. Thus, the motives behind this entrepreneurial force are important to the 
understanding of the evolution of the society. In the specific case of the emergence of the modem form of 
capitalism, Weber identified religious imperatives as the critical characteristics of the successful 
entrepreneur. These religious imperatives make up what is called the Protestant ethic and the specific ethos 
of the first European capitalist entrepreneurs. According to Weber, it is the ethos of the first European 
capitalist entrepreneurs which explains why the modem form of capitalism is a phenomenon peculiar to 
Western civilization.
Entrepreneurs were the predominant bearers of the "spirit of capitalism", which combined the 
impulse to accumulate with a frugal life-style. The accumulation of wealth was morally sanctioned in so far 
as it was combined with a sober, industrious career; wealth was condemned only if employed to support a 
life of idle luxury or self-indulgence. Though, the greatest possible productivity in work and the rejection 
of luxury led to a style of life which directly influenced the spirit of capitalism, by creating the right 
atmosphere for its development. Thus, for Weber, the spirit of capitalism was closely connected with the 
Puritan religious ideas which supplied the moral energy and drive to the capitalist entrepreneur. It is 
important to emphasize the crucial role played by the entrepreneur in Weber's framework. According to the 
author, what brought about the capitalist revolution in the economic life was not a stream of new money 
invested in the industry, but, above all, the spirit of capitalism15.
Thus, Weber describes the entrepreneur as a deviant, who is not necessarily a capitalist, driven by 
a set of principles and values, which in the case of the first European entrepreneurs was embodied in the 
Protestant ethic. This analysis provides an useful starting point for the investigation of die intellectual 
formation of the mineiro entrepreneur and the ideas which drove diem. In some parts of Minas Gerais, for 
example, European immigrants of a Protestant background constituted an important source of entrepreneurs.
14 Hebert and Link, op.cit.. pp.29-35.
15 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. (20th. ed. 1989).
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In others, the intellectual formation of some of the most prominent entrepreneurs followed principles very 
similar to the ideas which constituted the background of the spirit of capitalism, as defined by Weber.
Schumpeter is another classical author. The main point of his analysis is the intimate association 
between entrepreneur and economic development. To Schumpeter development is a spontaneous and 
discontinuous change in the channels of the existing course of economic growth, it alters and displaces 
forever the equilibrium state previously existing. These spontaneous and discontinuous changes may occur 
in the following cases: 1) the introduction of a new good; 2) the introduction of a new method of 
production; 3) the opening of a new market; 4) die conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or 
semi-manufactured goods; 5) the carrying out of new organization in an existing industry. Credit can be used 
to facilitate the acquisition of the necessary means of production as to foster new combinations. The credit 
supply, however, is the function of that category of individuals - die financiers - who the author identifies 
as capitalists and who should not be confused with the category of individuals who carry out the new 
combinations, the innovators and risk-takers, i.e. entrepreneurs. The Schumpeterian concept of the 
entrepreneur includes not only the innovator and risk-taker, die independent businessmen, but all who 
actually fulfil the function by which the concept is defined, like managers, members of boards of directors, 
and even other types of employees of a company. However, it does not include all heads of firms or 
managers or industrialists who merely may operate an established business. The concept, therefore, includes 
only those who actually have the capacity of innovation16.
Schumpeter's description of the new combinations of productive forces fits very well into what can 
be observed of the action of several mineiro entrepreneurs during the last century. However, his concept of 
the entrepreneur is sometimes a little narrow to fit into the mineiro experience. The carrying out of new 
productive combinations in the mineiro business environment involved much management effort, which was 
an essential part of the entrepreneurial activity.
A more recent contribution to the concept of entrepreneurship is the work of Kirzner, drawn from 
the so-called "Austrian School", of which Schumpeter was an early exponent, and which conceives the 
economy as a market process in a state of perpetual desiquilibrium, driven by human action - man's constant 
alertness to the opportunity to improve his position. The tendency to desiquilibrium creates continuously 
opportunities for entrepreneurial activity17. Thus, to Kirzner the entrepreneur is the arbitrageur and 
equilibrating agent whose prime characteristic is the ability to perceive profit opportunities and act upon 
them. He has no need to possess capital or special knowledge and he does not fulfil any coordinating or 
management role in the productive process. Thus, the entrepreneur requires no special ability to carry out 
his function other than the capacity to perceive an opportunity for gain thereby ensuring increasing 
perfection in the working of the market18.
16 J.A. Schumpeter, A Teoria do Desenvolvimento Economico. (Sao Paulo, 1982), p.68.
17 Lydall, op.cit.. pp.69-71; Binks and Vale, op.cit.. pp. 12-3, 43; Barreto, op.cit.. 14-21.
181.M. Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship. (Chicago, 1973), pp. 13-81.
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The main difference between Kirzner and Schumpeter is that whereas the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur acts breaking the state of equilibrium the Kirznerian entrepreneur is the equilibrating force of 
the economic life. However, both authors agree that risk-taking is an essential feature of the entrepreneurial 
function.
The authors reviewed so far have written about the entrepreneur regardless of the economic 
environment in which he acted. These authors did not take into account that the role of the entrepreneur and 
the nature of entrepreneurship may change according to differences in the business environment. One of the 
first authors to introduce such idea is Gerschenkron, who rejects those theories which predict that die 
industrially more developed countries present to the less developed countries a picture of their future. For 
Gerschenkron, such generalizations, based on the pattern of industrialization in England, does not fit die 
experience of more backward countries because it does not take into account the fact that the development 
in backward countries may differ fundamentally from that of advanced countries.
According to Gerschenkron, the entrepreneur plays an important role in the process of economic 
development since everywhere the process of industrialization means, among other things, the appearance 
of men, willing and able to exercise the entrepreneurial function. Nevertheless, the role played by the 
entrepreneur will be different according to the uniqueness of each individual country and, mainly, to its 
degree of backwardness. Different degrees of backwardness gave rise to divergent patterns of development 
where entrepreneurs, banks, and the State played distinct economic roles. Therefore, while entrepreneurs 
were crucial in the process of industrialization in England, the same cannot be said about the experience of 
backward countries. Despite the fact that the entrepreneur still plays an important role in the process of 
economic development, in moderately backward countries industrialization occurred under the aegis of the 
banks, or under the aegis of the State in more backward areas.
Industrialization in England occurred without any substantial utilization of banking for long-term 
investment purposes. By contrast, because in relatively backward countries capital was scarce and diffused, 
the distrust of industrial activities was considerable, and there was great pressure for bigness, the use of 
industrial investment banking was critical for development. However, such use was specific not to backward 
countries in general, but to those countries where backwardness did not exceed certain limits. Where the 
level of economic development was incomparable lower when industrialization began, the role of the State 
was clearly distinct. Usually in these countries the supply of capital required the compulsory machinery of 
the government. Thus, the greater the backwardness the less central is the role played by the entrepreneur. 
The banks or the State will replace him in some of his functions such as: capital provision and investment 
in infrastructure19.
Gerschenkron's main contribution to the study of the mineiro entrepreneur is his concept that 
different degrees of backwardness produced important qualitative differences in the nature of 
entrepreneurship. Thus, in backward countries banks or the State intervened to overcome the existing social
19 A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: a book of essavs. 
(Cambridge, 1962).
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and economic barriers to industrialization, replacing the entrepreneur in some of his traditional functions and 
devoting their attention to the heavy industry, rather than the light, and die building of infrastructure. 
Consequently, in backward countries it seems more likely to find entrepreneurs investing in light industries, 
such as textiles, food processing, and so on, which was indeed the starting point of the Brazilian industrial 
entrepreneurial class20.
Hence, the various theories of the entrepreneur reviewed above describe the entrepreneur as risk- 
taker, capitalist, innovator, leader, manager, and employer of factors of production. He is presented as being 
motivated by material gains (most of the time, profits), will, religious conviction, or social recognition. He 
is perceived by some as a deviant, whose actions disrupt the "self-perpetuating equilibrium", and by others 
as the point of equilibrium in a market economy. Furthermore, depending on die degree of backwardness 
and the intellectual climate of the business environment there will be important differences in the role of 
the entrepreneur and the nature of entrepreneurship, resulting in the intervention of banks or the State. Thus, 
the various theories of the entrepreneur reviewed in this part provide an useful framework to the 
investigation of entrepreneurship in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. The following part examines the debate 
about the emergence of the Brazilian entrepreneur in order to place the study about Minas Gerais within a 
more specific context.
2.2 - The Brazilian Entrepreneur
Drawing on the Brazilian economic historiography, this part considers the debates about the 
emergence of die coffee entrepreneurial class and the origins of the industrial entrepreneurial in the 
nineteenth century.
During most of the nineteenth century, the Brazilian business elite struggled to legitimize itself. 
Legitimation was necessary because the business profession was held in low esteem and business enterprise 
usually relied on government support. Traditional Luso-Brazilian culture accorded the businessman low 
status and regarded him as habitually dishonest. A large proportion of the Brazilian business elite during this 
period was made up of foreigners. Merchants often faced the animosity of large landowners, the Brazilian 
dominant class, because of the nature of economic relations between them. Industrialists had to prove the 
desirability and feasibility of manufacturing as alternative to Brazil's traditional economy21.
The Brazilian economy in the late eighteenth century was overwhelmingly agricultural and pastoral 
and, moreover, export oriented. To speak of entrepreneurs at that time is to speak of senhores de engenho 
(sugar planters and millowners) and other plantation owners. During the colonial period, there was a clear 
distinction between the rural aristocracy, most of whom were Brazilians, and merchants, most of whom were 
foreigners. In the professions, Brazilians were generally restricted to those positions highly regarded in the
20 F.C. Prestes Motta, Empresarios e Heeemonia Politics. (Sao Paulo, 1979), p.41.
21 E.W. Ridings, "Business Associationalism, the Legitimation of Enterprise, and the Emergence 
of a Business Elite in Nineteenth-Century Brazil", in Business History Review. 63, (Winter 1989), pp.757-8.
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rural slave-owning society, such as lawyers. Brazilian wealthy and traditional families, would not invest nor
work in the commercial sector, unless these activities were subordinated to agrarian interests. Equally they
did not feature as import merchants and shopkeepers22. With the development of the coffee economy in the
early 1820s, a new entrepreneurial class destined to play an important role in the future economic
development of the country began to emerge. This new class was initially made up of local entrepreneurs
who had accumulated some capital in commercial activities - mainly provisioning the city of Rio de Janeiro
which was the main Brazilian consumer market - and later turned towards coffee production23.
Comparing the processes of the formation of the ruling classes in the sugar and coffee economies,
some fundamental differences can be pointed out When the ruling class of the sugar economy was formed,
commercial activities were controlled by groups established either in Portugal or in die Low Countries. The
men in charge of production lacked any perspective of the sugar economy as a whole, as die production and
commercial phases were separated. Furthermore, as the fundamental decisions were made at the commercial
stage, the sugar-entrepreneurial class lost its true economic function and executive tasks were carried out
by overseers and other employees. Thus, as Furtado puts it:
"It can therefore be easily seen how the former entrepreneurs [the sugar-entrepreneurial 
class] evolved into a class of idle landlords living within a small rural environment whose 
eventual descendants were to be the easygoing patriarch class."24
Independence from Portugal did not bring about fundamental changes in the sugar-cane planting system.
The formation of the coffee economy occurred under quite different conditions. From the beginning, 
the ruling class was composed of men with business experience, as mentioned above, and production and 
trading interests were inter-related. The new coffee-entrepreneurial class was thus formed through a struggle 
for land, for labour supply, for internal means of transport, for marketing at the ports, for official contacts, 
and for financial and economic policies. These entrepreneurs indeed took advantage of their proximity to 
the capital of the country and soon took control of the government But what particularly differentiates them 
from the other pre-existing dominat groups is the fact that they had a clear concept of their own interests 
and utilized that control to attain their objectives25.
Thus, the sugar class lacked several of the characteristics of the entrepreneur enumerated by the 
economic literature such as risk-taker, capitalist, innovator, and leader. Even the managerial role was handed 
out to overseers and sugar entrepreneurs were restricted to the role of employers of factors of production. 
It was only the new class that emerged with the coffee economy which truly performed the role of the
22 L.C.T.D. Prado, "Commercial Capital, Domestic Market and Manufacturing in Imperial Brazil: 
The Failure of Brazilian Economic Development in the XlXth Century", University of London, unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, 1991, pp.174-83.
23 C. Furtado, The Economic growth of Brazil: A Survey from Colonial to Modem Times. (Los 
Angeles, 1965), pp. 124-125.
24 Ibid., p. 125.
25 Ibid., pp. 124-6.
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modem capitalist entrepreneur.
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that within the coffee entrepreneurial class there were 
important differences between coffee merchants from Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Coffee merchants were 
roughly speaking divided in three ideal types: factor, sacker and exporter. The factor was responsible for 
receiving the processed coffee sent by the planter and selling it to another domestic middleman, the sacker. 
The sacker, in turn, packaged coffee in lots conforming to the requirement of different export houses who 
sold it abroad. In Rio de Janeiro, coffee factors and sackers were predominantly Brazilian and Portuguese, 
whereas the export trade was controlled by a small number of foreign merchant houses. Furthermore, very 
often coffee planters became partners in many carioca factorage houses, rendering it difficult to differentiate 
the factor from the planter. Thus, small, specialized merchants controlled most of the coffee trade in the 
Parafba Valley and played a large role in the pioneering coffee entrepreneurial class26. In contrast, coffee 
trade in Sao Paulo since the beginning tended to be dominated by large export houses, mostly owned by 
foreigners, who concentrate all three roles (factor, sacker, and exporter) in one big operation27.
However, during the first half of the nineteenth century no significant industrial class emerged. 
Although Rio de Janeiro and other Brazilian cities were full of establishments making soap, candles, cotton 
thread, clothing, hats, snuff, cigars, furniture and ironware, the textile and food-processing industries which 
were to form the basis of Brazil's early industrial growth did not appear until after 1840. Indeed there was 
no significant industrial growth until the 1870s. Furthermore, there is some controversy over the debate 
about the social and economic origins of the Brazilian industrial entrepreneurial class. Two main approaches 
may be identified in this debate. The first, die "bourgeois immigrant" approach28, which argues that in the 
promotion of industrialization in Brazil the most important role was played by importers and immigrants, 
or the so-called bourgeois immigrant The second, the "latecomer capitalism" approach29, which argues that 
in Sao Paulo coffee-planters constituted the social group from which emerged the industrial bourgeoisie. 
Nevertheless, both approaches agree that until the end of the 1940s Brazilian industrialization was carried 
out by the rising national bourgeoisie. The participation of the State and of foreign capital was secondary
26 For a detailed description between the relationship coffee planter, factor, sacker and exporter in 
Rio de Janeiro see J.E. Sweigart, Coffee Factorage and the Rmergence of a Brazilian Capital Market 1850- 
1888. (1987).
27 For a more detailed account of the coffee merchant in Sao Paulo see R. Graham, Britain and the 
Onset of Modernization in Brazil. 1850-1914. (Cambridge, 1968). For a comparative view of the mechanics 
of the coffee of economy in the Paraiba Valley and Western Sao Paulo respectively see S.J. Stein, 
Vassouras: A Brazilian Coffee Countv. 1850-1900. (Cambridge, Mass. 1957) and W. Dean, Rio Claro: A 
Brazilian Plantation System. 1820-1920. (Stanford, 1976).
28 Mainly represented by W. Dean, A Industrializacao de Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo, 1971), and J. 
Gorender, A Burguesia Brasileira. (Sao Paulo, 6th ed. 1986).
29 Mainly represented by J.M. Cardoso de Mello, O Canitalismo Tardio: Contribuicao a Revisao 
Critica da Formacao e Desenvolvimento da Economia Brasileira. (Sao Paulo, 1982) and W. Cano, Raizes 
da Concentracao Industrial em Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo, 3rd. ed. 1977).
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during this period30.
The "bourgeois immigrant" approach, argues that the great-grandfather of the Brazilian entrepreneur 
is the artisan agent and the trader. During the nineteenth century, with the emergence and development of 
the importing retail stores, die agent became either the owner of an importing retail store himself or a wage 
labourer. From these importing retail stores were created the largest fortunes of the country31. According to 
Prestes Motta, industry thought of in terms of establishments founded before the First World War was not 
only Brazilian, but also, fundamentally concentrated in textiles, food, and beverages. The textile industry 
represents the starting point of the national bourgeoisie, who conducted the first industrial up-surge. 
However, if it was the national bourgeoisie who carried out the first industrial up-surge, inside the primitive 
Brazilian entrepreneurial class, the importance of the immigrants is widely known32. According to Vinhas 
de Queiroz & Evans, at least 40% of the largest Brazilian economic groups were founded by immigrants33. 
According to Silva, the nucleus of the rising industrial bourgeoisie in die coffee-growing regions descended 
from European immigrants34. Furthermore, as Dean argues, the immigrants who became entrepreneurs were 
not the ones who did not have any resources. These bourgeois immigrants began in the trading business, 
mainly in export and import businesses which were controlled by foreign companies. Thus, their social 
origin and location ensured their position in commerce and manufacturing35. Silva points out that the 
immigrant became die representative of foreign companies, and was entrusted with the distribution of 
branded products in the interior36.
Generally speaking, most of these immigrants became industrialists after coming from the trading 
business, either as owners or as employees. In the city of Rio de Janeiro, most of the textile mills 
established during the last quarter of the last century were founded by foreign merchants dealing with the 
import of cloth37. Several paulista retailers dealing in imports followed the same path. Given the importer's 
privileged position, owing to his control over the internal trade of that time and over commercial capital, 
he was the one who was ffequendy at the origin of manufacturing firms established after 1880. Three 
circumstances favoured the transformation of the importer into an industrialist. Firsdy, importers already had
30 A good brief account of both approaches is given by W. Suzigan, Industria Brasileira: Origem 
e Desenvolvimento. (Sao Paulo, 1986), pp.31-8.
31 Dean, op.cit..
32 Prestes Motta, op.cit.. p.41.
33 Vinhas de Queiroz & Evans quoted in ibid., p.41.
34 S. Silva, Exnansao Cafeeira e Origem da Industria no Brasil. (Sao Paulo, 1976), p.91.
35 Dean, op.cit.. p.58.
36 Silva, op.cit.. p.5.
37 A.M.F.C. Monteiro, "Empreendedores e Investidores em Industria Textil no Rio de Janeiro: 1878- 
1895", Universidade Federal Fluminense, unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Niteroi, 1985, pp.342-3.
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complementary activities, such as assembly operations or even small industrial transformations, in order to 
deliver the final product. Secondly, the importer had knowledge of the market as well as the access to the 
credit provided by the foreign producers or local branches of European banks. Finally, as soon as internal 
consumption increased and diversified, and demand for more complex machinery also increased, they were 
stimulated to transform their sales agency into a licensed manufacturing plant38.
According to the "latecomer capitalism" approach, coffee planters actively participated in the 
establishment of industries at the end of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize 
that farmers were not die only ones to promote the establishment of industry: traders, bankers, immigrants, 
importers and other agents of the coffee complex established industries as well. But the great majority of 
them were in some way or another inter-related with the coffee economy complex. In other words, the 
Brazilian industrialist of the last century was someone wrapped up with the coffee economy in one way or 
another. He might be the farmer, the banker, die importer, the trader, the agent, or even all of diem at the 
same time. He could have started in one of these activities, progressively becoming an industrialist He also 
could be one of the coffee planters' relatives who got into industry with the planter's help. Thus, if one could 
draw the genealogical tree of the Brazilian industrialist one should certainly come to the conclusion that his 
great-grandfather was die colonial merchant capitalist; his grandfather, the merchant, slave-owning coffee 
planter; and, his father, the capitalist coffee planter or other businessmen of the coffee economic complex39.
According to Cano, it was coffee capital which promoted the first industrial expansion, direcdy or 
indirectly. Farmers themselves invested their profits directly in industries, as well as indirectly, when their 
profits passed through the banking system (or were utilized in the establishment of the banks themselves) 
or through any other form of financial and capital intermediation40. Some evidence of this fact can be found 
in Mello, who examines the portfolio of the most wealthy persons from Sao Paulo in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. This group was mainly constituted by farmers, and more specifically, farmers from 
Western Sao Paulo, growing coffee or sugar. According to the author, several of these names were direcdy 
or indirectly related with the main companies established in the last decades of the last century. They, or 
their relatives, were directors or shareholders in banks, railways, textile mills, public utilities companies, 
import and export trading companies, and a number of companies in different branches of the industry41. 
As she puts it:
"There would be, therefore, resources in cash which transferred from the coffee export
complex flowed to several other investments. Part of the agrarian capital, transformed in
shares, constituted an important source of financing to the new undertakings."42
38 Dean, op.cit.. pp.25-9.
39 Cardoso de Mello, O capitalismo tardio. and Cano, op.cit..
40 Cano, op.cit.. pp.69-87.
41 Z.M.C. Mello, Metamorfoses da Riaueza: Sao Paulo. 1845-1895. (Sao Paulo, 1985), pp. 131-4.
42 Ibid., pp.138.
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Thus, the "latecomer capitalism" approach supports the idea that the Brazilian industrialist of the last century 
was someone who logically evolved from the development of the coffee economic complex and was 
intensively wrapped up with it.
To sum up, according to the Brazilian economic historiography die modem Brazilian capitalist 
entrepreneur emerged only in the second decade of the last century with the expansion of the coffee 
economy, first in the Paraiba Valley and then in Western Sao Paulo. This coffee-entrepreneurial class 
established the economic and social basis for the emergence of a further stage of capitalist development in 
Brazil. In regard to the origin of the Brazilian industrialist, there are two main interpretations: the first, 
which argues that in the promotion of industrialization in Brazil the most important role was played by 
importers and immigrants, the so-called bourgeois immigrant; the second, argues that coffee-planters 
constituted the social group within which the industrial bourgeoisie emerged. Moreover, although the State 
will have an important role in the Brazilian economic development later on, the process of industrialization 
which occurred during die last century was basically carried out by the Brazilian entrepreneurial class. 
However, most of what was written so far about the social and economic origins of the Brazilian industrialist 
are drawn based mainly on evidence of the experience of Sao Paulo and, to a lesser extent, Rio de Janeiro. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence suggesting that the pattern of entrepreneurial development in other parts of 
Brazil, like Minas Gerais was somewhat different.
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Chapter 3 - THE MINEIRO ENTREPRENEUR
An important aspect in the study of the entrepreneur is the question of the availability of 
entrepreneurs. While classic economic theory devotes much attention to factor availability, it does not 
consider the supply of entrepreneurial talent The general view is that there will be ample supply of 
entrepreneurs, as long as there is a suitable legal framework, a free market, and freedom of enterprise. 
Generally speaking, however, die supply of new entrepreneurs is influenced by the groups from which they 
come, by general social influences and attitude towards entrepreneurship, and by economic considerations.
In many societies, the pool of entrepreneurial talent is composed of the families, the associates and 
- occasionally - the workers of existing entrepreneurs. In less developed countries a large proportion of early 
industrial and commercial entrepreneurs were drawn from the rural sector. Possibly this was due to the 
farming traditions of independence and self-sufficiency handed down from generation to generation. Often 
the children of farmers could count on financial support when setting-up in business, as the case of the 
Mascarenhas family illustrates so well. Also, small early manufacturing enterprises were often established 
in the countryside1.
The general social attitude towards entrepreneurship is another major influence on the supply of 
entrepreneurs. Social influences that derive from the educational system, literature and arts in general, 
religion, and politics affect the supply of entrepreneurs. Weber, as mentioned above, explored the influence 
of religion on the general attitude towards entrepreneurship in Western Europe. On the economic side, 
institutions, laws, or regulations which affect opportunities for the entrepreneurs can also be regarded as 
having an effect on the supply of entrepreneurship. The availability of means of transport or the willingness 
of financial institutions to provide funds to new or aspiring entrepreneurs are obviously significant2.
This chapter will examine the social, ethnic, and economic origins of nineteenth-century mineiro 
entrepreneur. It will compare the main social and economic influences on the process of the formation of 
the mineiro and the Brazilian entrepreneurial classes. The first part investigates the social and ethnic 
background of the mineiro entrepreneur. Its main focus is an analysis of the social groups from which the 
mineiro entrepreneurs emerged. The second part examines the main economic influences on the formation 
of the mineiro entrepreneurial class. In other words, it investigates the main sources of capital available to 
would-be entrepreneurs.
3.1 - Social Background:
This part considers the social and ethnic origins of entrepreneurs. It is focused on the 
entrepreneurial formation in the main coffee-growing and non-coffee-growing regions of Minas Gerais 
(mainly the southern and the central parts respectively) and on four different economic sectors: iron;
1 H. Lydall, The Entrepreneurial Factor in Economic Growth. (1992), pp.82-3.
2 Ibid., pp.84-6.
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transport; textile; and electricity generating industries.
As shown above, the social group constituted by importers and immigrants, the so-called bourgeois 
immigrant, had a large influence on the formation of the paulista entrepreneurial class3. The importance of 
immigrants is also widely acknowledged, even in the case of the primitive Brazilian entrepreneurial class4. 
Regarding the formation of the mineiro entrepreneurial class, the participation of immigrants was much more 
limited. Immigrants had a small but relevant participation in the establishment of the mineiro iron industry 
and had a large participation in the entrepreneurial class of the Mata zone, a major coffee-growing area. 
Elsewhere, immigrants are hardly observed.
In the iron sector, foreign entrepreneurs were important during the first three-quarters of the last 
century. Two of the most successful foundries during this period were established by foreigners. The 
Patribtica foundry was set-up by Eschwege, a German engineer, who came to Minas Gerais in 1811 with 
the permission of the Portuguese Prince D. Joao IV for whom he had previously worked in the Figueiro dos 
Vinhos foundry in Portugal. He was reckoned to be a man of great knowledge, having written extensively 
about natural sciences5. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that he had a more elaborated background and 
can be classified as a bourgeois immigrant, as defined by Dean6. The Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry was 
founded by Monlevade, a French engineer who came o Brazil in 18177. Other foundries, smaller and less 
important, were also established by foreigners8. Furthermore, foreigners and their descendants participated 
in the establishment of the larger foundries which began to dominate the mineiro iron industry in the last 
quarter of the last century. The Esperanga foundry was established in 1888 by three Brazilians (Amaro da 
Silveira, Henrique Hargreaves, and Carlos da Costa Wigg) and a Swiss metallurgist (Alberto Gerspacher). 
Later Jose Gerspacher (son of Alberto Gerspacher and who operated both mills) and Carlos da Costa Wigg 
established the Bumier foundry in 18929.
Thus, foreign entrepreneurs had a small but relevant participation in the establishment of the 
mineiro iron industry. This seems due to the technological know-how that these foreigners possessed, which 
was not available in the form of machinery as was the case of the textile industry10. Nevertheless, from the
3 W. Dean, A Industrializacao de Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo, 1971).
4 F.C. Prestes Motta, Empresarios e Hegemonia Pohtica. (Sao Paulo, 1979), p.41.
5 F.A.M. Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil. (Belo Horizonte/Sao Paulo, 1983), pp.79-85.
6 Dean, op.cit..
7 D.C. Libby, Transformacao e Trabalho em uma Economia Escravista: Minas Gerais no Seculo 
XIX. (Sao Paulo, 1988), p.149.
8 Ibid., pp. 163-9.
9 W. Suzigan, Industria Brasileira: Origem e Desenvolvimento. (Sao Paulo, 1986), pp.258-9.
10 For a further discussion of iron and textile technologies see chapters 6 and 7.
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tevidence presented above and bearing in mind that the estimated number of foundries in Minas Gerais 
during the period 1821-1893 was never smaller than 30H, it is clear that most of the foundries belonged to 
Brazilians.
The participation of immigrants was much larger within the entrepreneurial class of the Mata zone. 
Here is widely accepted that foreign residents played a key role in the process of industrialization12. The 
flow of immigrants to the region began in the 1850s with the establishment of an immigrant colony by the 
Companhia Uniao e Industria (CUI). Most of the immigrants were Germans, who were later responsible for 
the first industrial upsurge of Juiz de Fora. In the late 1880s, a large number of Italians arrived in Juiz de 
Fora. Several would subsequently establish tanneries and factories making hats, shoes, furniture, and so on13. 
Table m .l  - Juiz de Fora: nationality of factory owners, 1858-1912.
Origin No. of Establishments %
Germans 28 43.1
Brazilians 19 29.3
Italians 14 21.5
English 01 1.5
Other 02 3.1
No Information Available 01 1.5
Total 65 100.0
Source: Adapted from L.A.V. Arantes, "As Origens da Burguesia Industrial em Juiz de Fora, 1858/1912", 
Universidade Federal Fluminense, unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Niteroi, 1991, p. 160.
Moreover, as shown in Table III. 1, immigrants owned more than 66% of the total number of 
industries established in Juiz de Fora during the period 1858-1912, which seems to corroborated Lydall's 
view - presented above - that immigrants are one of the major sources of new entrepreneurs14. German 
immigrants were particularly well represented and owned the largest number of the industrial establishments 
(43%). Furthermore, it is important to point out that although nearly half of the Germans who came to Juiz 
de Fora were Catholics, those who became industrialists during the period 1858-1912 were mainly 
Protestants15. This seems to corroborate Weber's theory of the influence of the Protestant ethic on the
11 Libby, op.cit.. p. 154.
12 For a further discussion about the participation of immigrants in the industrialization of Juiz de 
Fora see A. Esteves, Album do Municfnio de Juiz de Fora. (Belo Horizonte, 1914); D.A. Giroletti, A 
Industrializacao de Juiz de Fora: 1850-1930. (Juiz de Fora, 1988); P. Oliveira, Histdria de Juiz de Fora. (Juiz 
de Fora, 1966); L.J. Stehling, "Trajetoria da Industria em Juiz de Fora", in Revista do Institute) Historico 
e Geogrdfico de Juiz de Fora. (Juiz de Fora, 1966), Vol.2, No.2, pp.30-7; and LA..V. Arantes, "As Origens 
da Burguesia Industrial em Juiz de Fora, 1858/1912", Universidade Federal Fluminense, unpublished M.Sc. 
thesis, Niteroi, 1991.
13 Arantes, op.cit.. pp.87-121.
14 Lydall, op.cit.. p.83.
15 Arantes, op.cit.. pp.88-9.
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formation of the spirit of capitalism. The figures presented in Table III. 1 provide undisputable evidence of
the importance of immigrants in the formation of the entrepreneurial class of the Mata zone, especially in
the city of Juiz de Fora. Furthermore, contrary to what some authors observed in Sao Paulo16, the immigrant
who became industrialist in Juiz de Fora usually did not fit into the "bourgeois immigrant" concept. Most
of the immigrants who became industrialists in Juiz de Fora had initially come to Brazil to work as
labourers, craftsmen, or farm hands, and were attracted by the prospect of owning a piece of land17.
Despite the importance of immigrants in the establishment of the iron industry and in the formation
of the entrepreneurial class of the Mata zone, the mineiro entrepreneurial class was nevertheless largely
constituted by Brazilians. Even in the Mata zone Brazilians were an important source of entrepreneurship.
As shown in Table III. 1, Brazilians were responsible for the establishment of nearly a third of the industries
founded in Juiz de Fora in the period 1858-1912. Within Brazilians, industrialists not connected with the
coffee economy owned just over 26% of die total number of industries. Farmers had a small participation,
owning just over 3% of the industries established in Juiz de Fora18.
One of the most important enterprises set-up by farmers of the Mata zone was the Companhia
Uniao e Industria (CUT). The company was established by Mariano Procdpio Ferreira Lage, a farmer bom
in Barbacena, and several other farmers of the region19, as illustrated by the following remark made in the
company report of 1857:
"I would like to acknowledge the services rendered to the company by two of its 
shareholders, (...). They are the Commendador Jos6 Antonio da Silva Pinto and Lino Jose 
Ferreira Armond. The Commendador Jose A. da Silva Pinto has advanced large amounts 
of money to the Company, (...); has hired out to the company more than a hundred slaves 
from his own stock, who are working on the construction of the turnpike between Mathias 
and the bridge over the Parahybuna river. Moreover, he has suffered several losses caused 
by the construction of the section which passes through his farm, destroying stables, etc., 
and has refused any kind of indemnification.20
Thus, it seems that the CUI was established by local farmers interested in improving the means of transport 
for their production, as was the case with several of the first railways in the province of Sao Paulo21.
The textile industry, which was mostly concentrated in the central part of Minas Gerais, as shown 
in Map 3, was established almost exclusively by Brazilian entrepreneurs drawn from a few families or a
16 See Dean, op.cit. and J. Gorender, A Burguesia Brasileira. (Sao Paulo, 6th ed. 1986).
17 Arantes, op.cit.. p.98.
18 Ibid., p. 160.
19 Ibid., p.35.
20 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), pp.38-9.
21 C.M. Lewis, Public Policy and Private Initiative: Railway Building in Sao Paulo. 1860-1889. 
(1991), pp.35-55. For a further discussion about the building and the financing of the Paulista railways see 
also F.A.M. Saes, As Ferrovias de Sao Paulo. 1870-1940. (Sao Paulo, 1981).
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MAP 3 - MINAS GERAIS: LOCATION OF TEXTILE MILLS FOUNDED BETWEEN 1872 AND 
1887.
Senhor Bon Jesus D'Agua Fria (1881)
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Source: D.C. Libby, Trapcfnrmacao e Trabalho em uma Economia Escravista: Minas Gerais no Seculo XIX. 
(Sao Paulo, 1988), p.231.
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small circle of friends. As shown in Table III.2, the mills founded during the 1870s were established by
Table IIL2 - Minas Gerais: nationality of the main promoters and shareholders of the textile mills 
established in the 1870s.
MILL MAIN PROMOTERS AND SHAREHOLDERS NATIONALITY
Cedro Antonio Candido Mascarenhas Brazilian
Caetano Mascarenhas Brazilian
Bernardo Mascarenhas Brazilian
Brumado Franciso Jose de Andrade Botelho Brazilian
SAIM Azarias de Souza Dias Brazilian
Biribiry Santos family Brazilian
Cachoeira Pacifico Mascarenhas Brazilian
Victor Mascarenhas Brazilian
Francisco Mascarenhas Brazilian
Luis Augus o Vianna Barbosa Brazilian
Uniao Itabirana Information not available n.a.
Guimaraes, Francisco Jos6 de Andrade Botelho. (Belo Horizonte, 1950), p. 14; M.L.P. Costa, A Fabrica de 
Tecidos de Machado. 1871-1917. (Belo Horizonte, 1989), p.25; M.T.R.O. Versiani, "The Cotton Textile 
Industry of Minas Gerais, Brazil: Beginnings and Early Development, 1868-1906", University of London, 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1991, pp.50-1; G.M. Mascarenhas, Centendrio da Fabrica do Cedro. 1872-1972. 
(Belo Horizonte, 1972), pp.93-118; S.J. Stein, Origens e Evolucao da Industria Textil no Brasil. 1850-1950. 
(Rio de Janeiro, 1950), p.216.
Notes: (n.a.) information not available.
local entrepreneurs. The Cedro mill, for example, was founded in 1872 by three brothers - Antonio Candido, 
Caetano, and Bernardo Mascarenhas - bom in Taboleiro Grande, Minas Gerais22. During the same year, 
Franciso Jos6 de Andrade Botelho, bom in Carrancas, Minas Gerais, set-up the Brumado mill23. The 
Sociedade Andnima Industrial Machadense (SAIM) was organized in 1875 by 24 people, most of whom 
were local businessmen. Among them, Azarias de Souza Dias, die main promoter and shareholder, who was 
bom in Santo Antonio do Machado, Minas Gerais24. The Biribiry mill was established in 1876 by the bishop 
of Diamantina, Minas Gerais, Joao Antonio dos Santos, two of his brothers (Antonio Felicio, and Joaquim 
Felicio dos Santos), his nephew and another partner25. The Cachoeira mill was founded in 1877 by three 
other brothers of the founders of the Cedro mill (Pacifico, Victor, and Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas), 
who were also bom in Taboleiro Grande, and one of their brothers-in-law (Luis Augusto Vianna Barbosa),
22 P. Tamm, Uma Dinastia de Teceloes. (Belo Horizonte, 2nd ed. 1960), pp.64-9.
23 G. Guimaraes, Francisco Jose de Andrade Botelho. (Belo Horizonte, 1950), p. 14.
24 M.L.P. Costa, A Fabrica de Tecidos de Machado. 1871-1917. (Belo Horizonte, 1989), p.25.
25 M.T.R.O. Versiani, "The Cotton Textile Industry of Minas Gerais, Brazil: Beginnings and Early 
Development, 1868-1906", Univeristy of London, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1991, pp.50-1.
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bom in Matozinhos, Minas Gerais26. There is evidence that the Uniao Itabirana mill, founded in 1876, was 
organized and financed by local people. A report of the Comissao Parlamentar de Inquerito observed that 
the Uniao Itabirana mill had this name owing to the fact that most of its shareholders came from the city 
of Itabira, Minas Gerais27.
As shown in Table III.3, during the 1880s textile mills continued to be founded by Brazilians, 
mainly local entrepreneurs. In 1880, the Filatorio Montes Claros was established by a small group of locals 
connected by ties of kinship and friendship. The major shareholders were two brothers, Manoel and Donato 
Rodrigues, from Grao Mogol, Antonio Narciso Soares, bom in Bocaiuva, Gregorio Velloso, from Montes 
Claros itself and Angelo de Quadros Bittencourt, bom in the province of Bahia28. There is no information 
about the founders of the Marzagao mill established in Sahara in 188029. Similarly, there is no information 
about the date when the Cassu mill was established nor about its founders but given the name of the 
company, Borges, Irmaos & Co., it is reasonable to believe that the mill belonged to Brazilians30. The same 
can be said about the owners of the Bom Jardim mill, established in 1883 by the partnership Pereira Murta 
& Co.31, and about the owners of the Vigosa mill, established in Vigosa by Mello & Reis Company32. The 
Sao Sebastiao mill was established in 1884 by Antonio Gongalves da Silva Mascarenhas, father of the 
Mascarenhas brothers, founders of the Cedro and the Cachoeira mill, who was bom in Curral d'El Rey in 
Minas Gerais33. Very little is known about the founders of the Sao Vicente mill established in 1885 in Pau 
Grosso. However, shortly after its establishment the mill was acquired by the Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira 
(CCC), founded by the Mascarenhas family34. The Companhia Cachoeira de Macacos (CCM) was 
established in 1886 by a group of locals brought together by Am6rico Teixeira Guimaraes35. He was bom
26 G.M. Mascarenhas, Centenario da Fabrica do Cedro. 1872-1972. (Belo Horizonte, 1972), pp.93-
118.
27 S.J. Stein, Origens e Evolucao da Industria Textil no Brasil. 1850-1950. (Rio de Janeiro, 1950),
p.216.
28 Versiani, op.cit.. pp.81-2.
29 Ibid., pp.75-6.
30 Ibid., p.76.
31 Ibid., p.76.
32 Ibid., p.77.
33 Tamm, op.cit.. p.25.
34 A.M. Vaz, Cia. Cedro e Cachoeira: Historia de iima Empresa Familiar. 1883-1987. (Belo 
Horizonte, 1990), pp. 102-3. i
35 Versiani, op.cit.. p.88.
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in Inhauma, Minas Gerais, and was the son of the main shareholder, Joao da Matta Teixeira36. Little
information is available about the Uniao Lavrense mill, apart from die fact that it was established in 1886.
Table III 3 - Minas Gerais: nationality of the main promoters and shareholders of the textile mills 
established in the 1880's
MILL MAIN PROMOTERS AND SHAREHOLDERS NATIONALITY
Cassii Borges, Irmaos & Co. n.a.
Marzagao Companhia Industrial Sabarense n.a.
Filatorio Montes Claros Manoel Rodrigues Brazilian
Donato Rodrigues Brazilian
Antonio Narciso Soares Brazilian
Angelo de Quadros Bittencourt Brazilian
Gregdrio Velloso Brazilian
Bom Jaidira Pereira Murta & Co. n.a.
Sao Sebastiao Antonio Gon9alves da Silva Mascarenhas Brazilian
Vi5osa Mello & Reis Co. n.a.
Industrial Mineira Andrew Steele English
John Steele English
Peter Steele English
William Moreth English
Hairy Whittaker English
Sao Vicente Information not available n.a.
Uniao Lavrense Information not available n.a.
Cachoeira dos Macacos Joao da Matta Teixeira Brazilian
Jeronymo Francisco Franca Brazilian
Am^rico Teixeira Guimaraes Brazilian
Santa Barbara Pedro da Matta Machado Brazilian
Augusto da Matta Machado Brazilian
Francisco F. Correa Rabelo Brazilian
Pedro Jose Verciani Brazilian
Joao Antonio L. de Figueiredo Brazilian
Antonio Moreira da Costa Brazilian
Paulo Moreirense Information not available n.a.
Mascarenhas Bernardo Mascarenhas Brazilian
Pedreira Information not available n.a.
Sao Roberto Quintiliano Alves Ferreira Brazilian
Industrial Ouro Preto Information not available n.a.
Historia de nma Empresa Familiar. 1883-1987. (Belo Horizonte, 1990), pp. 102-3; N.A.M. Freitas, "Cia. 
Textil Cachoeira dos Macacos: Empresa que deu Origem a uma Cidade", Fundagao Mineira de Arte 
Aleijadinho/Escola Superior de Artes Plasticas, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1990p.l7; N.L. Mascarenhas, 
Bernardo Mascarenhas: o Surto Industrial de Minas Gerais. (Rio de Janeiro, 1954), pp. 123-5.
Notes: (n.a.) information not available.
36 NA..M. Freitas, "Cia. Textil Cachoeira dos Macacos: Empresa que deu Origem a uma Cidade", 
Fundagao Mineira de Arte Aleijadinho/Escola Superior de Artes Plasticas, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1990, 
p.17.
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Nevertheless, there is evidence that most of its first shareholders lived in the city of Rio de Janeiro -there 
was pressure to transfer the headquarters of the company from Lavras to Rio de Janeiro37. The founders of 
the Santa Barbara mill, established in 1886, were a small and local group of friends and relatives bom in 
the county of Diamantina where the mill was set-up, namely, the three brothers Alvaro, Pedro and Augusto 
da Matta Machado, their brothers-in-law Francisco Ferreira Correa Rabelo, Pedro Jos6 Verciani, and Joao 
Antonio Lopes de Figueiredo, and Antonio Moreira da Costa38. There is no information about the founders 
of the Paulo Moreirense mill, established in 1887, nor about the founders of the Pedreira mill, founded in 
188839. The Tecelagem Mascarenhas mill was organized in 1888 in Juiz de Fora by Bernardo Mascarenhas, 
who was bom in Taboleiro Grande, as mentioned above40. The Sao Roberto mill was founded in 1888 by 
Quintiliano Alves Ferreira, the Baron of Sao Roberto, who was a local businessman41. Although there is little 
information about the establishment of the Industrial Ouro Preto mill, it seems that the mill was set-up by 
capitalists from Rio de Janeiro42. The Industrial Mineira mill was one of the few textile mills established 
by foreigners during the 1880s: it was established in Juiz de Fora in 1884 by Englishmen - Andrew Steele, 
John Steele, Peter Steele, William Moreth, and Henry Whittaker43. It is interesting to point out that, with 
the exception of the Industrial Mineira mill, the SAIM, and the Tecelagem Mascarenhas mill, all of the firms 
set-up before the end of the 1880s were established in non-coffee-growing areas.
Most of the textile mills organized during the 1890s were also founded by Brazilians, as shown in 
Table IH.4. The Companhia de Tecidos Santanense (CTS) was set-up in Santana do Sao Joao Acima in 1891 
by members of the Souza Moreira family: Manoel Jose de Souza Moreira, bom in Bonfim, Minas Gerais; 
his sons, Manoel Gonsalves de Souza Moreira and Augusto Gonsalves de Souza Moreira, bom in Santana 
do Sao Joao Acima; and his son-in-law, Antonio Pereira de Mattos, bom in Campos, Rio de Janeiro44. The 
Sao Joanense mill was established in 1891 by Antonio Moreira da Costa Rodrigues, of whom there is no 
information about his place of birth45. The Companhia Industrial Pitanguense - which bought, enlarged and
37 Versiani, op.cit.. p.88.
38 Ibid., pp.86-8.
39 Ibid., pp.89-91.
40 N.L. Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas: o Surto Industrial de Minas Gerais. (Rio de Janeiro, 
1954), pp. 123-5.
41 Versiani, op.cit.. p.91.
42 Ibid., p.92.
43 Ibid., p.82.
44 M.A.G. Souza, Historia de Itanna. (Belo Horizonte, 1986), I, p. 101-94.
45 Versiani, op.cit.. p. 128.
improved the Brumado mill - was founded in 189346. Its major shareholders were Luiz Augusto Vianna
Barbosa, Francisco Bahia da Rocha, Sergio Mascarenhas Barbosa, and Antonio Mascarenhas Barbosa
respectively47. Sergio Mascarenhas Barbosa and Antonio Mascarenhas Barbosa were sons of Luiz Augusto
Table III.4 - Minas Gerais: nationality of the main promoters and shareholders of the textile mills 
established in the 1890s.
MILL MAIN PROMOTERS AND SHAREHOLDERS NATIONALITY
Santanense Manoel Jose de Souza Moreira Brazilian
Manoel Gonsalves de Souza Moreira Brazilian
Augusto Gonsalves de S. Moreira Brazilian
Antonio Pereira de Mattos Brazilian
Sao Joanense Antonio Moreira da Costa Rodrigues n.a.
Itabira do Campo Information not available n.a.
Pitanguense Luiz Augusto Barbosa Brazilian
Francisco Bahia da Rocha n.a.
Sergio Mascarenhas Barbosa Brazilian
Antonio Mascarenhas Brazilian
Cachoeira Grande Anonio Ferreira Alves da Silva Brazilian
Joao da Matta Teixeira Brazilian
Americo Teixeira Guimaraes Brazilian
Herculino Franga • Brazilian
Progresso Fabril Carlos Vaz de Mello Brazilian
Melancias Jeronymo Francisco Franga Brazilian
Joao da Matta Teixeira Brazilian
Theophilo Marques Ferreira Brazilian
Sao Domingos Moreira Penna family Brazilians
Sao Joao Nepomuceno Daniel de Moraes Sarmento Junior Brazilian
Jequitahy Information not available n.a.
Perpetua Information not available n.a.
Itinga Information not available n.a.
on.cit.. p. 128-243; G.M. Mascarenhas, op.cit.. p.l 18; Tamm, op.cit.. p.87; Companhia Industrial Pitanguense, 
T.ista Nominativa dos Srs. Subscritores. (1894), in Minas Gerais. 5 January 1894, p.7; Companhia Industrial 
Pitanguense, Estatutos. (1893) in Minas Gerais. 5 January 1894, pp.7-8; Companhia Industrial Pitanguense, 
Ata da Assemblea Geral Institutiva. (1893) in Minas Gerais. 5 January 1894, p.7; Companhia Progresso 
Fabril, Ata da Sessao da Assemblea Geral dos Accionistas para a Constituicao da mesma Cnmnanhia. 
(1893), in Minas Gerais. 23 May 1893, pp.6-8; Companhia Industrial Sao Domingos, Ata da Assemblea de 
Instalacao. (1894), in Minas Gerais. 21 February 1894, p.7; and Companhia Industrial Sao Domingos, Lista 
dos Acionistas. (1894), in Minas Gerais. 21 February 1894, p.7.
Notes: (n.a.) information not available.
46 Companhia Industrial Pitanguense, Estatutos. (1893) in Minas Gerais. 5 January 1894, pp.7-8; 
and Companhia Industrial Pitanguense, Ata da Assembleia Geral Institutiva. (1893) in Minas Gerais. 5 
January 1894, p.7.
47 Companhia Industrial Pitanguense, Lista Nominativa dos Srs. Subscritores. (1894), in Minas 
Gerais. 5 January 1894, p.7.
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Vianna Barbosa48 and Custodia Mascarenhas, one of the sisters of the Mascarenhas brothers49. There is no 
information about the place of birth of Francisco Bahia da Rocha. However, one of his sons, who had the 
same name, was a minor shareholder in the CCC and had been manager of the Sao Vicente mill from 1894 
to 189950. The Cachoeira Grande mill was established by Antonio Ferreira Alves da Silva, a farmer from 
Minas Gerais, associated with Joao da Matta Teixeira, Americo Teixeira Guimaraes, and Herculino Franca, 
all three shareholders of the CCM51. The promoter and major shareholder of die Companhia Progresso 
Fabril, established in 1893, was Carlos Vaz de Mello, a politician from Vigosa, Minas Gerais52. The 
Melancias mill was established by a group of mineiro investors who were already associated with other 
textile undertakings in Minas Gerais: Jeronymo Francisco Franca, Joao da Matta Teixeira - both of whom 
were directors of the CCM at the time of the establishment of the Melancias mill - and Thedphilo Marques 
Ferreira who was bom in Lagoa Santa, Minas Gerais53. The Sao Domingos mill was founded in 1894 in 
Santa Barbara by local people54. Four of the seven original shareholders belonged to the Moreira Penna 
family55. One of the members of the Moreira Penna family was Affonso Augusto Moreira Penna, who was 
one of the largest shareholders of the mill and Governor of Minas Gerais at this time56. The major 
shareholder of the Companhia de Tecidos Mineiros Sao Joao Nepomuceno, organized in 1894, was Daniel 
de Moraes Sarmento Junior, who also belonged to a local family, the Moraes Sarmentos57. There is no 
information available about the founders of the Itabira do Campo, the Jequitahy, the Perpetua, and the Itinga 
mills58.
Hence, as evidence presented above has shown, most of the owners/shareholders of textile firms
48 Versiani, op.cit.. p. 168.
49 Tamm, op.cit.. p.87.
50 Versiani, op.cit.. pp. 169-70.
51 Ibid., pp. 174-5.
52 Companhia Progresso Fabril, Ata da Sessao da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas para a 
Constituicao da mesma Companhia. (1893), in Minas Gerais. 23 May 1893, pp.6-8.
53 Mascarenhas, Centenario da Fabrica do Cedro. p. 118 and Versiani, op.cit.. p. 165.
54 Companhia Industrial Sao Domingos, Ata da Assembleia de Tnstalacao. (1894), in Minas Gerais. 
21 February 1894, p.7.
55 Companhia Industrial Sao Domingos, Lista dos Acionistas. (1894), in Minas Gerais. 21 February 
1894, p.7.
56 Versiani, op.cit.. pp.172-74.
57 Companhia Tecidos Mineiros, Relacao dos Acionistas. (1894), in Minas Gerais. 11 February 
1894, p.6.
58 Versiani, op.cit.. pp. 128-243.
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in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais were locals with strong ties of kinship and friendship. This is hardly 
surprising since, as Lydall has observed, in many societies families and associates are the main sources of 
entrepreneurial talents59.
Comparison between the nationality of the main promoters and shareholders of textile firms 
established in Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais illustrates very well the ethnic differences between the
Table EQ.5 - The city of Rio de Janeiro: nationality of the main promoters of the textile companies 
established in the period 1878-1895.
COMPANY MAIN PROMOTERS NATIONALITY
FTSL Jose Maria Teixeira de Azevedo Portuguese
FTPG Antonio Felfcio dos Santos Brazilian
Jose Rodrigues Peixoto Brazilian
John Sherrington English
FTR Frederico Glette German
FFTTA Jos6 Augusto Laranja Portuguese
Joaquim C. de Oliveira e Silva Portuguese
Henry Whittaker English
FFTTB Joaquim Marques da Costa Portuguese
FFTC Peter Steele English
Henry Whittaker English
George Holden English
FTSJ John Valentine Hall 
James Grainger Bellamy 
John Henry Lowndes
English
English
English
FTSC Frederico Pinheiro da Silva Brazilian
John Henry Lowndes English
Jose da Cunha Ferreira Brazilian
CFTCI Manoel Salgado Zenha Portuguese
Francisco Tavares Bastos n.a.
Joao Jose dos Reis Portuguese
CPIB Banco Rural e Hypotecario 
Banco Intemacional do Brasil
CFTC Viscount of Figueiredo Brazilian
C&ndido da Cunha Sotto Maior Portuguese
CFTSF Affonso de Lamare n.a.
FTR - Fabrica de Tecidos do Rink; CFTC - Companhia de Fiagao e Tecidos Corcovado; CPIB - Companhia 
Progresso Industrial do Brasil; FFTC - Fabrica de Fiagao e Tecelagem Carioca; FTPG - Fabrica de Tecidos 
Pau Grande; FTSC - Fabrica de Tecidos de Sao Christovao; FTSJ - Fabrica de Tecidos Sao Joao; FTSL - 
Fabrica de Tecidos Sao Lazaro; CFTCI - Companhia de Fiagao e Tecidos Confianga Industrial; CFTSF - 
Companhia de Fiagao e Tecidos Sao Felix; FFTTA - Fabrica de Fiagao, Tecidos e Tinturaria Allianga; 
FFTTB - Fabrica de Fiagao, Tecidos e Tinturaria Bomfim.
Source: AJM.F.C. Monteiro, "Empreendedores e Investidores em Industria Textil no Rio de Janeiro: 1878- 
1895", Universidade Federal Fluminense, unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Niteroi, 1985, pp.98-283.
Notes: (n.a.) information not available.
mineiro entrepreneur and his carioca counterpart. Most of the textile mills established during the period
59 Lydall, op.cit. pp.80-9.
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1878-1895 in the city of Rio de Janeiro were founded by foreigners. As shown in Table III.5, die Fabrica 
de Tecidos Sao Lazaro (FTSL) was founded in 1877 by Jose Maria Teixeira de Azevedo, a Portuguese60. 
The Fabrica de Tecidos Pau Grande (FTPG) was founded in 1878 by Antonio Felicio dos Santos, bom in 
Diamantina Minas Gerais, Josd Rodrigues Peixoto, from Rio de Janeiro, and John Sherrington, an 
Englishman61. The Fabrica de Tecidos do Rink (FTR) was founded in 1879 by Frederico Glette, a German62. 
The Fabrica de Fiagao, Tecidos e Tinturaria Albania (FFTTA) was founded in 1880 by Josd Augusto 
Laranja, Joaquim Carvalho de Oliveira e Silva, both of them Portuguese, and Henry Whittaker, an 
Englishman63. The Fabrica de Fiagao, Tecidos e Tinturaria Bomfim (FFTTB) was probably founded in 1882 
by Joaquim Marques da Costa, a Portuguese64. The Fabrica de Fiagao e Tecelagem Carioca (FFTC) was 
founded in 1884. The main promoters of the mill were three Englishmen Peter Steele, Henry Whittaker, and 
George Holden65. The Fabrica de Tecidos Sao Joao (FTSJ) was probably founded in 1886 by Englishmen 
John Valentine Hall, James Grainger Bellamy, and John Henry Lowndes66. The Fabrica de Tecidos de Sao 
Christovao (FTSC) was founded in 1888 by two Brazilians, Frederico Pinheiro da Silva and Josd da Cunha 
Ferreira, and an Englishman, John Henry Lowndes67. The Companhia de Fiagao e Tecidos Confianga 
Industrial (CFTCI) was founded in 1885 by two Portuguese, Manoel Salgado Zenha and Joao Jose dos Reis, 
and Francisco Tavares Bastos, of whom there is no information about his nationality68. The Companhia 
Progresso Industrial do Brasil (CPIB) was founded in 1889 by the Banco Rural e Hypotecdrio and by the 
Banco International do Brasil69. The Companhia de Fiagao e Tecidos Corcovado (CFTC) was founded in 
1889 by the Viscount of Figueiredo, a Brazilian, and Candido da Cunha Sotto Maior, a Portuguese70. Finally, 
the Companhia de Fiagao e Tecidos Sao Felix (CFTSF) was founded in 1891 by Affonso de Lamare, of 
whom there is no information about his nationality71.
60 Monteiro, op.tit.. pp.98-101.
Ibid., pp. 120-3.
Ibid., pp. 132-4.
Ibid., pp. 143-7.
Ibid., pp. 156-9.
Ibid., pp.169-76.
Ibid., pp. 182-3.
Ibid., pp. 193-4.
Ibid., pp.208-13.
Ibid., pp.223-9.
Ibid., pp.239-43.
Ibid., pp.252-4.
75
A comparison between the nationality of the main promoters and shareholders of the mineiro and
carioca textile industries reveals how different the mineiro entrepreneurial class was ftom that portrayed by
the Brazilian economic historiography. Whereas a large number of carioca textile entrepreneurs were
immigrants, their mineiro counterparts were mainly local entrepreneurs. The main reason accounting for this
discrepancy was the larger concentration of foreigners in Rio de Janeiro. In the period 1872-1920, for
example, foreigners represented no less than 20% of the carioca population, while during the same period
they did not represent more than 4% of the mineiro population72. In addition, foreigners controlled the large
sectors of commercial activities of the main urban centres. In the late 1850s, foreigners owned 62% of
wholesale textiles in Rio de Janeiro73. Soon, they dominated the manufacturing activities closed linked to
their commercial activities, a process already observed in Sao Paulo74
The mineiro electricity generating industry of the turn of the centuiy was also mostly established
by local entrepreneurs. The Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade (CME) was founded by Bernardo
Mascarenhas, who was bom in Taboleiro Grande, Minas Gerais, as mentioned above. Further evidence that
the CME was a family and local affair is found in the following letter written by Bernardo Mascarenhas:
"I am organizing the CME, with a capital of 150:000$000, divided into shares of 100$000 
each - 1 will keep 500 shares for myself, another 500 will be offered to the inhabitants of 
the city [Juiz de Fora] and 500 will be distributed within our family to those who want 
them."75
Thus, among the 30 original shareholders, 12 belonged to the Mascarenhas family76 and several others were 
prominent names of the local business community77. The Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina
72 See Ministerio da Agricultura, Industria e Commercio, Recenseamento do Brazil Realizado em 
1 de Setembro de 1920. (Rio de Janeiro, 1924), IV, 2nd. part, p.48 and Directoria Geral de Estatistica, 
Relatorio Annexo ao do Ministerio dos Neeocios do Imperio de 1876. (Rio de Janeiro, 1877), p. 15.
73.L.C.T.D. Prado, "Commercial Capital, Domestic Market and Manufacturing in Imperial Brazil: 
The Failure of Brazilian Economic Development in the XlXth Century", University of London, unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, 1991, pp. 180-3.
74 See Dean, op.cit.. pp.25-40.
75 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas reproduced in Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. p. 118.
76 The members of the Mascarenhas family and the number of shares that each one held were: 
Bernardo Mascarenhas (400), Policena da Silva Mascarenhas (100), Francisco Mascarenhas (78), Vitor 
Mascarenhas (50), Caetano Mascarenhas (50), Viriato Diniz Mascarenhas (35), Thedphilo Marques Ferreira 
(30), Elvira Diniz Mascarenhas (25), Pacifico Mascarenhas (20), Antonio Diniz Mascarenhas (20), Altivo 
Diniz Mascarenhas (15), and Antonio Augusto Mascarenhas (10), P. Oliveira, Comnanhia Mineira de 
Eletricidade: Pioneira da Ilnminacao Hidreletrica na America do Sul. (Juiz de Fora, 1969), p.27.
77 Among the original shareholders of the CME it is possible to identify the names of the following 
local businessmen: Francisco Baptista de Oliveira, the baron of Santa Helena - who together with Francisco 
Baptista de Oliveira founded the first bank in Minas Gerais, the Banco Territorial e Mercantil de Minas 
Joao Baptista de Oliveira e Souza - Francisco Baptista de Oliveira's father -, Frederico Ferreira Lage and 
Alffedo Ferreira Lage - sons of Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage, founder of the CUI. Companhia Mineira 
de Eletricidade, Ata da Primeira Reuniao dos Acionistas da Comnanhia Mineira de Eletricidade. Instalacao
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(CFLCL), in its turn, was established by two Brazilians and one Portuguese: Norberto Custodio Ferreira, 
bom in Rio Novo, Rio de Janeiro78; Jose Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira, bom in Leopoldina, Minas Gerais79; 
and Joao Duarte Ferreira, bom in Coimbra, Portugal, who came to Brazil in 187280.
A review of the origin of entrepreneurs who established die electricity generating industry in the 
cities of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro also reveals a sharp difference with Minas Gerais. In the cases of 
Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the first electricity generating companies established at the turn of die century 
were founded by foreigners. The Sao Paulo Tramway, Light and Power Company (SPTLPC) was promoted 
by Francesco Antonio Gualco, an Italian businessman, and Frederick Pearson, an US engineer and capitalist. 
The company was founded in 189981. The Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company Ltd. 
(RJTLPC) was promoted by Alexander Mackenzie, who was certainly a foreigner, and founded five years 
later by a group of Canadian capitalists82.
A further important aspect of the social origin of the mineiro entrepreneur is that the most 
prominent entrepreneurs of the nineteenth-century seem to have come from the ruling class and traditional 
families. Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage, founder of the CUI, was bom into a wealthy and prestigious 
family from Barbacena. His father, Mariano Jose Ferreira Annond, also bom in Barbacena, was assigned 
a piece of land by the Portuguese government in 1794 and became an important farmer - the Fortaleza de 
Sant'Ana farm was huge and one of the most important farms in the Mata zone. In 1820, Mariano Jos6 was 
elected town councillor in Barbacena and later a provincial deputy83. Mariano Jos6 was as wealthy as 
prestigious. In 1861 he hosted the Emperor Dom Pedro II and his entourage, as he had done previously with 
the Emperor D. Pedro I84. Other close relatives of Mariano Procdpio were wealthy and important. His sister, 
Maria Jose Ferreira Lage, married their cousin, Honorio Augusto Jose Ferreira Armond, who was the second 
Baron of Pitanguy. Honorio's father, Marcelino Jose Ferreira Armond - the first Baron of Pitangui -, was 
Mariano Jose's stepbrother, an important political chieftain in Barbacena, and a wealthy farmer who had a
da Assembleia Geral e Constituicao da Sociedade. reproduced in ibid., pp.25-6.
78 "O Falecimento do Dr. Norberto Custodio Ferreira", in Jomal Cataguases. (Cataguases), 17 
February 1935, p.l.
79 "Dr. Jos6 Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira", in Gazeta de Leopoldina. (Leopoldina), 19 May 1946.
80 L.S. Costa, Cataeuases O.ntenaria: Dados para a sua Historia. (Cataguases, 1977), p.541.
81 Panorama do Setor de Energia Eletrica no Brasil, ed. R.F. Dias, L.M.M. Cabral, P.B.B. 
Cachapuz, and S.T.N. Lamarrao, (Rio de Janeiro, 1988), pp.34-5.
82 Ibid., pp.34-9.
83 W.L. Bastos, Mariano Proconio Ferreira Lage: Sua Vida. Sua Obra. Descendencia. Genealogia. 
(Juiz de Fora, 2nd ed. 1991).
84 Ibid., p.204.
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fortune estimated at £400,000 in 185085.
Like his father, Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage himself was a man of power and influence.
Mariano Procopio was elected national deputy for Minas Gerais in 1861 and again in 1869. He was also the
director of the Dom Pedro II railway (EFDPH) from 1869 until his death in 1872 and the director of the
customs86. In 1849, he was nominated an official of the Order of the Rose by the Emperor D. Pedro II87.
It also seems that he had enjoyed some intimacy with the Royal family, as can be inferred from the
following letter sent to him in 22 April 1871:
"The Minister and Secretary of the Affairs of the Empire informs the Illustrious Deputy 
Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage that His Majesty the Emperor invited him to attend at the 
Royal chapel on the 26th of this month at 11 o'clock to the high mass, beginning on die 
25th at 6 o'clock in the afternoon, which will be celebrated in memory of Her Highness 
the Princess D. Leopoldina, Duchess of Laxe."88.
Mariano Procopio was very wealthy. When he died in 1872 he left a fortune of approximately 900 Contos 
(£93,600)89.
Bernardo Mascarenhas - who founded several textile mills, a bank, an electricity generating 
company, and took part in several other enterprises -, was also bom into a wealthy and prestigious family. 
His father, Antonio Gonsalves da Silva Mascarenhas, started as a merchant in the central part of Minas 
Gerais and later became a farmer and financier. When Antonio died in 1884 he was certainly one of the 
richest men in Minas Gerais. As a wealthy landowner Antonio enjoyed great political prestige. Although 
he had never participated directly in political activity, some of his sons did90.
Antonio Gonsalves da Silva Mascarenhas had thirteen children: Antonio Candido, Antonino, Jose, 
Custodia, Escolastica, Francisca, Victor, Pacifico, Caetano, Bernardo, Maria Teodora, Sebastiao, and 
Francisco91. Most of them also became very wealthy and came to wield political influence. Antonio Candido, 
Bernardo, Caetano, Victor, Pacifico, and Francisco, were partners in the Cedro and Cachoeira mills, and later 
in the CCC. Antonino, the second son, was a merchant, a muleteer and owned the Capim Branco farm in
85 R.F. Burton, Viagem aos Planaltos do Brasil (18681. (Sao Paulo, 1941), I, p. 147.
86 Bastos, Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage. p. 16.
87 "Receipt to Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage signed by J.A. Brito, 29 March 1849", Biblioteca 
Nacional - Sessao de Manuscritos - Catalogo de Documentos Biograficos - Pasta C 1034-57.
88 "Letter to Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage from the Minister and Secretary of the Affairs of the 
Empire, the 22 April 1871". Biblioteca Nacional - Sessao de Manuscritos - Cat&logo de Documentos 
Biograficos - Pasta C 1034-57.
89 Bastos, Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage. pp. 172-3.
90 Vaz, oo.cit.. p.34-40.
91 Ibid., pp.48-51, 71.
78
Sete Lagoas92. Jose, the third son, was established as merchant in Curvelo. Custodia married Lufs Augusto 
Viana Barbosa, a farmer and an industrialist, as mentioned above. Escolastica was married to Quintiliano 
Soares Diniz, a farmer from Curvelo93. Morover, Pacifico - the eighteth child - and Sebastiao - the twelfth 
child - graduated in medicine and both became politicians. Pacifico was was elected Vice-President of Minas 
Gerais in 1902 and Sebastiao was several times elected national deputy for Minas Gerais94. The Mascarenhas 
family was and remained very wealthy, prestigious and politically powerful.
Francisco Baptista de Oliveira, a famous businessman in Juiz de Fora, was bom in Entre-Rios de 
Minas on the Santa Cruz do Salto farm which belonged to his father. Francisco's paternal grandfather, 
Gerv&io Joaquim de Souza, had been a prestigious merchant and farmer in Entre-Rios de Minas where he 
was also the leader of the Conservative Party. He had fourteen children, among them, Joao Baptista de 
Oliveira e Sousa, Francisco's father. Joao Baptista, was also bom in Entre-Rios and had been a merchant 
and cattle rancher. Francisco's maternal grandfather, Francisco Ribeiro da Silva, was a farmer, Lieutenant- 
Colonel of the National Guard, town councillor, district judge, and leader of the Conservative Party in Entre- 
Rios de Minas. He was granted the title of Knight of the Order of the Rose by the Imperial government. 
He had eleven children, among whom was Maria da Natividade e Oliveira, Joao Baptista's cousin and 
Francisco Baptista de Oliveira's mother95.
The paternal grandfather of Americo Teixeira Guimaraes, the promoter of the CCM, was Antonio 
Teixeira Guimaraes, owner of the Nova and the Paraiso farms. His father, Joao da Matta Teixeira, was the 
main shareholder of the CCM and an established capitalist. Furthermore, as Joao da Matta Teixeira was 
wealthy and owned land, it is reasonable to conclude that he also was a farmer and that this must had been 
his main activity96.
Jos6 Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira, one of the founders of the CFLCL, was the son of a farmer from 
Leopoldina, Jos6 Ribeiro Junqueira, and belonged to a traditional family from southern Minas Gerais. Jos6 
Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira himself had a long political career. After graduating in law he was elected state 
deputy and re-elected four years later. He was also elected Mayor of Leopoldina, federal deputy, and 
senator. In 1931, he became Secretary of Agriculture for die state of Minas Gerais97.
92 DA. Giroletti, "Formagao do Empresario Industrial", Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 
Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1991, p.4.
93 Tamm, op.cit.. p.87-151.
94 Ibid., p.87-151.
95 W.L. Bastos, Francisco Baptista de Oliveira nm Pioneiro: Sua Vida. Sua Obra. Sua Descendencia. 
Genealoeia. (Juiz de Fora, 1967), p.144-69.
96 Companhia Cachoeira dos Macacos, "Ata da Assembleia Geral dos Subscritores de Agoes da 
Sociedade Anonyma Cachoeira dos Macacos para Constituigao da mesma", reproduced in Freitas, op.cit.. 
p.23.
97 Gazeta de Leopoldina. (Leopoldina), 19 May 1946.
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Norberto Custodio Ferreira, another founder of the CFLCL, was a public prosecutor in Ponte Nova
and from 1895 to 1897 he was elected town councillor in Cataguazes98.
Francisco Jose de Andrade Botelho, founder of a textile mill in Brumado, Minas Gerais, came from
an important mineiro family. His paternal great grand-father, Francisco Ignacio Botelho, was a prestigious
and wealthy farmer from Lavras. According to the Revista do Arauivo Publico Mineiro of 1911:
"Among die most traditional families of this town [Lavras] which still had representatives, 
are the Botelhos, (...). The founder of the family Botelho was Francisco Ignacio Botelho, 
who died in this town on the 4th of August of 1796. He was the son of Francisco Jose 
Botelho and Thereza Maria Joanna, bom in Carvilhan, Portugal."99
Furthermore, one of Francisco Jos6 de Andrade Botelho's brothers, Fidelis, was elected senator of die empire 
in 1888100.
Joao Antonio dos Santos, one of the founders of the Biribiry mill, was die bishop of Diamantina101 
and belonged to an important local family. One of his nephews, Antonio Felfcio dos Santos, was a doctor 
in die city of Rio de Janeiro, a Liberal Party deputy from 1867 to 1886, one of the founders and the first 
president of the Associa?ao Industrial, and one of the founders of the Fabrica de Tecidos Pau Grande102.
Francisco Leite Ribeiro's grandfather, Jose Leite Ribeiro, was bom in Portugal in 1723 and 
emigrated to Minas Gerais to wash for gold in partnership with another Portuguese. With the wealth Jos6 
derived from mining he invested in land and raised cereals, cane and cattle. When he died in 1801, he was 
a wealthy man. Francisco's father added to the wealth of the family by trading between Rio de Janeiro and 
the family base in Sao Joao d'El Rey, Minas Gerais. Francisco Leite Ribeiro himself began in mining near 
Sao Joao d'El Rey. He moved to Barbacena in 1805 where he was briefly occupied in tax farming. Then 
he moved to the border with Rio de Janeiro where he acquired 17 land grants after 1817. He devoted 
himself to the cultivation of coffee and by 1822 he was considered the largest farmer in Minas Gerais. When 
he died in 1845 he left a fortune of 1.087:000$000 Contos (£115,113), including 225 slaves. In the 1860s, 
Francisco's son, Joaquim Vidal Leite Ribeiro, took part in banking in Juiz de Fora. In 1871, Joaquim moved 
to Rio de Janeiro, where he died in 1883, leaving a fortune of over 2.000:000$000 Contos (£179,600), 
largely in public debt bonds103.
Hence, biographical data reviewed above strongly supports the conclusion that most pioneer mineiro
98 "O Falecimento do Dr. Norberto Custodio Ferreira", in Jomal Cataguases. (Cataguases), 17 
February 1935, p.l.
99 Reproduced in Guimaraes, op.cit.. p. 14.
100 Ibid., pp. 11-31.
101 Versiani, op.cit.. pp.50-1.
102 Monteiro, op.cit.. p. 122.
103 P. Cammack, "State and Federal Politics in Minas Gerais, Brazil", Univerity of Oxford, 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Oxford, 1980, pp.55-6.
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entrepreneurs came from the ruling class and traditional families. They and their relatives were wealthy and 
politically influential. This is in clear opposition to what is known about the social origins of the pioneer 
British entrepreneurial class. In Britain, only a relatively small proportion of the pioneer industrialists came 
from the upper or lower classes. Most of them, came from the middle ranks of society, usually with 
mercantile connections104.
Finally, it is interesting to take a brief look at the intellectual formation of one of the most 
prominent and successful entrepreneurial families of nineteenth-century Minas Gerais: the Mascarenhas 
family. In several important respects, the intellectual formation of the Mascarenhas family conforms with 
the Protestant ethic described by Weber. As mentioned above, Antonio Gongalves da Silva Mascarenhas 
(Bernardo Mascarenhas' father) had thirteen children: nine sons and four daughters. Their formation began 
at home through an ascetic life-style, based on religious principles, and directed towards work - as a mean 
to achieve self-fulfilment -, discipline, sobriety, and independence. Their father's success in business was 
an example to be followed. Their entrepreneurial training also began at home, in their father's muletrain, 
retail store and farm, and in the daily contact with suppliers, customers and slaves, under the supervision 
of their father and elder brothers, in the case of the younger sons. Antonio Candido, for example, began 
working in his father's retail store. Antonino began taking charge of his father's muletrain, while Caetano 
started overseeing the slaves of the Sao Sebastiao farm. Furthermore, all thirteen children studied in the best 
boarding schools of Minas Gerais. After graduation, each son received a sum of 26 Contos, as an 
anticipation of their inheritance, in order to establish themselves as businessmen. Most of the sons followed 
their father becoming merchants, muleteers, financiers and farmers. Most of them also became industrialist. 
Furthermore, two of them - Pacifico and Sebastiao - became doctors. Moreover, there is evidence to believe 
that this intellectual formation was not peculiar to the Mascarenhas family, since it met the spirit of the time 
and expressed very well the development of the Brazilian social and economic capitalist formation105.
This analysis of the social and ethnic background of the mineiro entrepreneur has shown that a large 
and important proportion of the mineiro entrepreneurial class does not conform with the description 
contained in the general Brazilian literature. There are important contrasts with the entrepreneurs of Sao 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The most obvious is the smaller importance of immigrants and coffee planters 
in the formation of the mineiro entrepreneurial class as a whole. As Cammack stressed:
"some of the most successful families in Minas in the nineteenth-century, in economic
terms, owed nothing (...) to coffee"106.
Therefore, apart from a few prominent cases in the iron industry and apart from the Mata zone, where 
immigrants made up the largest proportion of the local industrial class, Brazilians bom into the ruling and 
traditional families, usually not connected with coffee-growing activity, seem to have been the main source
104 P.L. Payne, British Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth Century. (2nd. ed., 1988), p.21.
105 Giroletti, Formacao do Empresario Industrial, pp.3-15.
106 Cammack, op.cit.. p.57.
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of entrepreneurs in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. The social background of pioneer mineiro businessmen 
also differs from that of the pioneer British entrepreneurial class. The latter was mainly recruited among the 
middle ranks of society. However, the peculiarities of the mineiro entrepreneurial class are not restricted to 
the ethnic and social aspects. As it is going to be shown in the following section, there are important 
differences in what concerns the economic influences on the formation of the mineiro entrepreneur. Finally, 
the analysis of the Mascarenhas family, points to the existence of a "spirit of capitalism" within the mineiro 
elite.
3.2 - Economic Background:
This section examines the economic background of the mineiro entrepreneur. It investigates the 
main economic influences on the formation of the mineiro entrepreneurial class, the career pattern of mineiro 
businessmen and die activities which represented their main sources of capital.
As mentioned above, the Brazilian economic historiography has suggested - based mainly on the 
naulista experience - that the main sources of entrepreneurship and capital in nineteenth-century Brazil was 
either the trading house, mainly the export and import businesses107, or coffee-growing, which was the basis 
for process of economic development which spread to a wide range of other businesses108. Although trading 
and fanning constituted the main sources of entrepreneurship and capital in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, 
they were different owing to the particular nature of the mineiro economy. Firsdy, Minas Gerais was 
landlocked, and trade was mainly oriented to local markets dealing with a limited number of basic items 
such as coffee, salt, bacon, catde, tobacco, cereals, cotton, etc. Import and export activities were 
concentrated in Rio de Janeiro, Santos, and Sao Paulo. Secondly, coffee cultivation was confined to the 
southern parts of the province, the Mata and the South zones. Thirdly, in other regions of the province, 
especially the central and northern parts, a different range of activities were being undertaken. These ranged 
from gold-mining to cattle-raising and farming109. Thus, coffee growers and merchants dealing with export 
and import were not as important in the formation of the mineiro entrepreneurial class as they were in Sao 
Paulo.
Nevertheless, there is evidence suggesting that the coffee economy - directly or indirectly - provided 
part of the funds invested in the establishment of mineiro industry. Mineiro coffee growers were responsible, 
among others, for the establishment of the CUI in 1852110. As mentioned above, the company was organized
107 Dean, op.cit..
108 See W. Cano, Rafzes da concentracao industrial em Sao Paulo. (Sao Paulo, 3rd. ed. 1977), 
chapter II; J.M. Cardoso de Mello, O capitalismo tardio: contribuicao a revisao critica da formacao e 
desenvolvimento da economia brasileira. (Sao Paulo, 1982), pp.96-106; and Z.M.C. Mello, Metamorfoses 
da Riaueza: Sao Paulo. 1845-1895. (Sao Paulo, 1985), chapters II and IV.
109 Cammack, op.cit.. pp.43-50.
110 Arantes, op.cit.. 41-5.
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by Mariano Procopio Feireira Lage, who was a farmer himself, and several other coffee growers. Mariano
Procopio's father, Mariano Jose Ferreira Armond, owned one of the most important farms in the Mata zone -
the Fortaleza de Sanf Ana farm. The farm produced coffee and cereals, and raised cattle. Nevertheless, the
lack of suitable means of transport for the production of the farm was one of the largest problems faced by
Mariano Jose. This seems to have been the original motivation for the building of the Uniao e Industria
turnpike, carried out by his son. Mariano Procopio started working in the Fortaleza de Sant'Ana farm and
later established an import and cloth wholesaler firm (the partnership Ferreira Lage, Maia & Cunha) in Rio
de Janeiro. Nevertheless, his career as merchant was short-lived. Soon he went to Europe and to die USA
in search of the new road building technology invented by MacAdam. He also examined the systems of toll
roads there. On his return he established the CUI111.
Moreover, coffee growers of the Mata zone itself financed the construction of several branches of
the Uniao e Industria turnpike. The company report of 1861 stated that local farmers were paying the wages
of the workers engaged in the construction of the branch to the town of Mar de Hespanha112. In a letter to
the president of the province of Minas Gerais (Vicente Pires da Motta), the chairman of the CUI (Mariano
Procopio Ferreira Lage) stated that:
"It is certain that the road built by the CUI (from Petropolis to Juiz de F6ra), although 
rendering important services, needs to be complemented by branches which will facilitate 
the transport of goods of several centres of production to the stations of the company.
There are in this situation several coffee-growing counties located between Juiz 
de Fora, Parahybuna, and Parahyba, which I will list - indicating the names of those 
farmers who are most interested and can, helped by the provincial government, supervise 
and contribute financially to the construction."113
It is interesting to point out that the process of funding of the Uniao e Industria turnpike was similar 
to that of the first railways in Sao Paulo. According to Lewis, most of the first paulista railways were 
financed by direct local private investment, funds which were derived mainly from the rural sector, more 
specifically the coffee sector. As the paulista case suggests, the struggle of mineiro coffee growers to build 
the Uniao e Industria turnpike indicates a substantial degree of entrepreneurial initiative and the existence 
of funds available to be invested elsewhere114. Nevertheless, contrary to what happened in the case of the
111 Bastos, Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage. pp. 15-270.
112 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1861), p.7.
113 Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage, then, listed the names of the following farmers: Candido Alves 
Coutinho, Joaquim Gomes Leal and Antonio Gomes de Siqueira, and their neighbours, interested in the 
construction of the branch from the Parahybuna station until the farm owned by Francisco Gomes de 
Oliveira; the Baron of Prados and his neighbours, interested in the construction of the branch from Jaguary, 
where there were large coffee farms, to the Simao Pereira station; Gervasio Antonio da Silva and Manoel 
Jose Pires, interested in the construction of the branch from the Esprrito Santo parish to the Mathias station; 
and, Marcellino Gonsalves da Costa and his son Jos6 Anastacio da Costa Lima, interested in the construction 
of the branch from the Sao Francisco parish to the Juiz de Fora station. See Companhia Uniao e Industria, 
Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1861), p.7, 17-8.
114 Lewis, op.cit.. pp.35-55.
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paulista railways, the Uniao e Industria turnpike was, shortly after the conclusion of its construction, taken
over by the State115. State intervention in the CUI was not due to the technology gap - which in the case
of turnpikes was certainly much less acute than in the case of railways -, but to the diminishing interest on
the part of the mineiro entrepreneurial class to invest more funds in die company after the construction of
the EFDPII. Moreover, State intervention reveals the difficulties that mineiro entrepreneurs had to fund more
capital intensive enterprises. This fact seems to corroborate Geischenkron's view that depending on the
degree of backwardness, and the supply of capital required, State action may be essential116.
Table m .6  - Distribution of the mineiro industry between the coffee-growing and non-coffee-growing 
regions in 1907.
REGIONS COFFEE NON-COFFEE UNKNOWN TOTAL
Establishment
Number 342 160 22 524
% 65.3 30.5 4.2 100.0
Capital
Contos 11,774 13,568 1,172 26,515
% 44.4 51.2 4.4 100.0
Workers
Number 3,751 5,162 508 9,421
% 39.8 54.8 5.4 100.0
Production
Contos 17,815 12,891 1,537 32,244
% 55.2 40.0 4.8 100.0
Capital per 
Establishment
34.42 84.80 53.27 50.60
Workers per 
Establishment
10.96 32.26 23.09 17.97
Production per 
Establishment
52.09 80.57 69.86 61.53
Source: J.H. Lima. Cafe e Industria em Minas Gerais (1870- 192th- fPetropolis. 1981V p.89.
Further evidence that the coffee economy provided part of the funds invested in the mineiro 
industry is the fact that although some industries - such as iron and textiles - were mostly concentrated in
1,5 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1865), p.5.
116 A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: a book of essavs. 
(Cambridge, 1962).
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the central part of Minas Gerais, a large number of small factories started to emerge in die latter part of the 
nineteenth century in several coffee-growing counties. In 1861, Juiz de Fora - one of the most important 
mineiro coffee counties117 - was already the third largest county in tax revenue, surpassed only by Sao Joao 
Del Rey and Ouro Preto in the Metalurgica zone118, and one of the main industrial centres of the province. 
In 1870, there were 34 industrial establishments in Juiz de Fora and seven years later 80119. Moreover, of 
the 20 largest mineiro counties in terms of industrial output in 1907 nine were located within the coffee- 
growing zones (7 in the Mata and 2 in the Sul) and 11 in the non-coffee-growing zones (10 in the 
Metalurgica zone and 1 in the Oeste zone). The largest county in terms of industrial output was Juiz de 
Fora, followed by Sete lagoas and Belo Horizonte both located within the Metalurgica zone. In addition, 
65% of the mineiro industries in 1907 were established in coffee-growing regions, whereas only 30% of 
them were established in the non-coffee-growing regions, as shown in Table IH.6. However, of the total 
capital invested in the mineiro industry only 44% was invested in the industries established in the coffee- 
growing regions, whereas more than 50% was invested in the industries established in the non-coffee- 
growing regions. In terms of the number of workers employed, the industries established in the coffee- 
growing regions employed only 40% of the total industrial workforce, whereas the industries established in 
the non-coffee-growing regions employed nearly 55%. Furthermore, the industries established in the coffee- 
growing regions produced 50% of the total industrial output, whereas the industries established in the non- 
coffee-growing regions produced 40%. Thus, although the industries established in the coffee-growing 
regions in 1907 were more numerous and productive, the industries established in the non-coffee-growing 
regions were more capital intensive and employed more workers per establishment The fact that a large 
number of industries were established in the mineiro coffee-growing regions is undisputable evidence of the 
participation of the coffee economy in the establishment of the mineiro industry.
However, the coffee economy which developed in the southern parts of the province did not have 
a great impact on the rest of the mineiro economy120. In the Mata zone itself, one of the major coffee- 
growing regions of Minas Gerais, farmers were responsible for only 3% of the industries established in Juiz 
de Fora (the most important industrial centre of the region) in the period 1858-1912. It was immigrants and 
Brazilians not connected with the coffee-growing activity who owned more than 90% of the industries 
established in Juiz de Fora in the period 1858-1912121. The capital invested by Brazilians was originally 
accumulated in the trading business or in their activities as professionals, or even in a combination of
117 See D.A. Giroletti, A Industrializacao de Juiz de Fora. 1850-1930. (Juiz de Fora, 1988), pp.27-
31.
118 Ibid., p.47.
119 Giroletti, A Industrializacao de Juiz de Fora, p.50.
120 J.H. Lima, Cafe e Industria em Minas Gerais (1870-1920). (Petropolis, 1981), pp. 101-2.
121 Arantes, op.cit.. p. 159.
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them122.
Immigrants (who were responsible for the establishment of more than 66% of the industries founded 
in Juiz de Fora during this period) usually did not fit into the "bourgeois immigrant" concept123. Most of 
them did not have capital and started working as labourers, craftsmen or even as farm workers124. Grieese, 
for example, was a German immigrant originally hired to work at the CUI. In 1858 he founded the first 
industry established in Juiz de Fora manufacturing carts and coaches125. During the same year, Wreied, a 
German brickmaker hired by the CUI, associated himself with a tanner to establish what became the largest 
tannery of the city126. Ten years later, his stepson (Krambeck), himself an immigrant who was originally a 
carpenter and a farm worker, took control of the tannery and expanded the business successfully127. In 1865, 
Martin Kascher, who also worked as a craftsman at the CUI, established a workshop to make coaches128. 
Antonio Meurer, the son of immigrants, started as salesman and representative of the breweries from Juiz 
de Fora. Later he established a small shop and became a farm trader. In 1898, he established a mill to 
manufacture socks129.
In other parts of Minas Gerais domestic commercial activities and mixed farming (not connected 
with coffee-growing activity) were the starting point in the career of most entrepreneurs. For example, in 
the case of the iron industry which throughout die nineteenth century was concentrated in die central part 
of the province130, as shown in Maps 4 and 5, there is evidence that most of the foundries were established 
by farmers. According to Eschwege, by the time of his arrival in Minas Gerais in 1811 most of the foundries 
belonged to blacksmiths and large farmers131. Moreover, the capital invested in the setting-up of the 
Patriotica foundry, founded by Eschwege himself, was divided in 10 shares, each share representing 1,000 
Cruzados of the initial capital. Eschwege subscribed two shares, the Conde de Palma (the governor of Minas 
Gerais) one, and a large and important mineiro family the remainder. Although there is no direct information
122 Giroletti, Industrializacao de Juiz de Fora, p.92.
123 For a further discussion of the concept of the "bourgeois immigrant", see Dean, op.cit.. pp.59-81.
124 Arantes, op.cit.. pp.87-8.
125 Ibid., pp.98-9.
126 Ibid., p. 100.
127 Ibid., p. 100.
128 Ibid., p. 101.
129 Ibid., p. 102.
130 According to Libby, most of the iron foundries were situated within the Metalurgica region. 
Libby, op.cit.. pp. 152-60.
131 W.L. von Eschwege, Pluto Brasiliensis. (Berlin, 1833; reprinted Belo Horizonte/Sao Paulo, 
1979), II, p.203.
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MAP 4 - MINAS GERAIS LOCATION OF IRON FOUNDRIES, 1854-1858.
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Source: D.C. Libby, Transformacao e Trabalho em uma Economia Escravista: Minas Gerais no Seculo XIX. 
(Sao Paulo, 1988), p. 157.
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MAP 5 - MINAS GERAIS LOCATION OF IRON FOUNDRIES, 1863-1866.
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Source: D.C. Libby, Transformacao e Trabalho em uma Economia Escravista: Minas Gerais no Seculo XIX. 
(Sao Paulo, 1988), p. 158.
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about the activities of both the Conde de Palma and the family, there is evidence that they owned land:
"We had to choose the most appropriate place [to set-up the foundry] (...).
The region of the Prata, (...), was not as rich in woods. Nevertheless, there was 
the advantage that the administration of the future foundry would be under the close 
supervision of its most important shareholders, who had their properties in the 
neighbourhood."132
Moreover, it is reasonable to believe that at least part of the capital invested by Eschwege may have been
accumulated in his activity as manager of iron foundries. As mentioned before, Eschwege worked in the
Figueiro dos Vinhos foundry in Portugal before coming to Minas Gerais133. However, most of the capital
invested in the establishment of the Patridtica foundry seems to have come from farming.
Further evidence that farmers established most of the mineiro foundries set-up in the fust three-
quarters of the last century is provided by the fact that these foundries began as integral parts of farms. In
1886, for example, a newspaper advertised the selling of a foundry located in an estate in the Diamantina
county which included, among other things, extensive grass for cattle, thirty head of cattle, com plantation,
and several fruit trees134. Even the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba mill, the most successful and one of the largest
foundries of this period, was considered by its owner (Monlevade) as an integral part of his farm135.
Therefore, as Libby suggests, it is reasonable to conclude that most of the small foundries established until
the 1880s were also an integral part of farms136.
One of the few foundries not to be established by farmers was the Morro do Pilar. The Morro do
Pilar foundry was financed by the Imperial government:
"Manuel Ferreira da Camara decided to build, at the expenses of the King [of Portugal], 
a large iron foundry in Minas Gerais, for which purpose he did not lack neither power nor 
money. He got both things from the government, who allowed him to use the former 
[power] and to withdraw the latter [money] from the cashier of the diamond mining 
business."137
Therefore, the Morro do Pilar was the only foundry established in the first three-quarters of the nineteenth 
century to be financed by the State.
The larger foundries (the Esperanga and Bumier) which were founded in the latter part of the 
century were not established by farmers. The Esperan?a was established by two engineers of the railway 
Central do Brasil (Amaro da Silveira and Henrique Hargreaves), a Swiss metallurgist (Alberto Gerspacher),
132 Ibid., p.247.
133 Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil, pp.79-85.
134 Libby, op.cit.. p. 183.
135 Ibid., p. 151.
136 Ibid., p. 152.
137 Ibid., p.207.
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and Carlos da Costa Wigg, the main shareholder, of whom there is no information about his activities138. 
The Bumier foundry was established by Carlos da Costa Wigg and the son of Alberto Gerspacher (Jos6 
Gerspacher), who had been the technical director of both (the Esperanga and the Bumier) foundries139. These 
are examples of employees/managers who acquired skills (and capital) working for others and then set 
themselves up in business, and supports the view that one of the main sources of entrepreneurs are people 
who have been previously in employment140.
Thus, there is evidence that in the first three-quarters of the last century most of the iron foundries 
were established by farmers. This fact corroborates Lydall's view that a large proportion of the new 
industrial entrepreneurs who emerge in die early stages of industrialization come from die group made up 
by farmers. According to the author, this is explained by the fact that small manufacturing workshops could 
be established on farms141, as was the case of several mineiro foundries set-up in the first part of the century. 
Moreover, it is interesting to point to the importance of the managerial ability in Monlevade's success as 
an entrepreneur. The Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry was for more than forty years managed by 
Monlevade, obtaining the best results among all the foundries in Minas Gerais. After Monlevade's death in 
1872 his family assumed the control of the foundry but the results were never the same and the foundry was 
finally sold to the Companhia Nacional de Foijas e Estaleiros (CNFE) at the beginning of the 1890s142. This 
seems to corroborate those authors who advocate management ability as one of the entrepreneurs' main 
characteristics143.
The textile industry, which was also concentrated in the central part of Minas Gerais, was
established mostiy by farmers (not connected with coffee-growing activity) and merchants. Among the
founders of the Cedro mill, Antonio Candido Mascarenhas was a farmer - he owned the Rasgao farm -, a
merchant and a capitalist, as shown in the following letter:
"I have, in partnership with two brothers, imported the machinery to establish a textile 
mill. By the time the mill will be set-up it will cost us more than we have. (...) It is for 
this reason that I write to you, my cousin, to inform you that your debts, including 
interests to this date, amount to 1,618 Contos. I also ask you from then on to pay what 
you owe me on a monthly basis".144
138 Suzigan, op.cit.. p.258-9.
139 Ibid., p.259.
140 Lydall, op.cit.. p.83.
141 Ibid., p.82.
142 J.A. Paula, "Dois Ensaios sobre a Genese da Industrializacao em Minas Gerais: a Siderurgia e 
a Industria Textil", in Anais do n  Seminario sobre a Economia Mineira. (Belo Horizonte, 1983), p.31.
143 See J.B. Say, Tratado de Economia Politica. (Sao Paulo, 1983) and F. Quesnay, Ouesnav's 
'Tableau feconomiciue'. (1972).
144 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.2", "Letter from 
Antonio Candido Mascarenhas to Joaquim Pereira Lopes, 3 August 1870".
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Caetano and Bernardo Mascarenhas started their entrepreneurial careers in a partnership fattening cattle for 
sale and trading in salt. The funds used by Bernardo and Caetano to start their partnership were drawn from 
a trust of 26 Contos which each son received from their father. With the change in the route of the 
muletrains and the decrease in the movement of muletrains due to the Paraguay War, die salt trade was not 
as attractive as before. The two brothers then decided to change business and with the profits they have 
earned in the salt and catde business (around 108 Contos) they decided to establish the Cedro mill. It seems 
that the idea to invest in a textile mill was mainly Bernardo's, because he was the intellectual organizer of 
the mill. The domestic cloth production their father's farm (Sao Sebastiao) was very profitable, even though 
the quality was poor and the process of production backward. Therefore, cloth production was a familiar 
activity for both of them. Later, Caetano came to own the Nova Estancia farm in Pirapora and Bernardo 
would invest in an electricity generating company, a bank, another textile mill, and so on145.
The analysis of the establishment of the Cedro mill shows that its founders possessed several of 
the characteristics of the entrepreneur described in chapter 2. It shows that the three Mascarenhas brothers 
were capitalists, that they possessed the foresightness and willingness to act and assume risk, and that they 
took advantage of changes in the business environment to act soundly and in a entrepreneurial way.
Among the founders of the Cachoeira mill, farmers and merchants were well represented. The funds 
for the establishment of the mill came from different sources. As happened to the founders of the Cedro 
mill, the three Mascarenhas brothers involved in this entrepreneurship also received a trust of 26 Contos 
from their father when they came of age146. Furthermore, before the establishment of the Cachoeira mill 
Victor Mascarenhas had been a merchant in Curvelo and manager of the Sao Sebastiao farm. Later he 
became one of the owners of the Sao Sebastiao textile mill and of the Sao Sebastiao farm147. His brother 
Pacifico Mascarenhas was a local doctor, who later became a farmer. There is no information about 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas' activities before the establishment of the Cachoeira mill. However, he later 
became a farmer, a merchant, and took part in several other industrial undertakings. As a farmer, he came 
to own the Periperi farm. As a merchant, he became partner in a retail store (Carvalho, Libano & 
Mascarenhas) in Rio de Janeiro at die beginning of the 1880s. As an industrialist, besides the Cachoeira mill, 
he established the Periperi textile mill and was also partner in a hat factory (Machado & Mascarenhas) in 
Curvelo. Finally, he was shareholder and one of the founders of die CME and the Banco de Credito Real 
de Minas Gerais, both enterprises organized by his brother Bernardo. Finally, Luis Augusto Vianna Barbosa 
was the owner of the Cachoeira farm were the Cachoeira mill was set-up148.
Later the founders of both the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills were joined by Theophilo Marques
145 Vaz, op.cit.. p.42-3.
146 Tamm, op.cit.. p.86.
147 Ibid., pp.87, 100-2, 109-10.
148 Ibid., pp.87-208.
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Ferreira, a merchant, and Antonio Joaquim Barbosa da Silva, a lawyer, in the establishment of the CCC149. 
Thus, the funds invested in the Cedro mill, the Cachoeira mill, and the CCC came mainly from trading 
business and farming (not connected with coffee-growing activity).
The Brumado mill was established in 1872 by capital accumulated in die trading business. Its 
founder, Francisco Jose de Andrade Botelho, was a mineiro who lived in Rio de Janeiro working as 
merchant in the partnership Botelho, Irmao & Andrade, before founding the textile mill. The Botelho, Irmao 
& Andrade firm was a partnership with his uncle and one of his brother. As was common among merchants 
of this time, Francisco travelled frequently to die hinterland of Minas Gerais as a representative of his firm. 
He was already a wealthy man when he arrived in Pitangui, in western Minas Gerais, and met Francisca 
Alvares da Silva. Soon after, they got married and Francisco decided to live in Pitangui. He quit the 
partnership in Rio de Janeiro, but Pitangui was a too narrow market for a retail store like the one he 
possessed in Rio. Thus, he decided to establish a textile mill stimulated by die good results of the Cedro 
mill. The most suitable and available place to build the mill was found in the neighbouring district of 
Brumado150.
The main shareholder and founder of the SAEM, established in 1875, was Azaiias de Souza Dias, 
who was also a farmer151. Among the remaining 23 shareholders of the mill mentioned by the Almanach 
Sul Mineiro in 1874, there is information about the activities of only 5 of them: Antonio Candido de Souza 
Dias, a farmer and a capitalist; Antonio Candido Teixeira, a district judge, a farmer, and a capitalist; and 
Antonio Domingos de Souza, Marcos de Souza Dias, and Gabriel Domingos, all of them farmers152. Thus, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the funds invested in this mill had been accumulated mainly in farming 
activities. However, it is important to point out that the mill was situated in a coffee-growing region (the 
Sul zone) and the farmers mentioned above might well had been coffee growers. Apart from die fact that 
one of the partners (Joao Antonio dos Santos) was the bishop of Diamantina, there is no information about 
the activities of the other four partners prior to the establishment of the Biribiry mill in 1876. There is also 
no information about the activities of the founders of the Uniao Itabirana mill established in 1876153.
Among the founders of the Filatdrio Montes Claros, Manoel and Donato Rodrigues, who subscribed 
53.3% of the capital, were both farmers from Grao Mogol, a county close to Montes Claros. Antonio 
Narciso Soares started his entrepreneurial career as a miner and diamond trader in Diamantina. Then, he 
moved to Montes Claros where he established himself as a local trader and later as a farmer. Gregorio 
Velloso also started as a local trader and, subsequently, became a farmer. Finally, Angelo de Quadros
149 Vaz, op.cit.. p.93.
150 Guimaraes, op.cit..
151 B.S. Veiga, Almanach Sul Mineiro. (Campanha, 1874), p. 148.
152 Ibid., pp. 146-51.
153 Versiani, op.cit.. pp.50-2.
92
Bittencourt had a farm in Campo Grande, in the county of Montes Claros154. Thus, the capital invested in 
the Filatorio Montes Claros was accumulated in the trading business, farming, and diamond mining.
Although there is no information about the activities of the founders of the Marzagao mill, it is 
telling that the mill was established on the Marzagao farm in the vicinity of Sahara155. There is no 
information about the activities of the founders of the Cassu, the Paulo Moreirense, the Industrial Ouro 
Preto, the Pedreira, the Bom Jardim, and the Vigosa mills156.
The Sao Sebastiao mill was established by Antonio Gonsalves da Silva Mascarenhas, who was the 
youngest son of a Portuguese immigrant, Antonio Gonsalves Mascarenhas, who arrived in Brazil in 1778. 
Although the information about Antonio Gonsalves Mascarenhas is not very precise, it is said that he 
became a protege of a prosperous muleteer, with whom he started to work. Years later, Antonio Gonsalves 
Mascarenhas became his partner and, when the muleteer decided to retire, his heir. With his own muletrain 
and three slaves, Antonio Gongalves Mascarenhas made frequent trips to the hinterlands of Minas Gerais, 
where he would sell salt and olive-oil, and would bring back to Rio de Janeiro textiles, sugar and bacon. 
In 1792, he married an Indian brought up by his protector. They had four children, although only three 
survived: Jose, Caetano and Antonio Gonsalves da Silva Mascarenhas. When the youngest was almost seven 
years old his father decided to take the whole family with him in his trips. In 1811, Antonio Gonsalves 
Mascarenhas and his wife got ill and died in the middle of one of those trips157.
After the death of his parents, Antonio Gonsalves da Silva Mascarenhas was taken in by his 
godfather, Jos£ Teixeira da Fonseca Vasconcelos, the Viscount of Caet£. Later, he became administrator of 
Viscount of Caete's land and subsequently of other estates. In 1824, Antonio Gonsalves da Silva 
Mascarenhas established himself as a merchant in Taboleiro Grande, in the central part of the province, 
which was the main passage for all muletrains heading to the hinterlands of Minas Gerais. Antonio 
Gonsalves da Silva Mascarenhas' business grew rapidly and at the age of thirty four - by then a wealthy man 
- he bought the land which came to be known as the Sao Sebastiao Farm. He then sold the store and became 
a prosperous farmer and financier. In 1884, Antonio Gonsalves da Silva Mascarenhas established the Sao 
Sebastiao mill on his farm158. Thus, although the fortune accumulated by Antonio Gonsalves da Silva 
Mascarenhas previously to the establishment of the Sao Sebastiao mill originated from different sorts of 
activities, it is reasonable to conclude that the funds invested in the mill were mainly accumulated in trading 
and farming.
Very little is known about the activities of the founders of the Sao Vicente mill, which was
154 Ibid., pp.81-2.
155 Ibid., pp.75-6.
156 Ibid., pp.76-7, 89, 91-3.
157 Vaz, op.cit.. p.34.
158 Ibid., p.34-40.
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established in 1885 and a few years later was acquired by die CCC159. The main shareholders of the CCM 
were Joao da Matta Teixeira and Jeronymo Francisco Franga, who were local farmers. Joao da Matta 
Teixeira is also mentioned in the report of the meeting of shareholders for die establishment of the CCM 
as a capitalist160. Thus, the CCM was a farmers' enterprise.
Although there is no information about the activities of the founders of the Uniao Lavrense mill, 
the first two directors of die mill were traders: Comendador Jose Duarte da Costa Negrao, a trader who lived 
in Rio de Janeiro at the time of the establishment of the mill, and Manoel Hermeto Correa da Costa, a local 
trader. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that at least part of the capital invested in the Uniao Lavrense mill 
originated in the trading business. However, it is not possible to say if the trading business of Comendador 
Jose Duarte da Costa Negrao, who lived in Rio de Janeiro, was or was not connected with the import and 
export trade161.
The Santa Barbara mill was initially planned by Joao da Matta Machado, a diamond trader from 
Diamantina, who also had a diamond-cutting workshop. After his death, his sons and sons-in-law, together 
with Antonio Moreira da Costa, the Baron of Parauna, set-up a partnership to establish the mill. Among Joao 
da Matta Machado's sons, one was a law student in Sao Paulo (Pedro da Matta Machado) and the other 
(Alvaro da Matta Machado) was a member of the Provincial Assembly at the time of the establishment of 
the mill in 1886. Among his sons-in-law, Francisco Ferreira Correa Rabelo worked as a lawyer, magistrate, 
and teacher, and was also a politician. Pedro Jose Verciani was an engineer who lived in Rio de Janeiro at 
the time of the establishment of the mill, and Joao Antonio Lopes de Figueiredo was a local doctor in 
Diamantina. Finally, Antonio Moreira da Costa, the only partner outside the Matta Machado family, had 
been engaged all his life in the diamond business. Thus, as Versiani points out, although the capital invested 
in the establishment of the Santa Barbara mill came from the different activities carried out by its owners, 
a significant part of it may have come from the activities related with the diamond business162.
The Sao Roberto mill was promoted by Quintiliano Alves Ferreira, the Baron of Sao Roberto, who 
was engaged in a number of local businesses, like the manufacture of hats and earthenware, and diamond- 
cutting163.
The Tecelagem Mascarenhas mill was established by Bernardo Mascarenhas, who started his 
entrepreneurial career in a partnership with his brother Caetano, as mentioned above. Later, the two brothers 
decided to invest the money they have accumulated in a textile mill. However, they did not have enough
159 Ibid., pp. 102-3.
160 Companhia Cachoeira dos Macacos, "Ata da Assembleia Geral dos Subscritores de Agoes da 
Sociedade Anonyma Cachoeira dos Macacos para Constituigao da mesma", reproduced in Freitas, op.cit.. 
p.23.
161 Versiani, op.cit.. p.88.
162 Ibid., pp.86-8.
163 Ibid., p.91.
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funds and needed a capitalist partner. Their father did not agree with the idea, because they were very young 
(Bernardo was 20 and Caetano was 23 years old) and a textile mill was a complicated matter164. Their 
brothers were equally unsupportive, except Antonio Candido who reluctantly agreed to join them, but 
imposed the condition that the mill had to be established in Taboleiro Grande instead of Juiz de Fora, as 
originally planned. The Cedro mill was thus set-up in Taboleiro Grande165. Some years later the Cedro mill 
was merged with the Cachoeira mill into the CCC. However, Bernardo was never happy with his life in 
Taboleiro Grande, which was too small for his entrepreneurial talents. Therefore, with the death of his father 
in 1887, Bernardo decided to move to Juiz de Fora and set-up a textile mill there as he had previously 
intended. One year after his arrival in Juiz de Fora he established the Tecelagem Mascarenhas166. It is 
reasonable to conclude that the funds invested in this mill had originated partially from the capital made in 
the Cedro mill and in the CCC, and in part from what he had inherited from his father, funds accumulated 
in trading and farming.
The Industrial Mineira mill was established in Juiz de Fora by five Englishmen (Andrew Steele, 
John Steele, Peter Steele, William Moreth, and Henry Whittaker). Most were traders living in the city of 
Rio de Janeiro, except William Moreth who lived in Petropolis167.
Among die textile mills established during the 1890s, the CTS, also established in the central part 
of Minas Gerais, was founded by Manoel Jose de Souza Moreira, his sons, Manoel Gonsalves de Souza 
Moreira and Augusto Gonsalves de Souza Moreira, and his son-in-law, Antonio Pereira de Mattos. Manoel 
Jose de Souza Moreira, the main promoter and largest shareholder, was both a farmer and a local trader. 
He married one of the daughters of a wealthy local farmer (Manoel Gonsalves Can^ado), from whom they 
inherited the Cachoeira farm where the CTS was later set-up. He also owned a large merchant house, 
Moreira & Filhos, in Santana do Sao Joao Acima. Manoel Gonsalves de Souza Moreira, Manoel Jos6 de 
Souza Moreira's eldest son and the second largest shareholder of the CTS, was also a local trader working 
in partnership with his father in Moreira & Filhos. His brother, Augusto Gongalves de Souza Moreira, was 
a doctor who at the time of the establishment of the mill was a member of the Constituent Assembly of the 
state of Minas Gerais168. Antonio Pereira de Mattos was a travelling salesman for large merchant houses 
from Rio de Janeiro, before getting married to one of Manoel Jos6 de Souza Moreira's daughters169.
There is little information about die activities of the promoter of the Sao Joanense mill, Antonio 
Moreira da Costa Rodrigues, or about the activities of the founders of the Itabira do Campo, the Jequitahy,
164 Vaz, op.cit.. p.42-3.
165 Ibid., p.43.
166 Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. pp.79-86, 123-9.
167 Versiani, op.cit.. p.82.
168 Souza, op.cit.. p.101-15, 123-7, 194-98.
169 Ibid., pp. 170-3.
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the Sao Joao Nepomuceno, the Perpetua, and the Itinga mills170.
The Companhia Industrial Pitanguense was established by experienced industrialists. For example, 
Luiz Augusto Vianna Barbosa, who was originally a farmer and one of the founders of the Cachoeira mill 
and the CCC. Furthermore, when he sold his shares of the CCC he invested the funds in die purchase of 
the Brumado mill171. There is no information about the activities of Antonio Mascarenhas Barbosa, one of 
Luiz Augusto Vianna Barbosa's sons. However, his other son, Sergio Mascarenhas Barbosa, was an 
industrialist. There is also no information about the activities of the second largest shareholder, Francisco 
Bahia da Rocha. His two sons, Francisco and Am6rico Bahia da Rocha, were an industrialist and a trader 
respectively. Together, Luiz Augusto Vianna Barbosa, Francisco Bahia da Rocha, and their sons, held more 
than 80% of the shares of the company. Among the other ten shareholders of the company, three were 
clergymen, two were farmers, two were traders, one was a magistrate, and the activities of the remaining 
two are not known172. Here again it is possible to observe the presence of die commercial and agricultural 
capital in the establishment of a textile mill, although a large proportion of the funds invested in this case 
came from the textile industry itself.
The Melancias mill was also established by experienced industrialists as the mill was set-up by a 
group of investors who were already associated with other textile undertakings in Minas Gerais. Among the 
three largest shareholders, Jeronymo Francisco Franca and Joao da Matta Teixeira were both directors and 
two of the main shareholders of the CCM at the time of the establishment of the Melancias mill. The third, 
Theophilo Marques Ferreira, had been one of the founders of the CCC and its general manager for several
173years .
The promoter and major shareholder of the Companhia Progresso Fabril, Carlos Vaz de Mello, was 
a politician from Vigosa who at the time of the establishment of the mill was a member of the Constitutional 
Republican Party's executive committee. The first two directors of the mill, Jos6 Tinoco and Augusto 
Ferreira Brant, held 10% and 12% of the shares of the company respectively. The former was a farmer and 
a capitalist, whereas the latter was a local trader174.
The main promoter of the Cachoeira Grande mill was a farmer from the central part of Minas 
Gerais, Antonio Ferreira Alves da Silva. Anxious about the impact of the abolition of slavery on his 
agricultural operations, Antonio Ferreira Alves da Silva decided to establish a textile mill. Lacking 
experience in the textile business, he associated himself with the founders of the CCM, Joao da Matta
170 Versiani, op.cit.. pp. 128-243.
171 Ibid., pp. 167-71.
172 Companhia Industrial Pitanguense, I.ista Nominativa dos Srs. Subscritores. (1894), in Minas 
Gerais. 5 January 1894, p.7.
173 Versiani, op.cit.. p.165.
174 Companhia Progresso Fabril, Estatutos. (1893), in Minas Gerais. 23 May 1893, pp.7-8.
96
Teixeira, Americo Teixeira Guimaraes, and Herculino Franga. Thus, the capital invested in the Cachoeira 
Grande mill came mainly from farming and the textile industry itself175.
Finally, the Sao Domingos mill was established by seven people, among them the members of the 
Moreira Penna family, who were the main shareholders. Namely Affonso Augusto Moreira Penna, then 
Governor of Minas Gerais, his brothers Domingos Moreira Teixeira Penna and Jose Moreira Teixeira Penna, 
both of whom were farmers176.
Thus, although on the whole coffee capital played a very minor role in the establishment of the 
mineiro textile industry, a substantial part of the capital invested in the industry was accumulated in farming. 
Trading was another important source of capital and several mills established in the county of Diamantina 
were financed mainly by capital accumulated in the diamond business. It is also important to point out that 
towards the end of the century several textile enterprises were being financed by capital accumulated in the 
industry itself.
Comparison between the origin of the funds invested in the establishment of the mineiro and the 
carioca textile industry reveals important similarities and differences. Most of the textile mills established 
in Rio de Janeiro during the period 1878-1895 were also financed by merchants. However, while it seems 
that mineiro merchants were of a more generalist nature and engaged mainly in up-country trading, their 
carioca counterparts were more specialized, dealing mainly with cloth, and engaged more specifically in the 
import-export trade. As shown in Table III.7, the FTSL was founded in 1877 by a merchant, Jos6 Maria 
Teixeira de Azevedo, engaged in the import-export trade177. The FTPG was founded in 1878 by Antonio 
Feh'cio dos Santos, a doctor from Minas Gerais whose father and uncle established the Biribiry mill in 
Diamantina, Jose Rodrigues Peixoto, a doctor and grocer from Rio de Janeiro, and John Sherrington178. The 
FTR was founded in 1879 by a merchant engaged in the import-export trade of cloth. The FFTTA was 
founded in 1880 by Jose Augusto Laranja, a merchant, Joaquim Carvalho de Oliveira e Silva, a cloth 
wholesaler, and Henry Whittaker, a technician179. The FFTTB was founded by a merchant engaged in the 
cotton trade180. The main promoters of the FFTC were Peter Steele, an Englishman living in Rio de Janeiro 
and engaged in the import-export trade of cloth, Henry Whittaker, a technician who was also a partner in 
the FFTTA, as mentioned above, and George Holden, an Englishman181. The FTSJ was founded by three
175 Versiani, op.cit.. pp. 174-5.
176 Companhia Industrial Sao Domingos, Ata da Assembleia de Instalaf ao. (1894), in Minas Gerais. 
21 February 1894, p.7.
177 Monteiro, op.cit.. pp.98-101.
178 Ibid., pp. 120-3.
179 Ibid., pp. 143-7.
180 Ibid., pp. 156-9.
181 Ibid., pp. 169-76.
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Table IIL7 - The city of Rio de Janeiro: activity of the main promoters of the textile companies 
established in the period 1878-1895.
COMPANY MAIN PROMOTERS ACTIVITY
FTSL Jose Maria Teixeira de Azevedo Merchant
FTPG Antonio Felicio dos Santos Doctor
Josd Rodrigues Peixoto Doctor
John Sherrington n.a.
FTR Frederico Glette Merchant
FFTTA Jose Augusto Laranja Merchant
Joaquim C. de Oliveira e Silva Merchant
Henry Whittaker Technician
FFTTB Joaquim Marques da Costa Merchant
FFTC Peter Steele Merchant
Hairy Whittaker Technician
George Holden n.a.
FTSJ John Valentine Hall Merchant
James Grainger Bellamy Merchant
John Henry Lowndes Merchant
FTSC Frederico Pinheiro da Silva Merchant
John Henry Lowndes Merchant
Jose da Cunha Ferreira Doctor
CFTCI Manoel Salgado Zenha Merchant
Francisco Tavares Bastos n.a.
Joao Jose dos Reis Merchant
CPIB Banco Rural e Hypotecario Bank
Banco Intemacional do Brasil Bank
CFTC Viscount of Figueiredo Banker and
Merchant
CSndido da Cunha Sotto Maior Merchant
CFTSF Affonso de La mare Merchant
FTR - Fabrica de Tecidos do Rink; CFTC - Companhia de Fiagao e Tecidos Corcovado; CPIB - Companhia 
Progresso Industrial do Brasil; FFTC - Fabrica de Fiagao e Tecelagem Carioca; FTPG - Fabrica de Tecidos 
Pau Grande; FTSC - Fabrica de Tecidos de Sao Christovao; FTSJ - Fabrica de Tecidos Sao Joao; FTSL - 
Fabrica de Tecidos Sao Lazaro; CFTCI - Companhia de Fiagao e Tecidos Confianga Industrial; CFTSF - 
Companhia de Fiagao e Tecidos Sao Felix; FFTTA - Fabrica de Fiagao, Tecidos e Tinturaria Allianga; 
FFTTB - Fdbrica de Fiagao, Tecidos e Tinturaria Bomfim.
Source: Monteiro, op.cit.. pp.98-283.
merchants engaged in the import-export trade of cloth, John Valentine Hall, James Grainger Bellamy and 
John Henry Lowndes182. The FTSC was founded in 1888 by Frederico Pinheiro da Silva, a merchant, John 
Henry Lowndes, an merchant who was one of the founders of the FTSJ, and Jose da Cunha Ferreira, a 
doctor183. The CFTCI was founded in 1885 by Manoel Salgado Zenha, a grocer, Francisco Tavares Bastos, 
of whom there is no information about his activities previous to the establishment of the mill, and Joao Jos6
182 Ibid., pp. 182-3.
183 Ibid., pp. 193-4.
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dos Reis, one of the largest merchants established in the city of Rio de Janeiro in the second half of the last 
century184. The CPD3 was founded by two banks: the Banco Rural e Hypotecdrio, and the Banco 
Intemacional do Brasil185. The CFTC was founded in 1889 by the Viscount of Figueiredo, a banker and 
merchant engaged in the import-export trade, and Candido da Cunha Sotto Maior, a merchant engaged in 
the import-export trade of cloth186. Finally, the CFTSF was founded in 1891 by a merchant, Affonso de 
Lamare187.
Thus, comparison between the origin of the funds invested in the mineiro. the carioca. and the 
paulista textile industries reveals important differences. In the first case, the capital invested originated in 
the generalist up-country trade business, in the diamond business, and in farming (not connected with the 
coffee-growing activity). In the second case, the main source of capital was the import-export trading 
business, dealing mainly with cloth, whereas the capital invested in the paulista industry came mainly from 
the-coffee-growing activity188.
The electricity generating industry, established in the last decade of the nineteenth century was 
financed in a similar way, investors transfered capital from trade, farming, manufacturing, banking and so 
on. As already mentioned, the CME was organized in 1888 by Bernardo Mascarenhas, who started in die 
trading business and then invested in the textile industry. Subsequently, Bernardo would invest in the 
electricity generating industry. The funds used in setting-up the CME came from different sources, as in the 
case of the Tecelagem Mascarenhas. Part of the funds came from the capital accumulated in the textile 
industry and part from what Bernardo inherited which had in turn been accumulated in trade and farming. 
Moreover, it is important to point out that Bernardo was the only one, among the nine brothers, who never 
came to own land. Bernardo later would take part in the establishment of the Companhia Construtora 
Mineira, the Sociedade de Imigragao, the Banco de Cr6dito Real de Minas Gerais, the School of Commerce 
of Juiz de Fora, and the Companhia de Tecidos de Juta, a short-lived enterprise189.
Furthermore, among the 30 original shareholders in the CME, 12 belonged to the Mascarenhas 
family190, individuals who in a way or another have accumulated their funds in trade, manufacturing, and
184 Ibid., pp.208-13.
185 Ibid., pp.223-9.
186 Ibid., pp.239-43.
187 Ibid., pp.252-4.
188 Suzigan in his work about the origins of the Brazilian industry comes to the same conclusions 
in what regards the origin of the funds invested in the mineiro and the carioca textile industries. For a brief 
discussion about the origins of the capital invested in the textile industry established in different parts of 
Brazil until the beginning of the twentieth century see Suzigan, op.cit.. pp. 122-45, and Stein, op.cit.. pp.41-3.
189 Vaz, op.cit.. pp.42-3.
190 The members of the Mascarenhas family are: Bernardo Mascarenhas, Policena da Silva 
Mascarenhas (Bernardo's mother), Francisco Mascarenhas, Vitor Mascarenhas, Caetano Mascarenhas, Viriato
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farming191. Moreover, one of the main promoters, a shareholder, and one of the first directors of the CME, 
Francisco Baptista de Oliveira, began working with his father in his retail store in Entre-Rios. In 1882, he 
moved to Juiz de Fora where he founded a famous and well known retail store in the Mata zone ("Casa da 
Barateza")192. Oliveira met Bernardo Mascarenhas with whom he became close friend and partner in several 
enterprises at the beginning of 1886. In 1887, he and the Baron of Santa Helena (who was also one of the 
original shareholders of the CME193) founded the first bank in Minas Gerais, the Banco Territorial e 
Mercantil de Minas194. Two years later, Oliveira was one of the founders of the Banco de Credito Real de 
Minas Gerais. He was also partner of Bernardo Mascarenhas in the Baptista, Mascarenhas, Bicalho & 
Companhia, a short-lived enterprise aimed at exploring gold mines in SabariL He was one of the founders 
and owners of a local newspaper from Juiz de Fora, O Difoio de Minas. Finally, in 1891, again in a 
partnership with Bernardo Mascarenhas, he founded the School of Commerce of Juiz de Fora195.
Thus, the funds invested in the CME came from trade, manufacturing, banking, and farming. It is 
also reasonable to believe that coffee capital could also have featured in the company since the CME was 
established in one of the largest coffee-growing counties of Minas Gerais (Juiz de Fora).
The CFLCL was established in 1905 by Norberto Custodio Ferreira, Jose Monteiro Ribeiro 
Junqueira, and Joao Duarte Ferreira. In 1889, Norberto Custodio Ferreira established his law office in 
Cataguazes. In 1898, he was invited to open the first branch of the Banco de Credito Real de Minas Gerais 
in the Mata zone in Cataguazes. In 1905, he was one of the founders of the CFLCL. In 1908, he was invited 
to establish and manage a branch of the Banco do Brasil in the city of Santos, the most important port in 
Brazil. In the following year he was promoted director of the bank, a position that he maintained until his 
retirement in 1925. He also owned rich farms where he grew coffee and bred cattle196. After attending 
schools in Bafbacena, Petropolis and Rio de Janeiro, Jose Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira went to Sao Paulo 
where he also read law. He graduated in 1894 and returned to Leopoldina where, after working provisionally 
as a public prosecutor, he established his office. One year after graduating, Jose Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira 
established with his partner in the law office the local newspaper, Gazeta de I^onoldina. In 1905, together
Diniz Mascarenhas, Theophilo Marques Ferreira, Elvira Diniz Mascarenhas, Pacffico Mascarenhas, Antonio 
Diniz Mascarenhas, Altivo Diniz Mascarenhas, and Antonio Augusto Mascarenhas, Oliveira, Comnanhia 
Mineira de Eletricidade. p.27.
191 Ibid., p.27.
192 Bastos, Mariano Proconio Ferreira Laee. p.21.
193 Ibid., p.27.
194 Bastos, Mariano Procopio Ferreira Laee. p.22.
195 Ibid., pp.23-5.
196 "O Falecimento do Dr. Norberto Custodio Ferreira", in Jomal Cataguases. (Cataguases), 17 
February 1935, p.l.
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with Noberto Custodio Ferreira and Joao Duarte Ferreira, he founded the CFLCL. In 1909, he established 
the Companhia Leiteira Leopoldinense, which became the main milk supplier of the city of Rio de Janeiro. 
In 1912, together with his brother, Custddio Junqueira, and his brother-in-law, Francisco de Andrade 
Botelho, he established the bank "Ribeiro Junqueira, Irmao & Botelho". In 1924, he established the Sao Jos6 
sawmill. Two years later he established the Companhia Fia^ao e Tecidos Leopoldinense197. Joao Duarte 
Ferreira was bom in Coimbra, Portugal, and came to Brazil in 1872. He started working as an employee 
of the Leopoldina Railway and later he became partner in the Joaquim Estolano da Silveira firm. In 1891, 
he established the first coffee-mill of Cataguazes (one of the largest centres of coffee production at this 
time), which boosted decisively his wealth. In 1893, he established the Banco of Cataguazes and in 1905 
he was one of the founders and the largest shareholder of the CFLCL and of the Companhia de Fia?ao e 
Tecelagem de Cataguazes. Joao Duarte Ferreira became one of the wealthiest men in Minas Gerais and his 
fortune included, among other things, coffee farms, coffee, sugar and rice mills, a sawmill, the Banco 
Construtor, and the Grande Hotel Villas198.
Thus, the establishment of the CFLCL was financed by capital accumulated in different activities - 
in manufacturing, banking, and law practices. Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that at least part of 
the capital invested in the CFLCL originated in farming, as the father of one of the founders of the CFLCL, 
Jose Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira, was a farmer in Leopoldina199. However, farming in this case probably 
means coffee-growing since Leopoldina was situated in one of the largest centres of coffee production of 
Minas Gerais200. It is also important to point out the importance of the coffee economy in the establishment 
of the CFLCL. Apart from the indirect contribution (the formation of a local consumer market, the funds 
for investment in infrastructure, and so on) that coffee-growing activity may have had to the establishment 
of the CFLCL, one of the founders' main sources of wealth previous to the establishment of the company 
was coffee milling.
A comparison of the process of funding of electricity generating companies in the cities of Sao 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, on the one hand, and in Minas Gerais, on the other, reveals important differences. 
The STLPC and the RJTLPC were financed by Canadian capital201 since the scale of the consumer market 
in the cities of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro was such that the capital required could not be easily supplied 
locally without the intervention of the State. In the case of the mineiro electricity generating companies, the 
respective consumer markets were smaller and local sources of capital were enough and available. In the
197 "Dr. Jose Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira", in Gazeta de Leonoldina. (Leopoldina), 19 May 1946.
198 Costa, on.cit.. p.541.
199 "Dr. Jose Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira", in Gazeta de Leopoldina. (Leopoldina), 19 May 1946.
200 In 1905, for example, Leopoldina was the 8 th largest producer of coffee in the Mata zone. See 
Lima, op.cit.. p.36.
201 D. McDowall, The Light: Brazilian Traction. Light and Power Company Limited. 1899-1945. 
(Toronto, 1988), pp.48-79.
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end, the restricted dimension of the markets instead of working as a limitation imposed by the mineiro 
business environment, worked as die necessary condition for the local investment in this particular industry. 
Furthermore, from the data presented above it is possible to observe that shareholders of both the CME and 
the CFLCL were either friends or members of the same family (or professions), further evidence of the local 
and personal nature of business affairs in Minas Gerais as late as the beginning of the twentieth century. 
In contrast, the paulista and carioca electricity generating companies had a more depersonalized ownership 
structure.
This analysis of the main economic influences on the formation of the mineiro entrepreneurial class 
has revealed important differences with the paulista and carioca entrepreneurial classes. The participation 
of coffee planters, the so-called "bourgeois immigrant", and merchants dealing with import-export trade was 
much lower in Minas Gerias than in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In the Mata zone - a major coffee- 
growing region -, coffee planters only had a small participation in the establishment of local industrial 
enterprises. It was immigrants, with very limited resources and thus cannot be classified as "bourgeois 
immigrant", and Brazilians unconnected with coffee-growing who were responsible for the establishment 
of more than 90% of the industries founded in Juiz de Fora during the period. Moreover, funds invested in 
the iron and textile industries, concentrated in the central parts of Minas Gerais, originated mainly in 
farming, again unrelated to coffee, in generalist up-country trade, and in the diamond business. The analysis 
of the mineiro electricity generating industry has revealed that the funds came from a variety of sources - 
farming (included coffee-growing), manufacturing, banking, and the practice of the legal profession. 
However, comparison with the funds invested in the paulista and carioca electricity generating companies 
has shown that, whereas the funds invested in the mineiro companies derived from local sources, those 
invested in the paulista and carioca companies derived from foreign sources.
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Conclusion
This section opened with an appraisal of theories of entrepreneurship and the debate about the 
origin and the nature of the Brazilian entrepreneur. Generally speaking, the study of the mineiro businessman 
has shown that he possessed most of the characteristics described by the economic literature. He was an 
employer of factors of production and a capitalist (or at least owned part of the capital invested). Most of 
his life was devoted to the management of his businesses. He was a leader and an innovator - as evidenced 
by the careers of men like Bernardo Mascarenhas and Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage who pioneered 
several industries in Minas Gerais. They were willing to assume risks. Furthermore, mineiro entrepreneurs 
introduced new goods (like electricity) or a new quality of a good (like a macadamized turnpike). They 
introduced new methods of production (like the industrial production of cloth). They exploited new markets, 
like the virtually unaccessible mineiro market for iron products. Moreover, they had an intellectual formation 
based on principles which were very close to the ethos of the first European entrepreneurs in several relevant 
respects. However, their businesses were restricted to the small-scale and/or light industry and cautious 
attempts to invest in infrastructure ended with the intervention of the government, as in the case of the 
Uniao e Industria turnpike.
The analysis of the social background of the mineiro entrepreneur has shown that he had a different 
social and ethnic background to entrepreneurs from Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Immigrants were less 
important in the formation of the mineiro entrepreneurial class. Therefore, apart from the iron industry - 
where foreign entrepreneurs had a small but important participation in the establishment of the industry - 
and apart from the Mata zone - where immigrants were responsible for the establishment of the majority 
of the industries founded before 1900 -, locals constituted the main source of entrepreneurs in nineteenth- 
century Minas Gerais. The CUT was organized by Mariano Proc6pio Ferreira Lage, who was bom in 
Barbacena, and several local farmers. The mineiro textile industry was also established mainly by local 
entrepreneurs, in marked contrast to entrepreneurs who established the carioca textile industry. Even the first 
mineiro electricity generating companies, which were established in the Mata zone, were also established 
by local entrepreneurs. The CME was founded by Bernardo Mascarenhas and other local businessmen, 
whereas the CFLCL was established by two Brazilians and one Portuguese. The case of the mineiro 
electricity generating companies also contrasts with that of the electricity generating companies established 
in the cities of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, where the first electricity generating companies were founded 
and promoted by foreigners. Furthermore, several of the most prominent nineteenth-century mineiro 
entrepreneurs came from ruling traditional families.
The analysis of the main economic influences on die formation of the mineiro entrepreneurial class 
has shown that although trade and farming constituted the main sources of entrepreneurship and capital in 
Minas Gerais as in Sao Paulo, they were of a different nature owing to the peculiarities of the mineiro 
economy. Minas Gerais was landlocked, and import and export trade was concentrated in Rio de Janeiro, 
Santos, and Sao Paulo. Moreover, coffee cultivation was confined to the southern parts of the province and 
elsewhere a different range of activities were undertaken, notably gold mining, cattie-raising, and the
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production of food staples. However, the mineiro coffee economy did provide - directly or indirectly - part 
of the funds invested in the mineiro industry. Coffee growers were directly responsible, among others, for 
the establishment of the CUI. The company was organized by Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage, himself a 
fanner, and several coffee growers of the Mata zone who also financed die construction of several branches 
of the Uniao e Industria turnpike.
Nevertheless, farmers were responsible for only a small part of the industries established in the 
coffee-growing parts of Minas Gerais in the period 1858-1912, in a clear indication that coffee-growers were 
not as important in the formation of the mineiro entrepreneurial class as they were in Sao Paulo. It was 
immigrants and Brazilians unconnected with coffee who owned most of the industries established in the 
southern parts of Minas Gerais. Moreover, immigrants usually did not fit into the "bourgeois immigrant" 
concept as most did not possess capital before arriving in Brazil.
In other parts of Minas Gerais up-country trade of a more generalist nature and food production 
farming represented the starting point in the career of most entrepreneurs. In the case of the iron industry, 
for example, which throughout the nineteenth century was concentrated in the central part of the province, 
most of the foundries set-up in the first three-quarters of the century were established by farmers as an 
integral part of the rural economy. However, in the latter part of the century, the larger ironworks (the 
Esperanga and the Bumier foundries) were not established by farmers, but by professionals and established 
industrialists.
Yet the main sources of capital for the mineiro textile industry, also concentrated in the central part 
of Minas Gerais, were trade, ranching and agriculture, and the diamond business. Towards die end of the 
century several textile mills were financed by capital accumulated in the industry itself. The process of 
funding of the mineiro textile contrasts with Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, 
most of the mills established during the 1878-1895 period were financed by more specialized merchants 
engaged in the-import-export trade, dealing mainly with cloth. In the case of Sao Paulo, capital came mainly 
from the coffee sector.
Finally, the mineiro electricity generating industry was financed by capital drawn from a number 
of different activities. Funds invested in the CME and the CFLCL came from trade, manufacturing, banking, 
and farming. There is evidence that coffee capital could also have contributed to the funding of these 
companies as they were established in one of the largest coffee-growing counties of Minas Gerais (the Mata 
zone). Furthermore, part of the funds invested in the CFLCL derived directly from the coffee economy, as 
one of the founders' main source of wealth, previous to the establishment of the company, was coffee- 
milling. Comparison with the electricity generating companies established in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro 
has shown that they were financed by foreign, not local capital. Thus, the analysis of the mineiro 
entrepreneur has revealed the existence of a great deal of entrepreneurial initiative and the availability of 
local sources of capital. The general social attitude towards entrepreneurship seems to have been mostly 
positive as most entrepreneurs came from the local elite. The main restrictions to the development of a more 
dynamic and conductive business environment seems to have been of an economic nature, lack of direct
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access to international markets, inefficient means of transportation, and a scattered and diluted consumer 
market.
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PART n  - THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRM 
Introduction
One of the key indicators of the emergence of modem capitalism is the rise of large business 
enterprises operating many distinct units and managed by a hierarchy of salaried executives. This section 
is divided into two chapters. The first reviews the literature on organization theory. It examines different 
forms of organizational structures, their origins and implications. The second chapter investigates the 
structure of several business enterprises in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. These are grouped in four 
different economic sectors: the iron industry; transport; the textile industry; and the electricity supply 
industry. This investigation assesses the degree of structural development of mineiro firms in the nineteenth 
century and relates it to the prevailing business environment, in the light of the literature examined.
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Chapter 4 - A BRIEF REVIEW ON THE LITERATURE ON 
ORGANIZATION THEORY
The theory of organizations can be divided into several themes, according to the aspect that authors 
elect as die most important to understand or to prescribe the effectiveness of the organizations1. A large 
number of authors have written extensively on each theme related to business organization, rendering the 
field a body of science in itself. To attempt to review all writers or even to cover each of the constituent 
themes in the literature would be a huge task and one that is beyond the scope and purposes of this diesis. 
Therefore, only those theories most suitable to the study of organizations in the nineteenth century will be 
considered. Several important and relevant theories were put aside either because they are based on modem 
organizations, and hardly fit into the experience of nineteenth-century mineiro organizations, or because they 
focus on themes for which there is very little information available. The authors considered in this thesis 
examine the structural differences they have identified, and investigate the causes of these various forms of 
organization and explore their implications. Furthermore, they have a historical approach which proved to 
be very useful for the analysis of the case of Minas Gerais.
One of the classic authors in the study of organizations is Max Weber. Although his main concern 
is with political organizations (as regimes)2, his concepts are applied in this thesis to the study of 
corporations and family businesses. Max Weber's main contribution to the study of organizations is his 
theory of authority structure. He identifies three different forms of organizations based on how authority is 
exercised within them, each of which is expressed in a particular administrative apparatus - charismatic, 
traditional, and bureaucratic3. They are presented along an evolutionary scale: from the most personalized 
and least efficient to the most depersonalized and efficient type.
In the first type of organization - "charismatic" - authority rests on the specific and exceptional 
character of an individual person. Authority is exercised by only one person, based on his qualities of 
leadeshipr. Charismatic authority is sharply opposed to both bureaucratic and traditional forms of authority 
in the sense that it is not a form of everyday control of action. Whereas bureaucratic authority is rational 
in the sense of being bound to intellectually analysable mles, and traditional authority is bound to the 
precedents handed down from the past and to this extent is also oriented to mles, charismatic authority is 
irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules. The only basis of legitimacy is the personal charisma 
of the leader. The basis of authority is in the characteristics of one person and commands are based on that 
person's inspiration. Typical examples of this kind of organization are small-scale revolutionary movements
1 In their introductory book on the organizational theory Pugh and Hickson, for example, divide 
the subject according to the following themes: the structure of organizations; the organization in its 
environment; the management of organizations; decision-making in organizations; and people in 
organizations. See D.S. Pugh and D.J. Hickson, Writers on Organizations. (4th ed. 1989).
2 See M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization- (New York, 1947).
3 Ibid., p.328.
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either religious or political in form, but many economic enterprises have had "charismatic" founders4. Some 
of the most important mineiro firms of the last century, for example, were founded by charismatic industrial 
pioneers such as Bernardo Mascarenhas (founder of the Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, Companhia Mineira 
de Eletricidade, Banco de Credito Real de Minas Gerais, among others) and Mariano Procdpio Ferreira Lage 
(founder of the Companhia Uniao e Industrial
In the second type of organization - "traditional" - authority and order are based cm custom and 
precedent, and it is very common for the most important posts to be filled with members of a ruling family 
or clan. Selection and appointment is thus based on kinship rather than expertise. The person or persons 
exercising authority are designated according to traditionally transmitted rules. Obedience is not owed to 
established rules, but to the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen 
for such a position on a traditional basis. It is interesting to point out here that most of the firms examined 
in this thesis were in this sense traditional, since occupants of managerial positions often came from die 
founding families and kinship was thus a basic requirement for appointment. In traditional organizations 
administrative staff is recruited among slaves, coloni, or conscripted subjects. Nevertheless, traditional 
regimes tend to restrict the development of rational economic activity for the following reasons: they place 
serious obstacles in the way of formally rational regulations; the absence of a staff of officials with formal 
technical training; there is a wide scope for arbitrariness on die part of the leader and his administrative 
staff; and there is an inherent tendency to the regulation of the economic life. For these reasons, only certain 
types of capitalist organizations are able to develop under the dominance of a traditional regime: a certain 
amount of capitalistic mercantile trade, capitalistic organization of tax farming, and the sale or lease of 
offices, for the provision of supplies for the state, the financing of wars and, under certain circumstances, 
capitalistic plantations5.
In the third type of organization - "bureaucratic" - authority is based on expertise. In such 
organizations the officials' sphere of competence is clearly defined, offices are arranged in a hierarchy, there 
is a set of written rules and procedures, administrative acts are formulated and recorded in writing, a clear 
separation is made between personal and business affairs, and appointment is based on expertise. 
Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge. The 
whole administrative staff is appointed and function according to the following criteria: 1. candidates are 
selected on the basis of technical qualifications; 2. the office is filled by a free contractual relationship; 3. 
individual officials are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official 
obligations; 4. officials are free to resign from their offices; 5. officials are remunerated by fixed salaries 
in money and the salary scale is primarily graded according to rank in the hierarchy; 6. the office is treated 
as the sole, or at least die primary, occupation of the incumbent; 7. occupations in the organization constitute
4 Ibid., pp.358-63.
5 Ibid., pp.341-58.
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a career; 8. the official is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office6. 
Several firms examined in this thesis had a clear bureaucratic structure where employees were organized 
in a hierarchical way, and their remuneration being fixed according to their ranking in the hierarchy and to 
a salary scale.
According to Weber, in modem society the capitalistic entrepreneur is the only person who has 
been able to maintain at least relative immunity from subjection to the control of rational bureaucratic 
knowledge. All the rest of the population have tended to be organized in large-scale corporate groups which 
are inevitably subject to bureaucratic control. The bureaucratic type of organization has become dominant 
because technical knowledge, through the development of modem technology and business methods in the 
production of goods, has become completely indispensable and bureaucracy is technically the most efficient 
form of organization possible. Bureaucracy is superior not only in technical knowledge, but also in the 
knowledge of the concrete fact within its own sphere of interest, which is usually confined to the interests 
of a private business - capitalistic enterprise. Furthermore, Weber points out that capitalism in its modem 
stages of development strongly tends to foster the development of bureaucracy. Capitalism is the most 
rational economic basis for bureaucratic administration and enables it to develop in the most rational form. 
Moreover, capitalistic development has created an urgent need for stable, strict, intensive, and calculable 
administration. It is this need which gives bureaucracy a crucial role in our society as the central element 
in any kind of large-scale administration. Only by reversion in every field - political, religious, economic, 
etc. - to small-scale organization would it be possible to any considerable extent to escape its influence7.
Thus, the close connexion established by Weber between the development of modem capitalism 
and bureaucracy is a useful tool for assessing die business environment in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, 
the emergence of increasingly bureaucratic organizations being a key indicator of the emergence of more 
advanced stages of capitalism. Furthermore, although these pure types of organizations - charismatic, 
traditional, and bureaucratic - are distinctions which are useful for analysing organizations, any real 
organization may be a combination of them, as the analysis of mineiro firms will show. A good deal of 
charisma was required to overcome the obstacles and prejudices against modem entrepreneurship, and 
traditionalism continued to be the rule in several aspects of the life of the mineiro firms. Nevertheless, as 
the nineteenth century witnessed the demise of the colonial regime in Brazil - and its institutions such as 
slavery, metropolitan monopoly, unequal commercial treaties, etc. - it also witnessed the emergence of firms 
in Minas Gerais with increasingly bureaucratic structures.
Chandler refined Weber's concepts when he restricted his analysis to capitalistic organizations of 
an economic nature. Chandler examined the organizational evolution of business enterprises in die USA in 
the last century and at the beginning of this. He identified basically two types of organizations, according 
to the complexity of their administrative structure and to the scope of their activities. Thus, firms were
6 Ibid., pp.329-36.
7 Ibid., pp.337-41.
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divided into traditional and modem business enterprises: the latter were further divided into three types - 
firms dominated by families, by financiers, or by managers. These divisions are determined by the 
relationships between owners and administrators in respect to the means of production and distribution.
In a traditional firm the administrative structure is embryonic or non-existent and owners are 
responsible for all basic activities: economic; administrative; operational and entrepreneurial. In contrast, the 
modem business enterprise has a clearly defined administrative structure, employing a hierarchy of middle- 
and top-salaried managers. This more developed administrative structure is a reflection of the scale of the 
operation of these firms, which usually operate on a national basis and have several units and divisions8. 
Modem firms dominated by families, or modem family firms, are large firms with a complex administrative 
structure, but whose founding entrepreneurs and whose family members, or their representatives, continue 
to be part of top-level management When die modem firm relies largely on outside financing for its 
establishment and initial growth, bankers and other financiers participate in top-level management decision­
making. Finally, modem managerial firms are the ones which are able to generate funds necessary for 
expansion, and top-level management decisions are made by salaried managers who own few of the 
companies' shares9.
Chandler, like Weber, describes the development of organizations along an evolutionary scale: from 
the most traditional to the most modem. It is also important to point out the correspondence between the 
classifications of the two authors. In other words, the more modem in Chandlerian terms, the more 
bureaucratic in Weber's view.
Chandler's framework is as useful a tool for classifying mineiro organizations as it is for assessing 
the business environment within which they were located. According to him, an economy or economic sector 
in which traditional firms predominate can be considered as an instance of traditional or personal capitalism. 
Those in which entrepreneurial or family firms predominate are considered as an instance of family 
capitalism, and so on, successively, until die most advanced stage, managerial capitalism. Therefore 
traditional, family and financial capitalism proved to be transitional stages in the evolution of modem 
business enterprise and of modem capitalism. All advanced market economies have moved from traditional, 
personal capitalism towards managerial capitalism since the middle of the nineteenth century10. Thus, the 
investigation of mineiro firms in the light of Chandler's framework will be useful to indicate the stage of 
development of the mineiro business environment
Other aspects important for the study of die mineiro business environment are the historical 
dynamic factors observed by Chandler in the growth of the US economy and its business system during the
8 A.D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. (Cambridge, 
MA., 1977), pp. 1-12.
9 A.D. Chandler, "The United States Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism", in Managerial Hierarchies: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of Modem Industrial Enterprises, ed. A.D. Chandler and H. Deams 
(Cambridge, MA., 1980), p. 13.
10 Ibid., p. 13.
110
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Until the last decades of the nineteenth century, the forces
behind the growing complexity of the US business enterprises were the rise of the railway, the development
of concentrated urban markets for industrial and consumer goods, and the emergence of mass-production
technology. From the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, the advent of electrification and the
internal combustion engine, and the rise of organized research and development became the most important
factors in the development of US business enterprises11.
Until the establishment of the railways and the telegraph and until coal had become a widespread
source of energy; and until most firms supplied only local markets - as in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais;
the extension of the business activity in the US economy did not require the creation of multi-division
enterprises and extensive and complex administrative structures. As long as traditional methods and sources
of energy - such as wood, wind and water, man and beast - were used in production and transport the daily
output of each individual firm could easily be supervised by the owners, assisted by one or two managers:
"Using century-old business methods, traditional, small, owner-managed enterprises had 
little difficulty in carrying out production and distribution in the United States."12
Notwithstanding the fact that the growth of the US economy in the earlier part of the nineteenth century had 
brought a rapid increase in the number of firms and the spread of activities over a wide geographic area, 
the result was not an increase in the size of firms. Firms became more numerous, more specialized, but not 
more sophisticated in managerial terms. Most produced and distributed only a single line of goods, and 
carried out a single function, such as wholesaling, retailing, manufacturing, or banking. The coordination 
of the activities of thousands of small businesses was almost entirely brought about by the invisible hand 
of the market.
With the establishment of the railways and the telegraph and with the widespread use of steam
power, the first modem enterprises quickly emerged in the USA. They first appeared in transport and
communications, then in distribution, and finally in production. The use of new technologies increased the
speed and volume of production and of movement of goods creating a need for managerial hierarchies to
supervise, monitor, and coordinate the processes of production and distribution:
"In transportation and communication, managers began to coordinate the movement of 
goods from one commercial center to another. In distribution, new mass-marketing 
enterprises, which relied on new means of transportation and communication, administered 
the flow of goods from processors or producers to retailers or ultimate consumers. In 
manufacturing the new mass producers came to coordinate the flow from the extraction 
of raw material through production to distribution to retailers or final consumers."
In sectors which were dominated by a few great modem multi-division corporations, top-level managers
11 T.K. McCraw, The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essavs toward a Historical Theory of Big 
Business. (Boston, 1991), p. 11.
12 Chandler, "The United States Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism", pp. 14-5.
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started to make the decisions that had previously been made by the owners of thousands of small firms13.
Up to the beginning of the twentieth century, the basic innovations in the US economy were more 
in the creation of new forms of organization and new ways of marketing. By the end of die last century, 
the great modem corporation, carrying on the major industrial processes, namely purchasing, manufacturing, 
marketing, and finance - all within the same organizational structure - had become the basic business unit. 
From 1903 onwards, the dominant stimuli for innovation in US industry were primarily new products and 
processes. Changes in organizational methods and marketing techniques were largely responses to 
technological changes14.
Chandler suggests that a comparable transformation has occurred in other advanced market 
economies, but more slowly and more recently. The rapidity of die change has differed among sectors and 
nations, but managerial capitalism now dominates the central producing and distributing sectors of every 
major market economy. Nevertheless, the development of modem business enterprise in Europe suggests 
a history quite different from that of the USA, which ifl its turn may point to different patterns of business 
development elsewhere like Minas Gerais. In continental Europe, for example, central government played 
a much larger role in designing, building, and operating the transport and communication infrastructure. As 
a result, administrative techniques and personnel may have been transferred direcdy to business from 
government bureaucracies in a way that would not have been possible in the USA, where no large 
government offices existed before the beginning of the twentieth century. The most important difference, 
however, was that mass markets developed more slowly in Europe, as it did in Brazil. The smaller, slower- 
growing European consumer market reduced manufacturers' incentives to build large organizations. Where 
large, multi-division enterprises did appear, they remained small enough to be managed at the top level by 
a small number of owners. As a result, family capitalism continued to flourish. Cultural and social factors, 
such as class distinctions and legal differences, also appear to have played a role in delaying the advent of 
the large managerial enterprise and, with it, managerial capitalism15.
A closer examination of the British and German experiences will illustrate even better the 
differences with the US pattern of business development and shed light on the mineiro experience. Although 
difference in size and rate of growth of the British and the US markets may explain many of the evident 
contrasts between their corporate structures, it only partially explains the contrasts between the two countries. 
To begin with, the size and rate of growth of the domestic market is not the best indicator of potential or 
actual demand. Britain, for example, exported a large proportion of its output for most of the twentieth 
century and, consequently, British firms faced a somewhat wider market than its domestic alone might 
suggest. Moreover, the nature of the British domestic market - highly compact and urbanized -, explains the 
absence of some types of vertical integration evident in the USA. The "invisible hand" of the market in
13 Ibid., p. 15.
14 Chandler, The Visible Hand, p.69.
15 Chandler, "The United States Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism", pp. 35-9.
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Britain secured the economies of speed gained by the visible hand of the manager in the USA. Large urban 
markets and efficient market institutions in Britain not only served as an alternative to complex 
administrative structures, but also made it possible for smaller firms to coordinate and oversee operations 
and to allocate resources effectively.
Thus, despite the fact that in some periods domestic market in Britain was better suited than the 
US counterpart to die development of modem corporations, they did not evolve and the characteristics 
associated with the modem corporate economy were still rare in Great Britain in 1919. Large corporations 
in almost all industries were less common than in the USA and corporate development in Great Britain 
presented distinctive national characteristics, with the loose holding company and die family firm remaining 
much more common structures. The pattern of family-dominated enterprise survived longer in Britain - as 
it did in Minas Gerais - than in the USA, in part because many of the enterprises were still small enough 
to be managed by family share-holder-directors - as nineteenth-century mineiro firms - and in part as a result 
of cultural factors. Furthermore, the persistence of family control was also a matter of deliberate policy on 
the part of the controlling families, since there was a lack of alternative resources available for management 
in Britain16.
Legal differences also account for part of the contrast in corporate development between Britain 
and the USA. Cartels and restrictive practices were legal in Britain - as well as in continental Europe - until 
the middle of the 1950s and in important respects they were an alternative to merger that was open to 
European entrepreneurs but closed to their counterparts in the USA. In Britain firms could maintain their 
single-unit structures whereas, at the same time, reducing competition by joining a cartel. Furthermore, 
imperialism, foreign investment, the social and the educational systems, as well as Great Britain's 
comparative advantages, also attract their shares of the blame for delaying the rise of modem corporate 
capitalism. In conclusion, the contrasts between Britain and the USA resulted from a combination of factors 
that include cultural attitudes, values, ideologies, and social structure as well as the nature of markets and 
the available technology17. The British experience suggests that a different combination of these same factors 
may have given rise to an even different pattern in Minas Gerais.
The rise of the modem business enterprise in Germany was closely related to the development of 
modem industrialism, as was the case in the USA. During the German first phase of industrialization - from 
1840 to the economic crisis of 1873 - the establishment of the railways and the related development of 
manufacturing brought the first massive investments in industry. Growth was made possible due to an 
increasingly integrated market, enlarged by the expansion of means of transport, and the attainment of
16 For a more detailed discussion about the problem of lack of managerial capacity in Britain until 
the first decades of the twentieth century see L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy. (2nd. ed. 
1983), pp.70-89.
17 L. Hannah, "Visible and Invisible Hands in Great Britain", in Managerial Hierarchies: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of Modem Industrial Enterprises, ed. A.D. Chandler and H. Deams 
(Cambridge, MA., 1980), pp.41-76.
113
economic and political unity. Industrialization in Germany thus began half century after Britain and roughly 
at the same time as in the USA. The second phase of Germany's industrialization occurred between 1873 
and 1913, by the end of which the country had finally overcome its relative economic backwardness, 
overtaking all other continental European countries and surpassing even Great Britain in some important 
respects. It is during the second phase of industrialization that the modem business enterprise emerged in 
Germany. In 1887 and 1907 almost no traditional firms (firms managed by the owners) were represented 
among the largest enterprises. Managerial enterprises (firms managed by managers solely) had clearly 
increased in number during this period. However, as late as 1907 most of die 100 largest corporations were 
still of an entrepreneurial type (firms managed by managers at their lower and middle levels, and by the 
owners at the top-level). Managerial firms were even rarer among the smaller companies.
There were striking similarities between the development of modem business enterprise in Germany 
and in the USA. In both cases, the largest manufacturing firms were clustered in capital-intensive, 
technologically advanced industries, especially those producing iron, steel and other metals, machinery, 
instruments, and transport equipment. This is even more marked when the two economies are contrasted 
with that of Britain, where most of the largest firms produced consumer goods, like textiles and food. 
However, there were important differences between Germany and the USA in what concerned the market 
for which firms intended their products. Most of the large US firms produced goods for the mass market, 
whereas German large firms usually produced according to customer specifications. The competitive strength 
of the German firms lay in technical virtuosity, whereas that of their US counterparts was in marketing skills 
and services. Furthermore, there were considerable differences in the proportions of managerial, 
entrepreneurial, and personal enterprises between Germany and the USA. Entrepreneurial corporations were 
more important in the former than in the latter country during the First World War. The major growth of 
the managerial corporation in Germany occurred after the War and even then many entrepreneurial firms 
remained among the 100 largest, as it was also the case of Minas Gerais.
Nevertheless, the size of the markets were not a significant factor in explaining the differences and 
similarities observed in the cases of Germany and the USA, otherwise the pattern of corporate development 
in Britain and Germany would be more similar. Neither do legal differences also account adequately for the 
differences in the patterns of corporate growth in Germany, Britain and the USA. Although the legal 
tolerance of cartels were similar both in Germany and in Britain, integrated concerns originated in much the 
same way in Germany and in the USA, despite their legal differences.
Several factors were involved in bringing about these differences between Germany and Great 
Britain. Organizational and managerial skills were available earlier in Germany than in Britain, partly 
because they were developed earlier in the public bureaucracy and were adapted to commercial enterprises. 
There were also differences in attitudes and values on the part of businessmen, in the educational systems, 
and in social and cultural traditions. Furthermore, due to their technical education many German 
entrepreneurs had a preference for "organization" and "production" over "market". However, other factors 
favoured very early expansion, diversification, and integration of German firms and explain more powerfully
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and comprehensively for the differences between Germany and Britain. Industrialization started relatively 
late and Germany was at first somewhat more backward than Britain and other parts of Western Europe. 
Then, industrialization took place more rapidly in Germany than in Britain. Moreover, the most important 
industries in the German Industrial Revolution - railways, chemicals, the manufacture of machinery, and 
some raw-materials production - had few if any predecessors, whereas the leading industry in British 
industrialization - textiles -, had a well-developed tradition dating back to early modem times. Thus, when 
German entrepreneurs tried to imitate and catch up to die British industries, they had to found businesses 
almost from the scratch.
Therefore, Germany's status as a latecomer to industry had three significant consequences for the 
history of the modem German corporation, which could also be applied to the case of nineteenth-century 
Minas Gerais. First, German entrepreneurs in important areas could not count on a well-developed industrial 
and commercial tradition to build their businesses. Because specialized middlemen to provide raw materials 
and markets for their products did not exist in sufficient numbers, industrial firms had to fulfil these 
functions themselves, within their own organizations and with their own employees, if they did not want 
to give up their plans altogether. This is why large-scale, highly integrated, diversified firms existed in the 
first phase of German industrialization and even earlier. Second, Germany's relative backwardness led the 
first industrial enterprises to early diversification. Since they manufactured goods for precarious markets, 
they preferred not to risk their survival on a single product line. Finally, since there was virtually no 
established competitors, manufacturer pioneers in relatively undeveloped industrial areas had little to fear 
when exploring new markets or introducing new product lines. Consequently, the patterns of expansion, 
diversification, and integration which developed in Germany seem to have lacked parallels in Britain and 
the USA, but not in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais as it is going to shown in the next chapter. Small, 
highly specialized, single-function personal enterprises were more clearly dominant in the first phase of 
industrialization in Britain and the USA than in Germany. Furtherthermore, British and US manufacturers 
relied on independent middle-men to the supply of raw materials and the distribution of finished goods, a 
practice was much less common among die first German and mineiro producers.
Other consequences of Germany's relative backwardness, which also facilitated early expansion, 
integration, and diversification, were the increasing importance of joint-stock companies and the strength 
of investment banks. Both institutions emerged as requirements of industrialization under conditions of 
relative economic backwardness18. Joint-stock companies usually encountered fewer barriers to rapid 
expansion than did family enterprises. Investment banks not only accelerated the expansion, integration, and 
diversification of manufacturing enterprises, but their strength was also related to the weakness of die 
middleman. Because the independent merchant was much less important in funding manufacturing firms in 
Germany than in Britain, this task was more often undertaken by banks. It seems that a strong tradition of 
independent middlemen mediating among highly specialized production companies, and between them and
18 For a thorough discussion about the role of banks in Germany's industrialization see A. 
Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essavs. (1962), pp.11-22.
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consumers, according to the laws of the market posed an obstacle to the rapid diversification and integration 
of manufacturing firms. This obstacle was much less a factor in Germany than in Britain, because of 
Germany's comparative backwardness at the beginning.
Despite the evidences of the British and the US cases, large-scale enterprise and high degrees of 
functional integration and product diversification do not necessarily indicate advanced or late stages of 
development. As the experience of Germany, Japan, and East Central Europe - and even that of Brazil - 
suggest, large-scale enterprises may well result from the attempt to make up for relative backwardness and 
they function as islands of modernity in a sea of traditional small and medium-sized enterprises19.
To conclude, Max Weber identifies three general types of organization based on how authority is 
exercised within them, each type being expressed in a particular administrative apparatus. The "charismatic" 
type is where authority is exercised by one person only and is based on the personal qualities of the leader. 
The "traditional" type is where authority and order are based on custom and precedent. Selection and 
appointment is based on kinship rather than expertise. In the "bureaucratic" type of organization authority 
is based on expertise. According to Weber, in modem society the bureaucratic type has become dominant 
because it is technically the most efficient form of organization possible.
Chandler advances Weber's concepts by applying his analysis to capitalistic organizations of an 
economic nature. Chandler identified basically two types of organizations, according to the complexity of 
their administrative structure and to the scope of their activities: the traditional and the modem business 
enterprises. In a traditional firm the administrative structure is embryonic or non-existent and owners are 
responsible for all of basic activities. The modem business enterprise, by turn, has a clearly defined 
administrative structure, employing a hierarchy of middle- and top-salaried managers. This more developed 
administrative structure is related to the larger scale of the operation of these firms. They usually operate 
on a national basis and have several units and divisions. A comparable corporate evolution has occurred in 
other advanced market economies, but more slowly and more recently.
Drawing on the historical experience of the USA, Britain, and Germany, Chandler, Hannah and 
Kocka show how different patterns of corporate structure emerge, shared by social and cultural factors. They 
also show the influence of different relative degree of economic backwardness and the importance of the 
local business environment in setting the pattern of organizational development.
Drawing upon the experience of more developed countries, the authors considered in this chapter 
point to several aspects of the business environment to explain the changes in the structure of firms and the 
differences found in the pattern of organizational development of each country examined. The following 
aspects are of particular relevance for the study of corporate development in nineteenth-century Minas 
Gerais: the size of firms and markets, the degree of development of the channels of distribution, the scale 
of production/operation, the nature of economic activities carried out by firms, and the role played by
19 J. Kocka, "The Modem Industrial Enterprise in Germany", in Managerial Hierarchies: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of Modem Industrial Enterprises, ed. A.D. Chandler and H. Deams 
(Cambridge, MA., 1980), pp.77-116.
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entrepreneurs and their families, or representatives, in the administrative life of the firms examined in the 
following chapter.
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Chapter 5 - THE MINEIRO FIRM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
As mentioned above, one of the key indicators of the emergence of the modem stage of capitalism 
is the rise of modem corporate business enterprises. However, even a brief glance at die pattern of corporate 
development in Minas Gerais during the last century reveals that most firms were traditional and small 
family affairs. Their limited scale never required the development of a more complex organization of the 
firm and mineiro entrepreneurs continued to manage their firms with old-century techniques and with the 
help of a small number of people. The few exceptions which emerged were due mosdy to die nature of die 
industry rather than the firm itself. Thus, this chapter analyses the organization of the mineiro firm through 
an examination of the scope of the activities and the administrative structure of several firms in four 
different sectors: the iron industry; transport; textiles; and the electricity generating industries.
5.1 - The Scope of the Activities:
To assess the scope of the activities of the business enterprises, the analysis will have to examine 
the size of the firms (measured in terms of the scale of production/operation, the number of workers, the 
number of units operated, and the economic functions fulfilled by the same company) and the nature of their 
marketing activities (assessed through the nature and size of the consumer markets, the range of products 
offered, and channels of distribution).
5.1.1 - The size of the firm:
Owing to the fact that the firms investigated here vary in nature, it is important to make some 
remarks before beginning the analysis of the size of firms in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. Concerning 
the number of units operated by each firm, it is important to point out that whereas industries like iron 
foundries, textile mills, and hydroelectric power plants, tend to concentrate their activities in only one site, 
road-construction and transport firms tend to have their activities spread over several sites. The implication 
of this fact is that a multi-site transport firm does not necessarily imply bigness owing to the nature of an 
individual firm, but to the nature of the industry itself. Therefore, this has implications for the organizational 
structure which has to be more institutionalized, bureaucratic (and less personalized). However, in other 
industries this can be a clear indication of the size of the firm. Furthermore, the size of the work-force 
employed by each company must be analysed in the light of the more or less labour-intensive nature of each 
particular industry.
Until the 1880s, the mineiro iron industry was dominated by a large number of very small firms. 
From then onwards, a small number of larger firms began to emerge and predominate. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, iron firms were single-unit enterprises operating only one foundry. The only exception 
was the Companhia National de Forjas e Estaleiros (CNFE), which in the early 1890s took over the Sao 
Miguel de Piraticaba, the Esperan$a, and the Bumier foundries. However, the CNFE was based in Rio de 
Janeiro and a few years after having taken control of the above-mentioned foundries the company went
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bankrupt1. Furthermore, all the mineiro foundries during this period carried out a single economic function - 
the production of iron.
Table V.l - Comparison of the methods of production of pig iron in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais.
METHOD CONSUMPTION 
OF CHARCOAL 
(tons)
CONSUMPTION 
OF ORE 
(tons)
NUMBER OF
WORKING
DAYS
PRODUCTIO
N
OF PIG IRON
Cadinho 7.0 1.0 27 days 100 kilos
Italian 5.5 1.0 18 days 120 kilos
Catalan 3.0 1.0 13 days 320 kilos
Source: JA. Paula, "Dois Ensaios sobre a Genese da Industrializagao em Minas Gerais: a Siderurgia e a 
Industria Textil", in Anais do IT Seminario sobre a Economia Mineira (Belo Horizonte, 1983), p.34.
The scale of production of the iron firms during the first three-quarters of the last century was 
limited by the technology employed by them. Basically, there were three methods of production employed 
by the iron foundries: the "cadinho" method, the "Italian" method, and the "Catalan" method. The first was 
the simplest and did not require a skilled work-force. Due to its simplicity, it was die commonest method 
used by four-fifths of the mineiro foundries2. As shown in Table V.l, output was very limited compared 
with that of the other two methods. To produce 100 kilos of pig iron by the cadinho method required 3 
labourers working 27 days, 7 tons of charcoal, and 1 ton of ore of high quality. Although the second method 
of production - the Italian - was used less, it was more efficient than the cadinho. producing 120 kilos of 
pig iron, consuming 5.5 tons of charcoal and 1 ton of ore in 18 working days3. Nevertheless, it required a 
more skilled work-force, since the process involved the operation of a blast-furnace which required more 
care in the regulation of the quantity of air to maintain the right temperature. Furthermore, it also required 
a regular series of successive heating and hammering operations to yield a good final product Finally, the 
Catalan method was the most complex process. It required even more skill from the labourers for measuring 
the quantity of ore and charcoal as well as for making a perfect linkage of the heating and hammering 
operations. Furthermore, the employment of this method was only feasible if the work was supervised by 
a manager who had a good knowledge of metallurgy4. The Catalan method was the most productive. It 
yielded 320 kilos of pig iron, required only 3 tons of charcoal and 13 working days. Even so, its scale of 
production was very limited when compared with the more modem indirect process of production employed
1 J.A. Paula, "Dois Ensaios sobre a Genese da Industrializagao em Minas Gerais: a Siderurgia e a 
Industria Textil", in Anais do II Seminario sobre a Economia Mineira. (Belo Horizonte, 1983), p.38.
2 D.C. Libby, Transformacao e Trabalho em nma Economia Escravista: Minas Gerais no Seculo 
XIX. (Sao Paulo, 1988), pp. 147-8.
3 Paula, op.cit.. p.32-3.
4 Libby, op.cit.. pp. 148-9.
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by the South Wales ironworks - then the most advanced in the world using mineral fuel and steam power5. 
As shown in Table V.2, the least productive ironwork in South Wales in 1812 produced a total of 35 tons 
per week per blast furnace.
Table V.2 - Output of pig iron in blast furnace in South Wales ironworks, 1812.
WORKS TOTAL BLAST 
FURNACES
TOTAL
OUTPUT/WEEK
(Tons)
AVERAGE 
OUTPUTAVEEK 
PER FURNACE 
(Tons)
Cyfarthfa & Ynysfach 6 340 57
Dowlais 5 200 40
Nantyglo 3 165 35
Plymouth 4 160 40
Penydarren 3 150 50
Ebbw Vale 3 135 45
Clydach 2 130 65
Aberdare 3 105 35
Beaufort 2 90 45
Sirhowy 2 80 40
Source: Adapted from M. Atkinson and C. Barber. The Growth and Decline of the South Wales Iron 
Industry. 1760-1880. (Cardiff, 1987), p.9.
Table V.3 also provides a clear picture of the scale of production of the iron industry in Minas 
Gerais. In 1821, the estimated number of iron foundries in Minas Gerais was 31. There were almost three 
times that number in 1853. By 1864 the number of firms had almost doubled. From then onwards, the 
number of companies started to decrease as railways reached the hinterlands of Minas Gerais, bringing with 
them foreign competition. In 1883, for example, there were only 80 foundries. For 1893, there are two 
estimates of the number of foundries. The first estimate shows an increase to 100. The second estimate 
differentiates between small and large foundries but lists only 51 of the former. Nevertheless, the long-term 
tendency of the number of small foundries to decrease is clear, and they were to disappear almost entirely 
in the following decades6.
Although these are only rough estimates, they are useful for drawing a more precise picture of the 
scale of production of the mineiro iron firms. The annual average output per foundry in 1853 and 1880, for 
example, was about 27 tons. In 1893, according to the first estimate in Table V.3, it was 20 tons. These 
average output figures are compatible with the annual output of 29 tons forecast by Eschwege for the small
5 M. Atkinson and C. Barber, The Growth and Decline of the South Wales Iron Industry. 1760- 
1880. (Cardiff, 1987), pp.4-6.
6 F.A.M. Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil. (Belo Horizonte/Sao Paulo, 1983), p. 148.
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foundries in Minas Gerais7. Comparison between Tables V.2 and V.3 shows clearly how limited the scale
Table V.3 - Estimated number of iron foundries in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, their annual 
output, and their annual and weekly averages.
YEAR NUMBER
OF
WORKS
ANNUAL
OUTPUT
(tons)
AVERAGE
ANNUAL
OUTPUT
AVERAGE
WEEKLY
OUTPUT
1821 31 - - -
1853 84 2250 26.8 0.5
1855 105 - - -
1864 140 - - -
1880 110 3000 27.3 0.5
1881 120 - - -
1883 80 - - -
1893 100 2000 20.0 0.4
1893 51*
4**
- - -
no Seculo XIX (Sao Paulo, 1988), p. 154.
* Number of small foundries 
** Number of large mills
of production of the mineiro ironworks was. In 1812, the least productive South Wales foundry produced 
an average of 35 tons per week. More than 40 years later mineiro foundries were producing an average of 
only 0.5 tons per week. In 1893, this average reduced even further to 0.4 tons. Furthermore, in 1880, the 
import of wrought iron into the port of Rio de Janeiro was more than 6,000 tons8, more than double the 
combined output of all 110 mineiro foundries. In other words, to supply the market represented by the 
import of iron into Rio de Janeiro alone, it would have been necessary to double the existing number of 
foundries in 1880.
Table V.4 - Average net output of the US Iron and Steel Industry for 1860-1880.
YEAR NUMBER OF 
ESTABLISHMENTS#
ANNUAL NET 
OUTPUT 
(tons)
AVERAGE
OUTPUT
(tons)
1860 627 919,770 1,466.9
1870 808 1,865,000 2,308.2
1880 1,005 4,295,414 4,274.0
1971), I, pp. 14,91-3.
# The number of establishments includes blast furnaces, mills for the production of bar, sheet, and railway 
iron, wire mills, forges, and steel-plates mills.
Comparison with the US iron industry is also revealing. In 1880, the US iron industiy produced 
more than 4,2 millions tons of iron, as shown in Table V.4. To produce the same quantity, at least 154,000
7 W.L. von Eschwege, Pluto Brasiliensis. (Berlin, 1833; reprinted Belo Horizonte/Sao Paulo, 1979),
II, p.261.
foundries like the ones existing in Minas Gerais in 1880 would have been required. Furthermore, average 
output per foundry in the US in 1880 was nearly 4,300 tons, more than 159 times the annual average output 
of the mineiro iron foundry. Thus, only an industry dominated by large firms, with complex administrative 
structures, could have handled the enormous quantity of activities involved in the coordination, planning and 
appraisal of such production. Therefore, in terms of scale of production, iron foundries in Minas Gerais in 
the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century were very small. Compared with the South Wales and the 
US works, they were almost craft units.
An analysis of the scale of production of individual firms is also very illustrative. In the early 
1880s, Jose Candido da Costa Sena, an engineer from the Mining School of Ouro Preto, visited and 
described several foundries located in the Metalurgica Zone, between Ouro Preto and Serro. Altogether, he 
surveyed 21 foundries producing from 694 to 803 tons of iron per year9, an average of 33 to 38 tons per 
year (or 0.6 to 0.7 tons per week) per foundry.
Table V.5 - Annual output in kilos of the Patriotica and the Morro do Pilar foundries) 1813-1821.
YEARS PATRIOTICA MORRO DO PILAR
1813 14.6 n.a.
1814 14.7 n.a.
1815 18.8 5.8
1816 16.7 17.1
1817 13.5 11.7
1818 n.a. 13.8
1819 24.2 10.3
1820 18.1 37.3
1821 n.a. 5.0
Source: Adapted from W.L. von Eschwege. Pluto Brasiliensis. (Berlin. 1833: reprinted Belo Horizonte/Sao 
Paulo, 1979), n, pp.212, 251 and 304.
Among the largest foundries the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry produced 450 kilos of iron per 
day in 1853. At this time, it was the only foundry in Minas Gerais to use the Catalan method10. The 
Patriotica foundry had 4 small furnaces employing die cadinho method. Table V.5 shows its annual output 
from 1813 to 1820, the years of Eschwege's administration. The highest level of output was 24.2 tons in 
1819 - a figure which was two-thirds of the weekly output of the smallest South Wales foundry -and the 
lowest level 13.5 tons in 1817. The figures for 1818 are not known. The average output for the whole period 
is 17.2 tons per year, less than one-third of the installed capacity of 58.8 tons11. At the Morro do Pilar 
foundry the story was not very much different. According to Eschwege, although die output of the Morro
9 J.C. Costa Sena, "Viagem de Estudos Metallurgies no Centro da Provincia de Minas", in Annaes 
da Escola de Minas. (Ouro Preto, 1881), No.l, pp.l 17-41.
10 Ibid., p. 112.
11 Eschwege, op.cit.. pp.247-52.
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do Pilar was planned to be much higher, its actual output was scarcely higher than that of his own foundry12. 
Comparison between the two foundries presented in Table V.5 shows that, apart from the years 1816 and 
1820, the annual output of the Morro do Pilar was always less than that of the Patriotica. Furthermore, for 
the period 1815-21, the average output of the Morro do Pilar was 14.4 tons, 19% less than the average 
output of Eschwege's foundry.
Thus, during the first three-quarters of the last century, iron firms in Minas Gerais were 
characterized by their low scale of production, both in terms of the installed capacity and of the actual 
output. Compared with die South Wales and the US ironworks, even the largest firms in Minas Gerais were 
very small in this particular respect.
Table V.6 - The Esperan^a foundry: annual output and variation in percentage year by year, 1899- 
1914.
YEAR VARIATION 
IN % YEAR 
BY YEAR
ANNUAL
OUTPUT
(Tons)
YEAR VARIATION 
IN % YEAR 
BY YEAR
ANNUAL
OUTPUT
(Tons)
1899 80 1907 (+) 14.9 1,901
1900 (+) 845.0 756 1908 (-) 1.7 1,868
1901 (+) 9.3 826 1909 (+) 14.2 2,134
1902 (+) 52.3 1,258 1910 (+) 24.6 2,658
1903 (+) 8.1 1,360 1911 (+) 22.7 3,262
1904 (+) 25.7 1,710 1912 (+) 6.2 3,463
1905 (-) 23.7 1,304 1913 (+) 15.5 4,000
1906 (+) 26.8 1,654 1914 (-) 45.5 2,181
Source: Adapted from C.M. Pelaez. Historia da Industrializacao Brasileira: Critica a Teoria EstmniralisTa 
no Brasil. (Rio de Janeiro, 1972), p. 146.
For the rest of the nineteenth century, the scale of production of the iron industry increased as 
larger works began to emerge. Nevertheless, output continued to be small in comparative terms. The largest 
works existing during this period were the Esperanga and the Bumier foundries. Until 1896, the Esperanga 
had an installed capacity of 5 tons per day, or 1,700 tons per year13. Although there is no more information 
about its installed capacity, figures of annual output of the Esperan^a foundry are not very impressive. As 
shown on Table V.6 , in 1899 annual output totalled only 80 tons. This very low level of output seems to - 
reflect the fact that the control of the foundry was passed to a group of banks after the bankruptcy of the 
CNFE. In the following year the foundry was sold to Joaquim Queiroz Junior14 and output increased 
considerably to 756 tons per year. In 1902, output increased by more than 50% compared to 1,258 tons. In 
1909, output reached the 2,000 tons per year mark and by the outbreak of the First World War, output stood 
at 4,000 tons per year. Compared with the average output of individual US iron firms these figures are 
indeed not very impressive. In 1896, the installed capacity of the Esperanga foundry was less than half of
12 Ibid., pp.207-213.
13 Gomes, Histdria da Siderurgia no Brasil, pp. 141-46.
14 C.M. Pelaez, Historia da Industrializacao Brasileira: Critica a Teoria Estmturalista no Brasil. (Rio 
de Janeiro, 1972), p. 145.
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the average output of the US industry in 1880 (4,274 tons per year). In 1900, output of the Esperanga 
foundry was less than 18% of the US average output in 1880. Finally, the 1880 US average output was still 
7% larger than the output of the Esperanga foundry in 1913. The Bumier foundry was not an exception. Its 
initial installed capacity amounted to 5 tons per day, or around 1,700 tons per year15. Unfortunately there 
is no information about its annual output Nevertheless, the figures for both the Esperanfa and the Bumier 
foundries are indisputable evidence that the "technology gap" was closing towards the end of the century. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century mineiro ironworks were minute compared with the then world 
leader (South Wales). By the end of the century the Esperanga capacity alone was half that of the US 
average. Thus, although the ironworks which emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century represented 
an evolution in terms of the scale of production of this industry, in comparative terms, iron firms were still 
only as large as the US ironworks had been three or more decades earlier and as large as the smallest South 
Wales foundry of the first decade of the last century, as listed in Table V.2.
Owing to the scarcity of information, it is nearly impossible to state precisely the average number 
of workers employed by mineiro foundries before 1880. Nevertheless, from the scattered information 
available, it is possible to say that very few foundries in this period employed more than 20 people. From 
1831 to 1840, for example, there were 24 foundries spread across several districts of die Metalurgica- 
Mantiqueira zones, where the bulk of the industry was situated16. There is information about the work-force 
of only 22 foundries. Altogether, they employed 168 slaves and 70 free workers17, an average of 10.7 
workers per foundry. In 1864, from the 21 foundries established in Santa Barbara, a district within the 
Metalurgica-Mantiqueira zones, 20 firms employed a total of 178 workers, each foundry employing between 
4 and 16 people18.
The exceptions to this rule were the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba, the Morro do Pilar, the Girau, and 
the Patriotica foundries, which were the largest in terms of number of workers during this period. In 1840, 
the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry employed 151 slaves. It seems that this number did not change very 
much in 1853, when answering an inquiry about the iron industry in Minas Gerais organized by the 
president of the province, Monlevade mentioned that in his foundry:
"There are 150 slaves already apprenticed to the art of iron, to the making of charcoal in
the European fashion, to the manipulation of iron of any form and size."19
15 Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil, pp. 146-7.
16 According to Libby, there is evidence that the industry was heavily concentrated in the 
Metalurgica region in 1821. This concentration will be confirmed in the period 1854-58, when 80% of the 
foundries were located in the Metalurgica-Mantiqueira region. The same trend was found for die period 
1863-66, although the information is incomplete and scattered. Libby, on.cit.. pp. 152-60.
17 Ibid., p. 165.
18 Ibid., p. 168.
19 Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil, p.l 11.
124
In 1864, the foundry employed 103 workers20. The Morro do Pilar foundry, was one of the first foundries 
established in Minas Gerais. The foundry was short-lived. Set up in 1808 it was shut down in 1831. In 1814, 
it employed a total of 34 workers and in 1821 137 workers21. The Girau foundry employed 25 workers in 
1817. In 1840, it employed 49 slaves and 1 manager. During the period 1831-1840, only die Patriotica and 
the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundries were larger than the Girau in terms of the size of the work-force22. 
The Patriotica foundry was established by Eschwege, a German engineer, in 1811. During Eschwege's days, 
until 1821, the Patriotica employed a total of 24 people, including Eschwege himself23. In 1831, the 
Patriotica was considered the largest foundry when it employed 55 slaves24.
Further evidence of the small size of mineiro iron firms emerges from the analysis of the number 
of workers required to the operation of the foundries which employed the widespread cadinho and the Italian 
methods of production. According to Ferrand, the cadinho process required at least three workers per 
furnace: one operating the cadinhos in the furnace, one working with die hammermill, and another as 
assistant. Although the preparation and procurement of charcoal and ore required the work of at least 8 
labourers, they could be acquired from a third party. The Italian process also required very few people in 
its operation. It required at least 4 workers per furnace: one operating the furnace, one the hammermill, one 
assistant, and another for carrying the ore. Thus, the small foundries using the cadinho method required only 
three permanent workers on site, whereas the foundries using the Italian method required only four 
permanent workers25. Unfortunately, there is no information about the minimum number of workers required 
to operate a foundry using the Catalan process. Nevertheless, die Catalan was the least employed method 
of production in Minas Gerais and the foundries which employed this method were probably the least 
representative of the average mineiro foundry.
This brief analysis of the mineiro iron firms shows clearly how small the industry was. While die 
industry was made up of small foundries employing an average of 11 workers, with very few firms 
employing more than 20 workers and the largest employing at most 150 people. Around the 1860s, US firms 
had an average of approximately 64 workers, as shown in Table V.7. In 1870, the average number of 
workers employed by the US iron and steel industries increased to 95 and in 1880 to 139, when the US 
average was about the same as the largest foundries in Minas Gerais. Thus, the mineiro iron industry of the 
first three-quarters of the nineteenth century was small in every respect: economic functions, scale of
20 Libby, op.cit.. p. 168.
21 Eschwege, op.cit.. pp.209-13.
22 Libby, op.cit.. pp. 163-4.
23 Eschwege, op.cit.. pp.247-254.
24 Libby, op.cit.. p. 162.
25 P. Ferrand, "A Industria de Ferro no Brasil (Provincia de Minas Geraes)", in Annaes da Escola 
de Minas. (Ouro Preto, 1885), No.4, pp. 167-85.
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production, number of workers employed, and the number of units operated.
Table V.7 - Average work-force in the US Iron and Steel Industry for 1860-1880.
YEAR NUMBER OF 
ESTABLISHMENTS#
NUMBER OF 
WORKERS*
AVERAGE
1860 627 40,000 63.8
1870 808 77,000 95.3
1880 1,005 140,000 139.3
Source: Hogan, op.cit.. pp.91-3.
* Estimated numbers
# The figures include blast furnaces, mills for the production of bar, sheets, and railway iron, wire mills, 
forges, and steel plates.
By contrast, die Companhia Uniao e Industria (CUT) was certainly a large enterprise. Basically, 
it fulfilled two economic functions: the construction of roads and the transport of goods and passengers. The 
relevance of this fact to an organizational analysis of the CUI is that the construction of large transport 
undertaking in the USA, for example, the Erie Canal, did not involve a lot of administrative coordination. 
It was more a technical than an administrative task. It was the operation of railways and canals which called 
for more administration, even though before the 1850s, due to their short length, the existing railways in 
the USA had little need for a systematic organizational structure26. Thus, the fact that the CUI not only built 
but also operated the Uniao e Industria turnpike indicates that it was an enterprise of a considerable size in 
organizational terms.
Table V.8 - Length of the Brazilian railways in 1867.
RAILWAY LENGTH (Kilometres)
EFDPII 197.4
Sao Paulo 139.0
Bahia 123.5
Pernambuco 124.9
Cantagallo 49.1
Maud 17.5
Total 651.4
EFDPII - Estrada de Ferro Dom Pedro II.
Source: Ministerio da Agricultura, Commercio e Obras Publicas, Relatorio da Reparticao dos Neeocios da 
Agriculture. Commercio e Obras Publicas. (Rio de Janeiro, 1868), p.84.
The scale of operation of the CUI was both large and unprecedent for nineteenth-century Minas 
Gerais. The establishment of the company and the construction of the turnpike pre-dated any railway in the 
province, a time when the bulk of the transport of people and goods was made by muletrain, ox cart and 
horse. In 1853, the company was granted a franchise to operate a provincial road - the Paraibuna road - 
which extended from Barbacena to the Paraibuna river. From 1856 to 1861, the company built 144 
kilometres of new carriageway linking the cities of Juiz de Fora, by the Paraibuna river in the province of
26 A.D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial 
Enterprise. (Cambridge, M.A., 7th ed. 1991), p.21.
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Minas Gerais, and Petropolis, in the province of Rio de Janeiro27. In 1867, the total length of roads operated 
by the company was approximately 380 kilometres28. To have an idea of what these figures represent, a 
comparison with railways in Brazil and the USA is revealing. In 1867, for example, the largest railway 
established in Brazil was the Estrada de Ferro Dom Pedro II (EFDPII), which was 197,4 kilometres in length 
as shown in Table V.8. The smallest was the Maua railway, which was 17,5 kilometres in length. Together, 
all the Brazilian railways in 1867 were 651,4 kilometres in length; i.e., less than double the length of roads 
operated by the CUI alone during the same year. A year later, the EFDPII continued to be smaller with 216 
kilometres29. Moreover, most railways in the USA before the 1850s were rarely more than 160 kilometres 
in extent30. Thus, in terms of route mileage, the Uniao e Industria turnpike was larger than existing railways 
in both Brazil and the USA.
Nevertheless, the scale of the transport of passengers and goods operated by the company does not 
point to a considerable operation. Table V.9 shows the passenger traffic from 1858 to 1874. From 1858 to 
1860, the turnpike was not in full operation. This is reflected in the figures of the passenger traffic. In 1858, 
from April to December, the passenger traffic amounted to 5,499 people to and from the hinterland of Minas 
Gerais. For the full year of 1859, numbers rose to 8,926 and to 10,093 in 1860. The main section of the 
turnpike, between Juiz de Fora and Petropolis, was inaugurated in June 1861. In the following decade 
passenger traffic nearly doubled from 13,505 in 1861 to 23,508 in 1871. In 1874, traffic amounted to 27,682 
passengers. Nevertheless, these numbers are very small if compared with the figures of the EFDPII. In 1869, 
the EFDPII transported a total of 778,543 people31, while the CUI handled only 23,975 passengers. In other 
words, the CUI transported 3% of the number of passengers carried by the EFDPII in 1869.
Table V.9 also presents the figures for freight carried by the CUI from 1858 to 1874. During this 
period the total weight of goods transported increased by a factor of five, from 10,974 tons in 1858 to 
55,861 tons in 1874. However, compared with the tonage carried by the EFDPII, the total of freight carried
27 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relat6rio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1861), p.5.
28 Ministerio dos Negricios de Agricultura, Comercio e Obras Publicas, Instmcoes exoedidas ao 
Conselheiro M.C. Galvao. encarregando-o de estudos relativamente as propostas da companhia Uniao e 
Industria concementes a Estrada de Ferro de Pedro II No.l, Sec?ao 3, 10/10/1868, reproduced in A.O. 
Esteves, "Mariano Procopio", in Revista do Institute Historico e Geoerafico Brasileiro. Vol.230, Jan-Mar, 
1956, pp.232-3.
29 Estrada de Ferro D. Pedro II, Relatorio do Ano de 1869 Apresentado ao Ilmo e F.xmo. Sr. 
Conselheiro Dioeo Velho Cavalcanti de Albuquerque. Ministro e Secretario de Estado dos Neeocios da 
Agricultura. Comercio e Obras Publicas por Mariano Procdpio Ferreira Laee. Director da mesma Estrada. 
reproduced in Ibid., p.250.
30 Chandler, Strategy and Structure, p.21.
31 Estrada de Ferro D. Pedro II, Relatorio do Ano de 1869 Apresentado ao Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. 
Conselheiro Diogo Velho Cavalcanti de Albuquerque. Ministro e Secretario de Estado dos Neg6cios da 
Agricultura. Comercio e Obras Publicas por Mariano Proc6pio Ferreira Lage. Director da mesma Estrada 
reproduced in Esteves, op.cit.. p.251.
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by the CUI was also very small. In 1868, for example, the EFDPII carried a total of 104,530 tons of 
goods32, against die 36,641 tons by the CUI (that is, the road handled only 35% of the freight carried by the 
EFDPII). Thus, although the CUI operated a large number of kilometres of roads, die scale of operation 
measured in terms of freight and passengers transported was not very large.
Table V.9 - Passenger and freight traffic, and percentage of goods exported in the Uniao e Industria 
turnpike, 1858-1874.
YEARS PASSENGERS TOTAL OF GOODS % OF GOODS EXPORTED
TRANSPORTED (tons)
1858* 5,499 10,974 68
1859 8,926 22,776 71
1860 10,093 26,970 75
1861 13,505 29,743 79
1862 14,291 20,695 59
1863 13,576 23,345 69
1864 13,962 23,802 64
1865 14,453 31,988 67
1866 14,902 32,627 65
1867 16,418 41,061 74
1868 21,969 36,641 73
1869 23,975 n.a. -
1870 21,385 n.a. -
1871 23,508 n.a. -
1873 27,098 51,683 62
1874 27,682 55,861 63
Source: Compiled from Companliia Uniao e Industria. Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1864.
1865, 1872, 1875).
* From April to December.
In terms of the size of its work-force, the CUI was certainly one of the largest employers in 
nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. In 1855, for example, the number of slaves employed by the company 
oscillated between 515 and 828. During that year, the company also employed several skilled workers like 
engineers, architects, carpenters, etc., and the overall number of workers may have reached 1,000 people33. 
In 1856, the company employed 1,102 people, among them, 900 slaves and 80 free labourers. The remainder 
was made up of architects, drivers, horse-masters, foremen, carpenters, bricklayers, coachmen, blacksmiths, 
engineers, etc.34. In 1857, the company employed 804 slaves and in the company report of that year the 
chairman of the Board, Lage, indicated that the number of free workers had increased:
32 Estrada de Ferro D. Pedro II, Relatorio do Ano de 1869 Apresentado ao Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. 
Conselheiro Diogo Velho Cavalcanti de Albuquerque. Ministro e Secretario de Estado dos Negocios da 
Agricultura. Comercio e Obras Publicas por Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage. Director da mesma Estrada. 
reproduced in Ibid., p.250.
33 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1856), pp. 13-5.
34 Esteves, op.cit.. pp. 138-9.
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"The workshops are established at the Juiz de Fora station employing carpenters, 
blacksmiths, locksmiths, cabinet-makers, painters, and saddlers. For the same reasons 
presented in my report of the last year (...) I have tried to develop these establishments, 
increasing the number of the necessary workers with part of the 20 Germans engaged and 
other native labourers."35
Thus, based on the figures of workers for the year 1856, when the company employed 1,102 people, it is 
realistic to say that the total number employed in 1857 may have been around 1,000. In 1858, according to 
a report by Lage to the president of the province of Minas Gerais, the company employed 2,636 workers. 
In the section of the road between Juiz de Fora and Paraiba 1,136 were employed - among them, 800 slaves 
and 336 free workers. The other 1,500 were employed in the section between Petrdpolis and Paraiba do Sul. 
For this section of the road there is no break down of the number of workers between slave and free36. In 
1860, with new roads under construction, notably the section between Pedro do Rio and the Paraibuna river, 
the company employed 3,500 workers. Again, there is no information of how this work-force was 
constituted. There is no indication of the proportion of slaves, of skilled workers, of those employed directly 
by the company, and of those employed by contractors hired to build parts of the turnpike. Nevertheless, 
based on the figures of the previous years, it is quite reasonable to say that the direct work-force for 1860 
could have been well over 1,000 people37. In 1861, the construction of the turnpike from Petropolis to Juiz 
de Fora was completed and, as no other major construction work was undertaken, the number of workers 
fell steadily from then onwards. In 1866, for example, the company employed a total of 344 people38. By 
the time the company was in serious troubles and was taken over by the Imperial government, the road was 
being leased back to the CUI for 15 years39. In the following years, as the EFDPII advanced towards the 
hinterland of Minas Gerais, competition became extremely tough for the CUI. Ultimately, in 1869 the 
turnpike was absorbed by the EFDPII40. As a consequence, investment decreased, as shown in the company 
report of 1871:
"The board of directors understands that from now on the surplus revenue of the company 
must not be employed in the construction of roads, other than those to which the company 
is not obliged by the 1864 contract. Construction must be limited to those roads that, 
without the sacrifice of the company's revenue, the provincial governments require (...)."
Thus, it is reasonable to expected that the number of workers tended to stabilize as the demise of the 
company approached. For the period 1866 onwards, however, there is no information about the number of
35 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), pp.21-3.
36 D.A. Giroletti, "A Companhia e a Rodovia Uniao e Industria e o Desenvolvimento de Juiz de 
Fora, 1850 a 1900", Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1980, p.30.
37 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1860), p.7.
38 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1866), Annexe 12.
39 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1865), pp.5-6.
40 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1869), pp.3-4.
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workers employed by the company.
Finally, in terms of capital the CUI could not be considered a large enterprise. The company was 
organized with a nominal capital of 5.000:000$000 Contos, but the issued capital never exceeded 
3.060:000$000 Contos41. To have an idea of the size of the capital of the CUI during its time, it is 
interesting to compare it with the capital of other Brazilian companies established during the same time. Of 
the 76 companies registered between 1850 and 1865 in the tribunal of commerce of Rio de Janeiro, only 
6 had a capital larger than 10.000:000$000 Contos and were considered large enteiprises in this respect. 
They were one railway (the EFDPII), two banks (the Banco do Brasil and the Banco Comercial e Agricola), 
two insurance companies (the Companhia Seguros Maritimos e Terrestres and the Companhia Seguros 
Maritimos e Terrestres Fidelidade), and the Companhia Reformadora, of whom there is no information about 
its activities. Furthermore, only 5 companies, with a capital between 5.000:000$000 and 10.000:000$000 
Contos, were considered medium size enterprises. Of the remainder 65 companies, the capital of 4 was 
unknown and 61 were considered small companies with a capital smaller than 5.000:000$000 Contos42. 
Thus, in terms of capitalization the CUI was considered a small enterprise.
Table V.10 - Brazilian textile mills in 1868: number of looms, workers, and annual output.
MILLS (Province) LOOMS ANNUAL OUTPUT 
(in meters)
WORKER
Todos os Santos (BA) 136 1,100,000 200
Santo Aleixo (RJ) 52 605,000 150
Nossa Senhora do Amparo (BA) 48 660,000 90
Sto. Antonio Queimados (BA) 30 352,000 90
Santa Theresa (RJ) n.a. n.a. 20
Modelo (BA) 39 550,000 110
Femao Velho (AL) 40 160,600 33
Concei^ao (BA) 35 495,000 60
Cana do Reino (MG) 5 220,000 15
Average 48 517,825 85
Source: Adapted from Ministfrio da Agricultura- Commercio e Obras Publicas. Relatorio da Reoarticao dos 
Neeocios da Agricultura. Commercio e Obras Publicas. (Rio de Janeiro, 1868), p.52.
The average mineiro textile of the last century could hardly be considered a large enterprise, even 
by Brazilian standards. Until the 1870s, only two textile mills were established in Minas Gerais: the 
Companhia Industrial Mineira (CIM), founded in the late 1830s, and die Cana do Reino mill, set-up in the 
early 1840s. Both were small and short-lived enterprises. The only information about production at the CIM 
dates from the end of 1840, when the mill produced about 990 meters of cloth in 20 days of work, 
employing 21 workers and 16 spindles. The story of the Cana do Reino mill is better documented. Although 
it was shut down in the 1870s, the mill was more successful than the CIM43. Nevertheless, it was a very
41 Giroletti, op.cit.. pp. 18-9.
42 A.C. El-Kareh, Filha Branca de Mae Preta: A Comnanhia de Estrada de Ferro D. Pedro II. 1855- 
1865. (Petropolis, 1982), pp.57-8.
43 Libby, op.cit.. pp.216-25.
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small affair even when compared with other Brazilian textile mills of its time. Table V.10 lists nine textile 
mills located in Bahia (BA), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Alagoas (AL), and Minas Gerais (MG) in 1868. The size 
of these mills are measured in terms of the number of looms and workers employed, and the annual output 
The largest mill was the Todos os Santos mill in Bahia employing 136 looms and 200 workers, with an 
output of 1,100,000 meters of cloth per year. The smallest was the Cana do Reino mill, employing 5 looms 
and 15 workers, with an output of 220,000 meters of cloth per year. On average, the textile mills listed in 
Table V.10 employed 48 looms, 85 workers and produced 517,825 meters of cloth per year. Thus, the Cana 
do Reino mill was considerably smaller than the average size of Brazilian textile mills in 1868.
Table V .ll - Minas Gerais: textile mills established in the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s.
YEAR MILL CAPITAL No. OF NO. OF
Contos £ LOOMS WORKERS
1872 Cedro 150 15,600 18 70
1872 Brumado 150 15,600 40 80
1875 Machadense n.a. - 10 n.a.
1876 BiriBiry n.a. - 20 n.a.
1877 Cachoeira 200 20,460 50 n.a.
1877 Uniao Itabirana 100 10,230 28 50
Average (1870s) 150 15,472 28 67
1880 Marzagao 150 13,800 46 100
1880 Filatorio Montes Claros 150 13,800 40 73
1881 Bom Jardira 233 21,250 50 140
1884 Sao Sebastiao 189 16,273 40 75
1884 Sao Silvestre 200 17,220 50 60
1884 Industrial Mineira 240 20,664 73 200
1885 Cassu 150 11,610 28 60
1885 Sao Vicente 160 12,384 40 n.a.
1886 Uniao Lavrense 200 15,560 176 n.a.
1886 Cachoeira dos Macacos 300 23,340 100 180
1886 Santa Barbara 200 15,560 60 n.a.
1887 Paulo Moreirense 120 11,208 n.a. n.a.
1888 Mascarenhas 600 63,120 30 n.a.
1888 Pedreira 200 21,040 65 n.a.
1888 Sao Roberto 500 52,600 60 n.a.
n.a. Industrial Ouro Preto 200 18,800# n.a. n.a.
Average (1880s) 237 21,764 61 101
1891 Santanense 600 37,260 100 n.a.
1891 Sao Joanense 300 18,630 100 n.a.
1892 Itabira do Campo 360 18,036 100 n.a.
1893 Pitanguense 400 19,320 200 n.a.
1893 Cachoeira Grande 500 24,150 120 n.a.
1893 Progresso Fabril 150 7,245 n.a. n.a.
1893 Melancias 100 4,830 38 n.a.
1894 Sao Domingos 150 6,300 n.a. n.a.
1894 Sao Joao Nepomuceno 130 5,460 n.a. n.a.
1895 Jequitahy 250 10,350 n.a. n.a.
n.a. Perpetua n.a. - 15 n.a.
n.a. Itinga n.a. - 48 n.a.
Average (1890s) 294 15,158 90 -
TOTAL AVERAGE 244 18,723 63 99
(Belo Horizonte, 1990), p.25; M.T.R.O. Versiani, "The Cotton Textile Industry of Minas Gerais, Brazil: 
Beginnings and Early Developmentl868-1906", University of London, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1991), 
pp.70-111; Libby, op.cit.. pp.227-30. Notes: (n.a.) information not available.
# This figure was calculated based on the exchange rate for 1890.
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It was only in the final three decades of the century that a number of larger and more successful 
textile mills emerged in Minas Gerais. Even so, they were small or medium size firms, operating only one 
unit, and fulfilling a single economic function - the manufacturing of cotton. In the 1870s, 6 mills were 
established in Minas Gerais. The average initial capital was 150:000$000 Contos (or £15,472) and the mills 
employed an average of 28 looms and 67 workers, as shown in Table V.ll. In the 1880s, investment in new 
mills boomed with 16 firms being established. On average, they were larger than the ones established a 
decade earlier. Nevertheless, they did not constitute large enterprises. The average initial capital of these 
latter mills was 237:000$000 Contos (or £21,764), with an average of 61 looms and 101 workers employed, 
as shown in Table V .ll. In the 1890s, 12 new mills were inaugurated in Minas Gerais. On average, in terms 
of capital they were smaller than the mills established in the 1870s and 1880s. The average initial capital 
was 294:000$000 Contos (or £15,158). It seems that in terms of the number of looms employed they were 
larger than the mills set-up in the two previous decades, with an average of 98 looms. However, it is 
important to point out that the average number of loom for the 1890s is biased towards the larger mills, 
since there is no information about the number of looms for several of the smaller mills founded during this 
period. Furthermore, there is no information about the size of the work-force employed by these mills. Thus, 
although in the long-run the mineiro textile mills tended to be larger, they did not constitute very large 
enterprises, at least not at the time of their establishment
Table V.12 - Brazilian textile mills in 1881: number of looms, workers, and annual output.
YEAR MILL (Province) LOOMS ANNUAL OUTPUT 
(in meters)
WORKER
1881 Santo Aleixo (BA) 110 1,000,000 180
1881 Petropolitana (RJ) 106 1,000,000 180
1881 Brasil Industrial (RJ) 450 3,200,000 400
1881 FFTTA (RJ) 100 2,000,000 210
1881 Femao Velho (AL) 60 550,000 125
1881 FTR (RJ) 110 1,500,000 130
1881 FTPG (RJ) 60 500,000 110
1881 Santa Francisca (SP) 80 - 160
Average 216 1,393,000 187
h'FTi'A - Fabrica de Fia^ao, Tecidos e Tinturaria Albania FTR - Fabrica de Tecidos do Rink; FTPG - 
Fabrica de Tecidos Pau Grande.
Source: Libby, op.cit.. p.232.
A comparison of mineiro and other Brazilian textile mills provides a better idea of the relative 
importance of firms in Minas Gerais. Table V. 12 lists eight textile mills located in Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Sao 
Paulo (SP), Bahia (BA), and Alagoas (AL) in 1881. The size of these mills are measured in terms of the 
number of looms and workers employed, and the annual output. The largest mill was the Brasil Industrial, 
located in Rio de Janeiro, employing 450 looms and 400 workers with an output of 3,200,000 meters of 
cloth per year. The smallest was the Fabrica de Tecidos Pau Grande (FTPG), also located in Rio de Janeiro, 
employing 60 looms and 110 workers with an output of 500,000 meters of cloth. On average, the textiles 
mills listed in Table V.12 employed 216 looms, 187 workers and produced 1,393,000 meters per year. Thus,
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they were considerably larger than any of the mills at the point when they were established in Minas Gerais 
in the last three decades of the nineteenth century.
Table V.13 - Mineiro textile mills in 1881-1882: number of looms, workers, and annual output of 
some.
YEAR MILL LOOMS ANNUAL OUTPUT 
(in meters)
WORKER
1881 Cedro 40 220,532 130
1881 Cachoeira 60 401,323 130
1881 Brumado 20 - 80
1882 BiriBiry 40 - 130
1882 Uniao Itabirana 28 - 42
Average 38 310,928 102
Source: Compiled from Libby, op.cit.. p.232; Vaz, op.cit.. pp.62,77.
Even a comparison of the mills listed in Table V.12 with die mineiro mills some years after their 
establishment, yields the same result: mineiro textile mills continued to be smaller. Table V.13 lists five of 
the six mills established in Minas Gerais in the 1870s. In 1881 and 1882, these five firms were certainly 
among the largest textile mills in Minas Gerais. Nevertheless, they were hardly half the average size of the 
eight textile mills listed in Table V.12. In 1881 and 1882, mineiro mills employed an average of 41 looms 
and 102 workers and produced an average of 310,928 meters per year. The other Brazilian mills listed in 
Table V.12 had approximately five times more looms, a workforce 45% larger, and an annual output five 
times larger than their mineiro counterparts in 1881-82. They were not only larger but also much more 
efficient. By 1885, things had not changed very much as the mineiro textile mills still were still not half the 
size of the mills listed in Table V.12. As shown in Table V. 14, on average, mineiro mills in 1885 employed 
49 looms, 104 workers, and produced 379,727 meters of cloth per year. These figures represented 23% of 
the average number of looms, 56% of the average number of workers, and 27% of the average annual output 
of the textile mills listed in Table V.12. Furthermore, it seems that this pattern did not change very much 
during the rest of die nineteenth century. In 1909, the 35 existing mineiro mills on average produced
470,000 meters per year and employed 110 workers44.
Thus, from the previous analysis, it becomes clear that the textile industry in nineteenth-century 
Minas Gerais was made up of small and medium size mills, both in terms of the number of looms and 
workers employed, and in terms of the annual output. It is also clear that the mineiro textile mills were more 
labour intensive than their Brazilian counterparts.
A closer look at some individual cases will further illustrate the fact that mineiro mills were small 
The Cedro mill, the first textile mill set-up in the last 30 years of the century, was a very small enterprise. 
It was established in 1872 employing 18 looms only. Ten years later, just before it was merged with the
44 Ibid., p.233.
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Table V.14 - Mineiro textile mills in 1885: number of looms, workers, and annual output of select 
mills.
MILL LOOMS ANNUAL OUTPUT 
(in meters)
WORKER
Cedro 56 369,136 132
Cachoeira 110 693,955 187
Uniao Itabirana 28 - 64
Montes Claros 40 360,000 81
Cassu 24 200,000 58
Sao Sebastiao 40 500,000 75
Marzagao 50 135,000 80
Sao Silvestre 50 400,000 60
Industrial Mineira - - 200
Sao Vicente 40 - -
Average 49 379,727 104
Source: Compiled from Libbv. op.cit.. p.232: Vaz. op.cit.. d d .62. 77.
Cachoeira mill, productive capacity had increased to 40 looms, as shown in Table V.15. Nevertheless, it
continued to be a small enterprise. As Bernardo Mascarenhas pointed out in a letter to his brothers regarding
the establishment of the Cachoeira mill, the minimum size of a mill in the 1870s was:
"It is not wise to buy less than 50 looms, since the most expensive and indispensable 
spinning machines may produce yam for 50 looms, it would be a mistake to buy 30 or 40 
looms, as the difference in price is very small."45
The annual output of the Cedro mill also reflects the limited scale of production, as shown in Table 
V.15. The mill started to produce in August 1872. From 1872 to 1874, output expanded from the initial 
33,920 meters to 333,921, the highest level of output in the period 1872-82. Output plummeted in the 
following 3 years, reaching its lowest level in 1877 with 82,422 meters. This decrease in output was a 
consequence of the economic crisis in Brazil and disruptions in water supply to power the mill in the 1875- 
77 period46. For the remainder of the period, output increased, partially as a consequence of new investments 
in the productive capacity, which not only became larger but most probably more efficient as well. In 1882, 
the Cedro mill produced a total of 231,428 meters, the highest level of output since 1877. Nevertheless, this 
still represented only 69% of the output in 1874. Furthermore, average output for the period 1873-82 was 
200,394 meters per year. This was very small compared with the average output of 1,393,000 meters per 
year of the other Brazilian textile mills in 1881, as shown in Table V.12. Another interesting conclusion is
45 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas on 13 April 1874 from Manchester, reproduced in P. Tamm, 
Uma Dinastia de Teceloes. (Belo Horizonte, 2nd. ed. 1960), pp. 193-4.
46 AM. Vaz, Cia. Cedro e Cachoeira: Historia He uma Emnresa Familiar, 1883-1987. (Belo 
Horizonte, 1990), p.63.
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that throughout the period 1872-82 accumulated output totalled 2,003,938 meters, as shown in Table V.15. 
This means that the total output of the Cedro mill over an 11-year period was smaller than the output of the 
Brasil Industrial mill in 1881 alone, and about the same of the output of the Allianga mill in the same year, 
as shown in Table V. 12.
Table V.15 - Cedro mill, 1872-1882: annual, accumulated, and average output, number of looms, and 
number of workers.
YEAR OUTPUT 
(in meters)
ACCUMULATED
OUTPUT
AVERAGE
(1873-1882)
LOOMS WORKERS
1872 33,920 33,920 - 18 70
1873 224,844 258,764 - n.a. n.a.
1874 333,921 592,685 289,382 n.a. n.a.
1875 208,706 801,391 255,824 n.a. n.a.
1876 185,332 986,723 238,201 n.a. n.a.
1877 82,422 1,069,145 207,045 n.a. n.a.
1878 116,809 1,185,954 192,006 n.a. n.a.
1879 167,682 1,353,636 188,531 n.a. n.a.
1880 198,342 1,551,978 189,757 n.a. n.a.
1881 220,532 1,772,510 193,177 40 130
1882 231,428 2,003,938 200,394 40 130
Source: Compiled and calculated from Vaz. op.cit.. pp.62-5: GM. Mascarenhas. Centenario da Fabrica do 
Cedro. 1872-1972. (Belo Horizonte, 1972), p.67, 88-90.
Notes: (n.a.) information not available.
Finally, considered in relation to its scale of production, the Cedro mill employed quite a large 
work-force, even though in absolute terms it did not constitute a large employer. In 1872, the Cedro mill 
employed a total of 70 workers, ten years later some 130 workers, as shown in Table V.15. By comparison, 
the Fabrica de Tecidos do Rink (FTR) located in Rio de Janeiro also employed 130 people in 1881. 
Nevertheless, it employed 110 looms and produced 1,500,000 meters of cloth, as shown in Table V.12. 
Thus, the Cedro mill could not be considered a large enterprise either in terms of the productive capacity, 
annual output, or number of workers employed. Furthermore, it was more labour intensive and less efficient 
when compared with other Brazilian textile mills.
The Cachoeira mill was established in 1877 with 52 looms, an initial productive capacity 3 times 
larger than that of the Cedro mill. In 1881, productive capacity had increased to 60 looms, as shown in 
Table V.16. Although it was one of largest mills in Minas Gerais in terms of its productive capacity, the 
Cachoeira mill was still considerably smaller than the largest Brazilian textile mills. As mentioned above, 
in 1881, the Brasil Industrial located in Rio de Janeiro possessed 450 looms.
The annual output of the Cachoeira mill was also not very large in comparison with major Rio de 
Janeiro mills. The Cachoeira started to produce in January 1877. Nevertheless, full production was not 
achieved until 1880, since the first 3 years were dedicated to running in the machinery47. Thus, in 1877, 
output was 172,416 meters, as shown in Table V.16. Two years later output more than doubled to 392,517
47 Ibid., p.81.
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meters, and in 1880 it totalled 410,580 meters. The upward trend observed in the previous years was not 
affected by the decrease in output in 1881, as output reached its highest level of the whole period in 1882. 
Furthermore, throughout the 1878-82 period average output was around 415,000 meters per year. This is 
double of the average output of the Cedro mill for the same period but still lower than the annual output 
of the smallest mills located in other Brazilian provinces listed in Table V.12. The highest output of the 
Cachoeira mill during this period was achieved in 1882 with an output of 435,438 meters. In 1881, the 
Femao Velho mill, located in Alagoas, and the FTPG, located in Rio de Janeiro, produced 550,000 and
500,000 meters respectively. Furthermore, accumulated output in the period 1878-82 amounted to 2,079,976 
meters, again an output smaller than that of the Brasil Industrial mill in 1881 and about the same of the 
output of the Allianga mill during the same year.
Table V.16 - Cachoeira mill, 1877-1882: annual, accumulated, and average output, number of looms, 
and number of workers.
YEAR OUTPUT 
(in meters)
ACCUMULATED
OUTPUT
AVERAGE
(1878-1882)
LOOMS WORKERS
1877 172,416 172,416 - 52 n.a.
1878 267,702 440,118 - n.a. n.a.
1879 392,517 832,635 416,317 n.a. n.a.
1880 410,580 1,243,215 414,405 n.a. n.a.
1881 401,323 1,644,538 411,134 60 130
1882 435,438 2,079,976 415,995 60 n.a.
Source: Compiled from Vaz. op.cit.. p.77: Mascarenhas. Centenario da Fdbrica do Cedro. p. 103: Libby. 
op.cit.. p.232;
Notes: (n.a.) information not available.
There is not a lot of information about the size of the work-force employed by the Cachoeira mill 
in the period 1877-82. As shown in Table V.16, the mill employed a total of 130 workers in 1881 rendering 
it one of the largest employers among the mineiro textile mills. Thus, the analysis of the size of the 
Cachoeira mill leads to the conclusion that, although the enterprise constituted one of the largest textile mills 
in Minas Gerais in the 1870s, its scale of operation proved to be quite limited in comparison with other 
Brazilian textile mills.
In 1883, the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills were merged into the Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira 
(CCC). The idea of the amalgamation of the two mills started with Bernardo Mascarenhas shortly after the 
establishment of the Cachoeira mill. During his travel to England to purchase machinery for the Cachoeira, 
Mascarenhas observed the formation of large industrial corporations through the merger of various mills 
under a single organization as a strategy to face competition and gain economies of scale. On his return, 
Mascarenhas proposed the merger of the two mills, but at the beginning there was some resistance among
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the other owners of both the Cedro and die Cachoeira mills48. However, in die early 1880s several textile
mills - some of them larger and more modem than both the Cedro and die Cachoeira mills - were being
established in the central part of Minas Gerais increasing competition in the local markets and threatening
the position of both mills49. Thus, at the end Mascarenhas' entrepreneurial wisdom succeeded and die merger
of the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills resulted in the creation of the CCC50. The merged company became
one of the largest textile firms in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. Shortly after the creation of the CCC,
Mascarenhas proposed the creation of a third mill as a strategy to beat the increasing competition. In 1885,
he wrote to his brother Antonino:
"Lets build our strength on the three mills of Cedro, Rio Pardo, and Cachoeira, with 
warehouses in each mill well stocked with a large variety of cloth. Thus, we will be 
respected and will be able to stop the large number of textile mills which are being 
planned to be built around us. Moreover, we will be able to attract the attention of the 
merchants due to the variety and low price of our products."51
However, Bernardo Mascarenhas' plans again encountered strong resistance from the shareholders of the 
CCC, who did not see the necessity of the investment since die expansion and modernization of the Cedro 
and the Cachoeira mills was just being concluded. Nevertheless, competition grew steadily in the following 
years and in 1888 the Sao Vicente mill, located just 6 kilometres away from die Cedro mill, was founded. 
If the mill succeeded it would represent a major threat to the Cedro mill. However, shortly after its 
inauguration production at the Sao Vicente came to a halt and the mill was put on sale. There were severe 
problems of water-power supply. Even so, the owners of the CCC decided to purchase the mill in 1891, as 
a rival firm was interested in its acquisition. Thus, the Sao Vicente mill became the third unit operated by 
the CCC, which was already one of the few, if not the only, multi-unit textile firm in nineteenth-century 
Minas Gerais52. There are basically two reasons which explain why the CCC was one of the few multi-site 
firms at this time. First, being virtually the pioneers of industrial production of textiles in Minas Gerais, the 
Mascarenhas brothers were able to build on their previous financial successes and reinvest in the industry, 
at a time when most rival firms were just beginning their first operation. Secondly, it was easier to expand 
through the merger and acquisition of existing mills. This is even more true if one takes into account the 
fact that, despite Bernardo Mascarenhas' plans, the merger of the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills and the 
purchase of the Sao Vicente mill were not the result of a long-term planning strategy. On the contrary, they 
were the result of pressing circumstances and existing opportunities. In other words, it was the result of a
48 N.L. Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas: o Surto Industrial de Minas Gerais. (Rio de Janeiro, 
1954), p.70.
49 Vaz, op.cit.. p.88.
50 Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. pp.70-1.
51 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas to Antonino Mascarenhas on 20 December 1885, reproduced 
in Vaz, op.cit.. p. 102.
52 Ibid., pp. 102-5.
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defensive strategy of merger - rather than expansionist, as in many cases in the USA53 and Britain54 for 
example.
Table V.17 - Annual and average output, number of looms, and number of workers of the Companhia 
Cedro e Cachoeira, 1883-1900.
YEAR OUTPUT 
(in meters)
AVERAGE
(1883-1900)
NUMBER OF 
LOOMS
NUMBER OF 
WORKERS
1883 649,516 - 100 264
1884 976,000 896,202 100 268
1885 1,063,091 1,072,737 166 319
1886 1,602,343 1,264,242 223 378
1887 2,030,262 1,439,837 223 446
1888 2,317,812 1,439,837 230 489
1889 2,159,995 1,542,717 230 485
1890 2,131,833 1,616,356 230 n.a.
1891 2,474,422 1,711,697 230 479
1892 2,292,603 1,769,788 230 n.a.
1893 2,212,802 1,810,062 230 n.a.
1894 2,392,957 1,858,636 334 n.a.
1895 2,797,990 1,930,894 339 n.a.
1896 2,332,725 1,959,596 339 n.a.
1897 2,610,441 2,002,986 339 n.a.
1898 3,086,672 2,070,716 339 n.a.
1899 3,208,228 2,137,629 339 n.a.
1900 3,347,625 2,204,851 339 n.a.
Source: Compiled from Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Relatorios da Diretoria", (1883-1888); Versiani, 
op.cit.. pp.135,298; Vaz, op.cit.. pp.105-7,196.
Notes: (n.a.) information not available.
Soon after the merger the productive capacity of both the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills was 
expanded. As shown in Table V.17, at the time of its constitution the CCC had a total of 100 looms: 40 at 
the Cedro mill and 60 at the Cachoeira mill. In the same year, it ordered from England 50 new looms for 
the Cachoeira mill and 16 for the Cedro mill, as the existing productive capacity was considered inadequate 
and insufficient55. As both mills were set-up in the early 1870s, machinery employed by them was certainly 
outdated at the time of the merger and insufficient to increase the company's expected market share. Thus, 
total productive capacity was expanded to 166 looms, which were in full operation by 1885. In 1886, a 
further expansion increased the number of looms at Cachoeira to 146 and in the Cedro mill to 77s6, bringing
53 See A.D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. 
(Cambridge, MA., 1977), chapter 10.
54 See L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy. (2nd. ed. 1983), pp. 16-23.
55 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Relatorio da Diretoria", (1883), pp.2-8.
56 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Relatorio da Diretoria", (1886), pp.1-4.
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the total productive capacity of the company to 223 looms. In 1888, another 7 looms were added at Cedro57. 
The expansion of the number of looms of the Sao Vicente mill from the existing 40 looms to 10458 
increased the productive capacity of the CCC to 334 looms in 1894. Finally, in 1895, another 5 looms were 
added at Sao Vicente59 increasing the total number of looms to 339, in the last expansion of the productive 
capacity of the century.
Yet, in terms of the annual output, the CCC could still not be considered a large enterprise. As 
shown in Table V.17, in the first year of the existence of the company, output totalled 649,516 meters. In 
the following year output grew by 50%, in what could be the first signs of the expanded productive capacity. 
In 1885, output just broke the 1,000,000 meters barrier totalling 1,063,091 meters. In 1886, with new 
capacity fully operational, output again increased more than 50% and totalled 1,602,343 meters. Output 
would break the 2,000,000 meters per year mark in 1887 with an output of 2,303,262 meters of cloth. From 
1888 to 1894, output was around the 2,300,000 meters per year. In 1894, the Sao Vicente mill started to 
produce and in the following year output rose to 2,797,990 meters. Output continued to be around die
2,500,000 meters per year until 1897. From 1898 onwards, output rose to 3,086,672 and continued above 
the 3,000,000 meters per year for the rest of the century.
The number of workers employed by the CCC also points to a medium-size enterprise. At the time 
of the constitution of the company, the number of workers employed totalled 264. In the following year, 
that number did not alter very much as the work-force increased only 1%, amounting to 268 people. From 
then onwards, the number of workers increased steadily until 1888, as Table V.17 shows. From 1885 to 
1887, die work-force increased nearly 20% per year. In 1888, the pace of expansion slowed a little, but even 
though the work-force increased another 10% to total nearly 500. In 1889, the work-force suffered a small 
decrease to 485. Two years later, the company employed 479 workers. There is no information about the 
size of the work-force of the CCC for the rest of the century. Nevertheless, as the productive capacity and 
the annual output of the company increased in the last decade of the century, the work-force may also have 
grown slightly.
Comparison of the CCC and the Fabrica de Fiagao, Tecidos e Tinturaria Allianga (FFTTA), located 
in Rio de Janeiro, shows clearly how large the first textile firm was. Graph V.l compares the output of the 
two textile firms: Graphs V.2 and V.3 compare the number of looms and workers. In 1881, the FFTTA 
produced a total of 2,000,000 meters of cloth60 whereas the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills together produced
57 M.T.R.O. Versiani, "The Cotton Textile Industry of Minas Gerais, Brazil: Beginnings and Early 
Development, 1868-1906", University of London, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1991, p.298.
58 Vaz, op.cit.. p. 106.
59 Versiani, op.cit.. p.298.
60 A.M.F.C. Monteiro, "Empreendedores e Investidores em Industria Textil no Rio de Janeiro: 1878- 
1895", Universidade Federal Fluminense, unpublished M.A. thesis, Niteroi, 1985, p. 145.
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a total of 621,855 meters61, as shown in Graph V.l. In other words, just over a quarter of the output of the 
FFTTA. In 1886, the output of the CCC was still smaller than the output of the FFTTA in 1881. 
Unfortunately, there is no information about the output of the FFTTA in 1886 and in 1892. Nevertheless, 
it is possible to imagine that the scale of production at die CCC was much smaller as its output totalled only 
1,602,343 meters in 1886 and 2,292,603 meters in 1892. In 1895, the FFTTA was considered the largest 
textile company in Brazil producing 8,220,000 meters of cloth62. During the same year, the CCC produced 
a total of 2,797,990 meters. During the years 1898 and 1899, CCC output continued to be about a third of 
the size of FFTTA. In 1898, the latter produced 9,971,000 meters whereas the former produced 3,086,228 
meters. In the following year, the FFTTA produced 11,560,000 meters63 and the CCC 3,208,228.
As shown in Graph V.2, the productive capacity of the FFTTA in 1881 was as large as that of die 
Cedro and the Cachoeira mills together 100 looms. In 1886, the FFTTA operated a total of 154 looms, 
whereas the CCC a total of 223 looms. In 1892, the number of looms employed by the FFTTA was more 
than 3 times the number of looms employed by the CCC. The former employed 800 looms whereas the 
latter employed 230. In 1895, the FFTTA employed 1,248 looms, more than three times the number of 
looms employed by the CCC during the same year - 339 looms. For the remainder of the period there is 
no information about the number of looms employed by the FFTTA.
Finally, in 1881, the FFTTA employed almost as many people as the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills 
together. The former employed 210 people whereas the latter two ones employed 130 people each. In 1886, 
the FFTTA employed a total of 400 workers, whereas the CCC employed a total of 378 workers. There is 
no information about the size of the work-force of the FFTTA in 1892. In 1895, the FFTTA employed 1,625 
people64. In 1898 and 1899, the company employed 1,452 and 1,510 workers, respectively65. There is no 
information about the number of people employed by the CCC dining these last three years. Thus, although 
the CCC was a multi-site firm, operating three different units, it could hardly be considered a large 
enterprise. The analysis of its scale of production and of the size of its work-force has shown that the CCC, 
during the last century, was about a third of the size of the largest textile mills located in Rio de Janeiro.
Finally, it is interesting to point out that, taking into account the figures of output, productive 
capacity, and size of the work-force of both companies for 1881 and 1886, it is clear that the FFTTA was 
much more efficient than the CCC. In 1881 - the only year in which there is information available about 
number of workers, output, and productive capacity for both companies -, production per worker at the CCC 
was 2,392 meters per year, whereas at the FFTTA was 9,524. During the same year, production per loom
61 G.M. Mascarenhas, Centenario da Fabrica do Cedro. 1872-1972. (Belo Horizonte, 1972), p.252.
62 Monteiro, op.cit.. p. 154.
63 Versiani, op.cit.. p.264.
64 Monteiro, op.cit.. pp. 145, 149,151-2, 154, 268.
65 Versiani, op.cit.. p.264.
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at the CCC totalled 6,218 meters per year and 20,000 meters at the FFTTA. In 1886, taking the figures of 
the FFTTA for 1881, the CCC continued to be less productive. Productivity per worker at die CCC reached 
4,239 meters while productivity per loom amounted to 8,254. However, comparing the figures of production 
per worker of the CCC in 1891 and the FFTTA in 1895 it seems that die former had become as efficient 
as the latter towards the end of the century. In 1891, the CCC employed 479 workers and produced 
2,474,422 meters66. Consequently, productivity per worker totalled 5,166 meters. On die other hand, 
production per worker at the FFTTA in 1895 amounted to 5,059 meters per year. During this year, 
productivity per loom was larger at the CCC (8,254 meters) than at the FFTTA (6,586 meters). The change 
in relative efficiency between the two companies suggests that the problem was most probably related to 
the efficiency of the equipment employed by the two companies, ratiier than to the fact that one company 
operated a single site factory and thus enjoyed economies of scale which smaller mills could not enjoy.
Although by 1920 Minas Gerais had the third largest installed electricity generating capacity (42,934 
KW) and the largest number of power companies (72) established in Brazil, the mineiro electricity 
generating companies also could not be considered large enterprises. Most of these companies were small, 
Willing only one economic function, working on a municipal basis, and operating power stations of a small 
scale67.
Although the Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade (CME) was a multi-sector operation - the 
company first began producing electricity in 1889 and some years later, in 1893, it acquired the telephone 
service of Juiz de Fora68 -, the company could not be considered a large business enterprise. At the time of 
the inauguration of the lighting service, the company operated only one plant producing a total of 250 kW, 
as shown in Table V.18. In 1892, the company increased its generating capacity to 375 kW. The 
construction of a second power plant increased the generating capacity to 600 kW in 1896. For the 
remainder of the century, there was no further increase in the generating capacity.
Table V.18 - Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, 1889-1901: power production.
YEARS 1889 1892 1896 1897 1901
POWER PRODUCTION 
(in kW)
250 375 600 600 600
Sources: Compiled from P. Oliveira. Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade: Pioneira da Iluminacao 
Hidreletrica na America do Sul (Juiz de Fora, 1969), pp.24-44; Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, Balanco 
e Relatorio reproduced in O Pharol. (Juiz de Fora), 27 August 1897, p.l.
Like the CME, the Companhia For^a e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina (CFLCL) also could not be 
considered a large firm. It fulfilled only one economic function, i.e. the generation of hydroelectric power,
66 Mascarenhas, Centenario da Fabrica do Cedro. p.252.
67 Panorama do Setor de Enereia Eletrica no Brasil, ed. R.F. Dias, L.M.M. Cabral, P.B.B. 
Cachapuz, and S.T.N. Lamarrao, (Rio de Janeiro, 1988), pp.48-54.
68 P. Oliveira, Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade: Pioneira da Iluminacao Hidreletrica na America 
do Sul. (Juiz de Fora, 1969), pp. 35-44.
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and in 1908 the company inaugurated its first plant with a total generating capacity of 800 KW69.
Comparison of both companies with what came to be known as the Light System is very 
illustrative. The Light System was constituted by the Sao Paulo Tramway, Light and Power Company 
(SPTLPC) and die Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company Ltd. (RJTLPC) which were foreign- 
owned companies. Both companies were constituted in Canada. The first in 1889 and the second in 1904. 
In 1901, the SPTLPC inaugurated its power plant with a generating capacity of 2,000 kW, which was 
expanded to 3,000 kW in February 1902, and to 4,000 kW in March of the following year. In other words, 
in 1901 the SPTLPC had a generating capacity more than three times larger than that of die CME in 1896, 
and more than twice as large as that of the CFLCL in 1908. The RJTLPC, by its turn, inaugurated its first 
electrical power plant - considered the largest in Brazil and one of the largest in the world - in April of 1908 
with a generating capacity of 12,000 kW70. In other words, a generating capacity 20 times larger than that 
of the CME in 1896, and 15 times larger than that of the CFLCL in 1908.
In terms of the size of the work-force employed, mineiro electricity generating companies of the 
turn of the century were also small. Although there is no information about the size of the work-force 
employed by the CME, the CFLCL employed in 1908 a total of 29 people71, which was a small work-force 
by any standard. The total number of workers employed by the company did not change considerably until 
the end of the 1910s, when it employed 30 people72.
The capital of both companies provide further evidence of their small size. The initial nominal 
capital of the CME amounted to 150:000$000 Contos in 1888 (or £15,780). As mentioned above, this is 
about the same amount as the initial capital of the Cedro mill in 1872 (£15,600), which was a small textile 
mill. In 1890, capital was increased to 300:000$000 Contos (or £28,200), and in 1894 to 800:000$000 
Contos (or £33,600). Finally, in 1911, the capital of the company was increased to 1.400:000$000 Contos73 
(or £94,780). The initial capital of the CFLCL in 1906 amounted to 500:000$000 Contos74 (or £32,800). A 
further comparison with the SPTLPC puts these figures into perspective. The SPTLPC was constituted in 
1889 with an initial capital of US$ 6,000,000 (or £1,232,79275). Furthermore, the power plant built by the
69 Companhia For^a e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, 80 Anos Comnanhia Forca e Luz Cataguazes- 
Leopoldina: IJma In  7 . (1988), pp. 1-4.
70 Panorama do Setor de Enereia Eletrica no Brasil, pp.34-41.
71 Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, Relatorio do Gerente. (1909), p.6.
72 Companhia For?a e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, Relatorio do Gerente. (1910), p.8.
73 Oliveira, Comnanhia Mineira de Eletricidade. pp.27-8, 39, 49-50.
74 Suplemento Minas Gerais, Comnanhia Forca e Lnz Catafnayes-Leopoldina. (Cataguazes, 1913).
75 The Banking Almanc. Directory. Year Book and Diarv. (1889), p.563.
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company, completed in 1901, alone cost 2.000:000$000 Contos76 (or £97,800), nearly three times the capital 
(in Pounds) of the CFLCL in 1906 and about the same the capital of the CME in 1911.
Thus, the mineiro electricity generating companies of the turn of the century were small firms in 
every respect: scale of operation, number of workers employed, capital, and range of activities.
To sum up, throughout the nineteenth century the mineiro iron industry was small in every respect 
Firms were single-unit enterprises carrying on only one economic function - the production of iron. In the 
first three-quarters of the last century, they employed very simple and primitive technology which imposed 
a strict limit to the scale of production. Towards the end of the century, a few larger works emerged 
employing a more complex technology. Nevertheless, the scale of production remained small. Finally, the 
number of workers was also small with very few foundries employing more than 20 people.
The data examined also reveals that the CUI was one of the largest enterprises in Minas Gerais in 
the nineteenth century. The company fulfilled more than one economic function: it constructed and operated 
the Uniao e Industria turnpike. From the point of view of the length of the roads built and operated, the 
company was a major concern, even by the standards of the USA. The size of the work-force also points 
to the direction of a substantial enterprise. Yet, the scale of operations, measured in terms of freight and 
passenger transport, could hardly be large if compared with that of the EFDPII. The size of its capital was 
also considered small when compared with that of the largest Brazilian companies established in the period 
1850-1865.
The analysis of the mineiro textile industry shows that the industry was made up of small and 
medium size firms, rarely operating more than one unit and fulfilling a single economic function - the 
manufacture of cotton. The scale of production of the largest mineiro textile firms proved to be only a third 
as large as that of the largest Brazilian textile firms. Finally, in terms of the size of the work-force, although 
the mineiro firms proved to be much more labour intensive than their Brazilian counterparts, their work­
force tended to be smaller in absolute terms.
Finally, the CME and the CFLCL were small enterprises in terms of the scale of their operations 
and the size of their capital, fulfilling no more than one economic function in the specific case of the 
CFLCL. Although there is no information about the size of the work-force employed by the CME, the work­
force of the CFLCL in 1908 points to a very small firm indeed.
5.1.2 - The market structure:
This part analyses the nature of the marketing activities of nineteenth-century mineiro firms through 
the examination of the nature and size of their consumer market, the range of products or services offered, 
and the channels of distribution used by them. Nevertheless, an analysis of the marketing of any firm must 
take into account the fact that, given the different nature of products and services, there are bound to be 
differences between companies producing tangible products - like iron foundries and textile mills - and those 
providing services - like transport and electricity generating companies. Utilities often enjoy monopolies
76 F.A.M. Gomes, "A Eletrificagao no Brasil", in Cademo Historia & Enerria. (Sao Paulo, 1986), 
No.2, October, p.8.
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(although sometimes temporary monopolies) whereas physical commodities are more tradable and subject
to distinct forms of external pressures as the parameters of a market shift. Thus, whereas channels of
distribution may be a relevant aspect in the marketing strategy of those companies dealing with tangible
products, for example, it may not be so relevant to companies providing services.
Nineteenth-century mineiro iron foundries were mostly restricted to local markets which were not
very large and could absorb only a small quantity of products. Evidence of the limited size of the consumer
market during this period is given by Eschwege, when he made the following remarks about the possibilities
of setting up a large-scale ironwork in Brazil:
"The large factories which are set-up in the interior of Brazil, (...), would end up without 
finding a consumer market for their production. Although raw material and salaries there 
[in the interior of Brazil] are half the average price on the coastal regions, these large 
factories would have to face obstacles such as die lack of foreign technicians and suitable 
means of transport to the coast, rendering their products much more expensive than the 
one imported from Europe.
(...) And even in the interior, they [the large factories] would not be able to 
expand more than what the local market can absorb.
As competition among the consumers is very small, because the population is 
scattered, the factories must be relatively small."77
Furthermore, when comparing the Patriotica foundry with the Morro de Pilar and the Sao Joao do Ipanema
foundries, the latter located in Sao Paulo, Eschwege gives further evidence about the limited size of the
mineiro consumer market for iron products:
"In what concerns my foundry, (...) it produced iron in the same quantity and quality as 
that of the Swede's [the Sao Joao do Ipanema mill] and Camara's foundries. The 
Patridtica foundry could produce more than 58 tons per year as long as it worked day and 
night without stopping. Nevertheless, it did not happen, first, because of the insufficient 
number of slaves to guarantee the production of the necessary quantity of charcoal; 
second, because it would not be possible to sell the whole output;"78
And he concludes the description of his foundry by saying that:
"In Brazil it is still rewarding to establish a small foundry, with maximum annual output 
of 29 tons, because a larger quantity will not find a market"79
Further, he estimates the size of the market for iron in Minas Gerais:
"This province has a population of 500,000 people, spread over an area of 18,000 square 
leagues. Its five-year consumption, (...), reached 36,699 arrobas [531 tons] of iron and 
6,968 [101 tons] of steel, an annual average of 7,339 arrobas [106 tons] of iron and 1,376 
[20 tons] of steel."80
And he concludes by saying that it would be impossible to establish a large foundry in Minas Gerais 
intended to supply the province as a whole. Several small foundries were already in operation and would
77 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.258.
78 Ibid., p.250.
79 Ibid., p.253.
80 Ibid., p.259.
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be nearly impossible to hinder the importation from other places, especially from the coast. Even if die iron
manufactured in Minas Gerais could be sold 50% cheaper than the imported one, the merchants would not
be able to sell it cheap to a consumer market more than 10 to 12 miles away from the foundry. The more
distant consumer preferred to import iron from the coast which would come mixed with other goods, than
to buy it directly from the foundries, in which case it would be very expensive and it would give him much
more trouble to transport on the backs of mules81.
Mineiro iron foundries supplied mainly mining companies, farms, and small towns. Needing
replacement of components that were difficult to import, gold-mining companies became essential to the
development of the foundries in Minas Gerais82. Mining companies had such a necessity for iron goods that
some were led to try to produce them on site, as Eschwege observed:
"Among the last initiatives of smelting [iron], I have to mention the one done at the 
beginning of 1828, by the British mining company of Congo Soco (...). According to these 
letters [written by Baird, the company's civil engineer], it is possible to observe that this 
engineer have built a furnace 16 feet high (...). He estimated that with this furnace it was 
possible to produce from 2 1/2 to 3 tons of pig iron each time."83
In his report to the president of the province in 1853, Monlevade provides further evidence of the
importance of local demand, particularly by gold-mining companies:
"An iron point for a drill [aguilhao] is being produced for the Morro Velho mining 
company which will weight not less than 60 arrobas [882 kilos] when ready. Larger pieces 
of wrought iron (which is difficult to produce) have already been manufactured for the 
Congo Company, in Morro da Agua Quente."
But Monlevade also hints at the importance of the market for agricultural tools and equipment as a source 
of demand for iron:
"I can say that, if there was not in the country this production of cheap iron to supply the 
gold and diamond mining, the agriculture, etc., etc., this province would be nearly 
abandoned."
In 1881, a study by Costa Sena, concluded that the range of products produced by the mineiro iron 
industry included not only parts for mining machinery and agricultural tools, but also domestic appliances, 
horseshoes and a variety of other items for muletrains and carriages which constituted the transport system 
of that time84. Further evidence that the transport sector might have been a consumer of the iron produced 
in Minas Gerais is given by Esteves. He remarked that the CUI used in its workshops a great quantity of
81 Ibid., p.259.
82 Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil, p. 120.
83 Eschwege, op.cit.. pp.253-4.
84 J.C. Costa Sena, "Viagem de Estudos Metallurgicos no Centro da Provincia de Minas", in Annaes 
da Escola de Minas. (Ouro Preto, 1881), No.l, p. 125.
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iron produced in Itabira, Minas Gerais85. Among the foundries located in the Metalurgica zone in the early 
1880s, which were primarily producing for the local market, Costa Sena mentions the following: the Joao 
Cameiro's foundry, which produced 120 kilos of iron per day and sold it to other small foundries who 
transformed it into hoes, scythes, axes, etc.; the D. Ana's foundry, situated 3 kilometres from the Joao 
Cameiro's, produced 90 kilos of bar iron per day which was sold to smaller foundries; the Captain Vicente 
Pessoa's foundry, situated 8 kilometres from Sao Miguel, which produced 90 kilos of iron per day 
transformed into hoes; the D. Luisa plant, located 11 kilometres from Sao Miguel, producing 150 kilos of 
iron per day and manufacturing hoes, sickles, and axes; the Onga foundry, located around 7 kilometres from 
Itabira, producing 135 kilos iron per day which were used in die production of 20 hoes per day; Lieutenant 
Joao Martins' foundry, located in Lages and manufacturing hoes, scythes, and ironware; Colonel Antonio 
Rodrigues' foundry, situated 3 kilometres from Morro do Gaspar Soares, producing horseshoes; Colonel 
Jorge's foundry, situated 3 kilometres from Morro do Gaspar Soares, producing horseshoes, hoes, horseshoe 
nails, etc.; Capitao Modesto's plant, producing hoes; and Capitao Domingos', manufacturing hoes. 
Monlevade's foundry manufactured not only parts for mining machinery and tools for agriculture, it also 
produced more delicate objects like clocks and even a sewing machine86. His hoes, for example, came to 
have a good reputation87. Thus, the evidence presented above shows that the iron industry as a whole 
supplied a number of different products to different customers, such as parts for mining machinery, 
agricultural tools, domestic appliances, horseshoes, etc., to very local markets. However, at individual firm 
level, the range of products manufactured tended to be much narrower.
Until the arrival of the railways, distribution of the output was made by muletrains. Apart from 
duties, the lack of suitable means of transport explains why imports could not compete with the local 
products. Prices would increase in the same proportion as the costs of transport. Thus:
"In the greater part of the province of Minas, the price of [imported] iron has already
increased 300%, since 100% are due to provincial taxes, 120% are absorbed by the costs
of transport, and 80% by the merchants as profits."
The output of the mineiro foundries were mainly commercialized by a large number of small merchants 
spread all of over he province. Besides iron goods, hese merchan s sold a wide range of produc s:
"In their shops and warehouses can be found every kind of luxury goods including wine,
English beer, cheese, butter, and Dutch gin."88
Thus, the industry did not use any specialized channel of distribution, which per se is a strong evidence of 
how primitive were the local consumer markets for iron products and die distribution system as well.
The fate of the CUI was linked to the prosperity of one commodity (coffee) from a single region
85 Esteves, op.cit.. p. 12.
86 Costa Sena, op.cit.. pp. 117-41.
87 Libby, op.cit.. p. 144.
88 Eschwege, op.cit.. pp.258-9.
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Table V.19 - Gross revenue provided by the transport service of passengers and goods and their 
percentage contribution to the total gross revenue.
YEAR PASSENGER % FREIGHT % TOTAL REVENUE
1858* 27:051$000 11 217:242$595 89 244:293$595
1859 42:014$000 8 468:543$205 92 510:557$205
1860 50:319$200 8 616:654$454 92 666:973$654
1861 120:342$930 12 909:362$792 88 1.029:705$722
1862 154:640$800 18 687:449$522 82 842:090$322
1863 146:337$460 18 651:563$922 82 797:901$382
TOTAL 540:7Q5$390 13 3.550:816$490 87 4.091:521$880
Source: Companhia Uniao e Industria. Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (18641 Annexe 6.8.9.
(the Mata zone). Freight was the most important source of revenue of the company, as shown in Table V. 19. 
From 1858 to 1863, for example, the gross revenue provided by the transport service as a whole amounted 
to 4.091:521$880Contos. Passenger traffic contributed 13% of the total and freight with die remainder 87%. 
During the same period the net revenue amounted to 911:409$442 Contos. Seventy nine per cent of it came 
from freight and 21% from passenger traffic89. The smaller importance of passenger traffic can also be 
observed in the case of the railways companies. The larger part of the revenue of the EFDPII, for example, 
also derived from freight. Although in the first 6 months of its operation freight revenue was just a fraction 
larger than passenger revenue, as soon as the railway started to reach the coffee-growing regions freight 
began to account for larger shares of the company's revenue. Thus, from 1859 onwards freight accounted
for about 60% of the revenue of the EFDPII, and increased to 75% in 1865 
Table V.20 - Coffee freight in the Uniao e Industria turnpike.
90
YEARS TOTAL OF % OF TOTAL OF % OF % OF
GOODS GOODS COFFEE COFFEE COFFEE
TRANSPORTED EXPORTED TRANSPORTED OVER THE OVER
(tons) (tons) TOTAL EXPORT
1858 10,974 68 7,400 67 97
1859 22,776 71 15,908 70 98
1860 26,970 75 20,024 74 99
1861 29,743 79 23,179 78 99
1862 20,695 59 11,342 55 93
1863 23,345 69 14,495 62 90
1864 23,802 64 13,042 55 85
1865 31,988 67 19,242 60 89
1866 32,627 65 19,504 60 92
1867 41,061 74 29,139 71 96
1868 36,641 73 24,602 67 92
Source: Compiled from Companhia Uniao e Industria. Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1868). 
* From April to December.
89 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1864), Annexe 8
and 9.
90 El-Kareh, op.cit.. p. 121.
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Freight consisted of a high proportion of exports - a one way traffic which made for high operating
costs mainly coffee. As shown in Table V.20, ftom 1858 to 1868, coffee accounted for over 70% of the
total of goods transported by the CUI and more than 90% of the goods exported. As freight provided nearly
90% of gross revenue and as export made up two thirds of freight, and as coffee represented 90% of the
goods exported, company profits were linked to the fate of coffee. A slump in coffee exports in 1862, for
example, caused a decrease of 31% in the quantity of goods transported by the company during that year.
The company report of 1863 made the following comment about this event:
"From the documents of the movement of goods and passengers it is possible to see that 
the total weight of goods carried in 1862 amounted to only 1,401,812® 131b (...)
A considerable difference which represents a decrease in freight of 31%, due to 
the lack of the main product of our agriculture [coffee], and that contributed strongly to 
the limited result of the respective revenue."91
Dependence on a single export (in most cases, coffee) seems also to have been the fate of the
majority of the railways in Brazil. In the period 1873-1905, most of the Brazilian railways were located in
the coffee-growing regions, as shown in Table V.21. In 1873,67% of the Brazilian railway lines were set-up
Table V.21 - Length of the Brazilian railway in the main coffee-growing provinces/states, 1873-1905. 
PROVINCE/STATE LENGTH OF THE RAILWAY NETWORK (in kilometres)
1873 % 1883 % 1905 %
Sao Paulo 254 22 1,457 26 3,790 23
Minas Gerais - 662 12 3,843 23
Rio de Janeiro 510 45 1,706 30 2,661 16
Espirito Santo - - 336 2
Brazil 1,129 100 5,708 100 16,782 100
Source: Adapted from H.P.Melo. O Cafe e a Economia Flnminense: 1889/1920. (Rio de Janeiro. 19931. p. 11.
in the coffee-growing provinces of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In 1905, the four major coffee-growing 
states (Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Espirito Santo) accounted for 64% of the railway lines. 
Furthermore, in the province of Rio de Janeiro railways were built only where coffee could guarantee freight 
and profits for the lines92. Most of paulista railways established during the last century were built to cater 
for the coffee trade as well. The San Paulo Railway (SPR), for example, provisionally opened in 1867, 
linked Santos, the principal paulista port, to Jundiai, a medium-sized industrial and commercial town at the 
edge of the paulista coffee zone. By 1869, over a half of the freight handled by the company was made up 
of coffee. Moreover, it was the coffee trade above Jundiai that attracted investment to other railways, firstly 
to Campinas and later beyond that city to Rio Claro and Mogi Mirim93. Thus, the dependence of the CUI 
on coffee for freight and profits, was a feature that the company shared with other major Brazilian transport
91 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1863), pp.11-2.
92 H.P. Melo, O Cafe e a Economia Fluminense: 1889/1920. (Rio de Janeiro, 1993), p.8. ?
93 C.M. Lewis, Public Policy and Private Initiative: Railway Building in Sao Paulo. 1860-1889. 
(1991), pp. 13-5.
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companies - all were characterized by a limited market
The mineiro textile industry in the nineteenth century also operated on a local basis. Most firms
supplied mainly their immediate neighbourhood, with a few supplying larger sub-regional markets. However,
the industry as a whole was restricted to those markets that could not be supplied from overseas or by
producers based in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Nevertheless, if the lack of adequate means of transport
constituted a barrier to the penetration of foreign competition, at die same time, it limited the size of the
market of the mineiro mills.
The output of the Brumado mill, for example, was consumed in Pitangui (the town where it was
located) and in the neighbouring towns of the western part of the province. The Biribiry mill, located in
Diamantina, and the Cassu mill, located in Uberaba, also sold their output in die immediate vicinity94. The
Companhia Cachoeira de Macacos (CCM) commercialized its output in both the immediate locality and in
the neighbouring northeastern part of the province95. The sales of the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills were
also restricted to the province of Minas Gerais. Bernardo Mascarenhas gives some evidence of this when
he wrote to the owners of the Cachoeira mill, proposing the statutes of the CCC:
"I have named the company - Cedro e Cachoeira - instead of the name - Uniao Industrial.
Our mills, well known and respected throughout the whole province, would disappear in 
the organization of the new company."96
Nevertheless, they did not supply the whole province, as the Triangulo and the Southern zones were supplied 
by the mills located in Sao Paulo, and the Mata zone was supplied by the local production and by the mills 
located in Rio de Janeiro97. These regions already enjoyed reasonably good communications with 
neighbouring provinces.
As output increased after the constitution of the CCC, the company tried to expand its market by
penetrating other areas, as suggested by Francisco Mascarenhas in 1887:
"If we could find a good employee in the capital of Goyaz, our sales there would be very 
big, (...).
Uberaba is also an important and still inexplored market. If some of our 
customers wanted to sell there we could have a good result."98
The company also tried unsuccessfully to penetrate Rio de Janeiro, then the most important market in Brazil.
94 Libby, op.cit.. p.233.
95 N.A.M. Freitas, "Cia. Textil Cachoeira dos Macacos: Empresa que deu Origem a uma Cidade", 
Fundagao Mineira de Arte Aleijadinho/Escola Superior de Artes Plasticas, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1990, 
pp.27-9.
96 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas on 24 January 1883 to Mascarenhas, Barbosa & Cia., 
reproduced in Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. p.71.
97 Vaz, op.cit.. p.245.
98 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Bernardo Mascarenhas, 1883-1899 - 
No. 148", "Letter from Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 26 April 1887".
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The reasons for the failure does not seem to have been restricted simply to costs and freight charges, but
also to the quality and design of the textile produced by the company. In 1887, Rodolpho Alves, a textile
merchant from Rio de Janeiro, stated that after examining and comparing the products of the company with
those produced by the mills from Rio de Janeiro, he did not believe that they could be sold there:
"Even if these cottons were suitable for the Rio de Janeiro market, taking into account the 
price paid for freight, it would be impossible to compete with the ones produced here, as 
competition is getting tougher everyday."99
In 1889, Theophilo Marques Ferreira, then general manager of the company, outlined his marketing strategy 
and provided further evidence of the limits of the market supplied by the company. According to him, most 
customers made their purchases directly at the mills, in a clear indication of the range of the market of the 
company. Moreover, it seems that the company did not employ a sales staff and production was sold to a 
small circle of warehouses and merchants, evidence of the primitive nature of the channels of distribution. 
Nevertheless, as a consequence of the commercial crisis that the company was facing, that was not true 
anymore and the company had to open several of its own warehouses and branches throughout the province. 
Once again, as in the merger of the Cedro and Cachoeira mills and the purchase of the Sao Vicente mill, 
innovation was driven by crisis rather than as part of a planned strategy. The change in the marketing 
strategy of the CCC represented an integration of functions (production and distribution) within the 
company, a move similar to that made by US companies in the nineteenth century100. However, such strategy 
does not seem to have worked as planned as all the warehouses and branches were closed down a few years 
later101.
Furthermore, Ferreira decided to send to the provinces of Parana and Santa Catarina the manager
of the branch in Ouro Preto:
"(...), who expects to sell a large amount of our products there. Also, acknowledging that 
Rio de Janeiro is the largest market, I sent some samples of our products to the evaluation 
of some of the most respected merchants from that city (...)"1Q2
Ferreira expected to sell at least one third of the output of the company in Rio de Janeiro103, but he did not 
succeed for the reasons already suggested in the above-mentioned letter of Rodolpho Alves: high costs and 
unsuitable quality. As die Sao Vicente mill began to operate in 1894, the traditional markets of the company 
proved to be not large enough to absorb the increased output104. Thus, the company tried once again to
99 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.21", "Letter from 
Rodolpho Alves, March 1887".
100 See Chandler, The Visible Hand, parts III and IV.
101 Vaz, op.cit. pp.220-6.
102 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Relatdrio da Diretoria", (1889), pp. 1-2.
103 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Relatdrio da Diretoria", (1889), p.3.
104 Vaz, op.cit.. p.246.
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penetrate the market of Rio de Janeiro. In 1895, Rodolpho, Irmao & Mattos, a textile merchant from Rio
de Janeiro, acknowledged the receipt of samples of the products of the Sao Vicente mill105. Some months
later, Eugenio de Azevedo & Companhia, another textile merchant from Rio de Janeiro, explained that:
"It seems that it is going to be very difficult for this company [the CCC] to sell its 
products in this market, since the several mills located here have stock enough to the 
nessecities of the market. Furthermore, the prices are not competitive."106
The company would not succeed in penetrating the Rio de Janeiro market until 1918, when it managed to 
establish contracts with the large merchants and warehouses in Rio. In the meantime, the company 
developed a marketing policy to preserve and expand its traditional markets, which were made up of a large 
number of towns located mainly in the northern part of Minas Gerais107.
Thus, throughout the last century the mineiro textile industry was restricted to local markets. The 
CCC, for example, tried to supply a larger market but it did not succeed. The company had neither suitable 
products nor competitive prices to compete and operate on a national basis. Therefore, the company, like 
most of the mineiro textile industries, was restricted to those markets inaccessible to die foreign competition 
and to die products of the larger mills from Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
But the mineiro textile mills were not only restricted to the local markets. They were also restricted 
to the poorest niche of the market They produced a limited range of products of low quality, mainly cloth 
for the labour force, either slave or free, and sackcloth for packing. As Stein observed, the production of 
these products did not require skilled workers, the machinery was simple to operate, and the market 
relatively secure. Furthermore, the wealthiest classes of the Brazilian society continued to consume imported 
cloths made of cotton, linen, silk, and wool108.
The case of the CCC is illustrative in this particular respect As the company was made up of mills 
which were established in rural areas, its consumer market was constituted by slaves and free people on low 
income. Thus, the company specialized in a type of product destined to this market: cheap and low quality 
textiles109. There is evidence that the consumer market of the CCM was also made up of the poorest stratum 
of the population, as the company sold its products in the northeastern part of Minas Gerais, one of the 
poorest areas of the province110.
105 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.41", "Letter from 
Rodolpho, Irmao & Mattos, 12 April 1895".
106 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.42", "Letter from 
Eugenio Azevedo & Companhia to Aristides J. Mascarenhas, 5 August 1895".
107 Vaz, op.cit.. pp.245-6.
108 S.J. Stein, Origens e Evolucao da Industria Textil no Brasil. 1850-1950. (Rio de Janeiro, 1950),
p.38, 80.
109 Vaz, op.cit.. pp.245-61.
110 Freitas, op.cit.. pp.27-9.
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Furthermore, it seems that die mining companies constituted another important customer of die 
mineiro textile mills. In 1889, for example, the St. John del Rey Mining Company (SJDRMC) ordered from 
the CCC cloth to be used as gauze for filtering mine slummy in the production of gold111. During the same 
year, the SJDRMC was also purchasing cloth for the same purpose from the CCM, as shown in the 
following letter
"The cloth is well produced, but very thin and extremely smooth to retain gold. I am 
sending you a sample of the cloth from the Itabira mill and I think that it would be a good 
idea if you could weave a small piece of the same width and texture and send me a 
sample of it as soon as possible."112
Two years later, the storekeeper of the SJDRMC, M.J. Clemence, complained about die quality of the cloth
supplied by the CCC, indication of the regular supply for the mining companies and of the poor quality of
the product manufactured by the CCC:
"The 69 meters that you sent have already arrived. Nevertheless, I shall call your attention 
to the quality of the cloth which seems to be much inferior to the one you used to 
produce."113
A month later, he notified the CCC of payment for the cloth supplied114. Finally, in 1899, the SJDRMC 
ordered scraps of cotton to be used in the cleaning of die machinery115. Thus, during the last century, the 
mineiro textile mills produced low quality products, like cloth for the low income stratum of the population, 
and sackcloth for packing. Furthermore, the mills which were located in the mining areas, found in the 
mining companies what may have been an important niche of the market.
Furthermore, as the markets supplied by the mineiro textile companies were scattered over a wide 
area and of difficult access, the main channel of distribution were the mule trains, either belonging to die 
textile companies themselves or to independent merchants. At the beginning, the output of the CCM was 
sold by salesmen travelling with muletrains to farms, villages, and hamlets spread through their way. Later, 
with the extension of the railways, these salesmen would go by train until Corinto, where they would rent 
muletrains and head for Montes Claros116. In another evidence of the integration of both production and
111 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.26", "Letter from M.J. 
Clemence to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 7 December 1889".
112 Letter from M.J. Clemence to Americo Teixeira Guimaraes on 25 October 1889, reproduced in 
Freitas, op.cit.. p. 123.
113 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.30", "Letter from M.J. 
Clemence to Thedphilo Marques Ferreira, 4 June 1891".
114 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.30", "Letter from M.J. 
Clemence to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 31 July 1891".
115 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.51", "Letter from M.J. 
Clemence to Aristides J. Mascarenhas, 3 June 1899".
116 Freitas, op.cit.. pp.28-9.
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distribution within the company, the CCC had its own muletrain as Francisco Bahia da Rocha, manager of
the Sao Vicente mill, showed in his report in 1895:
"It is essential that this mill continues to employ four carts with the necessary number of 
oxen. Nevertheless, there is no suitable pasture (...) depleting rapidly the oxen which in 
a matter of days are unsuitable for the work."117
Further evidence of the integrated nature of the business is found in the correspondence of the general
manager of the CCC. In 1898, Manoel Pimenta Figueiredo, a merchant from Capelinha, wrote offering a
boy to look for the muletrain of the Sao Vicente mill118. However, the company also relied on its customers'
muletrains to distribute production or consignment. Independent merchants, like Cassimiro Teixeira Collares,
loaded their muletrains with cloth at the mills and travelled around the province selling it:
"Cassimiro Teixeira Collares, one of our best customers from Grao Mogol, who buys only 
with cash, sent here his muletrain to buy some cloth and sent cash and tobacco, that his 
slave muleteer has sold. However, the tobacco did not reach the expected price and the 
money was short 51 $754 Milreis of the total amount of the purchase, which I have debited 
to headquarters (...)"’19
Mill managers also sold directly on orders. The above mentioned dealings between the CCM, the CCC, and
the SJDRMC shows it clearly, as well as the following letter written by Americo Teixeira Guimaraes, the
general manager of the CCM:
"Concerning the 12 packs of striped material you ordered in your letter of yesterday, I am 
sorry to tell you that I cannot provide it. I have a customer here loading 80 packs and 
after that I have to provide another customer with 120 packs. Furthermore, I have several 
other orders received a long time ago which are already late."120
Another important channel of distribution used by the CCC was the company's own warehouses,
as mentioned above. When the commercial situation became increasingly difficult after 1886, the company
reluctantly decided to establish several warehouses in an attempt to boost sales:
"Until then, all of our customers would come to the doorstep of our mills. Now very few 
of them appear. Thus, it became necessary to take the extreme decisions of establishing 
warehouses and branches in several points of the province with a large financial burden, 
investments, and commissions.
The warehouses were always considered by me as the last resort, because they
117 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Relatorio e Quadro Demonstrative de Lucros Apresentado pelo 
Dr. Francisco Bahia da Rocha, Gerente da Fabrica de Sao Vicente", (1895).
118 Letter from Manoel Pimenta Figueiredo to the general manager of the Companhia Cedro e 
Cachoeira on 15 July 1898, reproduced in D. Giroletti, Fabrica Convento Disciolina. (Belo Horizonte, 1991), 
p.67.
119 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 23 July 1884".
120 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.36", "Letter from 
Americo Teixeira Guimaraes to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 27 August 1893".
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do not represent any guarantee of sales."121
Warehouses were established in the most important consumer markets, with their own team of salesmen122. 
The report of the board of directors of 1889 listed 6 warehouses in Ouro Preto, Formiga, Montes Claros, 
Calhao, Congonhas, and Pitanguy123. Later on, another 7 warehouses were established in Arassuaf, 
Capelinha, Teofilo Otoni, Abadia, Pirapora, Diamantina, and Rio de Janeiro. The company continued to 
distribute through its own warehouses until the beginning of this century, when they were replaced by local 
merchants who acted as representatives124. Hence, from the evidence presented above it is reasonable to 
conclude that mineiro textile mills relied on a diverse and somewhat sophisticated marketing structure, 
developed throughout the years by several crisis. The development of such strategy was an attempt to 
replace the "invisible hand" of the market - which in the case of nineteenth-century Minas Gerais was very 
precarious - by the "visible hands" of the managers.
Table V.22 - Number of street and domestic lamps powered by the Companhia Mineira de 
Eletricidade, 1889-1901.
YEARS No. OF STREET LAMPS No. OF DOMESTIC LAMPS
1889 40 -
1892 185 700
1896 - -
1897 304 2,470
1901 337 -
Sources: Oliveira. Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade. pp.24-44: Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade. 
Balanco e Relatorio reproduced in O Pharol. (Juiz de Fora), 27 August 1897, p.l.
The mineiro electricity generating companies of the turn of the century supplied very small markets, 
even if it is taken into account that markets for utilities such as electricity are different from those of 
tangible products like iron and textiles. Throughout the nineteenth century, the CME supplied only the city 
of Juiz de Fora, which was not a large market, both for the supply of electricity and for the provision of 
telephone service. Although demand was continuously increasing, the market for lighting in Juiz de Fora 
was not very large, as shown in Table V.22. In 1889, the company began supplying electricity to 40 street 
lamps. There is no information about the number of domestic connexions. Nevertheless, Bernardo 
Mascarenhas gives an idea of it in the plan that he drew the specifications of the equipment ordered to the 
Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) in 1888. According to Mascarenhas' plans, the power plant would 
have a capacity to supply energy to 500 domestic lamps125. In 1892, according to the company report, that
121 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Relatdrio da Diretoria", (1889).
122 Mascarenhas, Centenario da Fabrica do Cedro. p. 145.
123 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Relatorio da Diretoria", (1889).
124 Vaz, op.cit.. p.226.
125 Report of the technical specifications of the equipment to be supplied by the Westinghouse 
Company, reproduced in Oliveira, Cnmpanhia Mineira de Eletricidade. pp.29-31.
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number increased to 185 street lamps and 700 domestic lamps. In 1897, the company reported to have
powered 304 street lamps and 2,470 domestic lamps in 225 houses. Finally, in 1901, the company supplied
electricity to 337 street lamps but there is no information about the figures for the domestic customers. Even
so, the company struggled to keep pace with demand, as shown in the company report of 1892:
"As there is a great demand for light another generator was ordered, which is going to be 
assembled soon and will enable the company to serve the customers better."126
Juiz de Fora also did not constitute a large market for power. The supply of power only began after
the inauguration of the second plant in 1896. The first two electric engines began to operate only two years
later, one of them at Bernardo Mascarenhas' textile mill - which was a separate enterprise from the CME -
and the other at the Pantaleone Arcuri & Timponi establishment127.
Finally, even though there is no information about the number of telephone lines supplied by the
company, there is evidence that the market was not large. A report of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (ATT) of 1919 attested the precariousness of the telephone service in Juiz de Fora at
the time when the CME acquired the concession:
"Either because the city did not charge properly for the telephone service or because the 
contract did not offer the necessary guarantees, the Companhia Industrial Mineira [the 
former concessionaire] could not develop it and sold it to the CME."128
In 1901, a company report stated that the revenue provided by the telephone service had decreased129, further 
evidence of the precarious nature of the market in Juiz de Fora.
At the beginning, the CFLCL supplied electricity to 4 different towns - Cataguazes, Leopoldina, 
Sao Joao Nepomuceno, and Rio Novo -, all of them located within the Mata zone. Even so, taking into 
account the original generating capacity of the CFLCL of 800 KW130, it is reasonable to conclude that these 
markets were very limited in size. As mentioned above, the generating capacity of the CME in 1901, which 
supplied only the city of Juiz de Fora, was of 600 KW. Further evidence of the limited size of the markets 
supplied by the CFLCL is found in the company report of 1909. According to it, in 1908 the company 
powered a total of 8 engines and lit 512 houses131. Unfortunately, there is no information about the number 
of street lamps lit by the company for this year. Nevertheless, evidence presented above leaves no doubt 
about die small size of the markets explored by the CFLCL. In addition, the markets explored by the
126 Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, Relatorio da Diretoria ,(1892), reproduced in Ibid., pp.38-9.
127 Ibid., p.39.
128 Ibid., p.44.
129 Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, Relatorio da Diretoria ,(1901), reproduced in Ibid., p.44.
130 Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, 80 Anos Companhia Forca e Luz Cataguazes- 
Leopoldina: Tima Lnz . (1988), pp. 1-4.
131 Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, Relatorio da Diretoria. (1909), pp.3-4.
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company were also precarious. As Ivan Botelho, who became president of the company in 1963, observed:
"[at the beginning] It was not enough to light the houses. First, the company had to 
convince the owner of the house that the supply of light was useful. Then, the company 
had to do everything - to install the cables, to give the lamps - to make the people to be 
used of having electricity at home. The people were used to live in the dark and did not 
have any idea of progress."132
Although this was hardly a peculiarity of the markets supplied by the CFLCL, it is undisputable evidence 
of its precarious and backward nature.
Comparison of both the CME and the CFLCL with the Light System is once more very illustrative. 
As the names of the companies which constituted the Light System suggest (the Sao Paulo Tramway, Light 
and Power Ccompany and the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company Limited), they supplied 
the two largest Brazilian consumer markets, i.e. die cities of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro133. Thus, the 
mineiro electricity generating companies were restricted to much smaller markets when compared with their 
paulista and carioca counterparts.
To conclude, for most of the last century the mineiro iron industry operated on a local basis 
supplying mining industries, farms, and small towns. It manufactured parts for mining machinery, 
agricultural tools, domestic appliances, horseshoes, and horsenails. Nevertheless, individual firms produced 
a narrow range of products. The distribution of output was undertaken by a large number of small generalist 
merchants spread all over the province and by muletrains until the arrival of the railway.
The analysis of the marketing activities of the CUI revealed that, as happened with the majority 
of the Brazilian railways, a larger proportion of its revenue came from freight which was heavily dependent 
on one product (coffee). Furthermore, the company did not operate on a national or provincial basis. It was 
limited to the Parafba Valley in the province of Rio de Janeiro and the Mata zone in Minas Gerais, a coffee- 
growing region.
Most of textile firms in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais sold their products in local and sub­
regional markets, and were limited to the least sophisticated end of the market. Furthermore, the most 
common channels of distribution were muletrains and travelling salesmen, either independent merchants or 
employees of the mills themselves. In the last decade of the century, the CCC resorted to the opening of 
a number of warehouses in an attempt to boost the distribution of its increasing output. The development 
of a diverse and sophisticated marketing structure was an attempt to overcome the limitations imposed by 
the market mechanisms.
Finally, providing new and technologically advanced services - the generation of hydroelectricity 
and the provision of telephone services - the mineim electricity generating companies were restricted to 
small and precarious markets.
132 M.F. Neto, "Os Frutos da Diversifica?ao", in Administracao e Servicos. June 1982.
133 Panorama do Setor de Energia Eletrica no Brasil, pp.34-41.
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5.2 - The Administrative Structure:
As most firms in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais operated on a small scale, and supplied small 
and local markets, very few of them had even an embryonic administrative structure. Often they had no 
administrative structure whatsoever. They were managed personally by their owners, who made long-term 
and day-to-day decisions assisted by one or two managers. They were usually owned by a small number 
of people, often members of the same family. Consequently, appointment, especially for managerial 
positions, was more often based on kinship than on expertise.
The iron industry shows this clearly. Iron foundries in the first three-quarters of the last century 
were mainly family affairs, even the largest ones like the Patriotica and die Sao Miguel de Piracicaba. The 
only exception was the Morro do Pilar, which was financed by the Imperial government and organized by 
Manuel Ferreira da Camara. Even so, the foundry was personally controlled by Camara throughout its 
existence134. The Patriotica was founded by Eschwege. In setting-up the foundry he had the help of the 
president of the province of Minas Gerais, Conde de Palma, who:
"Enjoyed the confidence of several important people and, mainly, of a large and important
family which was courted in the whole province. He had a great influence in the ministry
and soon he succeeded in getting the interest of this family to the business."
Thus, the ownership was divided in 10 shares, each share representing 1,000 Cruzados135 of die initial 
capital. Eschwege subscribed to two shares, the governor one, and the large and important family the 
remainder136. The Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry was established by Monlevade and Captain Luiz Soares 
de Gouveia in 1827. After Monlevade's death in 1872, his family assumed the control of the foundry until 
it was sold to the Companhia de Forjas e Estaleiros at the beginning of the 1890s137.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, although the size of iron firms grew they continued to 
be owned by very few people. The Esperan^a foundry, set-up in 1888, was established by Amaro da Silveira 
(an engineer of the EFDPII), Alberto Gerspacher (a metallurgist), Henrique Hargeaves (chief of the 
extension works of the EFDPII) and Carlos G. da Costa Wigg. The latter was the main shareholder, owning 
70% of the initial capital. The Bumier foundry, built a few years later after the sale of the Esperanga 
foundry, was established by Jose Gerspacher, Alberto's son, and Carlos G. da Costa Wigg, who owned 80% 
of the capital138. Thus, throughout of the last century, iron foundries were owned by a small number of 
people and were very often family affairs.
134 Libby, op.cit.. p. 137.
135 The Cruzado was the old Portuguese currency and the official Brazilian currency during the 
colonial period. A.B.H Ferreira, Novo Dicionario da Lingua Portuguesa. (Rio de Janeiro, 2nd ed. 1986), 
p.504.
136 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.247.
137 Paula, op.cit.. p.31.
138 Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil, pp.141-7.
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Furthermore, short and long-term administration was carried out by the owners themselves. Camara,
for example, personally handled all the basic activities of the firm. He supervised the production:
"Two measures of charcoal were placed in the furnace daily, and this activity was made 
under the supervision of Mr. Camara, who was always present at work."139
He planned long-term investments, like the building of a large road with the purpose of exporting iron, as
Schoenewolf, a German foundry master, reported to Eschwege in 1816. He also controlled and disciplined
personally the workers:
"Mr. Camara became very angry and beat so severely a certain blacksmith that this man 
vomited blood for eight days. During the whole existence of the foundry, the whipping 
post was never empty."140
Finally, appointment at the Morro do Pilar mill was clearly based on kinship, as observed by Schoenewolf:
"They have spent 2,000 Cruzados monthly and the work did not develop. Although several 
workers are on the pay-roll only few of them actually work, since from the manager to 
the last foreman, they are all relatives, not wanting to cause any harm to each other. Thus, 
it is impossible that this mill will ever develop."141
Like Camara, Eschwege also personally handled all the basic activities of the firm, like the construction of 
the mill:
"A skilled carpenter, under my permanent supervision, made all the work which was 
finished in a year. Hence, m i 12 December 18121 was able to forge for the first time with 
the big hammer."142
Similarly he often supervised production:
"The consumption of charcoal, while I personally supervised the work of the foundry, was 
five times less than later, as a consequence of the negligence of the managers."143
Like Camara and Eschwege, Monlevade was deeply involved in every aspect of his business. He personally
made the plans for the construction of his foundry:
"Mr Monlevade, a respectable gentleman, a great mineralogist, a great chemist, apart from 
further knowledge in physics, mathematics and literature who, acknowledging the riches 
of this country, associated with Captain Luiz Soares de Gouveia, (...) established an iron 
foundry superior than any other in the country. There that gifted physicist showed his 
skills in the design of the buildings and in the plan of the furnace. It was he who took a 
pickaxe to work on the foundations."144
139 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.208.
140 Ibid., p.209.
141 Ibid., p.210.
142 Ibid., p.248.
143 Ibid., p.251.
144 Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil, p. 109.
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And Monlevade was also involved in the daily activities of his foundry, especially in the supervision of the 
workers:
"If the founder [Monlevade] of the foundry [the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba] could 
maintain it throughout his life it was because he was always supervising his workers and 
had a legendary activity and energy which were admired by the inhabitants of the country.
As a mining engineer, he knew deeply the process which he employed and as he 
was continuously present at work, he could overcome his employees' indifference and 
obtain from them the necessary care."145
Even in the larger ironworks which emerged in the last quarter of the century, owners continued to be 
involved in the daily management of the firm. At the Esperanga foundry, for example, management was 
entrusted to Alberto Gerspacher, who was its technical director and one of the owners. Soon, the initial 
capital proved to be insufficient for further developments and the foundry was sold to the CNFE146. The 
CNFE tried to constitute an iron trust in Brazil, but went bankrupt147 and the Esperanga foundry was then 
sold to the firm Queiroz Junior e Leandro, whose partner, the engineer Queiroz Junior, served as manager 
for several years148.
Hence, throughout the century iron foundries in Minas Gerais were owner-managed, irrespectively 
to their size. However, the production of iron was not the only economic activity of foundry owners or even 
of their workers. Usually the foundries, especially the smaller ones, were part of a farm and the work in the 
foundry was divided with the activities of the farm. Monlevade, for example, described to the president of 
the province what he called the "Monlevade farm", which included the famous Sao Miguel de Piracicaba 
foundry and plantations149. Furthermore, the death of die owner in many occasions meant the end of the 
activities of the foundry. Costa Sena, for example, mentions the existence of a well established foundry close 
to Conceigao, in the Metalurgica zone, which was abandoned because of the death of its owner, Eduardo 
Felix. He further refers to the Cubas foundry which was also abandoned as a consequence of the death of 
its owner150. When Monlevade died in 1872, his son took control of the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry, 
but as he could not find any one technically competent to operate the Catalan method he hired a master who 
transformed it into an Italian foundry151. The case of the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry shows clearly 
how bad was the problem of shortage of skills in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais.
The lack of administrative structure was generalized among the iron firms in Minas Gerais. In 1814,
145 Ibid., p. 109.
146 Ibid., pp.141-2.
147 Paula, op.cit.. p.38.
148 Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil, p. 144.
149 Libby, op.cit.. pp.151-2.
150 Costa Sena, op.cit.. pp.140-1.
151 Paula, op.cit.. p.31.
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the Morro do Pilar foundry, for example, employed a total of 34 workers. Among them, 15 smelters, 8 
blacksmiths, 6 carpenters, 2 blacks, 2 apprentices and 1 foreman. Thus, it had no administrative personnel 
apart from Camara himself. In 1821, it employed one manager, one foundry master, 6 foremen, one master- 
blacksmith and one blacksmith, 2 master-carpenters, 28 workers for furnace and hammermill, 17 apprentices 
for furnace and hammermill, and 70 slaves for the coal-bunkers152. Although, the number of workers had 
increased from 34, in 1814, to 127, in 1820, it still employed very few managerial staff for an enterprise 
of its size. There was also no administrative structure in the Patriotica foundry. Until 1821, the foundry 
employed 20 slaves, two free Brazilians, occasionally 1 German foundry master, and Eschwege himself153.
The CUI, by its turn, was organized on a larger basis. The nominal capital of the company was 
divided into 10,000 shares, although the issued capital never exceeded 6,120 shares. As the chairman of the 
company, Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage was certainly one of the largest shareholders. In his will, written 
before a trip to Europe in 1867, Lage declared a holding of 805 shares (or 13% of the issued capital)154. 
However, although ownership of the CUI was spread among a larger number of people, control was firmly 
in the hands of its founder. Until his death in 1872, Lage had a great influence on die company as its 
president and main executive. Furthermore, some of his relatives, like Jose Antonio da Silva Pinto and Lino 
Jose Ferreira Armond, were shareholders who had made important contributions to the company155. Thus, 
because ownership of the CUI was diffused Lage was able to control the company with a relative small 
share participation.
Furthermore, as chairman of the company, Lage's activities were not only concerned with long-term
decisions, but also with short-term decisions, like personnel management:
"The engineers of the company judge that, with this increase of personnel, they will be 
able to handle all the work required by the stations and roads beneath and beyond the 
Parahyba river. And with the assurance they gave me of not being needed to increase the 
number of engineers I decided to give them a gratification for the increase in the volume 
of work."156
He was also directly involved with activities like the engagement of foreign engineers and the recruitment 
of workers:
"The conditions of the recruitment of slaves, (...), were the same until 31 December 1855.
Before the end of the year and in order (...) to call the attention of the proprietors of 
slaves who wanted to let them and to stimulate free workers, I was forced to announce 
new conditions, increasing the wages to more than a quarter than it was established
152 Eschwege, op.cit.. pp.209-13.
153 Ibid., pp.247-254.
154 Giroletti, op.cit.. pp. 18-9.
155 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), pp.38-9.
156 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1856), p.14.
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before."157
Thus, the involvement of the founder of the company in its top administration constitutes evidence that if 
the CUI was a modem enterprise, in Chandlerian terms, it should be considered a modem entrepreneurial - 
and not managerial - firm.
Nevertheless, both the construction and operation of the turnpike Uniao e Industria required a wide 
range of professionals. From 1853 to 1860, the company payroll included engineers, architects, 
geometricians, drivers, foremen, book-keepers, etc.158. In 1865, for each one of the 10 stations located along 
the turnpike Uniao e Industria the company employed one manager, in what might have constituted a layer 
of management159. In 1866, the administrative structure of the technical staff of the company was clearly 
organized in a hierarchical way. As shown in Figure V.l, it was divided in seven categories, each with a 
distinct status which was translated into higher and lower salaries. At the head was the chief engineer, 
assisted by a deputy called the first engineer. The chief engineer earned 12:000$000 Contos and his deputy 
8:400$000 Contos per year. Then, there were four section heads, who were engineers as well, earning 
6:000$000 Contos. They were assisted by 6 first class assistants and 5 second class assistants. The formers 
received 4:800$000 Contos and the latter 3:600$000 Contos per year. Then, came 6 first class drivers, 
earning 3:000$000 Contos, and 9 second class drivers, earning 2:400$000 Contos. There was also a general 
traffic inspector and a chief of the workshops, both engineers: there is no information about their salaries160. 
Thus, the existence of a clearly defined administrative structure of the technical body of the CUI is beyond 
any doubt.
However, the existence of this somewhat more complex administrative structure of the technical 
body was due to the nature of the industry rather than to the CUI itself. In 1864, for example, the EFDPII 
was divided in several different departments: headquarters, warehouse, traffic, telegraph, construction, 
rolling-stock, and stations, as shown in Figure V.2. Apart from the headquarters, which was a small 
department employing a total of 7 people, the others were strictly technical departments. Each was organized 
in a hierarchical way, with posts being divided according to seniority, and different status and salaries. Thus, 
as shown in Figure V.3, at the head of the traffic department, for example, was the general traffic inspector 
assisted by a deputy called the resident engineer. The general traffic inspector earned 14:000$000 Contos 
and his deputy 6:000$000 Contos per year. Then, there was the chief of traction, earning 5:000$000 Contos, 
the chief of die traffic department accountancy, earning 3:600$000 Contos, and the secretary, earning 
3:000$000 Contos per year. Finally, there were 5 employees, without clearly defined occupations, earning
157 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relat6rio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1856), p. 14.
158 Esteves, op.cit. pp. 149-52.
159 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1866).
160 Esteves, op.cit.. p.224.
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Figure V.l - Administrative Structure of the Technical Department of the Compnahia Uniao e 
Industria.
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165
Figure V.2 - D. Pedro II Railway: Administrative Structure.
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Source: Adapted from A.C. El-Kareh, Filha Branca de Mae Preta: A Companhia de Estrada de Ferro de D. 
Pedro II. 1855-1865. (Petropolis, 1982), pp.78-9.
Figure V.3 - D. Pedro II Railway: Traffic Department.
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at most 2:200$000 Contos per year161. The existence of a clearly defined administrative structure of the
technical body of the EFDPII and the CUI derives from the nature of their operations.
Nevertheless, the structure of the top administration of the CUI indicates that its administrative
structure was in an embryonic stage, as a study of the merger of the company and the EFDPII suggests:
"It seemed to me that the administration of so important roads, like the EFDPII and the 
Uniao e Industria turnpike, required a larger board of directors than the existing one at the 
CUI, constituted of only three members,"162
And the statute of the CUI states clearly:
"A board of directors constituted of 3 members among the shareholders with more than 
50 shares, and a counsel constituted by 5 members among the shareholders with more than 
20 shares."163
Further evidence of the embryonic nature of the structure of the top management of the company is 
confirmed in the reports of 1865, 1869, 1870 and 1875. They were all signed by die board of directors, 
invariably constituted by 3 members: the president, the secretary and the treasurer164. Finally, it is interesting 
to point out that the structure of the top administration of the CUI was very similar to that of the textile 
companies, which were neither complex nor large firms, as seen above. The board of directors of the CCC, 
for example, was also constituted by three members, who ought to hold at least 50 shares of the company165.
The mineiro textile industry was no exception in what concerned the lack of complexity of the 
administrative structure. The textile companies were family affairs, owned by a small number of people and 
managed exclusively by the founders and their relatives. The CCC, for example, was die result of the merger 
between the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills, both of them belonging to members of the Mascarenhas family. 
Although organized as a joint stock company, the CCC was actually family run. As shown in Table V.23, 
of the 9 founders of the CCC 6 were brothers, one (Luiz Augusto Vianna Barbosa) was brother-in-law166, 
and another (Theophilo Marques Ferreira) was married to a niece of the Mascarenhas brothers167.
Apart from Antonio Joaquim Barbosa da Silva, who left the company in 1884168, the group formed
161 El-Kareh, op.cit.. pp.78-9.
162 Esteves, op.cit.. p.240.
163 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relat6rio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1860), p. 14.
164 Companhia Uniao e Industria Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1865,1869,1870,
1875).
165 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Estatutos", (Cedro, 1883), pp.7-8.
166 D.M. Mascarenhas, Genealogia da Familia Mascarenhas. 1824-1989. (Belo Horizonte, 1990),
p. 183.
167 Mascarenhas, Centenario da Fabrica do Cedro. p. 140.
168 Vaz, op.cit.. p.95. •
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Table V.23 - Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira in 1883: individual share participation, occupation, and
family connexion of the founders.
NAME
(FAMILY CONNEXION)
OCCUPATION NUMBER OF 
SHARES
% OF THE 
TOTAL
Antonio Candido Mascarenhas 
(Brother)
Capitalist 658 13.16
Bernardo Mascarenhas 
(Brother)
Merchant 658 13.16
Caetano Mascarenhas 
(Brother)
Farmer 658 13.16
Francisco Mascarenhas 
(Brother)
Merchant 658 13.16
Pacffico Mascarenhas 
(Brother)
Doctor 658 13.16
Victor Mascarenhas 
(Brother)
Capitalist 658 13.16
Lufz Augusto Vianna Barbosa 
(Brother-in-law)
Merchant 658 13.16
Theophilo Marques Ferreira 
(Married to a Mascarenhas)
Merchant 353 7.06
Antonio J. Barbosa da Silva Lawyer 41 0.82
(No connexion)
Source: Compiled from Mascarenhas. Centenario da Fabrica do Cedro. p. 118: P.M. Mascarenhas. 
Genealogia da Famflia Mascarenhas. 1824-1989. (Belo Horizonte, 1990), p. 183.
by the founders concentrated in their hands the ownership of the company throughout the last century. As 
shown in Table V.24, although the number of shareholders jumped from 9 in 1883 to 49 in 1890, the 
founders still held 68% of the total shares of the company. In 1900, the number of shareholders increased 
to 139 and the remaining 7 founders (Bernardo Mascarenhas died in 1898169) still possessed 44% of total 
number of shares.
Table V.24 - Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, 1883-1900: individual share participation of the nine 
founders.
YEARS NUMBER OF SHARES NUMBER OF 
SHAREHOLDERS
PERCENTAGE OF 
THE FOUNDERS
1883 5,000 9 100
1884 5,000 17 94
1885 5,000 17 93
1890 5,500 49 68
1891 7,500 64 65
1895 10,000 118 51
1900 10,000 139 44
Source: Adapted from Vaz. op.cit.. p. 15b.
Nevertheless, these figures still do not tell the whole story about the concentration of the ownership 
of the CCC in the hands of the Mascarenhas family. The share participation of the family as whole,
169 Ibid., p. 150.
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including that of the founders, their brothers and sisters, their parents, and their direct descendants, is shown 
in Table V.25. In 1883, for example, the family owned 92% of the shares of the company. Family share 
ownership came to just over 90% in 1884 and 82% in 1888. The share participation of the Mascarenhas 
family was 62% and 56% in 1893 and 1899 respectively. At the beginning of this century, family ownership 
was less than 50% but they were still firmly in control.
Table V.25 - Share participation in percentage of the founders of the Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira - 
their brothers and sisters, parents and their direct descendants, 1883-1902.
SHAREHOLDERS 1883 1884 1888 1893 1899 1902
Antonio Candido Mascarenhas 13.16 10.00 8.70 8.00 6.85 7.22
Luis Augusto Vianna Barbosa* 13.16 12.66 12.72 - - 0.05
Victor Mascarenhas 13.16 12.66 9.96 10.97 10.44 9.21
Pacifico Mascarenhas 13.16 12.40 12.78 8.01 10.50 11.23
Caetano Mascarenhas 13.16 13.16 12.00 10.86 8.54 8.95
Bernardo Mascarenhas 13.16 12.66 10.54 8.22 5.17 -
Francisco Mascarenhas 13.16 12.90 9.12 9.04 5.19 5.34
Jos6 Mascarenhas - 0.60 - - - 0.26
Escolastica Mascarenhas - - - - 0.31 0.37
Francisca Mascarenhas - 0.60 1.41 1.46 2.02 3.00
Maria Teodor a Mascarenhas - 2.74 2.72 2.76 3.10 4.04
Sebastiao Mascarenhas - - 0.03 - - -
Policena Mascarenhas** - - 2.54 2.77 4.27 0.01
Antonio Gonsalves 
Mascarenhas**
- 0.02 0.01 - - -
TOTAL 92.12 90.40 82.53 62.09 56.39 49.68
Source: Adapted from Vaz. op.cit.. p.274.~ 
* brother-in-law; ** parents.
Thus, although the CCC was one of the first companies in Minas Gerais to be formally organized 
as a joint stock company, in reality it was run as a private, family owned affair. One of the consequences 
of this fact was that throughout the last century the top administration of the company and the managerial 
posts were filled by members of the Mascarenhas family only. As shown in Table V.26, during the period 
1883-1901 all members of the board of directors of the CCC belonged to the Mascarenhas family, either 
as brothers, brothers-in-law or as nephews, a trend which continued until the 1970s170.
Appointment of managers reflected the real type of ownership. The requirement for managership 
was kinship rather than merit or expertise. As Vaz pointed out, at the CCC the appointment of managers 
represented more the compromise to maintain the equilibrium between the main branches of shareholders 
than anything else171. As shown in Table V.26, all the general managers of the CCC, during the period 1883- 
1901, belonged to the Mascarenhas family. Bernardo Mascarenhas was the first general manager of the 
company, from 1883 to 1887. He was replaced by Theophilo Marques Ferreira in 1888. His successor in
170 Mascarenhas, Centenario da Fabrica do Cedro. p.245-7.
171 Vaz, op.cit.. p.151.
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the managership was Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, who was succeeded by Aristides Jose Mascarenhas, 
a nephew of the original group of shareholders, for the remainder of the period172.
Table V.26 - List of the members of the board of directors and general managers of the Companhia 
Cedro e Cachoeira, 1883-1901.
PERIOD MEMBERS OF THE BOARD PERIOD GENERAL MANAGER
1883 Antonio Candido Mascarenhas 1883 Bernardo Mascarenhas
to Bernardo Mascarenhas to
1888 Padfico Mascarenhas 1887
1888 Antonio Candido Mascarenhas 1887 Theophilo Marques
to Padfico Mascarenhas Ferreira
1889 Theophilo Marques Ferreira
1889 Antonio Candido Mascarenhas to
to Padfico Mascarenhas
1892 Aristides Jos6 Mascarenhas
Antonio Diniz Mascarenhas 1893
1892 Antonio Candido Mascarenhas 1893 Francisco de Paula
to Aristides Mascarenhas to Mascarenhas
1895 Antonio Diniz Mascarenhas 1895
1895 Antonio Candido Mascarenhas 1895 Aristides Jose
to Aristides Jose Mascarenhas Mascarenhas
1899 Viriato Diniz Mascarenhas
Caetano Mascarenhas to
1899 Aristides Jose Mascarenhas
to Viriato Diniz Mascarenhas
1901 Caetano Mascarenhas 1901
Source: Mascarenhas. Centpinario da ftahrica do Cedro. p.245-7.
The same phenomenon can be observed for the remaining of the managerial posts at the CCC. As 
shown in Table V.27, the Cedro mill was managed by Bernardo Mascarenhas, Thedphilo Marques Ferreira, 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, and Aristides Jose Mascarenhas. The Cachoeira mill had only two 
managers during the century: Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas and Dario Diniz Mascarenhas, another 
nephew of the original shareholders. Finally, the Sao Vicente mill was managed by Caetano Mascarenhas, 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, and Francisco Bahia da Rocha, who was married to a niece of the original 
shareholders173.
During the nineteenth-century shareholders, directors, managers, and relatives were synonyms at 
the CCC. Although the company was formally established as a joint stock company, ownership and 
managership never reflected that. On the contrary, ownership of the company was always safely in the hands 
of the founders and all managerial positions were filled by members of the Mascarenhas family, without 
exception.
The scope of the activities performed by managers reflects the stage of organizational development 
of the CCC and gives further evidence about the complexity of the business environment in Minas Gerais
172 Mascarenhas, Centenario da Fabrica do Cedro. pp.245-6.
173 Mascarenhas, Genealogia da Familia Mascarenhas. p.205.
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Table V.27 - Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, 1883-1899: List of factory managers.
MILLS/
YEARS
CEDRO CACHOEIRA S. VICENTE
1883 Bernardo Mascarenhas Francisco de P. 
Mascarenhas
1887 Theophilo Marques Ferreira
1891 Caetano Mascarenhas
1892 Dario Diniz Mascarenhas Francisco de P. 
Mascarenhas
1893 Francisco de P. 
Mascarenhas
1894 Francisco Bahia da Rocha
1895 Aristides Jose Mascarenhas
1899 Caetano Mascarenhas
Source: Mascarenhas. Centenirio da Fabrica do Cedro. pp.247-8.
in the last century. As in the iron sector, managers were involved in every aspect of the life of the company,
from long-term investment decisions to daily operations. They concentrated in their hands all managerial
tasks, as shown in the following letter:
"There are so many things to be done that I do not know what to do first: if I check the 
loads, control the services, supervise, build, answer the correspondence, etc., etc., because 
I have only two assistants - Satyro and Americo - who cannot abandon the work which 
comes from different sources."174
Therefore, there was no trace of any departmentalization nor specialization of any sort. Managers, assisted
by one or two persons, were responsible for several tasks - like marketing, industrial relations, finance,
production, and even legal affairs - which in modem firms are the subject of specific departments. In 1884,
for example, Francisco Mascarenhas, then manager of the Cachoeira mill, established the conditions of sales
of the output of the mill, as shown in his letter to Bernardo Mascarenhas:
"I am also sending you letters from which you can see that Mr. Assis has guaranteed 90 
days term for small customers. It would be a good idea if you write asking him not to 
guarantee orders [on these terms], because what is produced here it is not enough to sell 
by cash at the mill; he can say that here in the mill it is sold only by cash."175
Francisco also administered sales made in markets closer to the mill:
"The beautiful striped cloth that you have sent me were very much appreciated in 
Diamantina, to such an extent that there was not enough for everybody. It would be a 
good idea to send me some more whenever you have the opportunity to."176
174 Letter from Dario Diniz Mascarenhas to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 17 July 1892, reproduced 
in Giroletti, op.cit.. p.223.
175 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 16 June 1884".
176 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 17", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 20 May 1885".
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Furthermore, it is possible to find the manager of the Cachoeira mill in 1895 - Dario Diniz Mascarenhas -
administering the accounts of customers, as he reported to the general manager, Francisco Mascarenhas:
"Among the customers overdue by the time of the balance, I have sent statements to some 
of them requiring the payment of the following amounts: (...)"177
Each mill manager was also responsible for the management of his workforce. Francisco Mascarenhas
directly recruited and hired workers while he was at the Cachoeira mill. In June 1884, Francisco wrote to
his brother Bernardo, saying that he could not find anybody who could write well and correctly and who
could count regularly. Thus, he decided to look elsewhere178. In the same year, he wrote again to Bernardo
complaining that it was hard to obtain workers, since it was the time of clearing the land179. In another
occasion, Francisco explained to his brother his industrial relations policy:
"It does not matter how hard you try, the result will always be the same: more people will 
not come. The better way to hold people was studied by me and applied since the 
beginning - if one works from 30 to 40 days, he will earn 660, from 50 to 60 days, 680, 
and from 85 to 90 days, 700. The rewards will be paid for the day worked, when the job 
is finished. In this way, I have managed to hold a great number of people whose interest 
in the rewards have kept them here until the end."180
Furthermore, as shown in the following letter, Francisco Mascarenhas was also responsible for controlling 
the workforce:
"Do not settle up with Smith, because it is necessary to deduct the three days wages 
during which he was ill. I must pay for the days spent on the round trip, but illness, no.
I also include the receipt of the money he took here, which I charged to the 
headquarters."181
As already mentioned, each mill manager was responsible for the finance of his mill. Francisco Mascarenhas 
once again gives a good example of that In January 1885, he wrote to Bernardo reporting that the balance 
sheet of the Cachoeira mill was ready showing a result of 68:757$391 Contos182. In 1895, Dario Diniz 
Mascarenhas reported to Francisco Mascarenhas that:
"It seems that the balance sheet was done correctly, but as I cannot rely on my expertise
177 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.41", "Letter from 
Dario Diniz Mascarenhas to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 7 February 1885".
178 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 16 June 1884".
179 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 15 September 1884".
180 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 13 June 1884".
181 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 2 September 1884".
182 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 17", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 14 January 1885".
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on this matter, I ask you to take a look at it and make all the necessary corrections until 
the 1st of January to avoid further changes in the balance sheet."183
Dario's letter also indicates lack of professional skills. In 1899, Caetano Mascarenhas, then the manager of
the Sao Vicente mill, gave the following account of the finance of the mill:
"Today I have debited the headquarters 12:278$880 Contos, the amount of 52 bundles of 
several different cloths, according to the invoice enclosed, (...)"184
Mill managers were also deeply involved in minute and different aspects of the production. From raw
material supply to sources of energy. On two different occasions in 1885, Francisco Mascarenhas wrote
about the problem concerning the cotton supply of the Cachoeira mill. In February of that year, he
complained about increasing raw cotton prices due to the activities of speculators. Two months later, he
signed a contract to supply the mill185. In 1900, Caetano Mascarenhas, then manager at Sao Vicente, also
looked for a supply of raw cotton:
"The mill was brought to a halt due to the lack of cotton. Whenever you have information 
about any delivery would you please inform Mr. Joao N. de Moura and I as soon as 
possible."186
The maintenance of the machinery was another concern of mill managers, as Dario Diniz Mascarenhas in
1904 informed Caetano Mascarenhas:
"New looms - at the beginning the machinery worked with locally manufactured belts, but 
these often broke. New belts were then ordered from England. These also broke but not 
so often, probably due to their greater width. Hence, I am now ordering wider English 
belts."187
A recurrent problem throughout the nineteenth century was the question of power for the mills. The supply
of water was very irregular and steam also had its own problems. Thus, managers were always busy trying
to resolve the problem of energy, as Francisco Mascarenhas wrote in 1885:
"Thirty looms and two spinning machines are regularly driven by steam. The ginning 
machine is also steam powered. But in order to obtain a sufficient head of steam to drive
183 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.41", "Letter from 
Dario Diniz Mascarenhas to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 7 February 1895".
184 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Caetano Mascarenhas - No. 149", 
"Letter from Caetano Mascarenhas to Aristides Jose Mascarenhas, 30 September 1899".
185 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 17", "Letters from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 24 February 1885 and 25 April 1885".
186 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Caetano Mascarenhas, 1883-1912 
- No. 149", "Letter from caetano Mascarenhas to Jose J. Fernandes Ramos, 23 March 1900".
187 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Caetano Mascarenhas, 1883-1912 - 
No. 149", "Letter from Dario Diniz Mascarenhas to Caetano Mascarenhas, 16 January 1904".
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all machines it is necessary to stop the equipment three or four times a day."1®
Finally, mill managers also dealt with legal affairs whenever the situation required. In 1885, for example,
Francisco asks Bernardo for a letter of attorney in order to:
"Defend the rights of the CCC in the civil and criminal court of justice in Curvello. People 
are destroying our woods and I can do nothing to prevent it."189
This analysis of the administrative structure of the CCC shows that there was little trace of any sort of 
departmentalization or specialization, an organizational process already under way in firms in the most 
developed countries at that time. Mill managers performed a wide range of tasks, such as the management 
of marketing, industrial relations, finance, and production. In other words, management reflected the degree 
of development and complexity of the business context.
Nevertheless, as a result of the fact that the CCC was a multi-site company, an embryonic 
administrative structure can be identified with at least 2 layers of managers: the general manager and the 
managers of the mills. The latter reported to the general manager, who by his turn reported to the board of 
directors, although he usually was one of the members of the board. Furthermore, the general manager also 
served as the manager of the Cedro mill. Bernardo Mascarenhas was general manager of the company and 
manager of the Cedro mill from 1883 to 1887. Theophilo Marques Ferreira succeeded Bernardo as both 
general manager and manager of the Cedro mill from 1887 to 1893. From 1893 to 1895, Francisco de Paula 
Mascarenhas succeeded Ferreira in both posts, as did Aristides Jos6 Mascarenhas from 1895 to 190119°. 
Hence, this accumulation of posts is another clear indication that the business environment in the nineteenth 
century was not very complex even for one of the largest textile companies in Minas Gerais.
The CCM was also constituted as a joint stock company. The company was founded by Joao da 
Matta Teixeira, who subscribed 19% of the initial capital. Joao da Matta Teixeira was elected director of 
the company in 1886 and held the position until 1923, when he died. His son, Americo Teixeira Guimaraes, 
was the only general manager of the company throughout the last century, following his election on 15 July 
1887191. It was Americo Teixeira Guimaraes who actually managed the company from its inception. He 
chose, ordered, and supervised the installation of machinery of the mill192. He managed every aspect of the 
life of the company. From the purchase of raw material:
"I have to inform you that I have decided to re-establish the price of cotton, due to the
188 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 13 June 1884".
189 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 17", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 14 April 1885".
190 Mascarenhas, Centenario da Fabrica do Cedro. pp.245-7.
191 Companhia Cachoeira de Macacos, Evolucao da Cia. Textil Cachoeira de Macacos. 1886-1967. 
mimeographed notes distributed by the company.
192 Freitas, op.cit.. p.27.
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necessity that this company has to make a larger provision for this year, (..,)"193
To the relation with other companies:
"I am aware that you have taken the general managership of the company, (...).
In what concerns the relation between our companies, I have to tell you that I 
will not spare any effort to the mutual progress, interest and assistance of both companies,
^  y / 1 9 4
Table V2S  - Companhia de Tecidos Santanense: share participation of the founders and their 
relatives.
NAMES NUMBER OF 
SHARES
Manoel Josd de Souza Moreira 600
Manoel Gonsalves de Souza Moreira 400
Augusto Gon9alves de Souza Moreira 150
Antonio Pereira de Matos 150
Members of the family Gon9 alves de Souza Moreira* 515
Total number of shares 3,000
Source: M.A.G. Souza. Historia de Itauna. (Belo Horizonte. 1986). I. p p . 124-6.
* The identified relatives of the four founders of the company are: Orozimbo Gonsalves de Souza, 100 
shares; Arthur Pereira de Matos, 20 shares; Vicente Gongalves de Souza, 150 shares; Josias Gonsalves de 
Souza, 20 shares; Francisco Gonsalves de Souza Junior, 5 shares; Mardocheu Gongalves de Souza, 5 shares; 
Virgilio Gonsalves de Souza Moreira, 10 shares; Francisco Gongalves de Souza, 200 shares; and Jovino 
Gonsalves de Souza, 5 shares.
The Companhia de Tecidos Santanense (CTS) followed the same pattern of administrative structure 
observed in both the CCC and the CCM. The CTS was typically a family affair, although again established 
as a joint stock company. The company was founded on 23 October 1891 by members of the Souza Moreira 
family: Manoel Jose de Souza Moreira, his sons, Manoel Gonsalves de Souza Moreira and Augusto 
Gonsalves de Souza Moreira, and his son-in-law, Antonio Pereira de Mattos195. Together they held 43% of 
the shares of the company. Furthermore, among the original shareholders, the relatives of the founders held 
another 17% of the shares, as shown in Table V.28.
Further evidence that the CTS was a family affair is provided by the fact that the company was not 
only owned but also administered by members of the Souza Moreira family. According to the statutes, the 
company was to be administered by the board of directors, whose members were elected every 4 years by 
the general meeting of the shareholders. Furthermore, each member of the board ought to hold at least 50 
shares of the company196. In practical terms, this meant that only a small group of people were eligible for 
the board. Among the 56 shareholders of the company in 1895, for example, only 15 held at least 50 shares.
193 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.26", "Letter from 
Americo Teixeira Guimaraes to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 2 May 1889".
194 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.36", "Letter from 
Americo Teixeira Guimaraes to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 27 August 1893".
195 M.A.G. Souza, Historia de Itauna. (Belo Horizonte, 1986), I, p. 124.
196 Companhia de Tecidos Santanense, Estatutos. (1891).
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Moreover, 10 of the 15 shareholders with at least 50 shares in 1895 belonged to die Souza Moreira family197. 
Therefore, throughout the century, the posts in the board of directors were filled by members of the Souza 
Moreira family, as indicated in Table V.29.
Table V.29 - Members of the board of directors of the Companhia de Tecidos Santanense, 1891-1899.
YEAR
(Month)
NAME POST
1891 Manoel Jos6 de Souza Moreira Chairman
(Sept.) Manoel Gonsalves de Souza Moreira Treasurer
Augusto Gongalves de Souza Moreira Secretary
Antonio Pereira de Mattos Manager
1891 Jose Gonsalves de Souza Chairman
(Dec.) Manoel Gonsalves de Souza Moreira Treasurer
1893 Manoel Jose de Souza Moreira Chairman
Manoel Gonsalves de Souza Moreira Treasurer
1894 Augusto Gonsalves de Souza Moreira Chairman
Manoel Jose de Souza Moreira Treasurer
1899 Jose Gonsalves de Souza Moreira Chairman
Manoel Gonsalves de Souza Moreira Treasurer
Sources: Compiled from Souza, op.cit.. dp. 124-6: Companhia de Tecidos Santanense. Ata da Primeira 
Assembleia Geral Extraordinaria dos Acionistas. (Itauna, 19 December 1891); Companhia de Tecidos 
Santanense, Ata da Assembleia Ordinaria dos Acionistas. (1893, 1894, 1899).
Appointment of managers also reflected the control of the Souza Moreira family over the company. 
The first manager was Antonio Pereira de Mattos, one of the founders of the company, Manoel Jose de 
Souza Moreira's son-in-law, and member of the board of directors in 1891. He was succeeded by Manoel 
Gonsalves de Souza Moreira, Manoel Jose de Souza Moreira, and finally by Joao Cerqueira de Lima, who 
was also Manoel Jose de Souza Moreira's son-in-law198 and shareholder of the company199.
The CME, conceived and organized by Bernardo Mascarenhas, was also a family-owned and local 
affair. According to Mascarenhas, the CME was organized with a capital of 150:000$000 Contos divided 
into 1,500 shares: 500 shares he kept for himself, 500 were offered to the inhabitants of Juiz de Fora and
197 The 15 shareholders holding at least 50 shares on 31 December 1895 were: Manoel Jose de 
Souza Moreira (670), Manoel Gongalves de Souza Moreira (385), Jose Gongalves de Souza Moreira (240), 
Francisco Gonsalves de Souza (210), Augusto Gonsalves de Souza Moreira (150), Vicente Gonsalves de 
Souza (150), Antonio Pereira de Mattos (150), Francisco Baeta Coelho (100), Antonio Maximiano de 
Campos (50), Jose Gonsalves de Souza (50), Joao Gonsalves de Souza (50), Francisco Manoel Franco (50), 
Francisco Bahia da Rocha (50), Rogerio Candido de Andrade (50), and Thomaz Antonio d'Andrade (50). 
Companhia de Tecidos Santanense, Lista Nominativa dos Acionistas da Companhia. (1895), reproduced in 
J.W.T. Mello, Santanense: Revolucao Filosdfica e Industrial em
SancfAnna do Sao Joao Acima. (Belo Horizonte, 1991), pp.252-3.
198 Ibid., pp.228-9.
199 Companhia de Tecidos Santanense, Ata da Assembleia Geral Ordinaria dos Acionistas. (24 
March 1899).
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500 were distributed within his family200. Although the firm was founded on 7 January 1888 as a joint stock 
company, Mascarenhas and his family concentrated ownership of the company in their hands until 1911, 
when a group of capitalists bought the company201. Among the 30 original shareholders, 12 belonged to the 
Mascarenhas family202 and together they held 833 of the total 1,500 shares, or 56%. Bernardo Mascarenhas 
himself held nearly 27% of the shares of the company203.
Even though the company pioneered die production of hydroelectricity in South America and could 
be considered modem in some aspects, the structure of the top administration of the company followed the 
traditional pattern used in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. The board of directors consisted of only 3 
members: the chairman, the secretary, and the treasurer. Furthermore, throughout the last century, all these 
positions were filled by shareholders. The board elected in 1888 consisted of Bernardo Mascarenhas, as 
chairman, Francisco Baptista de Oliveira, as secretary, and Francisco Eugenio de Rezende, as treasurer204. 
Francisco Baptista de Oliveira and Francisco Eugenio de Rezende were both among the largest shareholders, 
holding 5% and 6% of the shares of the company respectively205. The only changes in the board during the 
last century occurred in 1897, when Francisco Baptista de Oliveira resigned, and in the following year, when 
Bernardo Mascarenhas died. Francisco Eugenio de Rezende covered the position previously held by 
Francisco Baptista de Oliveira until the next election for the board in 1900. Bernardo Mascarenhas was 
succeeded by Azarias Monteiro de Andrade, who was also one of the original shareholders and two years 
later became Mascarenhas' son-in-law206.
Furthermore, Bernardo Mascarenhas himself was involved in every aspect of the life of the 
company. He, for example, drew up the specifications for the equipment to be ordered207 and personally 
supervised the assembly of the plant, as shown in his letter to the WEC:
"You may have an idea of my anxiety and fear of disappointment. I do not think that Mr.
Merriman [the technician sent by the WEC to install the equipment] has enough
200 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas reproduced in Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. p. 118.
201 Oliveira, Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade. p.48.
202 The members of the Mascarenhas family and the number of shares that each one held were: 
Bernardo Mascarenhas (400), Policena da Silva Mascarenhas (100), Francisco Mascarenhas (78), Vitor 
Mascarenhas (50), Caetano Mascarenhas (50), Viriato Diniz Mascarenhas (35), Theophilo Marques Ferreira 
(30), Elvira Diniz Mascarenhas (25), Paci'fico Mascarenhas (20), Antonio Diniz Mascarenhas (20), Altivo 
Diniz Mascarenhas (15), and Antonio Augusto Mascarenhas (10). Ibid., p.27.
203 Ibid., p.27.
204 Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, Estatutos. (1888), reproduced in Q Pharol. (Juiz de Fora), 
15 January 1888.
205 Oliveira, Comnanhia Mineira de Eletricidade. p.27.
206 Ibid., p.41.
207 Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. p. 134.
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knowledge, and he himself told me that he did not have any practical experience in 
alternative installations, but only in Edison's system. Today we are going to restart our 
experiment but I do not have too much faith in it."208
Thus, during the nineteenth century, the CME was owned by a small number of people, mainly 
local and members of the Mascarenhas family. Furthermore, at least at the beginning, the main shareholders 
of the company were deeply involved in its day-to-day management. However, apart from the board of 
directors, there is no information about the administrative structure of the company.
Although there is no detailed information about the ownership of the CFLCL, there is evidence that 
the company was owned by a small number of people, who also controlled its administration. Although the 
CFLCL was established in the twentieth century, the structure of its top administration was similar to that 
of companies established in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. The company was founded by Jose Monteiro 
Ribeiro Junqueira, Norberto Custodio Ferreira, and Joao Duarte Ferreira, who were also the directors of the 
company from its inception in 1905. Jose Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira was the chairman, Norberto Custodio 
Ferreira the treasurer, and Joao Duarte Ferreira the secretary209. The latter was the main shareholder of the 
company210, and in 1909 he resigned211 to dedicate to his political career212. Further evidence that ownership 
and control of the company continued firmly on the hands of the founders and their families, is the fact that 
in 1982 the chairman of the company was Ivan Botelho, Jose Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira's grand-nephew213.
The administrative structure of the CFLCL was composed of the headquarters, the power-station, 
5 local offices, and the distribution department, as shown on Figure V.4. The headquarters was headed by 
a manager, who reported to the board of directors. In January 1910, for example, the board of directors 
determined:
"the manager [of the company] to make all the modifications in the public lighting of 
Cataguazes, according to the determinations of the president of the city council, Mr. Joao 
Duarte Ferreira, (...)"214
Moreover, on 9 June 1910 the board of directors authorized the manager to increase the salaries of 
theemployees in 10%215. The manager was assisted by an engineer, a bookkeeper, and senior and junior
208 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas to the Westinghouse Electric M. Company, reproduced in 
Ibid., p. 141.
209 Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, "Ata da la. Reuniao da Diretoria", (1905).
210 L.S. Costa, Cataguases Centenaria: Dados para a sua Histdria. (Cataguases, 1977), p.541.
211 Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, "Ata da 25a. Reuniao da Diretoria", (1909).
212 Costa, op.cit.. p.542.
213 Neto, on.cit..
214 Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, "Ata da 27a. Reuniao da Diretoria", (1910).
215 Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, "Ata da 29a. Reuniao da Diretoria", (1910).
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Figure V.4 - Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina: Administrative Structure.
POWER
STATION
LOCAL
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DISTRIBUTION
BOARD OF
DIRECTORS
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Source: Adapted from Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, "Relatorio do Gerente", (1910), p.9.
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Figure V.5 - Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina: Administrative Structure of 
Headquarters, Power Station, and Local Offices.
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assistants, as shown on Figure V.5. The manager and the engineer earned 550$000 Milreis per month, the 
bookkeeper 250$000 Milreis, and the assistants 90$000 and 40$000 Milreis per month respectively. The 
power-station was headed by a manager, who earned 400$000 Milreis per month, assisted by a technician 
in charge of the turbines, 3 senior and a junior assistants, who earned 150$000,90$000, and 60$000 Milreis 
per month respectively. The local offices in each one of the 5 towns supplied by the company in 1910 
(Cataguazes, Leopoldina, Sao Joao Nepomuceno, Rio Novo, and Providencia) were headed by a manager 
who was aided by a senior and a junior assistant. The salaries of the managers of the local offices varied 
from 130$000 to 150$000 Milreis, and that of their assistants from 50$000 to 110$000 Milreis per month. 
Furthermore, there were 3 workers in charge of the cables of transmission, each earning 70$000 Milreis per 
month216.
The analysis of the CFLCL has revealed that the company was controlled by a small number of 
people. Although the structure of the top administration was similar to the pattern adopted by most mineiro 
firms in the nineteenth century, the company had a fairly developed administrative structure with at least 
2 layers of managers. As in the case of the CUI, this seems to be related with the nature of the industry 
rather than with the complexity of the company per se.
Thus, in the last century the mineiro iron industry was owned by a small number of people, usually 
drawn from one family. Foundries were managed by their owners, irrespectively of their size, without the 
assistance of any kind of administrative staff. In addition, the foundries rarely constituted the sole occupation 
of owners and workers.
Although ownership of the CUI was not restricted to a small number of people, control over the 
company was in the hands of a small number of shareholders. Furthermore, the company employed a wide 
range of professionals and workers, organized in an extensive administrative structure. In such administrative 
structure it is possible to identify a layer of managers who operated the several stations along the turnpike 
and a technical body organized in a hierarchical basis. However, this somewhat more complex administrative 
structure is due to the nature of the business rather than to the peculiar complexity of the company itself. 
Because transport companies were physically different - with workers spread around several distinct 
locations - when compared, for example, with textile mills and iron foundries - which usually employed all 
workers on a single site -, a different and more complex structure had to be devised. Therefore, structural 
differences were industry specific and not due to different managerial approaches. This is evidenced by the 
structure of the top administration of the CUI, which was very similar to that of the textile mills.
The administrative structure of some of the largest textile firms shows that they were invariably 
family affairs, even though organized as joint stock companies. The board and managerial positions were 
filled by members of the controlling families in a clear indication that kinship was one of the basic 
requirements for appointment The most extensive administrative structure consisted of no more than two 
layers of managers. Managers were responsible for a wide range of activities, from short to long-term
216 Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, "Relatorio do Gerente", (1910), p.9.
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decisions - further evidence of the lack of complexity of the business life.
Finally, the electricity generating companies were also owned by a small number of people, usually 
locals. Due to the nature of the industry, these companies had a more developed administrative structure of 
their technical bodies. Nevertheless, administrative personnel was very limited in number and the structure 
of the top administration, which did not differ from that of the other industries examined in this thesis, 
reflected the embryonic stage of their organizational structure.
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Conclusion
This section examined the organization of mineiro firms in the nineteenth century by analysing the 
scope of their activities, measured in terms of the size of the firms and of the structure of their markets, and 
of their administrative organization. The analysis of the scope of the activities shows that, generally 
speaking, they were traditional business enterprises. They were small, single-unit firms, carrying on only 
one economic function, producing a limited range of products, and restricted to local markets. Furthermore, 
most of them applied traditional methods and sources of energy - such as wood, wind and water, man and 
beast - in the production and distribution of daily output.
The iron industry, in the first three-quarters of the last century, was dominated by a large number 
of small foundries employing a very simple and primitive technology which imposed a strict limit on the 
scale of production. In the latter part of the century, a few larger mills emerged employing a more complex 
technology, although the scale of production remained small. The size of the work-force was also small, with 
very few foundries employing more than 20 people in the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century. 
Furthermore, they operated on a regional basis supplying mining companies, farms, and local towns. The 
mineiro iron industry manufactured parts for mining machinery, agricultural tools, domestic appliances, and 
horseshoes. Nevertheless, individual firms produced only a narrow range of products. The distribution of 
the output was made by a large number of small generalist merchants spread across the province and by 
mule trains.
The CUI was certainly an exception in some respects. From the point of view of the length of the 
roads built and operated, the company was certainly a large business. The size of its work-force also points 
to a large enterprise. Nevertheless, in terms of the scale of the operation, measured in terms of freight and 
passenger transport, the company could hardly be considered large. Furthermore, the company operated on 
a local basis, being limited to the market consisted of the Parafba Valley in the province of Rio de Janeiro 
and the Mata zone in Minas Gerais, and highly dependent on the transport of only one product - coffee.
The mineiro textile industry was made up of small and medium size firms, rarely operating more 
than one unit Their scale of production was very limited compared with that of the largest Brazilian textile 
firms. In terms of the size of the work-force, although the mineiro firms proved to be much more labour- 
intensive than their Brazilian counterparts, their work-force tended to be smaller in absolute terms. They 
were restricted to local markets and to the less sophisticated niche of the market. Their output was 
distributed by muletrains and travelling salesmen, although in the last decade of the century the CCC 
resorted to the opening of warehouses accross the province.
Finally, although the electricity generating companies established at turn of the century provided 
technologically advanced services (the generation of hydroelectricity and, in die case of the CME the 
provision of telephone services), they also could hardly be considered large firms. They fulfilled only one 
economic function, they were small both in terms of the scale of their operation and in terms of the size of 
their capital, and were restricted to small and local markets.
Furthermore, the analysis of the administrative structure of the mineiro firms has shown that, in this
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respect, they were even more traditional and less complex than die analysis of the scope of their activities 
may have suggested. They were usually owned by a small number of people, managed by their owners, and 
very often they had no administrative structure whatsoever. Iron companies were rarely owned by more than 
a handful of people. They were managed by their owners, irrespectively of their size, without the assistance 
of any kind of administrative structure. Although the ownership of the CUI was not restricted to a small 
number of persons, control was in the hands of a small number of shareholders. The company's 
administrative structure consisted of a few layers of managers and a technical body organized in a 
hierarchical basis. Nevertheless, the top administration was very small, in a clear indication that the CUI 
was still in an embryonic stage of administrative development. Textile firms were invariably family affairs, 
even though organized as joint stock companies. The board of directors and the managerial positions were 
filled by the members of the controlling families in a clear indication that appointment was based on kinship 
rather than expertise. The most extensive administrative structure consisted of no more than two layers of 
managers. Managers responsibilities included a wide range activities, in a further evidence of no 
departmentalization or specialization of any sort. The electricity generating companies were also owned by 
a small number of people, mainly locals. Although these companies had a clear administrative structure of 
their technical bodies, organized on a hierarchical basis, with a few layers of managers, the main 
shareholders had a tight control of the daily life of these companies and the structure of the top 
administration once more revealed the embryonic stage of the organizational development of these firms.
Finally, the organizational analysis of mineim firms reveals that towards the end of the century, 
firms tended to become more and more bureaucratic, as they grew in size or were replaced by larger firms. 
Nevertheless, the mineiro economy continued to be dominated by traditional firms which became more 
numerous and specialized towards the end of the century. This is the phenomena which preceded die 
emergence of the large and modem business enterprises and of the managerial capitalism in the USA, Great 
Britain, and Germany. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that, from the organizational point of view, 
the business environment in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais was characteristic of the first stage of the 
capitalist development - the traditional and personal capitalism.
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PART in  - TECHNOLOGY
Introduction
The prime influence behind die more or less rapid rates of economic growth of the Western 
European economies during the last two hundred years has been technological progress1. Technological 
progress is a necessary element of economic development. Capital goods, the means of production in which 
much of technology has been embodied, have enormously increased productivity. In the absence of 
technological progress, the process of growth by capital accumulation and division of labour as proposed 
by Adam Smith would eventually encounter diminishing returns. The process of economic development is 
not only a matter of the increase of capital goods of the same type2. As Schumpeter has pointed out, 
economic development consists primarily in the employment of different resources in a different way, in 
doing different things with them. Different methods of employment of economic resources, and not savings 
and the increase inthe availability of labour, has changedthe face of the world3.
Thus, the first chapter of this section reviews the literature on technological progress. It examines 
the nature of technical change and the importance of technological progress for the process of economic 
development of less developed countries such as Brazil. As production of technical knowledge has been 
mainly restricted to the so-called developed countries, less developed regions such as Brazil have depended 
heavily on borrowed technology to promote economic development. As the historical experience of less 
developed European countries has shown, die absence of a store of technical knowledge in backward 
countries was solved by its import from abroad. Developed countries served in this case as sources of 
technical assistance, skilled labour, and capital goods at the "disposal" of less developed countries4. 
Therefore, the second chapter of this section examines the process of the transfer of technology in 
nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. It discusses the dependence of various firms on foreign technical 
knowledge and the limits to the development of an indigenous technology during this period. It also 
discusses how mineiro entrepreneurs managed to absorb these technologies, from selection to operation, 
adaptation, and modification. The importance of this investigation for the study of the mineiro business 
environment arises from the fact that over the years one of die key indicators of the formation of a positive 
business environment is the capacity of an economy to absorb and refine imported technology.
1 P. O'Brien, The Mainsprings of Technological Progress in Europe, 1750-1850', in Innovation and 
Technology in Europe: From die Eighteenth Century to the Present Dav. eds. P. Mathias and J.A. Davis, 
(Oxford, 1991), p.6.
2 J.L. Anderson, Explaining Long-Term Economic Change. (1991), p.41.
3 J.A. Schumpeter, A Teoria do Desenvolvimento Economico. (Sao Paulo, 3rd.ed. 1988), p.50.
4 A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essavs. (1962), 
pp.47, 127.
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Chapter 6 - A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
LITERATURE
Technological progress may be defined as changes in the ways of doing things - of manufacturing 
goods, of organizing production and distribution, of transporting goods and people, and of providing services 
to consumers. It consists of the introduction of new machines, products and systems5. There are basically 
two views about the nature of technological progress. Rather than being contradictory, these views are 
complementary. The first, represented chiefly by Schumpeter, stresses discontinuity. Technological progress 
is seen as a series of major "breakthroughs" which have a great impact upon the pace and direction of 
economic development. The second view emphasizes the continuous, cumulative and piecemeal nature of 
technological progress. There are small sequential steps spread over long periods of time before full 
technological potential is achieved. The process is one of "learning by doing" and "learning by using"6.
Moreover, three different stages can be identified in the process of technological progress: 
invention, innovation, and diffusion or adoption. Invention may be defined as conceiving an idea for some 
change and demonstrating its feasibility. Innovation is the incorporation of an invention into the production 
process7. Innovation is closely linked to the inventive process and constitutes the beginning of the diffusion 
process. The diffusion process is dependent upon a series of improvements in the performance of an 
innovation, its progressive modification and adaptation to suit the requirements of various submarkets, and 
the availability and introduction of other complementary inputs which decisively widen the economic 
usefulness of an original innovation8. Thus, the diffusion process relates to the spread in the use of an 
already-established technological innovation9. It also includes the transfer of technology both from one 
industry to another and from one country to another10. Therefore, the processes of diffusion and technology 
transfer form a continuum with no clear dividing line11.
Owing to the nature of this thesis and the degree of technological development of the mineiro 
economy during the last century, the transfer of technology is the stage of the process of technological 
progress which relates most directly to a study of the formation of the mineiro business environment As 
most mineiro firms relied on foreign technology and as the pocess of technological generation was almost
5 P. Temin, Casual Factors in American Economic Growth in the Nineteenth Century. (1986), p.31.
6 N. Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics. (New York, 1990), pp.5-6; and 
O'Brien, op.cit.. pp.7-9.
7 Anderson, op.cit.. p.44.
8 N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology. (New York, 1976), pp.75-6.
9 C.T. Stewart and Y. Nihei, Technology Transfer and Human Factors. (Lexington, 1987), p.2.
10 A.C. Samli, "Introduction", in Technology Transfer: Geographic. Economic. Cultural, and 
Technical Dimensions, ed. A.C. Samli (Westport, 1985), pp.xv-xvii.
11 Stewart and Nihei, op.cit.. p.2.
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non-existent in Brazil, the international transfer of technology will be analysed in detail.
International technology transfer may be defined as the process by which a technology is 
transplanted or diffused from one country to another12. As a concept it includes an aspect of absorption of 
the technology on the part of the recipient country. The international transfer of technology only takes place 
when there is some degree of assimilation of the technology under consideration by recipients, assimilation 
means the recipient's capacity to utilize the technology in its own right for its own purposes13.
Technology is a method for doing something and its use requires three elements: information about 
it, the means for carrying it out, and some understanding of it. Of these three elements, only information - 
usually embodied in blueprints, manuals, and technical books - and means - such as capital goods - can be 
transferred. Understanding can only be acquired by study and experience. Both information and physical 
means are worthless if the recipient does not know how to use them, which involves the knowledge of the 
potential of a technology and, mainly, some experience in the use of it. The ability of the recipient to use 
technology effectively comes from his understanding, and the degree of understanding required is related 
to the objective sought in employing the technology. Moreover, every technology is part of a larger system, 
and the presence or absence of other technologies has a major impact on what has to be acquired to 
accomplish the objective sought Information, means, and understanding can be obtained basically by three 
ways. First, it can be provided by foreigners who retain the ownership. Second, it can be purchased from 
foreigners. Third, it can be acquired through indigenous efforts to translate foreign technical knowledge into 
specific methods. In addition, technology can be transferred with varying degrees of human capital 
accumulation and institutional development At one extreme, technology is transferred with indigenous 
involvement limited to an unskilled labour force - as in direct foreign investment. At the other extreme, the 
knowledge is assimilated and then used to create the necessary elements. Knowledge can be acquired 
through education, experience, experimentation, research, or purchase14.
Furthermore, regarding what is acquired through technology transfer, it is possible to identify three 
broad types of capability. The first is the production capability which is required to operate a technology. 
Production capability is not achieved by passively importing technology. It requires local participation and 
considerable indigenous effort to master the use of a technology. The accumulation of local production 
experience is important to provide the understanding necessary to carry out some of the tasks involved in 
the other two capabilities. The second type is the investment capability which is required to expand and/or 
create new productive capacity. The third type is die innovation capability which is required to develop new
9
12 R.C. Barquin, "Some Introductory Notes on the Transfer of Technology", in Industrial 
Development and Technology Transfer. D. Soen ed., (1981), p. 103.
13 Stewart and Nihei, op.cit.. pp.2-4.
14 C. Dahlman and L. Westphal, "The Transfer of Technology: Factors in the Acquisition of 
Technology", in Finance & Development December 1983, pp.6-7.
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methods of doing things15. Each one of these capabilities require different types and levels of skill and 
different supporting institutions. Only after all three types of capabilities have been transferred has the 
receiving country acquired permanently the mastery of any technology16. The transfer of technology to 
nineteenth-century Minas Gerais was restricted mainly to the level of the production capability. The 
investment capability was only incipient during the period studied and the innovative capability was virtually 
non-existent.
The international transfer of technology is widely recognised as the principal means for relieving 
world poverty, technology being crucial not only for growth, but also for the capacity to grow. However, 
a technology which works in one situation does not necessarily work in another. The international transfer 
of technology is thus a complex process encompassing different dimensions: economic, cultural and 
technical. In some respects, technology transfer is governed by economic forces, as for example: 
expectations of profit, levels of capital formation, market size and structure, relative factor (land, labour, 
capital) prices, the extent of entrepreneurial opportunities, and the availability of financial institutions. 
However, the transfer of technology is also influenced by cultural arrangements such as values, 
organizational forms, and material expressions of social groups. The rate of diffusion within the receptor 
economy/society is explained by cultural forces, combined with economic ones. Furthermore, imported 
technology selection is often shaped by cultural features themselves. Then there is the technology itself. The 
timing of transfer and adoption is clearly influenced by the appropriateness of a technology for a recipient 
economy/society. Furthermore, diffusion is likely to be a gradual process depending on the pace at which 
secondary improvements perfect the original innovation, and the level of human skills (especially machine- 
making skills) in the recipient economy is also critical. Moreover, bottlenecks in related production activities 
need to be removed before an innovation can spread. Finally, the nature and level of technical knowledge - 
which manifests itself in the form of technical vocabularies, technical measuring systems, patents, technical 
handbooks, etc. - in both the originating and receptor economies/societies is also an aspect which can present 
obstacles to the international transfer of technology17.
Although the international transfer of technology has been going on for a long time, its scale and 
impact has vastly accelerated since the Industrial Revolution, when the introduction of a number of new 
technologies brought immense improvements to productivity. Although the Industrial Revolution began in 
England, new technologies spread and were adopted elsewhere when circumstances and conditions were 
propitious. British technologies provided the basis for industrial development in several Western European 
countries, the USA and other countries where conditions were positive. Countries receiving foreign
15 Ibid., p.7.
16 Stewart and Nihei, op.cit. pp.2-4.
17 D.J. Jeremy, "Introduction: Some of the Larger Issues posed by Technology Transfer", in 
International Technology Transfer: Europe. Japan and the USA. 1700-1914. ed. D.J. Jeremy (Aldershot, 
1991), pp. 1-3.
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technology were in a favourable position. They could industrialize through the mere transfer of existing 
technologies without having to reinvent them18. The classic example in the nineteenth century was the USA19 
and in the twentieth century Japan20. Furthermore, as Gerschenkron has correctly pointed out, the 
opportunities for rapid industrialization through technology borrowing was one of the few advantages of 
backward countries. Their prospects of industrialization was more promising the greater the accumulation 
of technological innovations at their "disposal" in die more advanced countries. Borrowed technology was 
one of the primary factors assuring a rapid development in a backward country21. However, the importance 
of this advantage should not be exaggerated. The successful transfer of technology is not just a matter of 
transporting a piece of hardware from one geographical location to another. The transfer of technology and 
its diffusion through the recipient economy has never been a simple, easy, or effortless task. To begin with, 
the import of foreign technologies requires some minimum level of technological skills, not only to modify 
and adapt the foreign technology, but also to provide the basis for an intelligent selection among the wide 
range of potential foreign suppliers. The nineteenth-century experiences suggest that the successful transfer 
of technology depends greatly upon the specific domestic circumstances in the recipient country22.
Technological change in Latin American countries has relied mainly on foreign sources of technical 
knowledge and information, as the case of nineteenth-century Minas Gerais illustrates very well. Although 
foreign technological knowledge has often come embodied in imported machinery and equipment, it has also 
come in the form of blueprints, patents, instruction manuals, and other technical documents. However, rather 
than being exogenously given and freely and instantaneously accessible to everybody, technical knowledge 
and information has to be sought systematically. This obviously implies time and cost. Firms seeking new 
technologies need to engage in various tasks. Furthermore, a package of technical information is almost 
never absolutely precise, rarely perfectly understood or easily replicable.
An important aspect of the transfer of technology to less developed countries is the structural 
differences between them and the developed countries. Less developed countries such as Brazil are 
characterized by smaller domestic markets, higher degrees of tariff protection, shortage of skills, acute 
market imperfections, distortions in technical information, a higher business concentration, a weaker 
competitive atmosphere, a lack of basic infrastructure, etc. The size of the domestic market is one of the 
most important differences between developed and less developed countries, and it is certainly one which 
greatly influences technology choice. With very few exceptions, industrial firms operating in less developed
18 Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box, pp.246-7.
19 See N. Rosenberg, Technology and American Economic Growth. (New York, 1972), pp.59-86.
20 C. Freeman, "Japan: A New National System of Innovation?", in Technical Change and 
Economic Theory, ed. G. Dosi, C. Freeman. R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, and L. Soete (1988), pp.330-46.
21 Gerschenkron, op.cit.. p.8.
22 Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box, pp.247-9.
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countries are much smaller than their counterparts in developed nations. These differences in size influence 
the selection of (appropriate) technology. Thus, manufacturing firms established in less developed countries 
usually settle for a technology involving a method of production of a more discontinuous nature and for a 
much lower degree of automation. This has a major impact upon plant "lay-out", type and cost of equipment 
and machinery, the overall organization of production (degree and patterns of subcontracting, etc.), the 
number of workers, etc. Such choices will also affect die size of the economies of scale which can 
eventually be captured by the firm.
The technology originally chosen by manufacturing firms in less developed countries also differs 
from that employed by industrial enterprises in developed nations in terms of the degree of vertical 
integration. Manufacturing firms in less developed countries usually make much less use of subcontracting 
than do their contemporary counterparts in developed countries, as the study of mineiro firms shows clearly. 
The degree of subcontracting may increase over time but not at a very rapid rate. The slow rate at which 
the division of labour and the development of a sufficiently vast network of subcontractors seem to proceed 
in less developed countries has at least two different explanations: die size of the market and the shortage 
of skills. Size of the market affects the likelihood of attaining economies of scale and specialization, and 
therefore the relative cost of external as opposed to internal production. Availability of technical skills and 
entrepreneurship is associated with quality standards and reliability and are certainly two major aspects taken 
into account by firms considering subcontracting decisions. A high degree of vertical integration usually 
means "in-house" provision of goods and services which are technologically dissimilar to the company's 
major activity, as in the case of the Companhia Uniao e Industria (CUI) for example. A high degree of 
technological dissimilarity necessarily means lower technical specialization, under-utilization of equipment 
and many difficulties concerning production planning and industrial organization.
Furthermore, various substitution effects play an active role inducing firms in less developed 
countries to adopt technologies different from those employed by comparable firms in more developed 
countries. Substitution effects can be of two different types: policy-induced and autonomous. Policy-induced 
substitution effects include all those forms of substitution between different types of machinery and/or raw 
materials, etc., and resulting from tariffs on imported goods, quotas, distorted exchange rates, outright 
prohibition of certain inputs, etc. Autonomous substitution effects derive from differences in resource 
endowments or other such "natural" phenomena. They are concerned with important technological 
differences between firms in less developed and developed countries and are induced by relative price 
differentials as between capital and labour. A much lower degree of automation - implying more universal 
machines or manual process-control, a less sophisticated maintenance technology, a more labour intensive 
transport system within the plant, etc. - are all standard features of Latin American manufacturing firms. 
This is particularly relevant in relation to the original choice of technology. In other words, most Latin 
American companies start To operate Technological packages with a rather high ratio of labour bo capital23.
23 J.M. Katz, "Domestic Technology Generation in LDCs: A Review of Research Findings", in 
Technology Generation in Latin American Manufacturing Industries, ed. J.M. Katz (1987), pp. 13-55.
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As the following chapter will show in detail, the above mentioned peculiarities of the transfer and 
absorption of borrowed technology to Latin American countries were, to different degrees, present in the 
mineiro experience of the nineteenth century. Structural differences between nineteenth-century Minas Gerais 
and the more advanced economies of that time were certainly large and had an immense impact on the 
whole of process of technology absorption.
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Chapter 7 - THE PROCESS OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
This chapter examines the transfer of technology in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. As local 
production of technical knowledge was virtually non-existent, most industries relied on foreign technology. 
Thus, the first part of this chapter examines the limits on the development of indigenous technology and the 
reliance of most mineiro industries on foreign technologies. Of the industries investigated here only the iron 
foundries established in the first three-quarters of the last century employed indigenous technology. The 
other three, textile, electricity generating, and transport and road-construction, relied exclusively on foreign 
technology. The second part of this chapter investigates several stages in die process of handling a 
technology, from equipment selection to its adaptation to the local environment However, technologies of 
different natures presented distinct problems. The selection of a intangible technology, for example, was 
primarily determined by the availability of skilled workers, whereas in the case of tangible technologies, 
price and technicalities were more relevant. Thus, the industries investigated are divided into two groups, 
according to the nature of the technology adopted by them. The first group is constituted by those industries 
which employed a highly intangible technology and where production or operation relied heavily on the 
technical expertise of workers and managers/entrepreneurs. These were the iron and transport industries. The 
second group is composed of those industries which employed a technology much more "embodied" in 
machinery and equipment, that is the textile and electricity generating industries. Production in these cases 
required comparatively less skill from the work-force, where the pace of work was primarily determined by 
the machinery/equipment itself.
7.1 - Reliance on Foreign Technologies and the Limits of Indigenous Technology:
The experience of successfully industrialized countries in the nineteenth century indicates that the 
existence of a capital goods industry was of critical importance for the development of indigenous 
technology. The crucial learning process involved in machinery production was a vital source of 
technological dynamism, flexibility, and vitality. Reliance on foreign technology perpetuates a posture of 
dependency, depriving a country of the development of a domestic capital goods industry properly adapted 
to its own needs1. Thus, firms established in countries deprived of a capital goods industry are forced to 
resort to foreign technologies and face all the problems that this dependence involved. The case of 
nineteenth-century mineiro business enterprises are in this sense very illustrative.
This part of die chapter examines the main sources of technology of mineiro finns during the last 
century and the nature of the technological dependence of each industry investigated in this thesis. As 
mentioned above, among the industries investigated three, the textile, electricity generating, and transport 
industries, relied exclusively on foreign technology. Consequentiy, they also relied upon foreign sources for 
the supply of materials, components, parts, equipment, and machinery. The only industry in nineteenth- 
century Minas Gerais to employ an indigenous technology was the iron industry, although a few foundries
1 N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology. (New York, 1976), pp. 154-68.
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employed foreign methods of iron production. Therefore, iron foundries relied even less upon foreign 
suppliers. Nevertheless, their development was limited by the deficiencies of such indigenous technology 
and by the limited ability of the local business environment to develop technical knowledge.
The terms of the dependence of each industry upon foreign suppliers depended on the nature of die 
technology employed by them. Industries employing a more tangible technology used more specialized 
equipment and machinery which were usually supplied by more specialized suppliers. Therefore, the 
dependence of such industries on their suppliers was more critical. Industries employing a more intangible 
technology used more universal equipment, which tended to be more easily replicated locally and 
manufactured by more generalist suppliers. Thus, among the industries examined in this thesis the 
dependence on foreign suppliers was much greater for the textile and electricity generating industries, due 
to the nature, complexity, and age of the technologies employed by them. The technologies employed by 
these industries were more tangible, embodied in complex machinery and equipment, which could not be 
found locally. Furthermore, these technologies were recent developments when compared with those 
employed by the transport and the mineiro iron industries. The technologies employed in road construction 
and in the transport of goods and passengers were of a more intangible nature, technical knowledge being 
carried by experts. Therefore reliance was upon people rather than upon equipment. Moreover, die 
technologies for road-construction and the building of wheeled-vehicles drawn by animals were century-old 
and well established by the middle of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, although several components and 
materials employed in the construction and operation of roads were not produced internally and mineiro 
road-building and transport companies had to resort to foreign suppliers, equipment and operational methods 
were soon replicated locally. Finally, the technology employed by the iron industry was also of a more 
intangible nature and the reliance was also upon people rather than upon equipment Furthermore, methods 
of iron production employed by the mineiro foundries in the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century 
were also century-old and well established technologies by the middle of the last century. On the other hand, 
although only a small number of foundries employed foreign technology and the equipment used in iron 
production was of a more universal nature, a few foundries very occasionally imported part of the equipment 
which was not possible to be produced on the site. Nevertheless, the iron industry was the least dependent 
on foreign suppliers.
The textile industry was not only the first industrial sector to emerge in Brazil, but also the most 
important until the late 1930s. In the second half of the last century, several textile mills were established 
in the country, being favoured by a number of factors: the availability of raw material, the increasing 
domestic demand for textiles, the availability of cheap labour, and protection against foreign competition2. 
As shown in Table VII. 1, the number of textile mills established in 1866 was 9: 5 in Bahia, 2 in Rio de 
Janeiro, 1 in Alagoas, and 1 in Minas Gerais. The mill established in Minas Gerais was probably the Cana
2 W. Suzigan, Industria Brasileira: On gem e Desenvolvimento. (Sao Paulo, 1986), pp. 122-3.
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do Reino mill, a short-lived and unsuccessful enterprise3. In 1875, there were 30 textile mills in Brazil: 11 
in Bahia; 6 in Sao Paulo; 5 in Rio de Janeiro; 5 in Minas Gerais; and 1 each in Maranhao, Pernambuco and 
Alagoas. Ten years later, the estimated number in the whole country amounted to 48: 13 in Minas Gerais; 
12 in Bahia; 11 in Rio de Janeiro; 9 in Sao Paulo; and 1 each in Maranhao, Pernambuco and Alagoas. Yet, 
no indigenous textile technology emerged in Brazil during this period and textile entrepreneurs had to look 
for machinery and equipment abroad.
Table VII.l - Estimated Geographic Distribution of the Brazilian Textile Mills, 1866, 1875,1885.
PROVINCES 1866 1875 1885
Maranhao 1 1
Pernambuco 1 1
Alagoas 1 1 1
Bahia 5 11 12
Rio de Janeiro* 2 5 11
Sao Paulo 6 9
Minas Gerais 1 5 13
Total 9 30 48
Source: S.J. Stein. Origens e Evolucao da Industria Textil no Brasil. 1850-1950. (Rio de Janeiro. 1950). 
p.36.
* The city and the province of Rio de Janeiro.
The most obvious sources of textile machinery and equipment during the last century were Great 
Britain and the USA. The textile industry was at the heart of the Industrial Revolution in late eighteenth- 
century England. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the British textile industry was the most 
important in the world and British equipment was the most modem available4. Furthermore, technological 
transfer between Great Britain and the USA in the early part of the last century was relatively quick and 
effective. Both countries were closely related culturally. They shared a common language, legal and 
economic systems, and enjoyed a common technical heritage. The technological synergy between the two 
countries meant that by the end of the eighteenth century machinists building all kinds of textile machines 
could be found in the USA. British immigrant machine-makers played a major role in the diffusion of new 
textile technology in the USA and as early as the beginning of the last century the USA was already an 
important producer of textile equipment5. Moreover, at the beginning of the twentieth century the US textile 
industry was the second largest in the world6 and the leadership in output and invention was passing to the
3 For a short account of the story of the Cana do Reino mill see D.C. Libby, Transformacao e 
Trahalho em lima Economia Escravista: Minas Gerais no Seculo XIX. (Sao Paulo, 1988), pp.218-225.
4 D.S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in 
Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge, 1969), pp.41, 211-15.
5 D.J. Jeremy and D.H. Stapleton, "Transfers between Culturally-Related Nations: The Movement 
of Textile and Railroad Technologies between Britain and The United States, 1780-1840", in International 
Technology Transfer: Europe. Japan and the USA. 1700-1914. ed. D.J. Jeremy, (Aldershot, 1991), pp.31-9.
6 Landes, op.cit.. pp.211-15.
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USA7. Rapid textile technology transfer between Britain and the USA also demonstrates the mobility and
adaptability of the textile technology "package" (that is, equipment and personnel).
Thus, for obvious reasons, mineiro mill owners relied mainly on British and US suppliers of
technology. When the Cedro mill was established in the early 1870s, the mill machinery was bought from
Guilherme Van Vlick Lidgerwood, a representative in Rio de Janeiro of the US manufacturer, Author
Danfort Paterson of New Jersey8. Nearly a decade later, and with 48 mills already established in Brazil, die
Cedro mill continued to rely exclusively on foreign suppliers, especially British and US, a clear evidence
of the inability of Brazilians to replicate internally textile technology. Replying to an inquiry from the
president of the Sete Lagoas City Council in Minas Gerais in 1882, the proprietors of the Cedro mill stated
that the machinery employed in the mill was partly US and partly English9.
The original machinery of the Cachoeira mill was also acquired in Britain and the USA. As
Bernardo Mascarenhas had already had the experience of setting up a mill (the Cedro), he was appointed
by his family to organize the establishment of the Cachoeira factory. As shown in his correspondence, to
select and purchase machinery Bernardo decided to go to the USA and Europe. In April 1874, he wrote
from Manchester that he had visited the main English manufacturers, including Platt Brothers & Company,
and that he was about to leave for New York to inspect US machines10. In December of the same year, he
wrote to his brothers from New York;
"I have been here for nine days, arriving from Liverpool, which I left on the 26th of last 
month. During this time, I have visited two US machine manufacturers, one from 
Dampoth, in Baltimore, and the other from Badsbure, in Philadelphia, besides other textile 
mills. As the English machines are cheaper than the US ones I have decided to return to 
England (...). Nevertheless, I will buy here three Tenk spinning machines, which are much 
better than the English ones (...)."11
It is interesting to point out the comparison made by Bernardo between British and US machinery. 
Apparently the British machinery was cheaper then its US counterpart, but not necessarily of better quality, 
an opinion at variance with the view of subsequent historical work. It is also important to point out that 
Bernardo decided to buy machines of different origins, a decision which had long-run consequences, as will 
be discussed in greater detail below.
7 T.K. Derry and T.I. Williams, A ShorT History of Technology: From The Earlies Times To A.D. 
1900. (Oxford, 1960), p.582.
8 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.2", "Con rac be ween Van Vlick 
Lidgerwood and Mascarenhas & Irmaos, 27 September 1870".
9 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Copiador de Cartas de 1881 - Mascarenhas Irmaos", "Letter from 
Mascarenhas Irmaos to the president of the Sete Lagoas City Council, 13 March 1882".
10 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas on 13 April 1874 from Manchester, reproduced in G.M. 
Mascarenhas, Centenario da Fabrica do Cedro. 1872-1972. (Belo Horizonte, 1972), pp.97-8.
11 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas on 18 December 1874 from New York, reproduced in Ibid., 
pp.99-100.
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In 1883, after the constitution of the Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira (CCC), the company decided 
to expand productive capacity. Hence, during this year another 50 new looms for die Cachoeira mill and 
16 for the Cedro mill were ordered in England as existing capacity was considered inadequate12. Further 
evidence that the CCC continued to be supplied by British and US manufacturers throughout the nineteenth 
century can be found in the extensive correspondence of the company with its suppliers and agents. In 1884, 
a year after the merger of the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills into die CCC, Max Nothmann, an agent in Rio 
de Janeiro, stated that:
"With the last steamship I received news from New York saying that the turbine would
be dispatched in die next one. As another steamship is expected in the next few days, I
hope to dispatch the turbine to you soon with the respective invoice."13
In 1887, the CCC ordered machine parts from the USA through the same agent14. Four years later, Robert 
L. Kerr, an engineer and machinery agent from Manchester, wrote informing the company that the English 
manufacturers of hydro-extractors wanted to supply the machine assembled and not in parts15. In 1893, the 
same agent wrote saying that he expected to deliver as soon as possible a steam engine and a boiler ordered 
by the company16. In 1895, James Leffel & Co., manufacturers of steam engines and steel boilers based in 
New York, wrote saying that they had received an order and specifications for the construction of a 
turbine17. In 1899, the company ordered machinery from England for both die Cedro and the Cachoeira 
mills18. Finally, in 1901, Kerr stated in his letter of 27 November that he was sending the estimate and 
specifications of a spinning machine, as had been requested19.
As this correspondence indicates, die CCCs reliance on foreign suppliers was not restricted to 
textile machinery. The company purchased capital equipment such as turbines, boilers and steam engines 
and inputs such as lubricants, yams, dyes, chemicals, etc. In 1899, Victor Uslaender, an agent in Rio de
12 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Relatorio da Diretoria", (1883), p.2.
13 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 16", "Letter from Max 
Nothmann, 1 July 1884".
14 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.21", "Letter from Max 
Nothmann, 21 May 1887".
15 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.30", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 6 August 1891".
16 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.36", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 29 September 1893".
17 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.41", "Letter from James Leffel 
& Co. to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 19 January 1895".
18 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.50", "Le er from Rober L. Kerr 
to Aristides Mascarenhas, 23 February 1899".
19 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.58", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Caetano Mascarenhas, 27 November 1901".
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Janeiro, informed the CCC that the shipment of oil (apparently bought in England) to him was larger than 
he had expected and consequently he was dispatching two barrels of oil instead of the ordered by the 
company20. In 1883, Max Nothmann wrote that he had already send the company's order for yam to 
England21. On yet another occasion, Blum & Company (another agent in Rio de Janeiro) wrote charging the 
company for part of the dye and chemicals shipment cleared from customs and already dispatched22.
There is no reason to believe that other textile mills in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais were not 
equally reliant on foreign suppliers. On the contrary, evidence from other mineiro mills suggests that the 
entire industry not only relied on foreign suppliers, but that it was also mainly supplied by British and US 
manufacturers. The Tecelagem Mascarenhas was equipped with machinery supplied by Hogson and Robert 
Hall & Sons of Manchester, England23. The machinery of the Companhia Cachoeira de Macacos (CCM) was 
purchased in England24 as was that of the Companhia de Tecidos Santanense (CTS), with the exception of 
the turbine and the ginning machine which was purchased in New York, USA25. The machinery of the 
Sociedade Anonima Industrial Machadense (SAIM) - a textile mill established in Machado, southern Minas 
Gerais, in 1872 - seems to have been purchased from a firm named "Lidgerwood". This was the name 
reported as being on the machinery. Coincidentally, as mentioned above, the machinery of the Cedro mill 
was purchased from a representative, called Guilherme Van Vlick "Lidgerwood" from Rio de Janeiro26. 
Moreover, a local almanac of 1874 reported that the machinery of the SAIM had come from England:
"If several parts of the machinery of the mill, which was ordered from England again, had
not disappeared the mill could already be working."27
Further evidence indicates that some of the machinery was English and some US28, a pattern already 
observed in the case of the CCC. The Uniao Itabirana also bought its machinery from both the USA and
20 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.50", "Letter from Victor 
Uslaender, 27 January 1899".
21 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 14", "Letter from Max 
Nothmann, 19 November 1883".
22 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.57", "Letter from Blum & 
Company, 24 July 1901".
23 N.L. Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas: Q Surto Industrial de Minas Gerais. (Rio de Janeiro, 
1954), p. 125.
24 N.A.M. Freitas, "Cia. Textil Cachoeira de Macacos: Empresa que deu Origem a uma Cidade", 
Fundagao Mineira de Arte Aleijadinho/Escola Superior de Artes Plasticas, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1990, 
p.27.
25 M.A.G. Souza, Historia de Itauna. (Belo Horizonte, 1986), I, p. 126.
26 M.L.P. Costa, A Fabrica de Tecidos de Machado. (Belo Horizonte, 1989), p.35.
27 B.S. Veiga, Almanack Sul Mineiro. (Campanha, 1874), p.148.
28 Costa, op.cit.. p.35.
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England. In 1883, the company observed:
"Some of our machines are English, manufactured by Platts, and some are US. All are 
very good and well-built. The English machines are more solid whereas die US ones are 
more convenient, since they are simpler, require fewer operatives, are cheaper, and 
produce as efficiendy as the English ones."29
These observations contradict the above mentioned remarks of Bernardo Mascarenhas about die difference 
in price between the English and US textile machinery. In 1874, Mascarenhas decided to purchase English 
machinery because it was cheaper than the US. It is possible that competition between manufacturers from 
England and the USA during these 9 years might have changed the previous balance between the prices of 
English and US machinery. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the heterogeneity of the origin of the 
machinery (the result of the lack of a native capital-goods industry) employed by the mineiro textile mills 
must have created and aggravated a number of problems. It most probably complicated the servicing and 
the operation of different machinery, created incompatibilities in the production line, and increased the costs 
of procuring replacement parts.
Thus, as the evidence presented above suggests, the mineiro industry relied on foreign suppliers 
for parts, machinery, equipment, components, and all sorts of material, such as lubricants, dyes, and yam. 
This was the result not only of the absence of an indigenous capital-goods industry, but also of the total 
absence of a domestic network of suppliers of any kind. As Katz has suggested, the absence of a network 
of independent and domestic suppliers in Latin America is due to the limited size of the markets, shortage 
of skills and entrepreneurship30. Although there was a sufficient supply of entrepreneurship for the 
emergence of new industrial sectors, the mineiro business environment was not conducive to the generation 
of the whole range of enterprises required by a complex and advanced economy. Furthermore, in several 
cases, the same mill was supplied by both British and US manufacturers, adding to the already long list of 
problems (caused by cultural and economic differences and by the geographic distance between users and 
suppliers; see Part 7.2.2) mineiro textile entrepreneurs had to face in relying on foreign technology.
Reliance on foreign technology was not restricted to the textile industry. Any industrial sector which 
employed more sophisticated and mechanized equipment depended heavily on foreign technology, as was 
the case of the mineiro electricity generating industry. However, due to the difference in the nature of 
electricity and textile technologies (the former was a "breakthrough" scientific development and the latter 
a piecemeal development of traditional crafts), the terms of the dependence of the electricity generating 
industry were somewhat different from that of the textile industry. Owing to its scientific complexity, 
electricity technology was under the firm control of a few specialized firms in the world and was less 
feasible to be replicated locally with less opportunities for adaptations. Furthermore, as electrical equipment
29 S.J. Stein, Origens e Evolucao da Industria Textil no Brasil. 1850-1950. (Rio de Janeiro, 1950),
p.51.
30 J.M. Katz, "Domestic Technology Generation in LDCs: A Review of Research Findings", in 
Technology Generation in Latin American Manufacturing Industries, ed. J.M. Katz (1987), pp.28-30.
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was even more specialized than textile machinery, there was less opportunities for the use of equipment of 
different manufacturers without major consequences.
Electricity in the last century was a new technology even in the most advanced countries. Its first 
practical use was telegraphy, invented in die USA and Britain during the 1840s. After the 1880s, telephone 
and electrical power were developed in both the USA and Germany. As the progress of electrical technology 
in the USA and Germany was particularly rapid with the introduction of successive innovations (a classic 
example of a Schumpeterian major technological "breakthrough"), the transfer of electrical technology was 
by no means easier than that of older technologies such as steam engines, mechanical spinning and iron 
smelting with coke. Electricity was development of nineteenth-century physical science, in contrast to the 
mechanical and metallurgical technologies of the eighteenth century, which were developed from the 
empirical skill in traditional crafts. Thus, the transfer of electrical technology at the end of the nineteenth 
century assumed an unusual character.
Since there were essential differences between the utilization of electricity and the manufacture of 
equipment, the spread of electrical utilities (including communication and power supply) within less 
developed countries was only possible when machinery was imported. As a public utility, the electricity 
generating industry supplied a service which was instantly consumed. Most firms were located close to their 
markets and given the nature of the "commodity" were immune from foreign competition, unlike textile 
firms. Indeed like all public utilities, the electricity supply industry enjoyed a natural monopoly, capital start­
up costs precluded the entry of new firms into the industry once a successful operator had been established. 
Moreover, machinery embodied the most up-to-date advances in electrical technology - as it was also the 
case of textile machinery -, so any country could make use of these innovations and the utility industries 
could emulate progress in power and communication technologies in the advanced countries31. This was a 
classic example of backward countries taking advantage of technological innovations available in more 
advanced countries, as pointed out by Gerschenkron32.
In contrast, electrical equipment was hardware which could be transported long distances and 
preserved over time. Furthermore, electrical machinery was an international good and their consumers 
(utilization industries) had the choice of buying either domestic or imported equipment, as it was also the 
case of textile equipment. Nevertheless, most electric machinery was made in Britain, Germany or the USA, 
and in particular by the big five manufacturers: Western Electric, General Electric and Westinghouse Electric 
Company (WEC) of the USA, and Siemens and AE& of Germany. These firms were not only the world's 
largest producers of electric machinery, but also the main innovators in electrical technology33. At the
31H. Uchida, "The Transfer of Electrical Technologies from the United States and Europe to Japan, 
1869-1914", in International Technology Transfer: Europe. Japan and the USA.
1700-1914. ed. D.J. Jeremy (Aldershot, 1991), pp.219-30.
32 A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essavs. (1962),
p.8.
33 Uchida, oo.cit.. pp.219-30.
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beginning, there were favourable conditions for entry into the heavy electrical industry. In the 1880s, 
electrical equipment was still in its infancy and could easily be copied by domestic mechanics with poor 
tools and little skill, as the case of Japan illustrates very well. However, by the end of the century, the 
products of the big US and German firms were improved in capacity as well as in quality, embodying the 
most recent achievements in electrical technology. Thus, the technological gap in the production of electrical 
equipment became so great that technology transfer could never be realized without the will of the big US 
and European electrical manufacturers34.
Therefore, electricity generating companies established in Minas Gerais at the turn of the century 
had to rely on foreign suppliers of electrical equipment and most of them relied on US suppliers. A month 
after the foundation of the Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade (CME) in 1888, Bernardo Mascarenhas 
ordered power station equipment through a representative in Rio de Janeiro, Max Nothman & Cia. The order 
was then passed to the WEC which supplied equipment for the transmission of electricity35. In 1889, the 
Marmelos-0 - the first large-scale hydro-electric power station established in Brazil - started operation36. For 
the remainder of the century, the CME continued to be supplied by WEC. In 1891, the company ordered 
new machines as the old ones had been damaged and the lighting service had been suspended37. In 1896, 
the new plant, the Marmelos-1, was also equipped with machinery supplied by the WEC38. The equipment 
employed by the Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina (CFLCL) was acquired in the USA and 
Europe. The turbine of the Mauricio power plant, inaugurated in 190839, was purchased from Escher Wyss, 
a Swiss manufacturer, whereas the rest of its equipment was acquired from WEC40.
As indicated, the mineiro electricity generating industry relied heavily on foreign suppliers of 
equipment, following die same pattern as the textile industry. However, in the specific case of the electricity 
generating industry, the reliance upon foreign suppliers was probably aggravated by the peculiar 
characteristics of electrical technology. Since electricity outgrew of the physical science, there were less 
opportunities for adaptation and the transfer of the technology for the manufacturing of electric equipment 
involved the creation of a much more complex system of innovation and network of suppliers than the one 
required by textile machinery. Furthermore, electric technical knowledge was controlled by a few large US
34 Ibid., pp.219-30.
35 P. Oliveira, Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade: pioneira da ilnminacao hidreletrica na America 
do Sul. (Juiz de Fora, 1969), pp. 29-31.
36 Panorama do Setor de Energia Eletrica no Brasil, ed. R.F. Dias, L.M.M. Cabral, P.B.B. 
Cachapuz, and S.T.N. Lamarrao, (Rio.de Janeiro, 1988), p.32.
37 Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, O Pharol. (Juiz de Fora), 27 March 1891.
38 Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, O Pharol. (Juiz de Fora), 8 August 1896.
39 Panorama do Setor de Energia Eletrica no Brasil, p.32.
40 Suplemento Minas Gerais, Companhia Forca e Luz Cataguazes-I^opoldina. (Cataguazes, 1913).
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and German corporations. Therefore, suppliers of electrical equipment could only be found abroad. Yet, 
although textile technology was simpler and less lumpy (and there was a dramatic growth in die number of 
firms), there was little difference in the textile and electricity generating industries in terms of technology 
absorption leading to backward linkages - i.e. the development of heavy industries.
The CUI also employed foreign technology, although its reliance upon foreign suppliers was very 
limited when compared to that of the textile and electricity generating industries. The reason seems to have 
been due to the nature of the technologies employed in the construction of roads and in the transport of 
goods and people at this period. The technology employed in the construction of roads was more intangible. 
In other words, road-building in the nineteenth century relied mosdy on the technical knowledge carried by 
experts: the equipment used was of a very simple nature and universally available as reproducible. 
Furthermore, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the prevailing technology was a century-old and 
accessible. The transport of goods and people employed a technology which was embodied in wheeled- 
vehicles drawn by animals. The technology to build carts, waggons, and coaches, dated to the ancient times 
and it was not very complex. This meant that local production of these vehicles was feasible. The most 
modem methods of road-construction in the nineteenth century evolved from the French methods of 
construction developed in the preceding century. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, die French 
roads were admired, and to some extent imitated, by the rest of Europe. Around the 1750s, P.M. J. Tresaguet 
developed a new three-tier system of road-construction. His system was more economical in terms of 
materials when compared with the standard stone causeway preceding it and had the advantage of avoiding 
excessive camber, which was often dangerous. This new method was adopted throughout France and by 
about 1775 had spread to central Europe, Switzerland, and even Sweden41.
In Britain, Turnpike Trusts operating their own toll-gate-enclosed sections of roads created a better 
road-system and became the characteristic English highway by the middle of the nineteenth century42. They 
made regular coach services possible. Furthermore, they had better road-surfaces which were created by road 
engineers like Telford and McAdam. The Telford and McAdam technology reduced the camber of road 
surfaces, thereby improving drainage, safety and speed. By 1834, for example, while English coaches were 
driven at an average of 9-10 miles an hour, the French malle-poste averaged 6 miles an hour43.
Telford, originally a journeyman stonemason with a wide experience of road-construction, 
developed a method of construction very similar to that of Tresaguet. He differed from the French road 
engineer in making the road-bed level and in forming the crown of the road with stone itself, rather than 
making the finished surfaced parallel to the base. Telford's methods were expensive for many of the turnpike 
trusts, who preferred to adopt the construction of John Loudon McAdam. McAdam's method, which
41 Derry and Williams, op.cit.. pp.429-30.
42 Ibid., p.431.
43 R.J. Forbes, "Roads to c 1900", in A History of Technology, ed. C. Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. 
Hall, and T.I. Williams (Oxford, 1958), IV, p.531.
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combined proper drainage with low cost by putting broken stone upon a road so as to form a solid hard 
surface, the size of the stones being closely controlled and the highway being drained by side ditches44.
John L. McAdam wrote several books about road building which were translated into various 
languages, thus popularizing the McAdam system abroad. In the course of the nineteenth century, "metalled" 
and "macadamized" (roads using broken stones in their construction) became almost synonymous in 
descriptions of roads. McAdam's system had such an impact in Europe that by the end of the last century 
some 90% of the main highways were macadamized. Slowly the macadam road penetrated beyond Europe. 
US road engineers studied his method of road-construction and in 1832 the first US national road east of 
the Ohio river was given a macadamized surface45. In Minas Gerais, the first macadamized road was built 
in the late 1850s. The Uniao e Industria turnpike was 144 kilometres long, linking Juiz de Fora in the Mata 
zone to Petropolis in the province of Rio de Janeiro46.
Furthermore, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the equipment used in the building of 
roads consisted of simple tools such as hammers, sieves, spades, wheelbarrows, rammers, and pickaxes. 
Machines for compaction, such as rollers, had been used by the ancients. However, it was only in the 1830s 
that horse-drawn rollers were gradually introduced in Europe. The first steam-driven roller was invented in 
1859, but despite its manifest advantages it gained ground only gradually. Moreover, in McAdam's days 
stones were broken by hand and continued to be so until as late as 1900, although the first stone-crusher 
was invented in 185847. Thus, until the late nineteenth century, road building preserved its craft nature, 
involving very little sophisticated equipment The basic requirement was technical knowledge carried by 
craftsmen and trained mad engineers.
The construction of the Uniao e Industria turnpike, for example, involved the work of several 
experts. The construction of the road began in 1856 under the supervision of foreign engineers and architects 
with a large experience of road-construction in Europe. The company also employed European surveyors 
and a number of foreign craftsmen, such as bricklayers, blacksmiths, locksmiths, painters, carpenters, belt 
makers, etc48.
In the case of the road system, the technology employed in the manufacture of wheeled vehicles 
required little equipment and was largely embodied in skilled personnel. Light wheeled chariots were used 
even before the ancient Greeks and the Romans, who used two and four wheeled chariots for the transport 
of goods more than passengers. In Britain, the use of wheeled vehicles declined with the decline of the state
44 I. McNeil, "Roads, Bridges and Vehicles", in An Encyclopaedia of the History of Technology. 
ed. I. McNeil (1990), pp.433-6.
45 Derry and Williams, on.cit.. p.433.
46 W.L. Bastos, Mariano Procopio Ferreira Laee: Sua Vida. Sua Obra. Descendencia. Genealoeia. 
(Juiz de Fora, 1991), pp.23-9.
47 Forbes, op.cit.. pp.536-7.
48 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), pp.21-3.
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of roads after the departure of the Romans. This situation persisted until the middle of sixteenth century 
when carriages and coaches began to be imported from the Continent Soon, British manufacturers started 
to make copies, marking the beginning of an indigenous coach- and carriage-building trade. From the 
seventeenth century onwards, several developments in coach design and building were introduced such as 
sprang suspension, dished wheels, one-piece iron tyres, and better brake systems. Individually these 
developments amounted to little but collectively they transformed the primitive vehicle - which was little 
more than a box on wheels - into comparatively speedy and luxurious coaches. From the 1780s onwards, 
goods vehicles changed little, but many new and improved passenger vehicles of an European origin 
appeared49.
Thus, the technology for the building of wheeled vehicles drawn by animals was basically the same 
for nearly a century, when the CUI started die construction and operation of its turnpike in the late 1850s. 
Therefore, the company was able to build the vehicles used in the transport of goods and passengers locally. 
Evidence of this fact is the existence of several workshops established at the Juiz de Fora station. Among 
them was the carpenters' workshops for the construction of all kinds of vehicles (carts, coaches, and 
carriages)50. Furthermore, a Parliamentary Decree of 7 August 1852, mentioned in the company report of 
1856, exempted the company from customs duties for 12 years on purchases of machines, instruments and 
any other objects destined for the construction of roads and vehicles of the company.
Nevertheless, due to the lack of a domestic network of suppliers, the CUI also had to rely on 
foreign suppliers and manufacturers for a wide range of materials. In 1856, for example, based on the 
Parliamentary Decree of 7 August 1852 mentioned above, the company purchased several commodities in 
Europe (from stationery to screws for bridges, carts, and carriages)51.
To sum up, the technologies employed by the CUI in the construction of the turnpike and in the 
transport of goods and people were also foreign. However, they were century-old technologies, of more or 
less common knowledge. Even so, owing to the total absence of a network of suppliers of any kind, the 
company had to rely on foreign suppliers for the supply of various components and material. However, the 
CUI's reliance was much smaller when compared to that of both the electricity generating and the textile 
industries. Materials, components and equipment used by the CUI were relatively simple and were soon 
replicated locally. The simplicity and universal nature of the technology employed by the CUI meant that 
backward linkages were more easily created, as the workshops of the company indicate.
In contrast with the textile, the electricity generating and die transport industries, the mineiro iron 
industry established during the first three-quarters of the last century was the only industry to employ an 
indigenous technology. However, a few foundries did rely on foreign technologies which were primitive 
when compared with that being employed at the same time in more developed countries. Although a few
49 McNeil, op.cit.. pp.438-9.
50 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relat6rio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), p.23.
51 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1856), p.22.
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foundries resorted to foreign suppliers of equipment on a few occasions, the intangible nature of iron 
technology means that the industry relied much more upon the technical expertise of people rather than upon 
equipment. Furthermore, due to the universal nature of the equipment used in iron production they were also 
more easily reproduced locally.
The production of iron in Minas Gerais was introduced by African slaves at the beginning of the 
last century52. Initially, foundries were essential components of agricultural enterprises, with scores of slaves 
specialized in the domestic production of iron for farm use. Gradually iron-making emerged as the main 
activity of some estates53. Until the first decade of the nineteenth century, several farmers and blacksmiths 
produced iron solely for their own consumption, not only because until the arrival of the Portuguese Royal 
family in 1808 the commercial production of iron was prohibited, but also because they did not have the 
technical knowledge for large-scale production54. Later, Eschwege, the founder of the Patridtica mill - the 
first foundry to produce iron on an industrial scale in Minas Gerais55 - and other foreign technicians 
introduced modifications to this local process, resulting in what became known as the cadinho method. These 
modifications were based on the Swedish method of production called stiickofen. As indicated in Figure 
VII. 1, the name cadinho derived from the shape of the cavities in the wall of the furnace. The shape of these 
cavities facilitated the introduction of ore and charcoal as well as the withdrawal of pig iron. There was also 
a small opening for the introduction of air by hydraulical bellows. The pig iron was taken to the hydraulical 
hammermill, where the slag was separated. When the separation was completed the pig iron was resmelted 
for transformation into cast iron. The cadinho method was very simple, requiring neither complex facilities 
nor skilled workers. It required only proximity to stands of timber and deposits of iron ore, and an 
abundance of water. Due to its simplicity, this method of iron-making was widely used in Minas Gerais in 
the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century56. However, output was very limited compared with that of 
the two foreign methods employed by some of the mineiro foundries during this period, namely the Italian 
and the Catalan methods57.
Among the four largest foundries established in Minas Gerais in the first three quarters of the 
nineteenth century, three (the Patriotica, Morro do Pilar58, and Girau59) employed the cadinho technology.
52 W.L. von Eschwege, Pluto Brasiliensis. (Berlin, 1833; reprinted Belo Horizonte/Sao Paulo, 1979), 
II, p.203.
53 Libby, on.cit.. p. 152.
54 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.203.
55 Ibid., p.205.
56 Libby, op.cit. pp. 147-8.
57 J.A. Paula, "Dois Ensaios sobre a Genese da Industrializagao em Minas Gerais: a Siderurgia e 
a Industria Textil", in Amis do II Seminario sobre a Economia Mineira. (Belo Horizonte, 1983), p.34.
58 Eschwege, op.cit.. pp.207-214, 247-54.
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Figure VII.l - The Cadinho Foundry
Plan of the Foundry
1. Blast Furnace
2. Resmelting Furnace  ^ Hammermill
Source: P.Ferrand, "A Industria de Ferro no Brasil (Provincia de Minas Geraes)", in Annaes da Escola de
Minas. (Ouro Preto, 1885), No.4, pp. 167-88.
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Furthermore, in his survey of the foundries located in the Metalurgica zone, Costa Sena found 17 foundries
employing the cadinho technology60, clear evidence of the widespread employment of the cadinho method
in Minas Gerais. However, there were a few occasions in which even the foundries employing the cadinho
technology had to resort to foreign manufacturers for the supply of materials and equipment, because of the
total lack of conditions to produce them on site. When Eschwege set-up his foundry in 1811, he imported
the hammermills from England because it was very difficult to find someone who could produce them
manually in Brazil61. In 1815, Schoenewolf informed Eschwege that Camara requested from the government
refractory material from England62. These two cases suggest that, at least in the first decades of the
nineteenth century, the local conditions for the manufacture of any kind of equipment were inadequate
despite the existence of an indigenous technology.
Hence, for the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century the large majority of the mineiro iron
foundries relied on the cadinho method, an indigenous method of iron production. The employment of
cadinho technology, however, did not mean that iron-masters did not resort to foreign suppliers, although
their dependence was most probably much less intense than that observed for the textile, electricity
generating, and transport industries. On the other hand, the employment of cadinho method imposed strict
limits to the development of the iron industry. The demise of small foundries in the last quarter of the
century is undisputable evidence of this fact. Once the natural barriers against foreign competition were
lifted, the limits of the indigenous technology employed by die large majority of the mineiro iron-masters
became evident63. As an engineer of the Mining School of Ouro Preto observed:
"In the period between 1881 and 1888, the iron industry began to realize that it was not 
possible to develop against foreign competition brought with the arrival of the railway in 
the hinterland of Minas Gerais. The national industry was not prepared to compete against 
foreign products, since it did not apply scientific industrial techniques."64
Despite the simplicity and popularity of the cadinho technology, a few mineiro foundries established 
in the first three quarters of the last century employed foreign methods of iron production, namely the Italian 
and the Catalan. However, like the cadinho technology, the Italian and die Catalan methods produced iron 
through the so-called direct process65, i.e. the process in which wrought iron is produced direcdy from the
59 J.C. Costa Sena, "Viagem de Estudos Metallurgicos no Centro da Provincia de Minas", in Annaes 
da Escola de Minas. (Ouro Preto, 1881), No.l, pp.134-5.
60 Ibid., pp.l 17-41.
61 F.A.M. Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil. (Belo Horizonte, 1983), p.84.
62 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.211.
63 Libby, op.cit.. pp. 159-60.
64 C.A. Oliveira, "A Metallurgia de Ferro em Minas", in Annaes da Escola de Minas. (Ouro Preto, 
1902), No.5, p.79.
65 Ibid., p.76.
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ore. Nevertheless, from the 1750s onwards this process was gradually eliminated by the indirect process, 
which was more productive and rapidly superseded the direct process as the major producing system in 
Great Britain66. Hence, the Italian and the Catalan technologies were obsolete when compared with those 
being employed at the same time in more developed countries such as Britain67.
From the middle of the eighteenth century to the First World War, Great Britain led the world in 
developing new technologies for the production of pig and wrought iron, and steel. In 1709, Abraham Darby 
successfully used coke instead of charcoal in blast furnaces to produce pig iron. By the end of the eighteenth 
century coke had displaced charcoal in smelting. In the early 1740s, Benjamin Huntsman developed the 
crucible process for making high-quality steel, which remained the dominant technique worldwide for more 
than a century. From the 1760s onwards, British ironmasters developed new technologies to replace charcoal 
with coke in the production of wrought iron. In 1784, Henry Cort developed the "puddling and rolling 
process", a method of making wrought iron from cast iron with mineral fuel which freed ironmakers from 
their last dependence on charcoal. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars Oort's techniques had come to 
dominate the refining stage of production. In the 1850s, Henry Bessemer introduced a new revolutionary 
process for manufacturing steel. Shortly after, William Siemens, a German who spent most of his life in 
Britain, together with two Frenchmen, Pierre and Emile Martin, developed the Siemens-Martin process, an 
open-hearth method for making steel. Until the First World War British industry continued to lead world 
steel industry in the introduction of technological improvements68. By the middle of the last century, 
although Britain was the world's leading producer of iron and in many respects was almost alone, other 
countries also developed important iron and steel industries. Based on the English model, there were 
important ironworks in Belgium and France. Germany had some works of note and US ironmaking was 
growing as well. The Swedish iron industry was in a special position, since the country's very pure iron ore 
enabled its industry to produce iron of very high quality69.
However, metallurgical processes of production differ from more purely mechanical technologies 
in some important respects and the international transfer of such technologies require further consideration. 
Metallurgical processes are intimately related to the qualities of the natural resource inputs. For example, 
the successful introduction of mineral fuel into the blast furnace in the last century depended upon the use 
of coal which had a chemical composition appropriate for smelting. However, until the latter part of the
66 J.R. Harris, The British Iron Industry. 1700-1850. (1988), pp. 12-3.
67 For a detailed account of the history of die technological development of the British iron industry 
in the nineteenth century see M. Atkinson and C. Barber, The Growth and Decline of the South Wales Iron 
Industry. 1760-1880. (Cardiff, 1987) chapter 3, and Harris, op.cit..
68 C.K. Hyde, "Iron and Steel Technologies moving between Europe and the United States, before 
1914", in International Technology Transfer: Europe. Japan and the USA. 1700-1914. ed. D.J. Jeremy 
(Aldershot, 1991), pp.51-2; and W.K.V. Gale, "Ferrous Metals", in An Encyclopaedia of the History of 
Technology, ed. I. McNeil (1990), pp. 153-76.
69 Gale, op.cit.. p.167.
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nineteenth century, such relations between particular processes and the qualities of natural resources were 
not understood in any serious scientific sense. Hence, metallurgy during this period was essentially an 
empirical activity and variations in resource inputs affected the success of the productive process in ways 
which could not be understood or predicted70.
Thus, the transfer of technology for the production of iron was a most complex process - sometimes 
even impossible -, and mineiro foundries which employed foreign technology were restricted to the use of 
more backward processes such as the Italian and the Catalan. As shown in Figure VU.2, die Italian method 
was constituted by a furnace, bellows, and hammermill. it employed blast furnaces which varied from 
between 3 to 2 feet deep, 5 to 3 feet long, and 3 to 2 feet wide, and required more care in the regulation 
of air for die maintenance of the temperature of the fire than the cadinho technology71. Moreover, this 
process required a regular series of successive heating and hammering operations. The Italian method was 
more productive and economical than the cadinho. and the quality of the final product was higher. However, 
this method was a simplified version of the Catalan process (shown in Figure VII.3), the most productive 
and economical method used in Minas Gerais during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth centuiy. The 
Catalan process was a complex method of production, requiring even more skill from the workers for 
measuring the quantity of ore and charcoal as well as for making a perfect linkage of the heating and 
hammering operations. Furthermore, local experience indicated that the use of this process of production was 
only feasible if supervised by someone with a good knowledge of metallurgy72.
Among the four largest foundries established in Minas Gerais in the first three quarters of the 
nineteenth century, only the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry employed the Catalan method of production. 
Even so, in the early 1870s, at the time of the death of its owner and founder, Monlevade, the ironwork was 
transformed into a Italian foundry73. Furthermore, among the 24 foundries surveyed by Costa Sena in the 
Metalurgica zone, 7 employed the Italian method of production, including the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba74. 
However, due to the empirical and intangible nature of metallurgical technology, and confirming what has 
already been said about die technology employed by the road-construction and transport industry, foundries 
which employed a foreign technology did not relied heavily upon foreign suppliers. The only known case 
of the import of equipment is that of the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry. When Monlevade established 
the foundry he imported more than 7 tons of equipment from England75.
70 N. Rosenberg, Technology and American Economic Growth. (New York, 1972), pp.77-8.
71 F.P. Oliveira, "Estudos Sidenirgicos na Provincia de Minas", in Annaes da Escola de Minas de 
Ouro Preto. (Ouro Preto, 1884), No.3, pp. 108-9.
72 Libby, op.cit. pp. 148-9.
73 Gomes, op.cit.. p. 112.
74 Costa Sena, op.cit.. pp.l 17-41.
75 Gomes, op.cit.. p. 110.
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Figure VII.2 - The Italian Foundry
Plan of the Foundry
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Figure VII.2 - The Italian Foundry
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Figure VII3 - The Catalan Foundry
Plan of the Foundry
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Source:P.Ferrand, "A Industria de Ferro no Brasil (Provincia de Minas Geraes)", in Annaes da Escola de
Minas. (Ouro Preto, 1885), No.4, pp. 167-88.
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Hence, for the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century only a small number of the mineiro 
foundries employed foreign technologies, which were outdated when compared with the technology 
employed in die more developed countries. The large majority of the iron foundries in Minas Gerais relied 
on the cadinho method. This indigenous method of production freed iron-masters from the dependence on 
foreign sources of supply of equipment experimented by the textile, electricity generating and, to a lesser 
extent, the transport industries. However, the widespread employment of this indigenous technology imposed 
strict limits to the development of the iron industry. Without access - and, most important, without the 
economic and technical conditions to have access - to the more modem foreign technology die mineiro 
industry was doomed to lag and perish. In the late nineteenth century, a few larger iron works emerged 
employing the - more modem and productive - indirect method of production. Nevertheless, until the end 
of the 1930s die Brazilian iron industry was mostly made up of small-scale industries still using charcoal. 
A large-scale iron and steel industry would only emerge as a result of the intervention of the federal 
government in the 1940s with the establishment of the CSN (Volta Redonda) in the state of Rio de Janeiro76. 
Minas Gerais had to wait until the late 1950s for the emergence of its first integrated iron and steel industry 
based on coal and on Japanese technology, the USIMINAS77.
To conclude, since the Industrial Revolution the international transfer of technology has become 
crucial to latecomer economies, not only for initial growth, but also for their capacity to sustain 
development. Most nineteenth-century mineiro industries relied on foreign technology and foreign 
manufacturers of equipment, machinery, parts, components, and materials. During this period, apart from 
the most elementary tools, sophisticated equipment could only be found abroad, mainly in Britain and the 
USA. However, such dependence differed according to the nature of the technology employed. Industries 
employing more tangible technology and specialized equipment depended more intensely on foreign sources 
than those employing more intangible technology and universal equipment and machinery. The mineiro 
textile industry imported from machinery to yam and dyes and the electricity generating industry also relied 
heavily on foreign equipment, material and components. Although the CUI also relied on foreign 
technologies, it did not rely on foreign plants, because the equipment used in road-construction and in the 
transport of goods and passengers was simple, more universal and could be produced locally. Furthermore, 
as the technologies used by the company were of a more intangible nature the company relied more on the 
expertise of people than on equipment. Nevertheless, the company relied on foreign manufacturers to supply 
components and material of every sort. This reflects the absence not only of a domestic capital goods 
industry, but also the absence of a domestic network of suppliers of any kind. The only industry in 
nineteenth-century Minas Gerais to employ an indigenous technology was the iron industry, although a few 
foundries also employed outdated foreign technologies. Most of the foundries established in the first three- 
quarters of the last century employed the cadinho technology, an indigenous method of production. However,
76 Suzigan, op.cit.. pp.277-8.
77 Gomes, op.cit.. pp.303-50.
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this method was very simple and the results were poor. Consequently, the domestic industry perished when 
it had to face foreign competition.
7.2 - The Handling of the Technologies:
The handling of any technology is a process which begins with the selection of a equipment or 
process, and involves a range of services which are essential to the continued operation of the technology. 
These include the ability to diagnose correctly the causes of mechanical breakdown or other sources of poor 
equipment performance, the availability of facilities and skilled labour to perform repair work and provide 
routine maintenance, and the provision of spare parts78. However, when technologies are carried to points 
remote and culturally different from where they emerged, they need to be adapted to the local conditions. 
Therefore, the handling of foreign technology poses special problems which require particular attention. 
Furthermore, the handling of technologies of different nature require different approaches for each stage. 
The selection of tangible technologies, for example, depends less on the availability of experts whereas this 
is a much more critical factor in the selection of an intangible technology, and so on. Consequently, this part 
of the chapter investigates several of the stages of the handling process of the technologies employed in 
nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. It examines the process of selection of different technologies, die 
relationship between users and foreign suppliers, and the adaptation and eventual modification of the 
technologies adopted.
7.2.1 - The process of selection:
Technologies are generally selected on the basis of highly imperfect information. First of all, in 
most sectors the degree of choice is often so overwhelming that no single businessman can be aware of the 
full range of feasible alternatives. Although in most cases decision-makers could benefit from a much greater 
flow of information, this may be expensive and require considerable time for the accumulation of 
knowledge. Furthermore, businessmen with a wide range of responsibilities do not generally know where 
suitable information is to be found. Thus, entrepreneurs rely on a range of imperfect mechanisms for 
identifying the most suitable sources of supply and/or the most suitable sets of equipment, for example, 
word-of-mouth recommendations, well-known brand-names, occasional advertisements, firms with whom 
they have dealt in the past. These criteria for choice are not likely to lead to a reliable determination of 
technological choice, as the experience of many firms in industrially advanced and developing countries 
alike have shown. The costs of this form of ignorance can indeed be very large79.
In nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, the criteria for the selection of equipment were not very 
reliable. Entrepreneurs resorted mainly to acquaintances, imported books and specialized magazines, 
foreigners living in the country, and even business trips abroad. However, different technologies required
78 Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, pp. 154-68.
79 R. Kaplinsky, "Technology Transfer, Adaptation and Generation: A Framework for Evaluation", 
in Technology Transfer in the Developing Countries, ed. M. Chatteiji (1990), pp. 19-20.
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distinct evaluation criteria. Because intangible technologies are carried by people - and not by machinery 
which perform most of the whole process of production with minimum human intervention - their selection 
are highly dependent on the availability of those experts. In this sense, metallurgy and road-building during 
the last century are illustrative.
Metallurgy, for most of the nineteenth century, was still essentially an empirical activity. Thus, the 
selection of a method of production of iron depended largely on the technical knowledge of workers and/or 
entrepreneurs/managers. Success in the productive process was affected by variations in resource inputs in 
ways that could not be predicted or understood and the best mix of resource inputs was found by trial and 
error80. Therefore, not surprisingly, the most successful mineiro foundries in the first three-quarters of the 
century were set-up by foreigners with extensive knowledge of metallurgy.
Eschwege, for example, had a wide knowledge of natural sciences and wrote extensively on the 
subject. Furthermore, he came to Brazil after having worked in the Figueird dos Vinhos foundry in 
Portugal81. However, one reason why he used the cadinho method at his foundry was his lack of knowledge 
of a more complex method of production:
"At that time, I still did not know how to work with the bellows, and I also did not have
practical knowledge of the production of iron in the so-called Swedish furnaces."82
Monlevade, founder of the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry, had an extensive knowledge of metallurgy. 
Between 1809 and 1812 he studied mining engineering in the Polytechnic of Paris83. His foundry was the 
only one to employ the Catalan method in Minas Gerais during this period. For more than forty years the 
foundry obtained good results because of Monlevade's technical knowledge:
"As a mining engineer, he [Monlevade] had a profound knowledge of the process which
he employed and as he was continuously present in the foundry, he could overcome his
employees' indifference and obtain from them the necessary care."84
Nevertheless, when Monlevade died in 1872, his family had to hire an Italian master, who switched from 
the Catalan the Italian method, because they could not find anyone who could operate the Catalan system85. 
This shows clearly that intangible technologies were selected on the basis of the availability of skilled 
labour. Once Monlevade was dead, the choice of a method of production was determined by the availability 
of people able to operate the plant, even if this meant going back to a simpler and less productive process.
Further evidence of the crucial role played by die technical competence of entrepreneurs in die
80 Rosenberg, Technology and American Economic Growth, p.77.
81 Gomes, op.cit. pp.79-85.
82 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.250.
83 Gomes, op.cit.. p. 109.
84 Ibid., p. 109.
85 Ibid., pp. 109-13.
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successful selection of a method of production of iron is provided by the appalling results of the Morro do
Pilar foundry. The foundry failed mainly because of poorly conceived plans and the incompetence of its
manager86. According to Eschwege, Manuel Ferreira da Camara, founder of the ironwork, made several
mistakes in the establishment of die Morro do Pilar foundry. To begin with, insufficient wood was available
at the site for the three blast furnaces planned:
"Any practical metallurgist who examines the region will soon be convinced that they [the 
woods] are not sufficient for even one blast furnace."87
Camara made so many mistakes in the construction of the buildings and the furnaces that he started
production only in 1814, two years later than initially planned:
"In 1812, he [Camara] had hoped to smelt some iron. Nevertheless, he was not successful 
until 1814, not only because the machinery did not correspond to the end for which it was 
designed - and consequently had to be modified - but also because he could not make iron 
without the help of an experienced foundry master."88
After trying unsuccessfully for some time to produce iron, Camara finally hired a German foundry master,
who spent six months demolishing and reconstructing all die installations of the foundry:
"Nothing that had been made could be utilized. I demolished everything, including the 
bellows with their innovations. I reconstructed it and now I am making a hammermill like 
the one you [Eschwege] have in your own mill."89
The history of the Patridtica, Sao Miguel de Piracicaba, and Morro do Pilar foundries illustrate well 
three different degrees of success in the selection of an intangible technology, such as metallurgy. They also 
illustrate the importance of technical competence of entrepreneurs. Eschwege's choice of a method of iron 
production was determined by his own technical knowledge rather than abstract appraisals of available 
technology. For this reason the Patriotica was the first successful foundry in Minas Gerais. Monlevade got 
the best results for more than forty years due to his technical competence on the chosen method of 
production. Nevertheless, as soon as he died his achievements in the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry 
vanished owing to the lack of an expert to replace him. Camara is the exemplar case of a complete failure 
for mistakes committed from the very beginning, i.e. the process of selection.
The case of the Uniao e Industria turnpike is also illustrative of the process of the selection of an 
intangible technology. It took Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage several months after a trip to the USA and 
Europe, where he spent some time studying science and technology, to decide what type of road to build 
and which method of construction to employ90. This was certainly a lengthy and expensive process of
86 Libby, op.cit.. p. 137.
87 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.207.
88 Ibid., p.208.
89 Ibid., p.210.
90 Bastos, op.cit.. pp. 15-6.
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selection, if one bears in mind that this happened in the first half of the last century - a time when a trip 
to Europe or the USA was very long and expensive - and that all the effort was only to enable him to 
choose the technology. In the construction work of the turnpike and the operation of the transport service, 
Lage employed a number of foreign engineers, architects, surveyors, drivers, craftsmen and so on91, who 
together carried the appropriate technologies for these activities. Thus, the analysis of the process of 
selection of intangible technologies, such as that employed by the iron and the transport industry in 
nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, has shown that the availability of skilled labour was a crucial factor.
The selection of technologies of a more tangible nature was much less dependent on the local 
availability of expertise, mainly because this kind of technical knowledge is found embodied in machinery 
and equipment Moreover, usually there are a larger number of producers of capital goods competing against 
each other. Therefore, machine manufacturers ought to have a more aggressive marketing approach - 
producing catalogues, appointing representatives, etc. - which in the end facilitate the process of selection. 
Nevertheless, the selection of tangible technologies in the last century was also a lengthy and sometimes 
very expensive process. In order to acquire detailed practical knowledge of the capabilities and operating 
technique of machinery, early entrepreneurs resorted to different strategies. They sought to establish direct 
contacts with overseas producers of machinery or with their representatives in Brazil. They asked for the 
help of foreigners established in the province. They read technical literature and travelled abroad.
When the Cedro mill was founded and Bernardo Mascarenhas was appointed to select and purchase 
the machinery. He first went to Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, where he visited the Santo Aleixo and the 
Sao Luis mills respectively. There, he obtained information about the construction of the buildings and the 
costs involved in the establishment of a textile mill92. He then went to the USA, where he stayed for a year 
and a half. During this period, he inspected various makes and types of machinery, and visited several textile 
mills in order to acquire knowledge about the technique of cloth production, the lay-out of the factory, and 
the performance of equipment93.
Some years later, with the establishment of the Cachoeira mill, Bernardo Mascarenhas sent his 
brother Francisco to talk to J.N. Gordon, chairman of the St. John del Rey Mining Company (SJDRMC), 
a British gold-mining company which was exploiting the Morro Velho mine in Minas Gerais, in order to 
obtain information about English machinery. The information obtained from Gordon was not very precise 
nor helpful and Bernardo decided to select the machinery himself. He then went to the USA and Europe, 
as mentioned above, where he spent some time inspecting and comparing the various makes and types of 
machinery and learning how to assemble and operate them:
"I decided to buy the English machines, which are much better for die production of fine
91 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatdrio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), p.21.
92 A.M. Vaz, Cia. Cedro e Cachoeira: Historia de uma Emnresa Familiar. 1883-1987. (Belo 
Horizonte, 1990), p.50.
93 Mascarenhas, Ftemardo Mascarenhas. p. 37.
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cloth. Furthermore, I have no reservation about them anymore, since I have seen them 
working satisfactorily in Macacos, Petropolis and Sao Paulo. (...) I have bought several 
books and I have studied this subject a great deal. In Manchester I will go daily to the 
factories to see if I can learn how to assemble the machinery and teach a clever boy how 
to operate it (...).',94
Further evidence of the way in which mineiro entrepreneurs selected technology can be found in
a letter from Ken in 1884:
"Knowing that you are interested in bleaching and desirous of being made acquainted with 
all the latest improvements I have pleasure in handing you the enclosed slips which I have 
cut from one of today's newspapers."95
Very often foreign technicians hired to work at the mills ordered parts, machines and equipment, and wrote
the letters in English to overseas suppliers. In 1882, Bernardo Mascarenhas informed Kerr that George Jates,
one of the two English technicians employed at the Cedro mill, would soon order the parts necessary for
repairing damaged machines96. Some years later, Theophilo Marques Ferreira wrote:
"I soon hope to order die dyeing machinery, but it would be advisable to learn the opinion 
of the dyer, who is yet to be hired, on the machinery which he believes to be necessary."97
Americo Teixeira Guimaraes, who founded the CCM in 1886, spent several months learning English 
in order to consult catalogues to select machinery for his mill98.
Towards the turn of the century, the process of selecting textile machinery became easier as foreign 
producers started to take the lead in approaching the Brazilian entrepreneurs and began to advertise in the 
local newspapers99. Thus, capital goods produced abroad were becoming more easily available and 
entrepreneurs could select the equipment for their mills through Brazilian and foreign representatives of US 
and British manufacturers of machinery without having to go abroad, to resort to consulting foreigners, or 
to spend months studying English or other languages. This development points to the growing importance 
of the Brazilian market for textile equipment
The process of selection of electrical equipment did not differ very much from that observed in the 
case of the textile technology. The main difficulty was that when Bernardo Mascarenhas decided to establish 
an electrical power company in Juiz de Fora in the 1880s the technology of electricity generation was new,
94 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas on 18 December 1874 from New York, reproduced in Ibid.,
pp.64-6.
95 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 15", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 17 April 1884".
96 D.A. Giroletti, Fabrica Convento Discinlina. (Belo Horizonte, 1991), p.85.
97 Letter from Theophilo Marques Ferreira to Robert L. Kerr on 23 March 1889, reproduced in 
Ibid., p.92.
98 Freitas, op.cit.. p.27.
99 Stein, op.cit.. p.50.
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even in the most advanced countries, as mentioned above. Few cities in the world were lit by electricity, 
so there was less scope to observe plants in operation. The installation of the world's first central electric- 
light power plant, for example, occurred in New York in 1881-82100. In Brazil, even the capital, Rio de 
Janeiro, was still lit by gas when Bernardo set-up his hydro-electric power plant101. However, even taking 
into account the fact that electricity was a science-based technology, the selection of electrical equipment 
was less dependent on the availability of skilled workers and/or managers than in the case of more intangible 
technologies.
In 1886, Bernardo Mascarenhas bought the concession to light Juiz de Fora and shortly afterwards
he established the CME. The process of selection of the technology for his hydro-electric plant involved
much study of electricity. In 1887, the local newspaper O Pharol gave the following account of Mascarenhas'
dedication to the study of electricity:
"Mr. Mascarenhas, as an enthusiast for electricity, has been studying the matter for a long 
time in order to discover its mysteries."102
Furthermore, Mascarenhas subscribed to specialized magazines, such as Electrician and Electrical World.
Kerr, his friend and agent from Manchester, sent him prospectuses of various producers of electrical
equipment: Zipemowski, Deri & Batty - producers of a new system of transformers -, Matem Platt, and
Elwell Parke & Co. Mascarenhas also read several technical publications such as The Electric Motor and
its Application and A Practical Treatise on Electric Lighting, by J.E. Gordon103. In 1887, Mascarenhas
wrote to Kerr, asking for more and recent publications on the matter:
"I have read with much interest the book on electricity you sent me, and I am delighted 
with die wonders of that science, mainly with the transmission of power, and light. The 
book you sent does not teach the waive and theories of the adopted measures - ohm, volts, 
watts, etc. I have seen in the Catalogue of the Brush Corporation, the advertsiment for 
General Rules and Tables, that I suppose to be a convenient one for learning the rules and 
units of measurement. Please send me one by mail."104
During the same year, he asked the City Council of Juiz de Fora to postpone the inauguration of the lighting 
service for six months, because he needed to make further studies of the matter105. At the beginning of 1888, 
he had finally made up his mind and had decided on the WEC alternating current system. He, thus, sent the
100 The Longman Encyclopedia, p.328.
101 Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. p.89.
102 Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, O Phaml. (Juiz de Fora), Vol.12, 12 November 1887.
103 Mascarenhas, Bernardo Masrarenhas. pp. 115-6.
104 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas to Robert L. Kerr on 21 February 1887, reproduced in Ibid.,
p.93.
105 Ibid., p. 115.
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order for the equipment together with a detailed plan of the plant106.
To sum up, depending on the nature of the technology employed, mineiro entrepreneurs resorted 
to different criteria of selection. Technologies of a more intangible nature, such as metallurgy, road- 
construction, and transport service, were selected based mainly on the availability of skilled labour. The most 
successful and productive iron foundries established in the first three-quarters of the last century, for 
example, were set-up by entrepreneurs with extensive knowledge in metallurgy. The selection of 
technologies of a more tangible nature, such as that employed in the textile and electricity generating 
industries, depended on different criteria. As the technical knowledge could be found in the form of 
machinery and equipment, entrepreneurs engaged in visits to other textile mills, both in Brazil and abroad, 
established direct contacts with foreign producers of machinery or their representatives, made use of 
technical books, or even asked for the help of foreigners based in the province. Furthermore, foreign 
technicians employed by mineiro entrepreneurs themselves were asked to select the appropriate machinery 
and equipment. However, towards the turn of the century, the selection of machinery became easier and 
more systematic as foreign producers began to establish representatives in die main cities in Brazil and to 
advertise in the local newspapers.
7.2.2 - The user-supplier relationship:
Those industries which depended most upon foreign technology suffered an additional problem, 
namely the nature of their relationship with suppliers of machinery and equipment. Most problems were 
caused the geographic distance, and the cultural and economic differences between users and producers: 
machines were not supplied exactly as they were ordered, parts went missing on their long journey from 
manufacturers to would-be industrialists, machines did not perform as advertised, etc. Among the industries 
examined in this thesis, this was particularly true of the textile and electricity generating industries. Both 
the iron industry and the CUI depended more on technical knowledge of skilled labour than on the 
acquisition of machinery.
In the textile industry, the use of the services of representatives and agents of foreign suppliers of 
machinery, based in Brazil and abroad, did not always make far smoother the relationship between users 
and foreign suppliers. In 1872, for example, the Mascarenhas & Irmaos, owners of the Cedro mill, had 
several problems with the Rio de Janeiro representative, Guilherme Van Vlick Lidgerwood, of the US 
manufacturer, Author Danfort Paterson, who originally supplied the machinery for the mill. Lidgerwood 
blamed Mascarenhas for the difficulties with technician recruited to assemble the machinery. Mascarenhas 
& Irmaos replied that these difficulties were not their fault. The first technician never arrived, returning from 
Juiz de Fora as soon as he realized that he had to make the rest of the journey by horse. The man was ill 
and his illness had never allowed him to ride a horse. The second technician did not possess the 
qualifications for the job, besides being rude, arrogant and insolent Even so, contrary to what had been 
alleged, he was paid in full. Furthermore, Mascarenhas & Irmaos contested the suggestion that missing parts
106 Gomes, op.cit.. pp.5-6.
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ordered sometime previously, and allegedly sent by the above mentioned representatives, had been stolen
on their way to the mill107:
"Regarding the reels, (...) stolen on the way, as you suggest, but stolen for what purpose?
Besides ours, is there any other textile mill in Minas? (...) The truth is that the reels have 
not arrived although we have already paid for them."108
As the distance between users and foreign suppliers of machinery was very great, the chances of
goods being lost on their long journey to die hinterland of Minas Gerais were greater than if they had been
supplied locally. In 1884, for example, Kerr wrote informing Bernardo Mascarenhas that:
"As already advised I sent a short time ago a case containing the same quantity of pegs 
as was in case BM627 which was lost in transit."109
In 1891, Kerr wrote to Theophilo Marques Ferreira regretting the fact that boxes containing dyeing material
and a hydro-extractor had been lost110. Part of the machinery of SAIM was also lost on its way to Machado,
causing the postponement of the beginning of the production of the mill111.
A further problem concerning foreign suppliers was the question of packing. As machinery had to
travel long distances by sea, rail, and by muletrain, manufacturers needed to take extra care in packing. Of
course, not every producer of machinery was sensitive to the problems of means of transport in a backward
country on the other side of the ocean. In 1885, for example, Kerr wrote regretting die fact that much
damage had been done to the machinery in transit and added that:
"Messrs. Hobson & Barlon are very careful in their packing. I wish all other makers were 
as careful, but I am sorry to say that some of them do not appear to be very anxious to 
improve."112
In 1893, the agent wrote again asking if the damage caused to the machinery dispatched was due to 
carelessness in packing113. During the same year, Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas informed Theophilo 
Marques Ferreira, then general manager of the CCC, that most of the machinery recently received was
107 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Copiador de Cartas da Fdbrica do Cedro - 18/10/1872 a 
10/04/1879", "Letter from Mascarenhas & Irmaos to Meilford de Lidgerwood, 18 February 1873".
108 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Copiador de Cartas da Fabrica do Cedro - 18/10/1872 a 
10/04/1879", "Letter from Mascarenhas & Irmaos to Meilford de Lidgerwood, 18 February 1873".
109 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 15", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 28 February 1884".
110 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.29", "Letter from Robert L. Keir 
to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 24 April 1891".
111 Costa, op.cit.. pp.35-6.
112 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 18", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 10 July 1885".
113 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.35", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 2 March 1893".
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broken on detraining in Lafaiete and unloading in Sahara114.
The supply of imported equipment was also very slow, sometimes taking months and creating 
embarrassing situations. In 1891, for example, the lighting service of Juiz de Fora was interrupted because 
of a breakdown of the generating machinery. The domestic lighting was only reestablished two months later 
when the new equipment ordered from the USA finally arrived115.
Mistakes in the supply of equipment were not uncommon and also required time to remedy. On 
4 January 1884, Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, manager of die Cachoeira mill, complained that he had 
opened a box of machinery from England, but the contents (wharves for spindles) were not the ones 
ordered116. On 24 March 1884, Ken wrote to Bernardo Mascarenhas that he regretted the mistake made with 
the spindles wharves. He had already contacted the producers (Hobson & Barlon), who were going to 
examine the matter and would hopefully give a full explanation in the course of a few days117. On 4 April 
1884, Kerr gave the following account about the problem:
"Referring to the spindles wharves which were sent by mistake I beg to say that Messrs.
Hobson & Barlon now admit that they by some misunderstanding made the mistake but
will supply the same quantity which you have recently ordered free of cost."118
It took three months from the day that the mistake was first noticed to the day that the supplier 
acknowledged it  The delay between the placing of the order and delivery of the correct material must have 
been much larger. If users and suppliers were closer to each other the solution would certainly take much 
less time. In 1885, Kerr again regretted that a wrong pair of hearts had been sent by mistake and, as a right 
one had already been dispatched, he expected it to be there in a fortnight's time119.
Sometimes machines did not perform as advertised. In 1889, Bernardo Mascarenhas advised 
Marques Ferreira, then general manager of the CCC, not to believe everything that the catalogues of the 
producers of machinery said, because they tended to exaggerate the performance of machines120. Moreover, 
machines did not always perform as expected and procuring replacements was a complex and long operation.
114 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.35", "Letter from Francisco de 
Paula Mascarenhas to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 13 January 1893".
115 Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, O Pharol. (Juiz de Fora), 27 March 1891.
116 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 15", "Letter from Francisco de 
Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 4 January 1884".
117 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 15", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 24 March 1884".
118 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 15", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 4 April 1884".
119 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 18", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 18 September 1885".
120 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias - Bernardo Mascarenhas, 1883-1899 
- No. 148", "Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 20 April 1889".
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In 1885, for example, Kerr wrote that he greatly regretted that the governors supplied with a turbine by
Gunther had not worked satisfactorily. The poor performance could had been caused by the speed at which
the governors were working:
"They [the governors] were running for several days before leaving the workshop and 
appeared to act very well and were very sensitive to any change in speed. It may be that 
they have not been working at the proper speed. I expect when you go to Cachoeira you 
will be able to find out why they do not work well."121
On other occasions, foreign suppliers failed to keep their word. In 1893, Henry Rogers Sons & Co., 
a representative from Rio de Janeiro, wrote that a supplier was refusing to exchange a part which did not 
fit the machinery of one of the mills of the CCC, although the supplier had promised to do so before he 
supplied it. The supplier argued that the part had signs of use and that a long time had passed since it had 
been sent to Brazil122.
On yet other occasions, machines were not always supplied according to the specifications
stipulated. In 1885, Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas complained that looms received did not satisfy his
specifications stipulated in the order
"All of the looms were set on die right side whereas in the plan several of them should 
be set on the left side. This will bring lots of problems if there is no solution."123
In 1899, Kerr informed Aristides Mascarenhas that the dyeing machine ordered for the Cachoeira mill had 
been made with only twelve divisions, instead of the fifteen originally ordered. The suppliers had never 
made such a large machine before and they had thought it would be unwise to do so124. In 1901, Victor 
Uslaender & Co., an agent from Rio de Janeiro, wrote that the machine was supplied with a table of 36" 
x 20", instead of 30" X 20", as ordered. The manufacturer had decided to make the machine larger because 
he thought it would otherwise not leave enough space for the operative125.
There were also times when a foreign supplier did not even guarantee that the equipment supplied 
would work at all. The first experiments with the equipment supplied by the WEC to the CME to generate 
electricity were unsuccessful. The supplier did not guarantee anything and expressed reservations about the 
chances of the equipment ever working. Moreover, the material was not supplied according to specifications
121 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 18", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 30 October 1885".
122 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.36", "Letter from Henry Rogers 
Sons & Co. to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 5 August 1893".
123 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 17", "Letter from Francisco de 
Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 22 April 1885".
124 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.51", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Aristides Mascarenhas, 15 June 1899".
125 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.58", "Letter from Victor 
Uslaender & Co., 11 December 1901".
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originally drawn-up by Bernardo Mascarenhas. Also the quantity was insufficient126.
Users of foreign technology were also more vulnerable to increases in the prices of materials and
machinery because of the length of time between placing an order and delivery, and because any change
in the exchange rates might represent an increase in their costs. Exchange variations posed a particular
problem for Brazilian importers, especially during the late nineteenth century127. In 1893, for example, the
CME increased the price of domestic lighting by 50% because of the increase in the prices, among other
things, of imported materials and machinery128.
Finally, sometimes foreign suppliers were themselves victims of some of problems caused by
geographic distance and cultural differences. In 1899, for example, the makers of a hardwaste breaking
machine complained that the machine had been ready for a long time and that Ken had done nothing
towards having it collected:
"The machine has been in our way now so long and you do not give us any intimation 
when you will take it that we now give you formal notice that failing receipt from you 
within 14 days of the requested instructions, we shall dispose of the machine and sue you 
for Ten Pounds as our damage for breach of contract."129
Distance and cultural and economic differences invariably caused problems of communication.
Geographical and cultural distance is a factor which may hinder the interaction between users and 
producers, and consequently jeorpadize the absorption of a foreign technology130. In the past, physical 
proximity between the producer and user of machinery was a significant factor promoting successful transfer 
of technology. Easy communication between the producer and user of machinery was important because it 
fostered and strengthened a complex network of contacts and communication. This promoted a convergence 
of interests between the user of a machine, who appreciates problems in connection with its use, and the 
producer of machinery, who is acquainted with the problems concerning machinery production131. However, 
as nineteenth century technologies were produced in places other than Portuguese-speaking countries and 
as most firms in Minas Gerais relied on foreign technology and were strongly depended on foreign skilled
126 Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. p. 140.
127 For a more detailed account of exchange rate variations in nineteenth-century Brazil see EA. 
Cardoso, "Exchange Rates in Nineteenth-Century Brazil: An Econometric Model", in The Journal of 
Development Studies. V.19 January 1983 No.2, pp. 170-8.
128 Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, "Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas to the president of the 
City Council of Juiz de Fora on 7 June 1893".
129 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.51", "Letter to Robert L. Kerr, 
11 August 1899".
130 B.A. Lundvall, "Innovation as an Interactive Process: From User-Producer Interaction to the 
National System of Innovation", in Technical Change and Economic Theory, ed. G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. 
Nelson, G. Silverberg, and L. Soete (1988), pp.349-66.
131 Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, p. 168.
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labour, problems of communication were aggravated. Because of a scarcity of illustrative material for the 
other economic sectors, the case of the textile industry will be mainly used to demonstrate some of the 
problems of communication that businesses in Minas Gerais encountered during the last century.
Although there is no direct evidence for the iron industry and the CUI, it is possible to speculate 
about the extent that these sectors problems were caused by poor communications. As the technologies used 
by these industries relied heavily on the technical knowledge of personnel, and as there was a large number 
of foreign entrepreneurs, managers and technicians, employed in both the iron industry and the CUI, it is 
reasonable to believe that the question of communication was crucial for the operation of these technologies. 
The learning of a foreign language was a crucial requisite for both entrepreneurs and workers. Eschwege, 
founder of the Patriotica foundry, for example, was a German. However, when he came to Minas Gerais 
he probably could already speak Portuguese since had previously worked in Portugal132. Nevertheless, 
Monlevade, founder of the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry, was a Frenchman who until the year when 
he came to Brazil lived in France. It is interesting to note that Monlevade's foundry was established only 
ten years after his arrival in Minas Gerais. He spent most of this time studying the deposits of minerals of 
Minas Gerais133, and had probably to learn Portuguese before attempting to invest in any kind of business. 
Schoenewolf, a German foundry master, who worked in both the Patriotica and the Morro do Pilar 
foundries134, had probably also to learn the language before he could effectively manage a foundry in Brazil. 
Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage, founder of the CUI, spent some time in the USA and Europe135 where he 
probably learned several languages. This proved important some years later when he organized the CUI, as 
most of the professionals and skilled workers employed by the company were foreigners136.
Nevertheless, this is only speculation and direct evidence of the problem of communication can only 
be found for the textile industry, mineiro textile entrepreneurs had to learn a foreign language before they 
could even make the first contact with the producers of machinery. When the Cedro mill was established 
Bernardo Mascarenhas spent a year and a half in the USA learning English, while visiting several textile 
mills to get the know-how of the production of cloth137. The learning of English would prove to be very 
important in his future entrepreneurial activities. By the time of the establishment of the Cachoeira mill, 
Bernardo spent eight months in England studying, working, and visiting factories. In Manchester, at 
Metropolitan Vickers, he met the engineer Robert L. Kerr who would become a close friend, his agent and
132 Gomes, op.cit.. p.79.
133 Ibid., p. 109.
134 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.208.
135 Bastos, op.cit.. p.23.
136 See Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1856), pp. 13- 
4; (1857), p.21; and (1866), Annexe No. 12.
137 Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. p. 37.
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a very useful contact in England138. Furthermore, Bernardo's command of English proved crucial by the time 
of die establishment of the CME, as seen above. Americo Teixeira Guimaraes - founder of the COM - had 
to learn English before sending the first letters to manufacturers of machinery in England. It took him 
several months of hard study before he could had a sufficient grasp of the language to carry out these 
transactions139.
Furthermore, not only textile entrepreneurs had to learn a foreign language. Foreign workers 
employed by them also had to acquire language skills, as illustrated by the following letter sent to J.N. 
Gordon, chairman of the SJDRMC:
"I am returning Mr. Jorge Gregor as we do not need an interpreter anymore, since the
Americans already understand Portuguese (...)."140
Communication problems should not be underestimated since most firms in Minas Gerais relied 
on foreign technology and depended strongly on foreign skilled workers.
Thus, there were many problems, old and new, in the user-supplier relationship which were created 
and aggravated by geographic distance and socio, cultural and economic differences. The most common of 
these problems were: delays in delivery, adulterated orders, inevitable misunderstandings, loss of goods, lack 
of sensitivity on the part of the suppliers to the specific circumstances of foreign users, vulnerability to 
changes in prices due to changes in the exchange rates, and unfulfilled promises. This was particularly true 
for those industries using embodied technologies, such as the textile and the power industries. The iron 
industry and the CUI depended more on the accumulated technical knowledge of skilled labour than on the 
acquisition of machinery. Another important problem in the relationship between users and producers who 
did not share common cultural features was the question of communication. Often mineiro entrepreneurs 
had to learn a foreign language before they could make die first contact with the suppliers of technology, 
while foreign workers sometimes had to rely on interpreters before they could understand Portuguese 
properly. Thus, the number of problems faced by the mineiro entrepreneurs in their relationship with foreign 
suppliers is undisputed and evidences the importance of physical proximity between users and suppliers for 
the successful absorption of technology. If the problems related to the distance and cultural differences 
between users and suppliers did not hinder the emergence of some of the industries examined in this work, 
they certainly delayed their development and increased their costs.
7.23 - Installation, maintenance, and adaptation:
Selecting and purchasing the right equipment or machinery was neither the hardest nor the least 
of the problems that mineiro entrepreneurs had to overcome in dealing with foreign suppliers and foreign 
technologies. After obtaining the appropriate equipment and before installing it, transporting it could prove
138 Ibid., pp.63-4.
139 Freitas, op.cit.. p.27.
140 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Copiador de Cartas da Fabrica do Cedro - 18/10/1872 a 
10/04/1879", "Letter from Mascarenhas & Irmaos to J.N. Gordon, 6 November 1872".
2 2 5
a real handicap. The problems of transport of machinery in the nineteenth century, from their countries of 
origin to their final destination, cannot be neglected. Very often the lack of suitable means of transport in 
latecomer economies represented an enormous barrier.
Nevertheless, die problem posed by the lack of roads did not affect every industry in the same way. 
The transport of equipment did not represent a major problem for those industries which employed a more 
disembodied technology. As mentioned above, metallurgy and road-construction in the nineteenth century 
depended more on technical competence of skilled labour than on the acquisition of machinery. The basic 
machinery could be, and actually was, built on the site. Eschwege, for example, helped by a carpenter built 
most of his foundry's facilities, from the furnaces to the bellows141. The installations of the Morro do Pilar 
foundry were also built on site142. Furthermore, the commonest method of production employed by the iron 
industry in die first three-quarters of the last century - the cadinho method - was an indigenous and simple, 
and did not require complex facilities143. The CUI also made most of its equipment on site, as die description 
of the workshops of the company suggests:
"There are established in Juiz de Fora workshops for a blacksmith, locksmith, carpenter
of carriages, carts and coaches, carpenter of bridges and buildings, cabinet-maker,
beltmaker and saddler, and painter."144
The company also had a brickyard in the Juiz de Fora station which produce bricks and tiles145.
Even so, foundries depended on some imported material, as the German foundry master 
Schoenewolf, who worked in the Morro do Pilar foundry for several years, showed clearly in his report to 
Eschwege about the planned changes in the facilities of the foundry:
"Everything will change now, including refractory material, which was ordered in England,
because the existing ones were useless after few days."146
The hammermills of Eschwege's foundry were also imported from England, since it was virtually impossible 
to produce them in Brazil147. As already mentioned, the CUI depended on some imported material and 
components. At the time of the construction of the Uniao e Industria turnpike the company had repeated 
problems in transporting material bought abroad. In 1856, Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage complained about 
the troubles caused by delays in clearing through customs imported material purchased in Europe. He 
illustrated very clearly the extent of such problems in the middle of the nineteenth century:
141 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.248.
142 Ibid., p.208.
143 Libby, op.cit.. pp. 147-8.
144 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), p.23.
145 Bastos, op.cit.. pp.40-1.
146 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.210.
147 Gomes, op.cit.. p.84.
2 2 6
"One day of delay of any object in the customs in Rio de Janeiro may represent a delay 
of two or three months, if by any chance we miss a muletrain that could bring it."148
Thus, although both the iron industry and the CUI were not totally free of the problems caused by the lack 
of suitable means of transport, which greatly disturbed other businesses, they were not unaffected.
The most affected industries were those that employed technologies embodied in the form of 
equipment and machinery. Due to the lack of roads, the transport of textile machinery from die port of Rio 
de Janeiro to the hinterlands of Minas Gerais was full of adventures and obstacles. Machines had to be 
carried on the back of beasts of burden. Roads were rough and sometimes bridges had to be built along the 
way.
Bernardo Mascarenhas, for example, arrived in Rio de Janeiro from the USA with 50 tons of 
machinery in 1871. From there, the machinery was transported to Entre Rios by rail, and from Entre Rios 
to Juiz de Fora in large carts by the CUI. From Juiz de Fora onwards, the machinery was transported in ox­
carts. The trip took approximately two months to cover a distance of nearly 250 miles149. An eye witness 
recalled the caravan passing by:
"A long time ago, when I was a child, I was woken up by the noise of the huge caravan 
of carts drawn by oxen passing, in the morning, through the small village of Santa 
Quit&ia, (...) carrying the machinery for the Cedro textile mill (...). Even now I can recall 
the large number of men carrying hoes, pickaxes, and shovels, anticipating the caravan and 
crossing the village to fix and build bridges along the way where the heavy carts had to 
pass (...)."15°
Further evidence of the lack of basic infrastructure and the difficulties in transporting machinery is given 
by the proprietors of the Cedro mill in their reply to the inquiry of the president of the Sete Lagoas City 
Council:
"The only difficulty in the acquisition of machines is freight, which is expensive and very 
slow from Rio de Janeiro to the mill."151
Moreover, the lack of suitable means of transport imposed strict limits on the ability of the suppliers 
or agents to dispatch machinery, parts and materials. In 1884, Kerr informed Bernardo Mascarenhas that he 
had sent three cases exceeding the weight permissible for transport on the backs of mules because the 
suppliers could not make them any lighter152. Some days later, Kerr gave the following account of the 
problems that had to be overcome when supplying materials to the textile mills located in the hinterland of
148 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1856), p.22.
149 Vaz, op.cit.. p.50.
150 Ibid., p.50.
151 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Copiador de Cartas de 1881 - Mascarenhas & Irmaos", "Letter 
from Mascarenhas Irmaos to the president of the Sete Lagoas District Council, 13 March 1882".
152 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 16", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 8 July 1884".
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Minas Gerais:
"With respect to the sizes of cases ordered by you for the dyeing materials I found several 
of them would have been too heavy for being conveyed on the backs of mules, I therefore 
have supplied you with smaller cases, and making up the quantity to a certain extent by 
increasing the number of cases. The Brown Catechu is only supplied in solid blocks, and 
the smallest block I could buy weighed about 3 [?] (...), so that I was obliged to purchase 
the block and get it cut into 3 pieces to suit the weights allowed for the back of mules."153
The opening of roads and the building of bridges on the way from Entre-Rios to Machado seems 
also to have been the destiny of Azarias de Sousa Dias, the founder of the SAIM. A slave who took part 
on the trip to bring the machinery to Machado, Antonio Moreira de Souza Guerra, better known as Chico 
Moreira, recalled that the oxen had to be constantly changed in order to continue the exhausting journey. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, one of the explanations given for the postponement of the beginning of 
the production of the mill was that part of the machinery had been lost during the trip154.
As had happened to Bernardo Mascarenhas and his brothers fifteen years before, Amdrico Teixeira 
Guimaraes faced very similar problems when he transported machinery for his mill in Cachoeira dos 
Macacos, which was not very far from the Cedro mill. To reach Cachoeira dos Macacos, the machinery was 
transported on the backs of animals and in large carts drawn by oxen especially built for the carriage of 
machinery. The journey took more than two months from Juiz de Fora, the railhead155.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the problem of transporting machinery became less 
acute, as the railway was penetrating farther and farther into the hinterlands of Minas Gerais. However, the 
problems of transport mentioned above did not disappear completely. In the early 1890s, machinery for the 
CTS was probably transported to either Divinopolis or Sahara, the closest railway stations at that time, some 
twenty five and fifty miles distance respectively, and from there to Sand'Anna do Sao Joao Acima by ox­
carts. This was indeed an improvement, though not the end of serious problems, as Z6 Carreiro, who had 
participated in the journey as a driver, observed:
"Hard time. (...)
We left family and friends behind. We needed a couple of days to prepare. (...)
(...) it required skill to load the cart. If the load were not well positioned the cart
would tilt forwards or backwards. Tilting forwards would hurt the back of the oxen; 
backwards would strangle them. (...)
(...) As a rule, we knew the road. We knew the pot-holes, the cliffs, the holes, (...), the 
right places to rest. It was possible to travel up to five leagues per day. (...) There were times of 
anguish. The pot-holes, for example, were as deep as they were wide and were impossible to cross. 
The carts and the oxen would sink. It would be a great disaster and the best thing to do was to
avoid them, passing by their edges. Nevertheless, there were pot-holes that deceived the driver,
even the most experienced. But the biggest danger were the cliffs. There were some of more than 
a hundred fathoms high, very steep. God help me! I do not like to recall it  When it was raining
153 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 16", "Letter from Robert L. Ken* 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 31 July 1884".
154 Costa, op.cit.. pp.35-6.
155 Freitas, op.cit.. p.27.
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the surface became very slippery. Saying it like that does not sound dangerous, but it really was. 
To pass along a road like that required experience. We were always afraid of losing the oxen, die 
cart or even the load. (...)156.
Ze Carreiro's description gives a good idea of the obstacles entrepreneurs had to overcome even before 
starting production. Furthermore, it graphically illustrates the lack of basic infrastructure in Minas Gerais, 
even at a time when the railway was starting to reach the hinterland of the province.
Although the mineiro electrical power companies also employed technologies embodied in 
equipment, the transport of this equipment did not represent a major obstacle for several reasons. The power 
companies were established mainly at the turn of the century, a time when the means of transport had 
improved considerably. The CME, for example, was established on 10 December 1887157 and the CFLCL 
on 26 February 1905158. More importantly, however, they were both located in the southern part of Minas 
Gerais, one of the first regions to be linked to Rio de Janeiro by good means of transport and where there 
was an extensive network of good roads. The CME was located in Juiz de Fora, which was served by the 
Uniao e Industria turnpike from the late 1850's159 and by the D. Pedro II railway (EFDPII) a few years 
later160. The CFLCL was located very near to Juiz de Fora, in the Mata zone.
Owing to the lack of suitable means of transport, the problems of shipping foreign machinery and 
equipment from their countries of origin to their final destination represented an enormous barrier, specially 
for the textile industry.
Once the first difficulties of selecting and purchasing a technology - and in the case of embodied 
technologies, of transporting it - had been overcome, it had to be installed and put into operation. When the 
transfer of technology involved countries geographically distant from one another, this implied that skilled 
labour had also to be procured overseas. Technology is not a set of techniques available independently of 
the human inputs who utilize it. The capacity to understand and apply technical knowledge is essential for 
the successful utilization information incorporated in any "technological package"161. In some countries 
skilled migrant labour played a critical role not only in setting up a technology but also on its daily 
operation. Most Paulista railways, for example, drew heavily on foreign labour for assembling imported 
material during construction phases and later in maintenance operations. At the outset, Paulista railways
156 J.W.T. Mello, Santanense: Revolucao Filosofica e Industrial em Sanct'Anna do Sap Joao Acima. 
(Belo Horizonte, 1991), p. 142.
157 Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. p. 120.
158 Companhia Forfa e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, 80 Anos da Comnanhia Forca e Luz 
Cataguazes-Leoooldina: Uma Luz sobre a Historia. (1985), p.l.
159 Bastos, op.cit.. p.30.
160 F. Iglesias, Politica Economica do Govemo Provincial Mineiro: 1835-1889. (Rio de Janeiro, 
1958), p. 165.
161 Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, pp. 154-68.
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depended entirely upon foreigners for both skilled and unskilled labour, as local supply was scarce. 
Foreigners, until the turn of the century, virtually monopolized skilled jobs162. Mineiro entrepreneurs very 
often also had to rely on foreign technicians to assemble, operate and maintain imported equipment. 
However, these foreign technicians were neither easy to find nor reliable. Furthermore, they were expensive 
and relationships with them usually proved difficult.
As in the case of the USA, where the transfer of iron and steel technologies took place via the 
migration of artisans or managers experienced in using the technology163, foreign entrepreneurs and 
ironworkers were extremely important in the establishment of the mineiro iron industry. However, the search 
for these foreign ironworkers was an uncertain enterprise for Brazilian businessmen compared to their US 
counterparts. Besides demanding high salaries and, sometimes, not possessing the knowledge they claimed, 
these ironworkers rarely stayed in the same foundry for long. Thus, hiring a European technician was usually 
prohibitively expensive. This is one of the reasons why the cadinho method was so popular164.
The largest foundries established in Minas Gerais in the earlier part of the nineteenth century were 
either owned by foreigners or relied upon foreign technicians. As mentioned above, two of the most 
successful foundries belonged to foreigners. The Patriotica was established, operated, and managed by 
Eschwege, a German engineer165. Moreover, Eschwege counted on the help of a German foundry master, 
who was considered very competent166. Also as indicated above, the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry 
belonged to the French engineer Monlevade and was for more than forty years, under his management, 
obtaining the best results among all the foundries in Minas Gerais167. Production at the Morro do Pilar 
foundry was only possible after Schoenewolf, the German foundry master who worked at the Patriotica 
foundry, was hired to supervise the work in 1814. His presence was absolutely vital to the successful 
production of the foundry168.
Eschwege stressed the vital role played by foreign ironworkers in setting up an iron foundry in 
Brazil. They were essential not only for assembling the facilities but also for training the native workforce. 
However, these foreign technicians earned three times more than Brazilian masters and their travelling 
expenses were high. There were further problems:
"The foreign masters, who believe themselves to be indispensable, make several demands.
162 R.H. Mattoon, "Railroads, Coffee, and Big Business in Sao Paulo Brazil", in HA HR. May 1977, 
Vol. 57, No.2, pp.289-93.
163 Hyde, op.cit.. pp.52-70.
164 Libby, op.cit.. p. 141.
165 Eschewege, op.cit.. pp.247-54.
166 Gomes, op.cit.. p.83.
167 Libby, op.cit.. p. 149.
168 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.208.
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Some become idle and others take to drink. As a consequence, they quarrel with their 
employers, who in the end dismiss them. The work is then done by Brazilians who have 
only learned a little from the foreign masters. Consequently, the products do not improve 
and production does not increase with change. Thus, the entrepreneurs are forced to close 
down their foundries."1®
The reliance upon foreigners in the construction and operation of the Uniao e Industria turnpike 
was also strong. As in the case of paulista railways established in the second half of the last century, at least 
at the beginning the CUI depended heavily on foreigners for skilled labour. The construction of the road was 
supervised by two French engineers, J.J. Regnier Vigouroux and Theodoro Flagolot, until 1856170. In 1857, 
the French engineers were replaced by a German, Keller, and a Brazilian engineer, Bulhoes. During the 
same year, the company also hired Keller's two sons to work as his assistants, who were probably not 
Brazilians171. For the architectural and surveying work, foreigners were also employed, namely Carlos 
Augusto Gambs and Miguel Lallemant, architects, and Adryano H. Mynssen, surveyor172. Moreover, in 1856, 
Mariano Procopio stated that the company had recruited 20 craftsmen in Hamburg for the workshops173. 
According to the decree of 7 August 1852, which granted the company the concession for the construction 
of the turnpike, the company established a colony of immigrants in Juiz de Fora in 1858. Among die 667 
adults, 389 men and 278 women, who lived in the colony in 1860, approximately 196 worked for the 
company: 48 in the brickyard, 85 in the workshops, 55 in the construction of the road, 5 in the warehouse 
and 3 as drivers174.
The mineiro textile industry is full of examples of how crucial foreign technicians were, and how 
difficult relationships with them might become. The contract for the purchase of machinery for the Cedro 
mill, for example, included the provision of a technician to assemble and operate the machinery175. However, 
after having reached its final destination after the long journey from the USA, where it has been made, to 
the hinterlands of Minas Gerais, where the Cedro mill was located, the machinery was left standing for 
months for a technician to assemble it. As already mentioned, the first technician who came from die USA 
in accordance with the contract never arrived. Then, two other technicians were hired, Barnes and Nicholson.
169 Ibid., pp.257-8.
170 A.O. Esteves, "Mariano Procopio: Trabalhos Originais", in Revista do Institntn Historico e 
Geografico Brasileiro. (Rio de Janeiro, 1856), Vol.230, pp. 149-52.
171 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), p.21.
172 D.A. Giroletti, "A Companhia e a Rodovia Uniao e Industria e o Desenvolvimento de Juiz de 
Fora, 1850 a 1900", Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1980, p.27.
173 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1856), p.13.
174 Giroletti, A Companhia e a Rodovia Uniao e Industria. pp.31-7.
175 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.2", "Contract of purchase of 
machinery signed by Mascarenhas & Irmaos and Gme. Van Vlick Lidgerwood, 27 September 1870".
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Barnes left the company five months after his arrival. He did not have the qualifications he claimed and his
relationship with the Mascarenhas rapidly deteriorated:
"The story that Bames is an experienced and excellent machinist is a great mistake. Barnes 
never was a machinist. He was a bad weaver in a factory, and finally worked as a taverner 
in New York, where he pretended to be a practical machinist, an occupation of which he 
is completely ignorant. This man, who cost us so much, has done nothing more than 
damage machines. Furthermore, he is rude, arrogant, and insolent. He broke off all his 
relationships, even with his countrymen, James and his wife. He himself decided to do us 
a favour and left"176
Nicholson stayed longer in the company and his wife became responsible for the training of the weavers. 
Furthermore, at least in the first years, every master in the mill, apart from the blacksmith and carpenter 
masters, was hired abroad, preferably in the country where the machinery had been bought177. In 1879, two 
Englishmen, George Jates and Nathan Holt, experts in weaving and spinning, were recruited by Kerr to work 
at the Cedro mill. Nathan Holt was dismissed in 1882 because of his rudeness and carelessness, which had 
caused considerable damage to the machinery. Obviously, there are two sides of the story and this is only 
the version of the employer. The worker's version, as usual, is not available. George Jates also left in 1882 
and the company hired another foreign technician, John Smith, in the same year178.
At the beginning, the Cachoeira mill also relied on foreign technicians to supervise work. In 1876, 
the Cachoeira mill hired an Englishman, William Hutchinson, for two years to set-up and operate the mill 
and train the workforce. In 1879, another two foreign machinists, John and William Lomas, and a foreign 
weaver, Andrew White, were hired to replace William Hutchinson, who had returned to England. The first 
machinist left the company to visit England in 1882 but would not promise to return. In the same year, 
William Lomas and Andrew White ran away during the night, but there is no information about the reasons 
which motivated them to do it. Nevertheless, based on the number of problems with foreign workers that 
employers reported, it is reasonable to believe that the attitude of mineiro employers towards their work­
force was harsh. In 1883, James Winders, another Englishman, was hired to work at the mill179.
The employment of, and the search for foreign technicians, as well as the problems of retaining 
foreign workers, continued throughout the century and remained at the beginning of this century. James 
Winders continued to be employed at the CCC, after the merger of the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills, until 
1889 despite the numerous problems he caused. In 1888, Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas wrote to Bernardo 
Mascarenhas giving the following account of James Winders' misbehaviour:
"During my absence, while I was travelling to Sao Sebastiao, several regrettable events 
occurred caused by James' drunkenness. (...) Last Saturday, with the excuse of a row
176 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Copiador de Cartas da Fabrica do Cedro - 18/10/1872 a 
10/04/1879", "Letter from Mascarenhas & Irmaos to Meilford de Lidgerwood, 18 February 1873".
177 Vaz, op.cit.. p.53.
178 Giroletti, Fabrica Convento Disciplina., pp.84-6.
179 Ibid., pp.86-8.
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between his wife and the Winders, James assaulted her, (...). On Sunday, James got drunk 
and assaulted his wife once again, causing a great scandal and too much screaming, and 
intended to shoot her with a gun and a rifle; meanwhile, an employee of the mill went 
there to save the poor woman and he was also assaulted by James. The insulted man 
grasped the Englishman and beat him badly, but not as much as he deserved."180
However, there is no information about Winders' story. In 1884, Kerr wrote saying that he had made
enquiries about an experienced and skilful dyer and that he had found that such workers expected to earn
from £5 to £6 per week, plus free accommodation181. Although there is no information about the salary of
a Brazilian machinist during this year, comparison between die salaries of James Nicholson and his wife
in 1872, and that of a Brazilian machinist fives later is illustrative of the differences between the salaries
paid to foreigners and Brazilians. In the first case, James Nicholson received 10$000 Milreis per day, plus
food and accommodation, and his wife 4$000 Milreis. In the second case, a Brazilian machinist received
in 1877 5$000 Milreis, without food or accommodation182. In December 1886, Kerr gave the following
account of the conditions to recrait a mechanic in England:
"With reference to looking out for another mechanic I presume I must not send any one 
until I hear from you again. I should like to know if you require a man who understand 
carding, spinning and weaving, and also the same man capable of erecting machinery and 
keeping die same in good order. It is rather difficult to find a man who is capable of doing 
all these things, but I would do my best for you."183
Moreover, William Hutchinson's long story with the CCC illustrates well not only the difficulties
of recruiting skilled foreign labour, but also the difficulty of retaining it. In 1883, William Hutchinson was
invited to work for the company once again. Nevertheless, he decided not to go back to Brazil because his
wife would not agree to accept the offer:
"In respect to our conversation respecting going to Brazil I have had very much 
conversation with my wife since I saw you at the mill, but she seems to take it very hard,
(...), we are both very sorry that we cannot reply in your favour (...) "184
In September 1886, Kerr wrote saying that he had spoken to William Hutchinson, who would consider the 
matter of rejoining the CCC and would reply in the course of a few days185. Three months later, Kerr wrote
180 Letter from Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas on 9 June 1888, 
reproduced in Ibid., pp.89-90.
181 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 16", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 8 July 1884".
182 Vaz, op.cit.. p.201.
183 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.20", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 11 December 1886".
184 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 14", "Letter from William 
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that Hutchinson was reluctant to travel to Brazil, unless the company was willing to offer him great
inducements to leave home again186. However, it seems that the CCC decided to pay the "great inducements"
that Hutchinson was requesting, as in 1889 he rejoined the company for a two-year contract. In 1891,
William Hutchinson returned to England and left his son, Hebert, in his place together with a relative, also
William, who had come out with him two years previously. Both of them continued working for the
company until 1894, when they returned for good to England. In 1892, William Hutchinson was once again
recruited to set-up machinery recently acquired for the Sao Vicente mill. He stayed until October 1894187.
However, in the following year, William Hutchinson again refused to return to Brazil because his family
opposed his leaving England188. Kerr tried to recruit another machinist, whose services would cost £6 per
week189. Eventually, the company decided to hire John Lomas, who was employed at the Sao Sebastiao milL
However, John Lomas left the company after a few months and the company failed to hire another foreign
technician190. Only in 1901 after the representatives in Brazil of Henry Rogers, Sons & Co., an English
manufacturer of textile machinery, were informed that the CCC needed a technician and offered an operative
from their own factory in England was the problem resolved:
"Our mutual friend, Mr. Viriato Mascarenhas, has been here and said that you need a 
master in spinning. We have one in our factory in England, Mr. James Hargreaves, who 
has already been at the Biribiry mill. We believe he is the person that you need (...)."191
The employment of foreign technicians can also be noted in other textile mills in Minas Gerais. In
1893, Manoel Jose de Souza Moreira wrote to Aristides Mascarenhas, chairman of the CCC, requesting the
help of a foreign technician for assembling machinery at the CTS:
"As I needed a mechanic to assemble four spinning and carding machines in the mill that 
I am setting up here, I wrote to Mr. John Lomas. Nevertheless, when he arrived here he 
informed me that it would be difficult for him to work here since he was still an employee 
of the Companhia do Cedro.
"U ).
"As the work of assembling the machines we have here will not take more than one or two 
months, I would like to ask if you could release Mr. Lomas to assemble our machines and put them
186 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.20", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 11 December 1886".
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into operation."192
At the CCM, an English technician was hired to install machinery. However, his relationship with the
manager of the mill, Am6rico Teixeira Guimaraes, soon deteriorated and the Englishman returned home
early193. In 1875, the Brazil Industrial, a textile mill established in Juiz de Fora, hired five technicians in
England just to assemble the machinery19*.
Although Bernardo Mascarenhas had a good knowledge of electricity and was able to draw-up
detailed plans for his electrical power plant, he also had to rely upon foreign technicians during installation.
At the beginning of 1889, the equipment ordered from WEC began to arrive together with two North
American technicians195. However, they did not possess the necessary skills, as Bernardo stated in his letter
to the agents of WEC:
"You may have some idea of my anxiety and great apprehension. I do not think that Mr. 
Merriman possess the necessary skill, and he himself has confessed that he does not 
possess any experience with alternating current, but only with Edison's system."196
The CME continued to rely on foreign technicians throughout the century. In 1893, the company informed 
its customers that the increase in the price of the domestic lighting service was due, among other things, to 
the increase in the salaries of its foreign employees197, probably due to exchange fluctuations.
Thus, mineiro business enterprises relied heavily on foreigners for setting-up and putting into 
Operation foreign technologies. However, once installed, it was often necessary to adapt imported equipment 
Or processes of production to local conditions. This was often necessary because of differences in physical 
c)r climate factors, in the inputs which were utilised198, and in the availability of factors of production among 
different countries. Techniques which were efficient in one environment might not be so in another199. The 
problem of adaptation did not apply only to the operation of equipment and machinery, but also with regard 
to managerial procedures. The problem of adaptation was often neither simple nor trivial. In some cases it
192 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.35", "Letter from Manoel Jose 
de Souza Moreira to Aristides Mascarenhas, 24 April 1893".
193 Freitas, op.cit.. p.27.
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196 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas, reproduced in Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. p. 141.
197 Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, "Declara^ao da Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade". "Letter 
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might require relatively sophisticated inputs of skills or information, drawing on the experience of other local
firms. It might also not be possible to undertake adaptation without the assistance either from governments,
educational institutions or even specialised consultants. However, it was often one of the most important
technological activities which a firm could implement. Indeed, empirical studies in Latin America have
shown that the primary source of technological change within firms arose from an accretion of these
relatively minor trouble-shooting efforts to adapt equipment and procedures to local conditions200.
During the nineteenth century, all of the mineiro firms examined in this thesis carried out a
surprising amount of minor adaptations and modifications. The development of the cadinho method of
production is clear evidence of this. The cadinho process derived from modifications applied by Eschwege
and other foreign experts, based on the Swedish method of iron-making, to a more primitive technique first
introduced into Brazil by African slaves. Eschwege's main contribution was the application of water to
power the bellows and the hammermill201. Nevertheless, the simplicity of the cadinho method meant that
scope for further modification was very limited. Lack of skilled personnel rendered the cadinho foundry die
only feasible method of in Minas Gerais. Attempts to employ more complex methods usually failed.
Manuel Ferreira da Camara, for example, attempted to establish a foundry of large proportions in
the first decade of the last century. He planned to build three blast furnaces, but in the end he built only one
because there was not enough water power and wood available in the neighbourhood for the operation of
more than one blast furnace, one forge, and one hammermill. Later, Camara decided to build two small
Swedish furnaces to replace the blast furnace. The original structure had been damaged as the result of early
experimental firings. The inexperience of the work-force led to high temperatures, which destroyed the walls.
Nevertheless, the Swedish furnaces could not operate effectively because of the scarcity of water power. In
1814, Schoenewolf, a German foundry-master who had work at the Morro do Pilar foundry for several
years, described the failure of attempts to adapt and repair the bellows of the forge:
"When I arrived, the hammermill and the forge were already built, (...), as well as the two 
bellows made of leather, which were put into action by strings instead of chains.
Mr. Camara assured me that the bellows produced enough air. However, the first 
experiment showed that the quantity of air was so irregular that it was not possible to 
refine (...).
Mr. Camara tried to repair it, (...) lost his patience and transferred the 
managership to his brother, who had never seen an iron foundry before, (...).
The manager attempted several innovations (...) without changing die final result."
In the end, Schoenewolf changed the whole lay-out of the hammermill and reconstructed the bellows 
according to Eschwege's specifications. Furthermore, Camara have decided not use a blast furnace before 
the arrival of the skilled personnel requested from the government Altogether, he requested 14 people,
200 Kaplinsky, op.cit.. pp. 19-26.
201 Libby, op.cit.. pp. 137-8.
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among smelters, refiners, moulder-masters, etc202. Further evidence of limits to the capacity of adaptation
and modification is given by Eschwege. He had imported the hammermills of his foundry from England as
it was nearly impossible to produce them locally203.
As shown above, although the CUI depended more on the technical knowledge of skilled labour
than on the acquisition of machinery, the company also relied strongly on imported tools and materials for
the construction of roads, carriages, and carts204. Nevertheless, the importation of these materials did not
represent a reliance on any specific technology embodied in machines or equipment The importation of
these implements were due to the impossibility of obtaining them locally. But, apart from the imported
materials and tools mentioned above, the company produced almost everything else it needed in workshops
at Juiz de Fora. The facilities there included workshops of a smithy, carriage shop, harness and leather
working depot, and a paintshop205. In the company report of 1856, Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage pointed
out the strategic importance of these workshops for the CUI:
"The work done in these workshops are already considerable. Without them the several 
activities of the company, especially that of transport services, would have necessarily 
suffered. The lack of local resources, the difficulty of obtaining them from where the 
central station is established [Juiz de Fora], and the necessity of the company not to 
depend on imports for everything it needs for its daily running, have led me to believe in 
the benefits and economy that result from the establishment of these workshops."206
Thus, the establishment of the various workshops in the Juiz de Fora station may be seen as part of the 
company's policy to create, in the long run, a local capacity of routine maintenance, repairs work, and the 
provision of spare parts.
Supply problems also encouraged textile entrepreneurs to invest in workshops, to provide 
maintenance and repair facilities and to manufacture locally some spare parts, and even to adapt and modify 
the imported machinery. At the CCC, for example, some form of equipment adaptation and modification 
was carried out. As the supply of imported parts could not be guaranteed the company employed several 
skilled craftsmen in its forges to replace broken parts. Manoel Peculista, a slave acquired by the Cedro mill, 
for example, was considered an excellent forger. He was probably employed to manufacture spare parts and 
tools207. Further evidence of the adaptation process is found in the correspondence of the company. In 1884, 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, manager of the Cachoeira mill, wrote to Bernardo Mascarenhas saying that
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he had to halt spinning operations pending repairs208. In 1885, he wrote again saying that:
"I am returning the axles of the turbines, which have given me too many troubles, because 
the manufacturers did not calculate the brackets of the three large hangers in relation to 
the position of the pulleys of the turbines. They sent the brackets were too large, (...) 
Nevertheless, by moving the pulleys from one side to the other I managed to sort 
everything out."209
During the same year, Francisco reported that the new weaving machine lacked the rear card and that he 
was going to make a new one of wire or bamboo to replace it, until a new card was ordered from 
England210. A month later, Francisco reported that they have worked until night-fall the preceding day trying 
to fix the turbines. They forged iron and put it on the edge of the axle to see if the turbines would work 
without the "thrust collars" which were badly damaged211. In the following year, Francisco wrote to 
Theophilo Marques Ferreira saying that James could go as soon as he finished the parts of the looms which 
were going to be modified212. A month later, Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas reported that he had made 
some alterations in the spindles and that the alterations had yield an increase of 70% in production213. This 
was not a simple adaptation and alteration, but an impressive improvement revealing a surprising ability to 
refine a foreign technology. In 1904, Dario Diniz Mascarenhas, manager of the Cachoeira mill, informed 
Caetano Mascarenhas that in the beginning the machinery had worked with national belts but they broke 
very often. Subsequently, new English belts were ordered. However, these continued to break though not 
as frequently as locally manufactured belts, probably because of their width. Hence, new modified belts 
would be required from England214. This episode demonstrates how, by trial and error, mineiro businessmen 
both adapted imported technology to local needs and were able to devise more specific technical instructions 
for foreign suppliers. Indeed, companies, when possible ordered machinery according to their own 
specifications. However, this kind of adaptation and modification required a sophisticated degree of 
interaction between user and supplier. No doubt the availability of an English agent was important element
208 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 16", "Letter from Francisco de 
Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 2 June 1884".
209 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 17", "Letter from Francisco de 
Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 12 May 1885".
210 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 18", "Letter from Francisco de 
Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 24 September 1885".
211 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 18", "Letter from Francisco de 
Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 17 October 1885".
212 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 19", "Letter from Francisco de 
Paula Mascarenhas to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 18 May 1886".
213 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 19", "Letter from Francisco de 
Paula Mascarenhas to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 28 May 1886".
214 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Caetano Mascarenhas, 1883-1912 - 
No. 149", "Letter from Dario Diniz Mascarenhas to Caetano Mascarenhas, 16 January 1904".
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in this interaction. In 1884, for example, Kerr wrote saying that he had dispatched die special looms and
jacquards that the CCC had ordered215. Nevertheless, these modifications were expensive, as Kerr observed:
"The special looms and jacquards that you ordered are now completed and despatched (...).
As the jacquards are very expensive I thought it would be more satisfactory to 
send a copy of Mr. Hodgson's invoice of these goods."216
Ordering non-standard equipment was undoubtedly expensive but must have been considered worthwhile.
In 1885, Kerr wrote again informing Bernardo Mascarenhas that:
"I send you a new catalogue by Mr. Gunther, and on page 35 you will see the same kind 
of governors on the same principle but altered a little in the design and construction, since 
yours were made for Cachoeira."217
In the following year, he reported that the modifications made on the bobbins for weft had been prompted
by Bernardo's suggestions. Nevertheless:
"They have cost rather more in the making of them, but they will prove more satisfactory 
than the last."218
Further evidence that modifications to standard equipment cost a company dear. Another point to be stressed
is that these extra costs had to be covered at a time when the milreis was depreciating rapidly against
foreign currencies. In these circumstances, special orders were doubly costly. Equipment would take longer
to supply by which time prices would have risen219. In the same year, James Leffel & Co. wrote saying that:
"We carefully note all the specifications, also the drawings which you send, and have 
forwarded the same to our shops to have suitable turbine constructed."220
Thus, the adaptations and modifications carried out by the CCC were not restricted to the company's 
workshops. In several occasions, the company ordered equipment according to its own specifications directly 
from the foreign manufacturer.
There is also evidence of adaptations and modifications of equipment and machinery carried out 
by the CME. The original plan drawn by Bernardo Mascarenhas and sent to WEC, gave detailed
215 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 16", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 18 July 1884".
216 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 16", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 18 July 1884".
217 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 18", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 30 October 1885".
218 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 19", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 16 July 1886".
219 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 18", "Letter from Robert L. Kerr 
to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 18 September 1885".
220 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.41", "Letter from James Leffel 
& Co. to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 19 January 1895".
239
specifications for the manufacturing of equipment for the electrical power plant. The plan specified that:
"The public electrical lighting for the city of Juiz de Fora, is going to be done by 
alternating current of 1,500 to 2,000 volts to light 40 lamps of 1,000 candle power (not 
nominal, but equivalent to 1,000 candles with a spermaceti of a diameter of 7 1/2 burning 
120 grains per hour, which is the English standard).
(...)
The plant will be equipped with two excellent generators powered by two turbines 
of vertical or horizontal axles, arranged in a way that they can work separately or in 
combination. Each generator, however, has to have power enough to light 50 lamps of
1,000 candle power and 500 of 16 candle power, so that one generator is able to provide 
perfectly well the lighting service when the other is out of order.
The plant will be equipped with all the measuring and recording apparatuses 
necessary for the perfect regulation, voltmeters, ammeters, etc., in order to maintain a 
constant tension in the circuits. Perhaps, it would be more convenient manually operated 
equipment for die distribution of electricity through the generators."221
Bernardo followed with a detailed description of the location and distance of the power plant in relation to 
the city of Juiz de Fora and how the electricity will be distributed in the different points of the city. 
Furthermore, he gave precise specifications for the manufacture of the lamps and bulbs, and the conductor 
cables which are going to be used in the distribution of the electricity222. Bernardo's plans demonstrate the 
extent of his technical knowledge previous to the establishment of the CME.
Moreover, close to the day fixed by the contract between the company and the City Council of Juiz 
de Fora for the inauguration of the lighting service, the experiments carried on with the equipment did not 
yield positive results. As mentioned above, the supplier would not guarantee the equipment which in any 
case did not follow exactly the stipulated specifications. To overcome these difficulties Bernardo had to 
improvise an axle and to extend the generator pulleys. He finally succeeded and on the 5th of September 
1889 the lighting service was inaugurated223. In this event, it is important to point out the importance of the 
existence of a local technical ability to deal with foreign, newly developed technology. Entrepreneurial skill 
and initiative enabled operating difficulties to be resolved by adapting equipment
Thus, owing to poor communications the problems of transporting foreign machinery and equipment 
from their countries of origin to their final destination represented an enormous barrier, specially for the 
textile industry. Machinery and equipment had to be carried on the backs of beasts of burden and roads and 
bridges had to be built along the way. It required special attention from the part of the foreign supplier to 
the packing and assembling of equipment as shipment was long and difficult. However, these problems of 
transport became less acute with the arrival of the railway by the end of the nineteenth century. Even so, 
difficulties related to the transport of machinery and equipment continue to persist. Nevertheless, some 
sectors of the mineiro economy were not as badly affected as the textile industry. Most of the equipment, 
machinery and facilities used by the iron industry and the CUI were built on the site. The electricity
221 Mascarenhas, Bernardo Mascarenhas. pp. 131-2.
222 Ibid., pp. 132-4.
223 Ibid., pp. 140-8.
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generating companies, in their turn, were established mainly after the turn of the century, a time when the 
means of transport had improved considerably, in an area with an extensive network of good roads.
Further, mineiro business enterprises relied strongly on foreigners. They were vital not only for 
introducing new technology, but also for operating equipment. In the iron industry, foreign ironworkers and 
foreign entrepreneurs played a critical role during the earlier part of the nineteenth century. The reliance of 
the CUI upon foreigners for the construction and operation of the turnpike was also great. The company 
recruited engineers, architects and craftsmen abroad. Foreign technicians were not less crucial to the textile 
industry. They assembled the machinery, supervised production, and trained the workforce. Finally, the 
electricity generating industry was no exception and foreign personnel was also used in the CME. However, 
foreign skilled personnel were difficult to find and expensive, and personal relationships with them usually 
proved difficult.
In addition, the successful transfer of foreign technology requires a local capacity for adaptation 
and modification - adjusting technology to a new socioeconomic environment. This capacity of adaptation 
and modification can be observed in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. In the iron industry, the development 
of the cadinho method points to the existence of a capacity of adaptation and modification. This native 
method of production was the result of modifications, based on the Swedish method of production, 
introduced by foreign technicians. Nevertheless, the simplicity of the cadinho method meant that the 
possibility of extensive refinement was limited, but the lack of skilled personnel made the cadinho foundry 
the only feasible means of production for the mineiro entrepreneur. Attempts to employ more complex 
methods of production usually failed, so Minas Gerais was compelled to use a "dead end" technology. Even 
though the CUI relied on imported tools and materials for the construction of roads, carriages, and carts, 
the company depended more on technical knowledge of trained personnel than on the acquisition of 
machinery and equipment. Thus, it seems inappropriate to speak of a process of adaptation of technology 
in a strict sense, mineiro textile entrepreneurs were prompted by problems in their relationship with foreign 
suppliers to invest in workshops thereby gaining the capability to repair, modify and even manufacture 
machinery. Finally, the adaptation and modification of equipment and machinery can also be observed at 
the CME which employed a newly developed technology with all the technical difficulties that this involves.
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Conclusion
Most business enterprises in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais relied strongly on foreign technology 
and the main sources of technology were Great Britain and the USA. The only exception in die first three- 
quarters of the nineteenth century was the iron industry which employed an indigenous process of 
production. Nevertheless, this indigenous technology imposed strict limits on the development of the industry 
which virtually disappeared when it had to compete against foreign products at the end of the century. In 
terms of the process of selection of technology, mineiro entrepreneurs resorted to different strategies to 
acquire die minimum level of technological skill required. These included long periods of study abroad, 
visits to similar establishments in Brazil and overseas, direct and indirect contacts with foreign producers 
of machinery, the use of technical books, and even the help of foreigners residents in Minas Gerais. 
Furthermore, the geographic distance and cultural, socio and economic differences between users and foreign 
suppliers of technologies aggravated existing and created new problems in their relationship. The most 
common problems were, among others, delays in delivery, adulterated orders, inevitable misunderstandings, 
loss of goods, lack of sensitivity on the part of suppliers to the specific circumstances of foreign customers, 
unfulfilled promises, etc. Moreover, as a consequence of the dependence of most mineiro firms upon foreign 
technologies and foreign skilled personnel, communicatipn problems were not a negligible difficulty. 
Entrepreneurs had to learn a foreign language before they could make the first contact with the producers 
of machinery, while foreign workers had to rely on interpreters before they could understand Portuguese 
properly. Very often, due to the lack of suitable means of transport, transporting foreign machinery to Minas 
Gerais proved to be a real hardship. Machines had to be carried on the backs of beasts of burden and roads 
and even bridges had to be built The penetration of the railway into the hinterland of Minas Gerais at the 
end of the nineteenth century helped to ease this problem, although it was not completely resolved. 
Moreover, mineiro business enterprises relied heavily on foreign technicians not only to set-up equipment 
but also to operate it. Nevertheless, these foreign technicians were difficult to find. They were often 
unreliable, expensive, and relationships with them usually proved difficult. Finally, although some capacity 
of adaptation and modification can be observed in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, this capacity had strict 
limits.
This examination of technology - availability and adaptation - reveals Minas Gerais to have been 
an inhospitable environment for the entrepreneur. Mineiro firms relied strongly on foreign technologies and 
skilled personnel. The process of adaptation and modification was too narrow to be characterized as a 
specific mineiro way of manufacturing. The existing informal and spontaneous technological innovative 
system was not developed enough to take the process of technological assimilation farther in the direction 
of a profound modification of existing foreign technologies or to the creation of a more complex indigenous 
technological alternative. The narrowness of the capacity of the ninteenth-century mineiro economy to absorb 
and refine imported technology was due to the lack of skills and entrepreneurship, which was confirmed by 
the failure to develop a capital goods industry.
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PART IV - LABOUR
Introduction
Labour is one of the key factors in the study of any business environment and its provision was 
certainly one of the most acute problems faced by businessmen in nineteenth-century Brazil. A great deal 
of attention is paid to this question in the Brazilian economic historiography. During the nineteenth century, 
easing the scarcity of labour was one of the priorities of both businessmen and politicians. Labour was seen 
by many as the key factor in die economic development of the country1. Slavery, the main source of labour 
until the last decade of the century, had long been doomed to disappear and nobody doubted it  Moreover, 
the legacy of slavery poisoned the relationship between non-slave workers and employers. Therefore, non­
slave Brazilians were reluctant to replace slave hands because they assumed they would be treated as slaves. 
Employers, in their turn, saw non-slave Brazilians workers as unreliable, lacking discipline and habits of 
work. Several attempts were made to bring foreign workers, but only die coffee economy of Western Sao 
Paulo was successful in attracting a large number of foreigners. Hence, other regional economies of Brazil 
had to rely basically on non-slave Brazilians when slaves became scarce and expensive, and finally 
disappeared.
The objective of this section is to address the question of labour in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. 
Any investigation of the problem of labour in Minas Gerais must take into account the process of the 
making of the Brazilian working-class. In other words, it must identify the forces behind the working- 
relations and the prevailing work-ethic. Local working-relations cannot be thoroughly understood outside 
their broader environment. Only inside this context can labour policies adopted by mineiro entrepreneurs 
be fully appreciated. Thus, the objective of the first chapter of this section is to identify the main forces in 
the shaping of the Brazilian labour market and the formation of the working class. The second chapter of 
this section examines the main sources of labour in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais. Its objective is to 
investigate the impact of the macro environment, examined in the first chapter, upon the micro environment 
within which business operated.
1 See C. Furtado, Formacao Economica do Brasil. (Sao Paulo, 16th ed. 1979), p.120.
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Chapter 8 - A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE 
MAKING OF THE WORKING-CLASS
This chapter identifies the main influences in the making of the Brazilian working-class by drawing 
parallels with the making of the English working-class. In both cases, a single major social influence - 
religion in England and slavery in Brazil - seems to have played a decisive role in shaping the prevailing 
work-ethic and labour market formation. Religion in England, for example, provided the moral energy for 
the new work-ethic which arose with the emergence of industrial capitalism. In Brazil slavery was the 
reference point for all the worker-employer relations during the last century. Thus, despite the obvious 
differences, the comparison between the two experiences will help to illustrate how these social processes 
taking place in the broader environment shaped the relationships between capital and labour.
8.1 - The Making of the English Working-Class:
Until the early nineteenth century the typical English working-man lived in the countryside working 
on the land together with his wife and children. Although industrial occupations existed, they accounted for 
only a minority of jobs when compared with agriculture2. During the first half of the nineteenth century all 
this changed dramatically. The census taken in 1811, for example, unmistakably indicated a new pattern of 
employment in England with fewer families engaged in agriculture than in trade, manufacture, and 
handicrafts. On the whole, families engaged in agriculture constituted little more than one-third of all 
families, as indicated in Table VIII. 1. By 1851, industrial workers constituted nearly a third of the entire 
British population3 and, although agriculture continued to be the largest single occupation, there were four 
times as many industrial workers as there were agricultural labourers, as shown in Table VHI.2. Britain had 
become an industrial nation and the lives of a large number of working people had changed extraordinarily. 
From their traditional life in the countryside, these people found themselves living in industrial towns and 
working in workshops, foundries, shipyards, brickworks, and textile factories4.
Table VIH.1 - Occupations in England in 1811.
Families employed chiefly in agriculture 697,353
Families employed chiefly in trade, manufacture, or handicrafts
923,588
All other families 391,450
Total 2,012391
Source: E. Hopldns. A Social History of the English Working Classes. 1815-1945. (1979k n.2.
This rapid change in the pattern of employment of the English working class brought with it a new
2 E. Hopkins, A Social History of the English Working Classes. 1815-1945. (1979), p.2.
3 Ibid., p. 3.
4 Ibid., pp.3-4.
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work-ethic in which religion, Methodism in particular, played an important role in its shaping. Although 
there has been an almost complete disagreement among historians about the role and significance of religion 
in English working-class life during the nineteenth century, they seem to agree about the influence of 
religion on working-class politics and on more general cultural changes, especially in the early years of the 
century. Christianity and Christian churches had a pervasive influence in nineteenth-century British society 
and nonconformity, in the period 1780-1840, spread rapidly within the English working class5.
Table V i l l i  - Principal Occupations in Britain in 1851.
Agriculture 1,790,000 Milliners 340,000
Domestic Service 1,039,000 Wool 284,000
Cotton 527,000 Shoemakers 274,000
Building 443,000 Coal Miners 219,000
Labourers 376,000 Tailors 153,000
Source : Ibid., p.3.
Research in church membership records reveals quite high percentages of working-class members 
in many congregations. Analysis of nonconformists registers of baptism and burials, mainly from the period 
1800-37, suggests that artisans were the largest occupational group. Together with smaller numbers of 
labourers and miners, artisans made up about 75% of the Methodists, Baptists and Congretionalists whose 
occupations were recorded in the registers. Further evidence shows that the great expansion of English 
nonconformity in the period 1780-1840 was mainly due to recruitment among the working class and that 
it was only in the twentieth century that Methodism has become predominantly middle-class. Analysis of 
marriage and baptismal registers from Wesleyan, Primitive, Baptist and Congregationalist chapels in 
Lancashire cotton towns in the period 1830-70 reveals a preponderance of working-class occupations6.
The influence of nonconformity within the English working class may be explained by the fact that 
in the latter part of the eighteenth century the building of new places of worship by the Church of England 
failed to keep pace with the growth of the population. The institutional weakness of the Anglican Church 
left a religious vacuum which was partly filled by nonconformity, especially in the new industrial towns that 
sprang up in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries7. Furthermore, for many working people the 
Church of England was very much the church of the employers. There, the workers7 social inferiority would 
be emphasized by the charging of pew rents and the segregation of working-class worshippers into die few 
free pews at the back or sides. Although nonconformist chapels also levied pew rents, they were usually 
smaller than in the Church of England and the number of free seats greater. Moreover, the poorest of the 
working classes might not have decent clothes in which to attend church. For these reasons the Church of
5 H. Mcleod, Religion and the Working Class in Nineteenth-Centurv Britain. (1984), p.9.
6 Ibid., pp. 14-5.
7 Ibid., pp.22-3.
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England was not likely to appeal to the working classes in the early decades of the nineteenth century8.
However, the profound social influence of nonconformist belief over many working-class people 
is also explained by other factors. First, with its emphasis on hard work and personal accomplishment 
nonconformism - especially Methodism - provided a social discipline which encouraged the working-class 
people to go on working and doing their duty to God and fellow men, however harsh their environment9. 
Second, dissenting religion offered the uprooted and abandoned people of die Industrial Revolution a kind 
of community spirit to replace the older values which were being swept away10. Third, religious observance 
became a kind of consolation after the many political defeats suffered by the working classes during the 
counter-revolutionary movement of the 1790s and the following decades. As their leaders failed to gain 
political reform after 1815 working-class people turned in despair to nonconformity11.
Although workers were more likely to worship at a nonconformist chapel than at an Anglican 
church, they were more likely to worship at a Methodist chapel than at the chapels of the Congregationalists, 
Baptists, or Unitarians. The latter ones were attended more by the middle classes than the working classes. 
Methodists had a powerful appeal to the working class due to the directness and simplicity of their 
teaching12. Hence, Methodism increased remarkably within the new industrial areas during the Napoleonic 
War years, creating a deep-rooted allegiance to Methodist Church in many working-class communities13. 
Although the increase of Methodism is an indication of its influence on the new working class of the 
Industrial Revolution, this gives little indication of its inner impact on individual workers and how 
Methodism helped to shape the new work-ethic.
Methodism was of crucial importance in training the first and second generations of factory workers 
in habits of discipline, regularity, and obedience14. Employers in the "putting-out" industries in the 
seventeenth century experienced difficulties as a result of the irregular working habits (drunkenness, 
embezzlement and so on) of the workers. Similar difficulties were encountered by mill-owners and woollen 
and cotton manufacturers throughout the eighteenth century. During this period, most workers were happy 
to leave their jobs for the month of harvesting, had loose and vagrant habits, and seldom remained long in 
the same establishment Peasants and rural labourers in unenclosed villages, as well as urban artisans, did 
not measure the return of their labour exclusively in terms of money. In his "traditional" way of life, a man
8 Hopkins, op.cit.. pp.80-2.
9 Ibid., p.80.
10 Mcleod, op.cit.. pp.22-3.
11 Hopkins, op.cit.. p.80.
12 Ibid., p.80.
13 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the Working Class. (1980), p.386.
14 Mcleod, op.cit.. pp.9-23.
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did not by nature wish to earn more and more money, but simply to live as he was accustomed and to earn 
as much as was necessary for this purpose. The same type of mentally can be observed within die Brazilian 
working class of the earlier part of the nineteenth century.
Under these circumstances, the master-manufacturer of the Industrial Revolution, as the Brazilian 
entrepreneur, was obsessed with problems of discipline. From the employer's point of view, workers needed 
to be educated to pay attention to instructions, to develop "methodical" habits, to fulfil contracts on time, 
and to consider the embezzlement of materials as sinful. Furthermore, the factory system demanded a change 
in human nature, in order for the worker to become adapted to die discipline of machines. For children, die 
discipline of the overseer and of the machinery might have sufficed, but not for adults. Adults required an 
"inner compulsion", a new work-ethic, and Methodist theology was better suited than any other for this 
purpose. In Brazil, this was achieved first with the employment of African slaves, who were disciplined 
through physical violence.
According to the Methodist theology, grace and sin are universal and any man who is convicted 
of sin may receive grace and know himself to be redeemed by Christ's blood. But Christ's redemption is 
only provisional and forgiveness of sin lasts only so long as the penitent sinned no more. Those who were 
"saved" were in a state of conditional and provisional election. It was always possible to "backslide". 
Moreover, as salvation is the prerogative of God, all that a man can do is to prepare himself, by utter 
abasement, for redemption. However, once convinced of grace and thoroughly introduced to the Methodist 
brotherhood, "backsliding" became a complicated matter for a working man or woman. They would have 
been expelled from the only community-group which they knew in the industrial wilderness and they would 
have to live with the ever-present fear of an eternity of punishment to come. How, then, to remain in a state 
of grace?
Since this world is the ante-room to eternity, wealth and poverty matter very little. For the rich 
people, evidence of grace was given by serving the Church; most notably, by building chapels for their 
workers. The poor were more likely to remain in a state of grace, because they faced fewer temptations to 
backslide. Three obvious means of maintaining grace presented themselves. First, by serving the Church as 
a class leader, local preacher, or in more humble capacities. Second, by the cultivation of one's own soul, 
in religious exercises, tract-reading, but - above all-in  attempts to reproduce die emotional convulsions of 
conversion, conviction of sin, penitence, and visitation by grace. Third, through a methodical discipline in 
every aspect of life, especially in labour itself, which is an evident sign of grace when undertaken for no 
other motive but as "a pure act of virtue". Moreover, as there was no assurance of salvation and temptations 
were everywhere, there was a constant inner pressure to "sober and industrious" behaviour - the visible sign 
of grace - at all times. The consequence of indiscipline at work might not only be the loss of employment 
but also punishment in the flames of hell. God was die most vigilant overseer of all. The Methodist was 
taught not only to accept poverty and humiliation, but also to be obedient Work was seen as the salvation 
of the "transformed" industrial worker. Such a drastic redirection of impulses were only effected with a 
central disorganization of the human personality. As joy became associated with sin and guilt, and pain
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(Christ's wounds) with goodness and love, so it became natural to suppose that man only found grace in 
God's eyes when performing painful, laborious or unpleasant jobs. "To labour and to sorrow was to find 
pleasure, and masochism was 'Love'"15.
Hence, Methodist theology - by virtue of its elevation of the values of discipline and of order, and 
of its moral rigidity - provided the ideological background and the moral energy for the new work-ethic 
which began to prevail with the emergence of industrial capitalism and the capitalist working-relations. In 
other words, Methodist ideas suited the necessities and circumstances of capitalism in England. They were 
used to soften the resistance of the working people and provide with a moral meaning the new pattern of 
discipline required by capitalist production. The Methodist indoctrination aimed at producing a docile, more 
easily managed, working class.
However, Methodist indoctrination was not only restricted to the working classes. Methodist ideas 
were shared by the employers as well. As Weber has pointed out, capitalism is in very great measure the 
product of a religious spirit such as Puritanism. The result of the convergence of religious and economic 
factors was the production of modem "rational" man; more specifically, the production of a social ethic 
which substantiated the capitalist culture. Capitalist entrepreneurs had an ascetic manner of living very well 
adapted to the peculiarities of the capitalism16. Furthermore, some of the English self-made men, who 
became employers themselves, were Methodists or Dissenters whose frugality had produced riches and who 
would tend to favour fellow-religionists, finding in them a guarantee for good conduct17. Therefore, 
Methodist ideas created a widespread view of work, its role and purpose in people's lives and how it should 
be carried out
In this sense, slavery in Brazil had a similar role as that of Methodism in England. Slavery 
produced a work-ethic which was shared by workers and employers alike. More than providing actual hands 
for the economy, it provided a social meaning for work, a basis for the formation of the Brazilian working 
classes. Slavery became die reference-point for all the working-relations providing, like Methodism, the 
ideological background which regulated the way in which labour was paid, treated and controlled. The 
mentality created by slavery had a deep and long lasting effect in both workers and employers in Brazil, 
as it is going to be shown in the following part of this chapter.
8.2 - The Making of the Brazilian Working-Class:
The impact of slavery on working-relations in Brazil can be seen even several years after its 
abolition in 1888. However, to understand the making of the Brazilian working-class, it is necessary to go 
back in time and look at some social and economic patterns peculiar to slavery and to the colonial system. 
What is important in this examination } s the basic characteristics and the legacy of both slavery and the
15 Thompson, op.cit.. p.391-409.
16 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. (20th. ed. 1989), pp. 13-78.
17 Thompson, op.cit.. p.385.
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colonial system; in other words, the deep roots which persisted during the nineteenth century and which had 
a great influence on die process of the formation of capitalism and of social classes in Brazil.
With the exception of the colonies of New England, the American colonial system was devised by 
metropolitan capital for the large-scale production of tropical products. Indeed, from the beginning, with the 
introduction of sugar cane and the development of tobacco in the sixteenth century, a permanent system of 
production was created which required a great amount of labour. This type of colonial exploitation 
necessitated a number of interrelated processes which had a wide impact on the social structure of the 
Americas. The first of these was the introduction of slave labour which, through extremely long working- 
hours and extremely low levels of subsistence, was more profitable than the attempt to submit the mass of 
the non-slave population to a harsh regime, given the great availability of land18. Brazil, for example, 
imported more African slaves than any other country in the American continent and Africans constituted 
the major source of labour for the main economic activities of the colonial period (1550-1822) - the sugar- 
mills in the Northeast in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and gold panning and diamond mining in 
the eighteenth century19. However, the colonial system of production created not only African slavery, but 
also a social structure based on slaves and commanded by slave-owners20.
After three centuries, the colonial system in Brazil had hindered internal ramifications capable of 
developing other economic activities. The concentration of resources in the production of tropical products, 
based on slave labour, weakened those activities which did not operate in close connection with the export 
sector. In this way, a stratified society was created down the centuries which led to the marginalization 
[desclassifica^ao] of those who could not find a place in the rigid and dichotomized slave order. On the one 
hand, there was a mass of slaves engaged in the productive process. On the other hand, the landowners who 
- together with the civil and military bureaucracy - formed the narrow circle which imposed the forms of 
political dominion and surplus extraction21.
During the nineteenth century, the importance of the colonial legacy would lead the employment 
of slave labour to persist in coffee production - by then the dominant economic activity -, maintaining a 
number of economic and social conditions which would continue to exclude the non-slave work-force from 
the productive processes essential to society. The introduction and persistence of slave labour in coffee 
production was due to the impossibility faced by farmers of resorting to a sufficiently numerous and reliable 
stock of non-slave Brazilians. This situation would exist until very late in the nineteenth century and would 
bring profound consequences to the formation of the labour market in Brazil. Even when coffee capital
18 L. Kowarick, Trabalho e Vadiagem: a Orieem do Trabalho Livre no Brasil. (Sao Paulo, 1987), 
pp. 18-23.
19 P.O. Mello and R.W. Slenes, "Analise Economica da Escravidao no Brasil", in Economia 
Brasileira: IJma Visao Historica. ed. P. Neuhaus, (Rio de Janeiro, 1980), p.91.
20 Kowarick, on.cit.. p.23.
21 C. Prado Junior, Formacao do Brasil Contemporaneo. (Sao Paulo, 5th.ed. 1957), pp.279-80.
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began to spread into other activities - such as railways, the coffee processing and packing industry, and 
banking -, slaves continued to be the main source of labour for a long period after 1850, when the Atlantic 
slave-trade was finally brought to an end22.
With the cessation of the transatlantic slave trade in the middle of the century, coffee growers 
started to buy slaves mainly in the Northeast, despite the fact that slaves became increasingly expensive. In 
addition to the high prices charged for slaves - due to die decrease in their number -, heavy taxes were 
levied on their transit from one province to the other23. The evolution of the stock of slaves after 1850 is 
very illustrative of the interprovincial slave trade. In Brazil as a whole the number of slaves decreased 
rapidly: from 1,715,000 in 1864 to 1,540,829 in 1874, to 1,240,806 in 1884, and to 723,419 in 1887, as 
shown in Table VIII.3. During the same years, the decrease in the number of slaves was more marked in 
the Northeast: from 774,000 in 1864 to 435,687 in 1874, to 301,470 in 1884, and to 171,797 in 1887. 
However, the province of Rio de Janeiro maintained its stock of about 300,000 slaves between 1864 and 
1874, the number decreasing to 258,238 in 1884, and to 162,421 in 1887. Thus, in this region a decrease 
began after 1874, whereas in Minas Gerais the slave population increased from 250,000 to 311,304, and in 
Sao Paulo from 80,000 to 174,622. In the following decade, whereas in all the other provinces the decrease 
in the number of slaves was substantial, in the latter two provinces the decrease was not significant 10,000 
in Minas Gerais and less than 8,000 in Sao Paulo. From then onwards, both provinces followed the general 
pattern of the years previous to the abolition of slavery: in 1887 there were 191,952 in Minas Gerais and 
107,329 slaves in Sao Paulo, as indicated in Table VIII.3.
Table VDI.3 - Brazil, the Northeast, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Sao Paulo: the evolution of 
the stock of slaves, 1864-1887.
YEARS BRAZIL NORTHEAST RIO DE 
JANEIRO
MINAS
GERAIS
SAO
PAULO
1864 1,715,000 774,000 300,000 250,000 80,000
1874 1,540,829 435,687 301,352 311,304 174,622
1884 1,240,806 301,470 258,238 301,125 167,493
1887 723,419 171,797 162,421 191,952 107,329
Source: Compiled from R. Conrad. The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery. 1850-1888. (1972). p.285.
With the development of coffee production and the huge slave imports of the 1830s and 1840s (see 
Chapter 1), slaveiy became generalized and was not confined solely to large-scale export production. The 
employment of slaves in activities not related to the growing of coffee was far from negligible. Slaves were
22 Kowarick, on.cit.. pp.35-41.
23 E. Viotti da Costa, "O Escravo na Grande Lavoura", in Historia Geral da Civilizacao Brasileira - 
II. O Brasil Monarquico. ed. S.B. Holanda (Sao Paulo, 1985), V, pp.155-7.
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to be found throughout rural Brazil in the production of basic foodstuffs24. They were also employed for the 
most diverse functions in the urban areas. They worked as factory hands, barbers, street porters, stevedores, 
domestic servants; they worked in craftshops and factories as skilled and unskilled labour, in transporting 
passengers and cargo, in the most varied urban services, etc. There were slaves living independently under 
the money-earning system [escravos de ganho], and there were slaves that could be found as prostitutes 
and beggars25. This form of slavery differentiated itself from that which prevailed in the great export 
plantations in the sense that it enjoyed a relative degree of autonomy and die master-slave relationship was 
more direct and democratic. Nevertheless, these two forms of slavery exhibited similarities, mainly in regard 
to the need for violence in the social order26. However, the form of slavery which dominated the great export 
plantations was the one which permeated the other sectors of the economy and was diffused into the general 
stream of social life27, as did Protestant ethic - with its emphasis on responsibility, discipline, ascetism and 
individual liberty - in England.
The situation of non-slave Brazilians clearly illustrates the influence of slavery upon the work-ethic 
in Brazil before and after the abolition of slavery. At the end of the eighteenth century the Brazilian 
population was almost 3 million, of whom nearly half was made up of Brazilians and freed men: individuals 
of various social origins, whose common characteristic was their marginalization in relation to the necessities 
of the large properties producing for export. They were marginalized because the slave system, concentrating 
and monopolizing economic resources, especially land, hindered the emergence of alternatives which could 
productively settle this increasing mass of individuals, who had irregular occupations or even without any 
occupation at all. Such was the situation of freed negroes, whites, and Indians, as well as of those groups 
produced by the interbreeding of these three races: mulattos and mestizos. A large number of these people 
was employed in rudimentary activities of subsistence having virtually no contact with agro-production for 
export. Another segment of the non-slave population was made up of servants or dwellers on the land who 
performed jobs on the farms which were combined with their own subsistence activities. Their survival was 
intensely unstable and completely dependent on the large property, because access to a piece of land 
depended on the discretion of the landowner. In addition, there were beggars, vagabonds, homeless ones 
who, like the others, could not find a stable place in the rigid division of labour of the slave system. Like 
the others, they were individuals from several different races and social origins, who were also marginalized.
The established slave regime excluded those who, being free, were unable to be masters. Since 
colonial times, the agro-export system based on slave labour had hindered production for the internal market.
24 L. Bethell and J.M. Carvalho, "1822-1850", in Brazil: Empire and Republic. 1822-1930. ed L. 
Bethell (Cambridge, 1989), p.46.
25 L.C. Soares, "Urban Slavery in Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro", University of London, 
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1988, pp. 145-273.
26 Ibid., p. 13.
27 J. Gorender, O Escravismo Colonial. (Sao Paulo, 1978), pp.88-9.
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Thus, for a large number of people the options for work were restricted to occasional jobs, subsistence 
activities or wandering through the country side and towns. Even with the end of the Colonial Pact, with 
Brazilian Independence, and with the emergence of the coffee economy, the Brazilian society of the 
nineteenth century would persist with slave labour as the basis of the productive process. A more dynamic 
and diversified economic system was slowly formed which, contrary to that of the previous period, kept 
increasing parts of the surplus in Brazil, but which would continue to be structured on the slave-master 
relationship. Thus, Brazilians and freed men would continue to be marginal to the essential productive 
processes of the Brazilian society28.
In the coffee-growing areas, until the beginning of the great movement of immigrants - which 
coincided with the abolition of slavery -, poor non-slave Brazilians participated only on an occasional basis 
in the productive process29. There were some options available for Brazilians as muleteers, coachmen, and 
grocers30. When directly linked to large farms, some of them would work as private policemen or in some 
more specialized aspects of the organization of the productive process. When they lived on the farms they 
were completely dependent on the landowner31. As soon as the interests of the farmer required, servants and 
dwellers on the land were expelled from the farms32.
To sum up, nationals were very mobile, moving constantly, and occasionally rendering services to 
the large farms. As long as the production continued to be based on slave labour, the large and increasing 
contingent of poor non-slave Brazilians would continue to be excluded from the productive system, and 
would be seen by landowners and rulers as vagabonds. Therefore, they were considered unfit for regular and 
disciplined work. Marginal - productively speaking - and without social significance in a slave economy, 
poor non-slave Brazilians were employed by the masters in the service of defence, coercion, or murder. In 
other words, nationals were employed in every type of violence.
In the nineteenth century, the coffee economy still faced the contradiction inherited from the 
colonial times: to convince Brazilians to exchange the alternative of a marginal and vagrant life, although 
free, for the regular and disciplined work of the plantations, would be necessary to offer them great material 
gains. However, these economic circumstances explain only partially the persistence of slave labour in the 
coffee economy. Another factor of crucial importance was the influence of slavery on working-relations 
since the beginning of the colonization, engendering a historical situation which persisted throughout the 
centuries. Indeed, poor non-slave Brazilians were seen by masters and employers as a segment which could
28 Kowarick, op.cit.. pp.28-31.
29 Lamounier, "Between Slavery and Free Labour: Experiments with Free Labour and Patterns of 
Slave Emancipation in Brazil and Cuba c.1830-1888", University of London, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
1993, p.185.
30 See M.S.C. Franco, Homens Livres na Qrdem Escravocrata. (Sao Paulo, 1969), pp.61-80.
31 Lamounier, op.cit.. pp. 184-5.
32 Kowarick, op.cit.. pp.31-2.
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be treated in a way similar to that which characterized the condition of the slave. The way that masters 
treated slaves - susceptible of being exploited to the limits of their survival - influenced both the perception 
that non-slave Brazilians had of regular and disciplined work, and the employers' perception of the possible 
ways of employing non-slave Brazilians. Brazilians, as long as slavery was the reference point of the 
productive process, could only regard organized work as the most degrading form of existence. Furthermore, 
as long as it was possible to produce their own subsistence they would not have any reason to submit to the 
strictness of the productive organization based on slave labour. In its turn, as the masters' and employers' 
reference point was work based on slave labour, which non-slave Brazilians tried to avoid in every possible 
way, the perception of Brazilians as vagabonds and unfit to work crystallized out53.
Slavery, insofar as it degraded work to an extreme degree, it did not stimulate the emergence of 
abilities and skills. It inhibited any type of manufacturing, and became an obstacle to the development of 
craft production, consequently skills did not develop, knowledge was not transferred, and personal abilities 
were not stimulated, because manual work was a slave's job, degrading and repulsive to Brazilians34. The 
exploitation of slave labour, on the one hand, and the marginalized mass of Brazilians, on the other, were 
the result of the colonial-slave enterprise which would reproduce itself until very late in the nineteenth 
century. The so-called Brazilian - white, black, mulattos, and mestizos -, freed or bom free, was the least 
desired to be employed on the coffee plantations. In the Northeast, after 1850, as the slave regime began 
to lose its hegemony within the sugar economy, with the internal migration of slaves, Brazilians were 
increasing hired. In the coffee regions, especially in Sao Paulo, Brazilians only began to be employed after 
the abolition of slavery, even so on a casual basis. Together with Brazilians and ex-slaves successive batches 
of immigrants would be employed in the new dynamic zones of Western Sao Paulo, whereas Brazilians were 
employed in the stagnated areas where the immigrant did not go35.
Nevertheless, the mass employment of immigrants on coffee farms began only in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century, when a large number of Italians, Spanish and Portuguese workers began to migrate 
to Brazil subsidized by state and federal governments36. The incorporation of new areas into coffee 
plantations, made possible by the expansion of the railway system, always created the necessity of more and 
more workers at a time when the Brazilian worker available in the region was difficult to recruit, and there 
was also a strong prejudice against him. The only alternative left was the transference of Brazilians from 
other places in Brazil, mainly from the Northeast where pressure for land and several successive droughts 
had created a population transformable into cheap labour. Nevertheless, at this time this alternative proved 
to be impracticable because of the high costs of transport between the two regions and, most of all, because
33 Ibid.; pp.45-48.
34 S.B. Holanda, Raizes do Brasil. (Rio de Janeiro, 21st.ed. 1982), pp.26-8.
35 Kowarick, op.cit.. pp.64, 68-9.
36 W. Dean, "Economy", in Brazil: Empire and Republic. 1822-1930. ed. L. Bethell (Cambridge, 
1989), pp.235-6.
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of the difficulty of recruitment. The local oligarchy strongly opposed a larger migration southwards, because 
such transference would have not only represented a loss of political power but would also have brought 
problems of labour to the rubber plantations in the North. The considerable internal migration of Brazilians 
in the last decades of the nineteenth century and in the first ones of the twentieth century was not mainly 
directed to the province of Sao Paulo. There were Brazilians who went to Sao Paulo, but in the period 
between the years previous to the abolition of slavery and the first decades of this century die internal flux 
of Brazilians was of small significance in comparison with the number of foreigners who went to this state 
after 188837.
The demise of slavery imposed a solution which could only be based on the employment of free 
labour. Rather than employing Brazilian labour - considered unfit for the regular and disciplined work of 
the farms - coffee planters opted for the employment of immigrant workers. In this sense, it must be 
emphasized that the economic crisis in Italy from the 1870 onwards presented as an ideal opportunity of 
recruitment of cheap labour in large numbers38. A large part of the successive batches of immigrants was 
employed in the production of coffee, because this was one of the clauses of die system of recruitment to 
which they were, at least temporarily, submitted39. Thus, there was created a continuous flux of workers who 
supplied the farms with cheap labour. The immigrant worker who left the farms was, for several decades, 
replaced by his fellow countryman who arrived creating a vicious circle of replacement of the work-force40.
However, it is important to point out that the type of labour which replaced slave labour cannot be 
characterized as free labour, which it is often stated to have been. The starting point is that the crisis of 
slavery brought with it free labour. However, contrary to what several authors believe, this process of 
replacement of slave labour by free labour was not an easy and simple one. Although the presumed slave 
mentality of the farmer may have created difficulties in the relationship with the immigrant, the truth is that 
the objective conditions for the replacement of the negro by the white did suffer very few modifications in 
relation to the prevailing conditions under slavery. As slavery was not a mere institution - but was a real 
relationship based on well defined historical conditions -, its legal suppression, or the mere incorporation 
of non-slaves into the productive process, was not sufficient to change the nature of the relationship between 
the farmer and the worker. Therefore, the mentality of the farmer had well defined social roots.
In the crisis of conversion from slave labour, free labour had a particular meaning to the farmer, 
which in any way was totally or mainly expressed in its legal form. To the farmer, free labour was the work 
actually free from the burden of the trafficker's charges. It was labour completely free of any extra charges.
37 Kowarick, op.cit.. pp.78-80.
38 S. Silva, Expansao Cafeeira e Origens da Industria no Brasil. (Sao Paulo, 1976), p.44.
39 B. Fausto, "Society and Politics", in Brazil: Empire and Republic. 1822-1930. ed. L. Bethell, 
(Cambridge, 1989), p.258.
40 Dean, op.cit.. pp.236-7.
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In this respect, the white immigrant was not necessarily free of any charge, although he was legally free41. 
Until the 1880s when provincial and Imperial governments began to subsidize European immigration, the 
farmer paid for die transport and supplies required by the immigrant and his family until the immigrant was 
able to provide for himself. Before this the immigrant had to pay the farmer back these expenses and any 
other advance payment42. Indeed, this was a new way of creating a new type of personal dependence. As 
the immigrant was indebted to the fanner, he was restricted to the farm without freedom to leave it unless 
he had the permission ftom the farmer himself. There was a contradiction in this situation. At the economic 
level, farmers behaved according to liberal principles. They considered the immigrants free to buy (goods 
and services) and sell (labour). Actually, however, at the social relations level, they tended to treat 
immigrants like they had treated slaves. Farmers believed that by economically maintaining the immigrants 
they had actually bought in advance the immigrants' labour, as had happened in the slave regime. The only 
way that the farmers could be certain of the return of their investment was to keep the immigrant in a kind 
of bondage. This at least was what the farmers believed43.
Only with the intervention of the State was it possible to break the circle of captive labour, thus 
creating the conditions for the establishment of free labour and of the labour market. Through the 
intervention of the State the farmers became free from the costs of transporting the immigrants from their 
countries of origin to the farms44. Hence, the fate of immigrant workers in the coffee-growing areas shows 
clearly the long-standing impact of slavery on the working-relations in Brazil
However, the influence of slavery on working-relations was not restricted to the agricultural sector. 
It also influenced working-relations in the emerging Brazilian industry. This can be observed in the way 
that owners of textile mills treated their employees:
"In the nineteenth century, the mill owners treated their journeymen in the same way
coffee farmers or sugar-mill owners [senhores de engenho] treated their slaves or their
few non-slave workers (...)"4S
Marginalized since the colonial times, poor non-slave Brazilians and freed men tended not to pass through 
"the school of work". They were seen as vagabonds who turned rather to vice or crime than to disciplined 
work. What is important in this process of rejection caused by the slave regime is that any manual work was 
considered a slave's work and, therefore, degrading and repulsive. It could not be otherwise in a situation 
in which individuals who performed productive tasks were treated as things, without volition, without any 
chance to decide where to live or when or how much to work, and who - suffering every sort of violence -
41 J. Souza Martins, O Cativeiro da Terra. (Sao Paulo, 1979), pp.9-62.
42 Lamounier, op.cit.. pp. 157-62.
43 Souza Martins, op.cit.. p. 123.
44 Ibid., p.66, 125-6.
45 S.J. Stein, Origens e Evolucao da Industria Textil no Brasil. 1850/1950. (Rio de Janeiro, 1979),
p.63.
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would die in captivity.
For those who were not masters, work would not lead anywhere and the effort of working, instead 
of dignifying the worker, tended to bring him close to the rules of dominion and submission existing in 
slavery. That is why short, and sometimes forced, periods of work were followed by long periods of rest. 
He who was not forced to work would only do it when it was absolutely necessary. In the social context 
in which the non-slave and poor worker does not accumulate anything, necessities are reduced to a minimum 
and are based for most of the time on a subsistence economy.
In this situation in which all activities were based on slave labour, in which servants were often 
treated in the same way as slaves, and in which dwellers on the land were summarily dispossessed or 
expelled, there were few alternatives left for the increasing contingent of poor non-slave Brazilians and freed 
men who historically swelled at the margin of a dichotomized society. Even the emerging Brazilian industry 
hardly constituted an alternative for this mass of people46. In 1869, for example, the Minister of Agricultura, 
Commercio e Obras Publicas complained about the lack of chances of employment for non-slave Brazilians 
in the industrial sector in Rio de Janeiro. Among the 1,009 people employed in the industries in the district 
of Santa Rita, 76 were slaves, 248 were Brazilians, and 685 were foreigners. Furthermore, the Minister made 
the following comments about the disproportion in the number of Brazilians and foreigners employed:
"These figures reveal the bias of our internal economic organization (...), which place so
many difficulties in the employment of Brazilians in our factories.
If the commercial and industrial establishments are not an alternative of work,
what will be left for him [the Brazilian worker]? (...)"47
Wherever there was a large influx of immigrants they tended to fill the places in the productive activities 
and reduced substantially the employment of non-slave Brazilians. In Sao Paulo, for example, immigrants 
were largely employed in the several sectors of the urban economy, particularly in industrial activities, where 
the employment of Brazilians was small. As happened in the prosperous coffee regions, the Brazilian worker 
was only occasionally employed in the Paulista industry. The number of immigrants was sufficient to supply 
the Paulista industry and create an abundant reserve of cheap workers. Thus, the emerging industry of Sao 
Paulo did not need to resort to the Brazilian work-force. The Brazilian worker was largely marginalized from 
the industrial activities, a situation more common among negroes and mulattos who suffered from the 
prejudice of colour so strongly implanted by slavery48.
However, where there was no influx of immigrants Brazilian workers were employed. The 
employment of Brazilians - white, negro or mulatto - distinguished the economy of Sao Paulo, where at the 
beginning of the twentieth century there was a total of 529,000 immigrants representing 23.19% of the whole 
population, from other regional economies. In Pernambuco, for example, in 1900 there were only 11,000
46 Kowarick, op.cit. pp.65-8.
47 Ministerio da Agricultura, Commercio e Obras Publicas, Relatorio da Reparticao dos Negocios 
da Agricultura. Commercio e Obras Publicas. (Rio de Janeiro, 1869), p.23.
48 Kowarick, op.cit.. pp. 101-6.
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immigrants, representing only 1% of total population of this state49. In several northeastern provinces, the 
number of Brazilian non-slave workers employed in sugar production increased50. Where slavery declined 
after the end of the transatlantic slave trade, and where the immigrant did not go, Brazilians were employed 
either in the countryside or in the cities.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, there was a change of attitudes about the nature of the 
labourer. This change in attitudes was coincident with the abolition of slavery and the massive European 
immigration51. From then onwards, other factors began to have a major influence on the making of the 
Brazilian working class - namely the labour movement of mainly anarchist inspiration. The years before the 
World War I constitute the formative period for organized labour. During that period, the first labour 
organizations were formed and the movement acquired die basic characteristics that shaped its later course.
Beginning in the 1840s, a variety of organizations turned their attention to working-class problems, 
and a modem labour movement gradually emerged. At first, mutual-aid societies, liberal political 
movements, and utopian experiments were the principal forms of organization. Towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, faced with the failure to improve their lot and under the influence of European working- 
class philosophies, workers moved towards more militant expressions of their goals and sought more 
adequate forms through which to achieve their aims. By World War I, unions, federations, and 
confederations constituted the predominant working-class organizational vehicles. In addition, political 
parties, representing worker's interests, were formed.
During the 1870s and 1880s, a growing acceptance of new and more militant ideologies led to the 
emergence of a modem labour movement. These doctrines, adopted from Europe but at times moulded to 
local circumstances, served as guides for workers seeking to improve their lives. Several circumstances aided 
the spread of ideas. Foreign immigrants played a major role in the process. In all, just under 10 million 
persons emigrated to Latin America before World War I; almost 8 million of them went to Argentina and 
Brazil. They generally settled in urban zones, although many farmed or worked on the land. By far the 
largest number of immigrants came from Italy and Spain, and anarchism's strong roots in both those 
countries partly account for its strength throughout Latin America52. Thus, from the beginning of the 
twentieth century onwards, under the increasing influence of political ideas brought from Europe, the work- 
ethic and the working-relations in Brazil became more closer to that prevailing in the industrial European 
nations.
To sum up, there were similarities in the problems faced by the English employers in the
49 Ibid., p. 116.
50 Lamounier, op.cit.. pp.339-40.
51 Ibid., p.349.
52 H.A. Spalding, Organized Labor in Latin America: Historical Studies of Urban Workers in 
Dependent Societies. (New York, 1977), pp. 1-8.
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and his Brazilian counterparts in the nineteenth century. Like 
Methodism in England, slavery was a major influence in the making of the Brazilian working-class during 
the last century. Methodism provided the moral energy for the new work-ethic emerging from the capitalist 
working-relations. Slavery was the point of reference for all the working-relations in Brazil. Its impact was 
felt even several years after the abolition of slavery at the end of the 1880s. Towards the end of the century, 
a large number of foreigners entered the country, going mainly to the coffee farms in Sao Paulo. Foreigners 
also went to the city of Sao Paulo where they were employed in large numbers in the emerging Brazilian 
industry. Nevertheless, in other provinces foreigners were not as numerically important as they were in Sao 
Paulo. In these provinces, Brazilians were more widely employed. As will be discussed later, this seems to 
have been the case in Minas Gerais, where foreigners constituted a small proportion of the whole population 
and thus a relatively less important source of labour.
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Chapter 9 - NINETEENTH-CENTURY MINEIRO LABOUR MARKET
Bearing in mind the major impact of slavery on the making of the Brazilian working class until late 
nineteenth century, it is important to examine the sources of labour available to nineteenth-century mineiro 
entrepreneur. As indicated above, in some parts of Brazil, like in the Northeast, non-slave Brazilians became 
the major source of labour available from the end of the transatlantic slave trade due to the exodus of slaves 
and the scarcity of foreigners. In other parts, like Sao Paulo, slaves first and foreigners later represented the 
main sources of labour. In Minas Gerais, slaves were undoubtedly an important source of labour for almost 
the entire century. They were employed in a wide variety of occupations in both the agricultural and non- 
agricultural sectors. Non-slave Brazilians, however, had a larger participation in the work-force. They 
constituted the majority of the population and some sectors of the mineiro economy relied almost exclusively 
on their labour. Even foreigners, numerically not as representative as in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, had 
a distinguished participation within the mineiro labour force as a source of skilled labour.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses briefly some of the main 
demographic characteristics of the mineiro population. It analyses the occupational structure of die mineiro 
population and the participation of different populational groups within it The aim is to draw a broad picture 
of the labour market and the possible sources of labour in Minas Gerais during the last century. The second 
part examines the main sources of labour - both skilled and unskilled - used by the firms surveyed in this 
thesis. It also examines - in those cases where information is available - the forms of recruitment used by 
mineiro firms.
9.1 - The Mineiro Population:
With one of the largest populations in Brazil during the nineteenth century1, Minas Gerais had also 
one of the largest slave populations in absolute terms. As shown in Table IX. 1, the province had the second 
largest slave population in 1823. During that year, only the province of Bahia had a larger number of slaves 
(237,458). In 18722, Minas Gerais had the largest slave population, as shown in Table IX.2. Towards the
1 Although nineteenth-century population data may be unreliable (sometimes the several estimates 
are contradictory and often they were not rigorously collected) most estimates and the 1872 census point 
to the same conclusion: Minas Gerais had one the largest populations in Brazil during the nineteenth century. 
In the first decade of the last century the mineiro population amounted to 350,000, making Minas the most 
populous province. In the 1820s, the population was estimated at around 600,000, increasing to more than
900,000 in the 1830s and to around 1,500,000 in the middle of the century. An estimate of 1870 calculated 
the population of the province in only 631,885 people, nearly a third of the estimate for 1867 (1,600,000) 
and 1869 (1,600,000). Nevertheless, even this low estimate confirmed the primacy of Minas as Brazil's most 
populated province. The census of 1872, found that Minas Gerais was the most populous province with 
2,039,735 people, a dominance confirmed by the censuses of 1890 and 1900. See Ministerio da Agricultura, 
Industria e Commercio, Directoria Geral de Estatistica, Recenseamento do Brazil realizado em 1 de 
Setembro de 1920: Resumo Historico dos Inaueritos Censitarios Realizados no Brazil. (Rio de Janeiro, 
1922), I, pp.403-23.
2 The census of 1872 also was not exempt of problems. Collection of data did not begin in the same 
day throughout the country. In the provinces of Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo and Mato Grosso it began only 
later. Furthermore, census was not carried out in 25 parishes: 1 in Maranhao, 2 in Piaui, 3 in Rio de Janeiro,
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Table LX.l - Brazilian population in 1823 per province and divided by nationals and slaves.
POPULATION
PROVINCES -------------------------------------
NON-SLAVES % SLAVES % TOTAL
Alagoas 90,000 69 40,000 31 130,000
Bahia 434,464 65 237,458 35 671,922
Ceara 180,000 90 20,000 10 200,000
Rio de Janeiro* 301,099 67 150,549 33 451,648
Espirito Santo 60,000 50 60,000 50 120,000
Goias 37,000 61 24,000 39 61,000
Maranhao 67,704 41 97,132 59 164,836
Mato Grosso 24,000 80 6,000 20 30,000
Minas Gerais 425,000 66 215,000 34 640,000
Para 88,000 69 40,000 31 128,000
Paraiba 102,407 84 20,000 16 122,407
Pernambuco 330,000 69 150,000 31 480,000
Piaui 80,000 89 10,000 11 90,000
Rio G. do Norte 56,677 80 14,376 20 71,053
Rio G. do Sul 142,500 95 7,500 5 150,000
Santa Catarina 47,500 95 2,500 5 50,000
Sao Paulo 259,000 92 21,000 8 280,000
Sergipe 88,000 73 32,000 27 120,000
Brazil 2,813,351 71 1,147,515 29 3,960,866
Source: Adapted from Ministerio da Agricultura. Industria e Commercio. Recenseamento do Brazil 
Realizado em 1 de Setembro de 1920: Resumo Historico dos Inoueritos Censitarios Realizados no Brazil. 
(Rio de Janeiro, 1922), I, p.404. * Including the province of Rio de Janeiro and the city of Rio de Janeiro.
3 in Rio Grande do Sul, 5 in Sergipe, and 11 in Minas Gerais. See Directoria Geral de Estatistica, Relatorio 
Annexo ao do Ministerio dos Negocios do Imperio de 1876. (Rio de Janeiro, 1877), pp.5-8.
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Table IX.2 - Brazilian population in 1872 per province and divided by non-slaves and slaves.
POPULATION
PROVINCES
NON-SLAVES % SLAVES % TOTAL
Alagoas 312,268 90 35,741 10 348,009
Amazonas 56,631 98 979 2 57,610
Bahia 1,211,792 88 167,824 12 1,379,616
Ceara 689,773 96 31,913 4 721,686
Corte* 226,033 82 48,939 18 274,972
Espirito Santo 59,478 72 22,659 28 82,137
Goias 149,743 93 10,652 7 160,395
Maranhao 284,101 79 74,939 21 359,040
Mato Grosso 53,750 89 6,667 11 60,417
Minas Gerais 1,669,276 82 370,459 18 2,039,735
Para 247,779 90 27,458 10 275,237
Paraiba 354,700 94 21,526 6 376,226
Parana 116,162 92 10,560 8 126,722
Pernambuco 752,511 89 89,028 11 841,539
Piaui 178,427 88 23,795 12 202,222
Rio de Janeiro 490,087 63 292,637 37 782,724
Rio G. do Norte 220,959 94 13,020 6 233,979
Rio G. do Sul 367,022 84 67,791 16 434,813
Santa Catarina 144,818 91 14,984 9 159,802
Sao Paulo 680,742 81 156,612 19 837,354
Sergipe 153,620 87 22,623 13 176,243
Brazil 8,419,672 85 1,510,806 15 9,930,478
Source: Adapted from Ministerio da Agricultura. Industria e Commercio. Recenspamemo do Brazil 
Realizado em 1 de Setembro de 1920: Resnmo Historico dos Inqueritos Censitarios Realizados no Brazil. 
(Rio de Janeiro, 1922), I, p.414.
* The city of Rio de Janeiro.
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1880s, although the number of slaves decreased in the country as whole, Minas Gerais continued to have 
the largest slave population. In 1875, for example, there were 1,419,966 slaves in Brazil, 298,496 (21%) in 
Minas Gerais. Ten years later, there were 1,133,228 slaves in the whole country and 276,275 (24%) in 
Minas Gerais3. Finally, by die time of the abolition of slavery, the Brazilian slave population was estimated 
in 800,000, of whom 230,000 (29%) resided in Minas Gerais4.
Table 1X3 - Minas Gerais: non-slave and slave population, and their percentage participation in the 
total population in 1819,1823,1830-1,1854-7,1869, and 1872.
YEARS NON-SLAVES (%) SLAVES(%) TOTAL
1823 425,000 (66) 215,000 (34) 640,000
1830-31 (69) (31) -
1854-57 (75) (25) -
1869 1,200,000 (80) 300,000 (20) 1,500,000
1872 1,669,276 (82) 370,459 (18) 2,039,735
Sources: Compiled from Ministerio da Agricultura, Industria e Commercio, Directoria Geral de Estatistica, 
Recenseamento do Brazil realizado em 1 de Setembro de 1920: Resumo Historico dos Inaueritos Censitarios
Realizados no Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, 1922), I, pp.403-23; and D.C. Libby, Transformscao e Trabalho em 
uma Economia Escravista: Minas Gerais no S6culo XIX (Sao Paulo, 1988), p.47.
Slaves constituted a large proportion of the mineiro population. During the first half of the 
nineteenth century slaves represented about 30% of the population of the province, as indicated in Table 
IX.3. This proportion was not much different from that for Brazil (29%) in 1823, as shown in Table IX. 1. 
During this year, only four other provinces had a larger proportion of slaves: Maranhao (59%); Espirito 
Santo (50%); Goias (39%); and Bahia (35%). From the middle of the century onwards, slave participation 
in the mineiro population decreased to 25% in the 1850s and to about 20% in the late 1860s and early 
1870s. In 1872, the proportion of slaves in the mineiro population (18%) was once more very similar to that 
for Brazil (15%), as shown above in Table IX.2. During this year, only the provinces of Rio de Janeiro 
(37%), Espirito Santo (28%), Maranhao (21%), and Sao Paulo (19%) had a larger proportion of slaves 
within their population. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the mineiro slave population was large both 
in absolute and relative terms.
If the size of the slave population in itself is an indication of the importance of slaves as a source 
of labour during the last century, this becomes even clearer when the figures for slave participation in the 
work-force are taken. As shown in Table IX.4, during the period 1831-40 slaves represented nearly 37% 
of the mineiro labour force. In 1872, although the participation of slaves in the mineiro work-force was not 
as large as in Rio de Janeiro, where slaves constituted more than 46% of the total work-force, it was still 
very significant. During this year, slaves still made up nearly 19% of the mineiro work-force.
Non-slave Brazilians constituted the largest group of the mineiro population. According to Table 
IX.5, non-slave Brazilians represented more than 80% of the total population in 1872. From 1890 onwards,
3 This number does not include the number of slaves of five counties.
4 This estimate, by Xavier da Veiga, is probably an exaggeration, as pointed out by F. Iglesias, 
Politica Economica do Govemo Provincial Mineiro: 1835-1889. (Rio de Janeiro, 1958), p. 130.
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Table IX.4 - Participation of non-slaves and slaves in the work-force, 1831-1840 and 1872.
1831-1840 1872
PROVINCES NON-SLAVES SLAVES NON-SLAVES SLAVES
Minas Gerais 63.26 36.74 81.07 18.93
Rio de Janeiro - - 53.80 46.20
Sao Paulo - - 78.41 21.59
Bahia - - 84.92 15.08
Pernambuco - - 85.70 14.30
Rio Grde. Sul - - 81.57 18.43
Sources: Adapted from D.C. Libbv. op.cit.. p.54.
Brazilians constituted more than 96% of the mineiro population, a participation very similar to that for Brazil 
as whole. Comparison with Sao Paulo and the city of Rio de Janeiro illustrates very well the weight of 
Brazilians in the mineiro population. In Sao Paulo, the participation of non-slave Brazilians in 1872 and 
1890 is very similar to that observed in Minas Gerais for both years. However, in 1900 the particpation of 
Brazilians in the paulista population decreased to 76.81%, increasing to 81.85% in 1920. In Rio de Janeiro, 
although the participation of Brazilians tended to increase during the period 1872-1920, Brazilians never 
represented more than 80%. Hence, Brazilians were, in quantitative terms, by far the most important source 
of labour in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais.
In contrast, foreigners constituted a small proportion of the mineiro population. As shown in Table 
IX.5, foreigners represented only 0.9% of the total population of the province in 1872. The participation of 
foreigners in the mineiro population was similar to that of Sao Paulo and Brazil during this year. However, 
comparison with the city of Rio de Janeiro shows clearly the small importance, in relative terms, of 
foreigners in Minas Gerais. During this year, foreigners represented 26.66% of the total population of the 
city of Rio de Janeiro. In 1890, the proportion of foreigners in Minas Gerais grew to 1.47%, less than it did 
in Sao Paulo where the participation of foreigners increased to 5.42%. During this year, the participation 
of foreigners in the mineiro population was still smaller than that in the city of Rio de Janeiro, where they 
represented 23.79%. At the beginning of the twentieth century, foreigners represented nearly 4% of the 
mineiro population. Nevertheless, at the same time foreigners represented 23.19% and 25.94% of the 
population of Sao Paulo and the city of Rio de Janeiro respectively. Despite the efforts from the 
provincial/state government, Minas did neither attract nor hold immigrants during the period of major 
population transfer from Europe to the American continent - 1880 to 1920. Immigration in Minas Gerais 
failed because coffee planters, for whom it was in large part intended, were both unwilling and unable to 
hold foreign labour, and state colonies, designed to promote new crops and new agricultural techniques, 
never achieved their objectives5. Therefore, foreigners could hardly be considered an important source of 
labour in quantitative terms.
However, if these demographic indicators are useful to give a broad idea of the possible sources 
of labour, to understand any aspect of the history of Minas Gerais in the last century it is necessary to bear
5 J.D. Wirth, Minas Gerais in the Brazilian Federation. 1889-1937. (Stanford, 1977), p. 15.
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Table 1X.5 - Participation of foreigners and Brazilians in the total population of Minas Gerais, Sao 
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Brazil in 1872,1890, 1900, and 1920.
YEARS/ PROVINCES 1872# 1890 1900 1920
MINAS GERAIS 
Total Pop. 2,039,735 3,184,099 3,594,471 5,888,174
Brazilians 1,650,867 3,137,312 3,452,824 5,800,161
Percentage 80.94 98.53 96.06 98.50
Foreigners 18,409 46,787 141,647 88,013
Percentage 0.90 1.47 3.94 1.50
SAO PAULO
Total Pop. 837,354 1,384,753 2,282,279 4,592,188
Brazilians 664,175 1,309,723 1,753,092 3,758,479
Percentage 79.32 94.58 76.81 81.85
Foreigners 16,567 75,030 529,187 833,709
Percentage 1.98 5.42 23.19 18.15
R. JANEIRO*
Total Pop. 274,972 522,651 811,443 1,157,873
Brazilians 152,723 398,299 600,928 917,481
Percentage 55.54 76.21 74.06 79.24
Foreigners 73,310 124,352 210,515 240,392
Percentage 26.66 23.79 25.94 20.76
BRAZIL
Total Pop. 9,930,478 14,333,915 17,438,434 30,635,605
Brazilians 8,176,191 13,982,370 16,159,371 29,045,227
Percentage 82.33 97.55 92.67 94.81
Foreigners 243,481 351,545 1,279,063 1,590,378
Percentage 2.45 2.45 7.33 5.19
Source: Adapted from Ministerio da Agricultura. Industria e Commercio. Recenseamento do Brazil 
Realizado em 1 de Setembro de 1920. (Rio de Janeiro, 1924), IV, 2nd. part, p.48 and Directoria Geral de 
Estatistica, Relatorio Annexo ao do Ministerio dos Negocios do Imperio de 1876. (Rio de Janeiro, 1877), 
p.15.
* Those figures refer only to the city of Rio de Janeiro.
# Those figures do not include the slave population.
in mind that the economic and social order was deeply marked by the slave regime that prevailed in Brazil
for most of that period (as shown in Chapter 8). Although the slave regime had created a stratified society
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divided into masters and slaves, the occupational structure of nineteenth-century mineiro population was very 
diversified6.
Slave-owners occupied the top of the social pyramid, top which was surprisingly large. More than 
two-thirds of slave-owners had no more than 5 slaves. Despite their small possessions, the exploitation of 
slave labour provided them with an increased production, as well as the status of "slave-owner", symbol of 
complete participation in the slave regime. Small slave-owners were found either in the countryside or in 
urban areas. They were dedicated to every sort of economic activity: cultivation of basic foodstuffs, domestic 
textile industry, mechanical workshops, and trading. Large and medium slave-owners (and the number of 
these seems to have been small) constituted the local elite of the slave regime. They were in control of the 
most dynamic economic sectors of the slave economy such as large plantations and extensive livestock, 
mining and large muletrains enterprises, or even manufactures.
Among the non-owners of slaves, the most privileged stratum was the group constituted by 
craftsmen - the independent producers so common in the urban areas and even in the hamlets of the 
province. Their privileged position was due to their greater participation in the money economy and to the 
greater relative status provided by the performance of crafts. The second most privileged stratum was made 
up by independent producers dedicated to subsistence agriculture organized in small family units of 
production. Wage-eamers constituted the lowest social stratum of non-owners of slaves. They occupied a 
position almost totally marginal in the structure of the slave regime, either in terms of their absence from 
the most dynamic and productive economic activities, or in terms of their complete exclusion from the 
political process of Imperial Brazil7.
Finally, at the bottom of the social pyramid there was the mass of slaves who were employed in 
all kinds of occupations. Contrary to what several authors have argued8, it is not true that the majority of 
slaves were employed in the subsistence sector. There is evidence to show that the mineiro slave economy 
was surprisingly diversified and flexible9. A large proportion of the slave population - both men and women 
- was employed as craftsmen, as skilled and unskilled workers in non-agricultural activities, and as domestic
6 D.C. Libby, Transformacao e Trabalho em uma Economia Escravista: Minas Gerais no Seculo 
XIX (Sao Paulo, 1988), p. 18.
7 Ibid., pp.81-3.
8 See, R.B. Martins, "Growing in Silence: The Slave Economy of Nineteenth-Century Minas 
Gerais", Vanderbilt University, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Nashville, 1980; R.B. Martins, "Minas Gerais, 
Seculo XIX: Trafico e Apego a Escravidao numa Economia Nao-Exportadora"', in Estudos Economicos. 
13(1): 181-209, Jan.-Abr., 1983; A. Martins Filho and R.B. Martins, "Slavery in a Non-export economy: 
Nineteenth-Century Minas Gerais Revisited", in HAHR. 63(3), pp.537-568, 1983.
9 See, R.W. Slenes, "Os Multiplos de Porcos e Diamantes: A Economia Escravista de Minas Gerais 
no Seculo XIX", in Cademo IFCH UNICAMP. 17, who shows how directly and indirectly some sectors of 
the mineiro economy were attached to the export economy, providing the necessary funds to the purchase 
of slaves; and Libby, op.cit.. who pointed out the importance of die iron, and the mining industry - which 
relied heavily on slave labour - in the mineiro economy of the last century.
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servants10, as it was also the case in the city of Rio de Janeiro11. According to the 1872 census, nearly 25%
of the mineiro slave population were employed in non-farming occupations12.
Equally important in the study of the mineiro labour market is the fact that slavery determined the
terms according to which the stratum of non-owners of slaves participated in the economy. Slavery was the
predominant form of labour in the most dynamic sectors of the mineiro economy until the 1880s13.
Consequently, slavery had a great impact upon the working-relations in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais,
as can be observed in several remarks made by entrepreneurs throughout the century. At the beginning of
the last century, for example, Eschwege observed that an entrepreneur in Minas Gerais would only succeed
if he could hire or buy slaves14. Thus, slaves were employed in every kind of work: as peasants, producing
sugar, transporting, cooking, as carpenter, postman, tailor, and so on. In contrast, the white population, even
the poor, did not engage in manual work because it was easy to find a way to survive. Very often even poor
whites possessed a slave, who could make ends meet. Even the mulatto, who considered work as a
degrading thing, would possess one. In the more populous areas, however, mulattos constituted the working
class. Nevertheless, they were the example of idleness, rarely working15. The freed negro, in his turn:
"Never has the means to buy a slave. Enchanted by the happiness of being free, he avoids 
any kind of work and does not submit himself to a new master in any way. Thus, he 
works only the necessary not to starve. Furthermore, following the example of the mulatto, 
if he earns in only one day the sufficient to eat for a whole week he will only come back 
to work in the end of these 7 days."16
Furthermore, a non-slave worker would immediately object to an order given by his employer by saying that 
he was not a slave17. In 1856, Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage justified the recruitment of foreigners on the 
grounds that non-slave Brazilians were unreliable18. Moreover, he argued that the recruitment of Brazilians 
was difficult and very often they lacked regular habits of work19. The same kind of remarks about non-slave
10 Libby, oo.cit.. pp.19, 73-92.
11 For a detailed account of the slave economy in the city of Rio de Janeiro see L.C. Soares, "Urban 
Slavery in Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro", University of London, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1988.
12 R. Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery. 1850-1888. (1972), p.300.
13 Libby, op.cit.. p. 18.
14 W.L. von Eschwege, Pluto Brasiliensis. (Berlin, 1833; reprinted Belo Horizonte/Sao Paulo, 1979), 
II, pp.248-9.
15 Ibid., pp.263-4.
16 Ibid., p.264.
17 Ibid., pp.249-64.
18 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1856), p. 13.
19 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembl6ia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), p.22.
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Brazilian workers were made by owners of textile mills in the last quarter of the century20.
Although the analysis of the mineiro population during the last century suggests that non-slave 
Brazilians constituted the main source of labour, they were only occasionally employed in the most dynamic 
sectors of the economy. Independent producers were mostly employed in crafts and subsistence agriculture. 
In contrast, despite being the second largest source of labour, slaves were employed in a wide range of 
occupations in both the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors of the mineiro economy. Thus, Minas Gerais 
- which had one the largest slave populations in Brazil - had its economic and social order deeply marked 
by slavery. Slavery had a major impact upon the pattern of employment of the non-slave population and was 
the predominant form of labour in the most dynamic economic activities of the province until its abolition 
in the late 1880s. Finally, foreigners were numerically the least important source of labour in Minas Gerais, 
although their importance as a source of skilled labour cannot be neglected, as it is going to be shown in 
the following part of this chapter.
9.2 - Sources of labour:
This part investigates the sources of labour from which mineiro entrepreneurs recruited their work­
force. As die demographic indicators examined in the first part of this chapter have shown, the majority of 
the mineiro population was made up of non-slave Brazilians and slaves, who constituted the bulk of the 
labour force in almost every industry examined in this thesis as both skilled and unskilled labour. 
Nevertheless, some of these industries relied more than others on slave labour. This difference is due to 
several factors such as the local availability of slaves and alternative sources of labour, the timing of the 
emergence of each industry, the labour-intensity of each economic activity, and the nature of the technology 
involved in each specific industry. The iron industry, for example, relied heavily on slave labour since its 
emergence dates to the first decades of the nineteenth century. As indicated in Chapter 1, during this period 
there was a large flux of Africans to Brazil and a large stock of underemployed slaves (as a result of the 
demise of eighteenth-century gold-mining economy) in the central part of Minas Gerais, where the industry 
was largely concentrated. Furthermore, the most widely employed process of iron production was introduced 
by African slaves, who consequently represented a vital source of skilled labour for the industry. A large 
number of slaves were also employed in the construction of the Uniao e Industria turnpike, a highly labour- 
intensive enterprise. The turnpike was built in the 1850s, when slaves were still cheap and abundant 
Moreover, it stretched across a coffee-growing region, where a large number of slaves was concentrated,
20 In 1884, Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas - one of the founders of the Cachoeira mill and of the 
Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira - wrote his brother Bernardo complaining about the difficulties of recruiting 
people to the Cachoeira mill. See, Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas 
No. 16", "Letter from Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 15 September 188", and 
Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from Francisco de 
Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 13 June 1884". In another occasion, he complained that it was 
time of feasts and that he would be forced to stop the mill since the workers would not turn up to work in 
any way. See, Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 17", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 22 April 1885".
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and several shareholders of the company were both slave-owners and coffee farmers themselves (see Chapter 
5). Although these two industries relied heavily on slave labour, they also employed a considerable number 
of Brazilians. In contrast with the iron and the transport industries, the textile industry did not employ a 
large number of slaves. Most of the mineiro textile mills emerged in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, a time when slaves were expensive and relatively scarce. Instead, they employed a large number 
of non-slave Brazilians, mostly women and children who were historically well suited to the work with 
textile machinery21. Among the industries investigated in this thesis, the electricity generating industry was 
the only one not to employ slaves at all, basically because the industry emerged after the abolition of slavery 
in Brazil. Therefore, the industry relied heavily on non-slave Brazilians, although die employment of 
foreigners cannot be neglected. Foreigners were employed in small numbers in all the industries examined. 
For most of the nineteenth century, they were the most important and accessible source of skilled labour.
There is some controversy over the time at which the production of iron in Minas Gerais began. 
According to Eschwege, iron was produced in the province from the first decade of the nineteenth century. 
At that point, many farmers and blacksmiths began to produce iron in small quantities for their own 
consumption. Until 1795 the production of iron for commercial purposes had been prohibited by the 
Portuguese colonial administration and manufacturing had also been limited by a lack of know-how about 
large-scale production22. Libby in turn argues that the production of iron in Minas Gerais began much earlier, 
probably in the middle of the eighteenth century, with rudimentary, domestic production on large estates. 
He argues that the 16 years - which separate the end of the restrictions on the industrial production of iron 
and the arrival of Eschwege in the province in 1811 - is too short a period to explain the large number of 
farmers and blacksmiths found by Eschwege producing iron. Thus, these farmers and blacksmiths must have 
started production much earlier, but only felt able to market their output commercially after the end of the 
restrictions. However, if there is some controversy over the time at which the production of iron began, there 
is general agreement that production in the province was introduced by African slaves23. Iron would have 
been produced for the first time in Antonio Pereira by a slave belonging to Captain Antonio Alves, and also 
in Inficionado by another slave belonging to Captain Duraes24.
Slavery was thus of crucial importance for the iron industry in Minas Gerais for two main reasons. 
First, as mentioned above, slaves were responsible for the diffusion of the first productive method. Second, 
the regular supply of slave labour, together with the physical isolation of the province created by natural 
difficulties of transport, represented the main competitive advantage that small foundries had against foreign 
competition. Until the 1880s, the mineiro iron industry expanded by relying heavily on slaves as its main
21 See F. Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England. (1987), p. 161.
22 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.203.
23 Libby, op.cit.. p. 136.
24 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.203.
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source of both skilled and unskilled labour25.
Such a dependency on slavery can be observed in the first iron foundries established in the 
province. At the beginning, Eschwege did not buy slaves to work in his foundry. With his European anti- 
slavery background, he believed that the work could and should be carried out by non-slave Brazilians. 
Nevertheless, the difficulties in hiring a permanent and reliable work-force of non-slaves proved 
overwhelming. Workers would leave his foundry within months of being trained. Not even the existence of 
a contract signed by the workers changed the situation: they would run away during the night or would 
behave so badly that in the end it was a great relief to be rid of them. The consequence was that after 
several years Eschwege was not able to train even a master or an apprentice. Among the first 30 men he 
had trained, only two stayed at the foundry, mainly because they were offered a high salary, a house, and 
a small piece of land to cultivate26. These demands illustrate well the difficulties encountered by nineteenth- 
century mineiro entrepreneurs to recruit non-slave native-born workers. It required greater material incentives 
to convince non-slave Brazilians to submit to the harsh discipline of a factory. These demands also show 
the attachment to land of die early non-slave Brazilian working-class and the backwardness of the money 
economy in Minas Gerais.
Furthermore, as Eschwege tried to organize the work at die charcoal-pit, the lack of habits of 
discipline, regularity, and obedience of non-slave Brazilians became obvious. He could not find anyone 
honest to oversee the work who would obey his orders punctiliously. The problems were worse on Sundays 
and holidays, when workers would leave the workplace unattended, thus causing fires in the woods and 
destroying the charcoal-pit on several occasions27. According to Eschwege's own words:
"It is nearly impossible for an industry to thrive in Brazil when it depends on non-slave
Brazilians"28
He also tried to hire slaves, but this did not work either. As soon as their masters judged that they were 
capable of doing the work they requested them back, clear evidence of the scarcity of skilled labour and the 
competition for it. In the end, Eschwege came to the conclusion that it was absolutely necessary to buy 
slaves, because he could rely on his slaves after training them as foundry masters and apprentices, and 
punish them when necessary. From then on, his foundry functioned much better and more productively29.
Slavery was therefore of utmost importance as the most viable source of labour available for the 
mineiro iron industry at the beginning of the century, although non-slaves Brazilians were also consistently 
being employed. During Eschwege's time - from 1811 to 1821 -, for example, the Patridtica foundry had
25 Libby, op.cit.. p. 135.
26 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.248.
27 Ibid., pp.248-9.
28 Ibid., p.249.
29 Ibid., p.248.
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a work-force made up of 20 slaves, 2 Brazilians, and occasionally a German foundry master. Slaves were
mainly employed as woodcutters, charcoal burners, and as carriers of every type. Brazilians were employed
in the smelting and reheating30, operations which required more skill from the part of the worker. These two
Brazilians were probably the only two he was able to train and hold before deciding to buy slaves, as
mentioned above. In 1831, when Eschwege had already left the foundry, the Patriotica foundry continued
to rely basically on slaves. At this time, it employed 55 slaves and one non-slave manager31. This implies
that the skilled tasks were shifted from the hands of non-slave Brazilians to the hands of slaves and further
confirms the dependence of one of the first iron foundries established in Minas Gerais on slaves as the main
source of both skilled and unskilled labour.
The Morro do Pilar foundry seems to have employed both slaves and non-slaves. According to
Schoenewolf - a German foundry master who worked at both the Morro do Pilar and die Patriotica foundries
-, there were 34 people working at the foundry in 1814: 15 smelters and iron-founders, 8 blacksmiths, 6
carpenters, 2 negroes, 2 youths, and a overseer. Schoenewolf gives no information on the number of slaves
and non-slaves within the work-force. However, based on evidence given by the German foundry master
on how Camara (the organizer of the foundry) beat one of the blacksmiths, it is reasonable to believe that
part of the work-force was slave:
"Mr. Camara became very angry and beat a certain blacksmith so severely that the man 
vomited blood for eight days. During the whole existence of the foundry, the whipping 
post was never empty."32
In 1821, Schoenewolf described the work-force of the foundry as made up of one manager, 2 masters, 6 
overseers, one blacksmith, 2 master-carpenters, 28 workers in the furnaces and the hammermill, 17 
apprentices, and 70 slaves for the charcoal-box33. Apart from the 70 slaves, the German foundry master gave 
no further information about the condition of the rest of the work-force. However, the number of overseers 
suggests that slaves were being employed in tasks other than the preparation of charcoal. The dependence 
of the Morro do Pilar on slave labour is indisputable. However, the employment of a large number of non­
slave Brazilians is also beyond doubt.
Another important foundry in Minas Gerais in the first half of the last century was the Girau, 
considered one of the largest foundries in the period 1831-40. Founded in 1813, by 1840 it employed 49 
slaves and one manager. Apart from the manager, all the skilled and unskilled workers were slaves, 
including 2 slave foremen, 3 smelters and iron-founders, and several blacksmiths34. The Sao Miguel de
30 Libby, op.cit.. p. 162.
31 Ibid., p. 162.
32 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.209.
33 Ibid., p.213.
34 Libby, op.cit.. pp. 163-3.
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Piracicaba foundry also employed a large number of slaves. In 1840, there were 151 slaves: 137 adults, 95 
men and 42 women, and 14 children under ten years of age35. This is the first conclusive evidence of the 
employment of women and children in the mineiro iron foundries. Although there is no further evidence, 
it is reasonable to believe that their employment was widespread. Thirteen years later the number of slaves 
employed at the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba had not changed considerably, as Monlevade (the owner of the 
foundry) observed in response to a survey of the iron industry in Minas Gerais organized by the president 
of the province:
"There are [in the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry] 150 slaves already apprenticed 
to the art of iron production, to the making of charcoal in the European fashion, and to 
the manipulation of iron of any form and size."36
The evidence given above shows clearly that the slaves employed at die foundry were performing all types 
work - skilled and unskilled.
The larger foundries were not the only concerns to employ slaves. The smaller factories did so also. 
However, they also employed a considerable number of non-slave Brazilians. In Itabira do Mato Dentro, 
for example, there were three small foundries in 1840 and all employed slaves. The owner, his blacksmith 
son, and 2 slaves worked in the first, the owner, a non-slave apprentice, and 4 slaves worked in the second 
one. In the third, the work-force was made up of 9 slaves. In Itabira do Campo in 1831, there were another 
three foundries: one employed 11 slaves and one non-slave worker; the other two employed 4 slaves, and 
5 and 6 non-slaves respectively. From 1831 to 1840, there were 24 foundries in the Metalurgica-Mantiqueira 
region of Minas Gerais37, 22 employed slave labour. There is no information available about die work-force 
of the other two remaining foundries. Of the 22 foundries that employed slaves, 10 did not employ any non­
slave workers, apart from the owner himself. Among the other 12, only 3 employed a larger number of non­
slaves. Altogether, the 22 foundries employed 168 slaves and 70 non-slaves, giving indisputable evidence 
of the importance of slaves as a source of labour for the smaller foundries. However, it becomes clear that 
the iron industry also provided enough for non-slave labour even in the first half of the last century when 
slaves were abundant and relatively cheap.
There is very little information available for the second half of the century. Nevertheless, in Santa 
Barbara - a district within the Metalurgica-Mantiqueira zone - in 1864, there were 21 foundries. One of 
these, the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry, is quoted as employing 103 workers, who most certainly were 
slaves. The remaining 20 foundries employed a total of 178 workers, each employing between 4 and 16 
people, but there is no information about the balance between slaves and non-slaves. However, on the
35 Ibid., p. 165.
36 F.A.M. Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil. (Belo Horizonte/Sao Paulo, 1983), p.111.
37 There is evidence suggesting that the iron industry was heavily concentrated in the Metalurgica 
region in 1821. During the 1850s, 80% of the mineiro foundries were located in the Metalurgica-Mantiqueira 
region and the same trend is observed for the period 1863-66, although the information is incomplete and 
scattered. Libby, op.cit.. pp. 152-60.
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evidence provided by the Sao Miguel de Piracicaba foundry, it is reasonable to believe that a large 
proportion of the 178 workers employed by the other 20 foundries were slaves. In 1883, Gorceix - a 
researcher from the Mining School of Ouro Preto - observed that most of the foundries established in the 
four main producer districts38 relied heavily on slave labour39. Thus, until the very last years of slavery in 
Brazil most of the iron foundries established in Minas Gerais - large or small - depended on slaves as their 
main source of skilled and unskilled labour.
Further evidence of the importance of slaves as a source of labour for the iron industry is given 
by Ferrand - a researcher from die Mining School of Ouro Preto - in 1884. While examining the methods 
of production (cadinho and Italian) employed in Minas Gerais, Ferrand pointed out that most of the 
foundries employing the so-called Italian method of production - considered one of the most technologically 
developed method of production used in Minas Gerais at that time - employed slaves. These foundries 
employed on average 11 slaves and one youth: 8 slaves and the youth preparing the charcoal, one slave at 
the furnace, one at the hammermill, one as assistant, and one transporting ore. Furthermore, the owners of 
foundries employing the Italian method very frequently had to change to a simpler method of production 
when the master-slave died40.
Thus, slaves represented the main source of skilled and unskilled labour for the mineiro iron 
industry until the abolition of slavery at the end of the 1880s. Their employment was widespread among 
both small and large foundries during this period. Nevertheless, as indicated above, there is evidence 
suggesting that non-slave Brazilians were also widely employed, although to a lesser extent.
Foreigners were another important source of skilled labour for the mineiro iron industry. Foreign 
ironworkers played a critical role in the industry at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As Eschwege 
pointed out, foreign ironworkers played a vital role in setting-up iron foundries in Minas Gerais. They were 
essential not only for assembling machinery, but also for training the native work-force and supervising 
production. The largest mineiro foundries established during this period relied upon foreign technicians. In 
the operation of the Patriotica foundry Eschwege depended on the help of a fellow German foundry master41. 
At the Morro do Pilar, Schoenewolf, the German foundry master who had worked at the Patriotica foundry, 
was hired as supervisor of the production in 1814. He proved to be absolutely vital to the successful 
production of the foundry. Before his arrival all attempts to produce iron had failed42. Moreover, in an 
attempt to improve production at the foundry, English ironworkers were requested from the Imperial
38 The districts are: Itabira do Mato Dentro, Santa Barbara, Conceigao do Mato Dentro, and Caet6.
39 Ibid., p. 174.
40 P. Ferrand, "A Industria de Ferro no Brazil (Provincia de Minas Gerais)", in Annaes da Escola 
de Minas. (Ouro Preto, 1885), No.4, pp.176-88.
41 Gomes, Historia da Siderurgia no Brasil, p.83.
42 Eschwege, op.cit.. p.208.
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government, as Schoenewolf informed Eschwege in his report of 1815:
"The blast furnace will not produce anymore until the arrival of the workers that Mr.
Camara requested from the government (...). With diem will also come the refractory 
material from England."43
After Schoenewolf had returned to Germany in 1821, 7 German technicians were recruited to work at the 
Morro do Pilar foundry. Nevertheless, the foundry was finally shut down ten years later. One of those 
German technicians continued in Minas Gerais and was found by Gardner, an Englishman, in 1840 operating 
a small foundry close to the village of Conceigao44.
Thus, until the abolition of slavery in 1888 slaves constituted the main source of skilled and 
unskilled labour for most of the large and small mineiro foundries. African slaves were responsible for the 
introduction of the first method of production. However, non-slave Brazilians were also widely employed, 
although in smaller numbers when compared with slaves. Foreigners represented an important source of 
skilled labour, at least in the first half of the century. Their importance as a source of skilled labour tended 
to decrease as more and more slaves and non-slave Brazilians became acquainted with the main methods 
of production. Nevetheless, the fact that foreigners continued to own the main foundries of this period (see 
Chapter 3) is a testimony of their qualitative - rather than quantitative - importance.
The Companhia Uniao e Industria (CUI) had a large number of slaves in its work-force, especially 
during the years of the construction of the turnpike. The company also employed a considerable number of 
non-slave Brazilians, as both skilled and unskilled labour. There were also a considerable number of 
foreigners employed, who were mainly employed as skilled labour.
Table IX.6 - Participation of slaves and non-slaves in the work-force of the Companhia Uniao e 
Industria, 1855-65.
YEARS TOTAL SLAVES % NON-SLAVES %
1855 - 515-818 - - -
1856 1,102 900 82 202 18
1857 - 804 - - -
1st Section 1,136 800 70 336 30
1858 2nd Section 1,500 - - - -
Total 2.636 - - - -
1859 3,500 - - - -
1865 344 - -
(1857), pp.21-3; (1860), p.7; (1866), Annexo 12.; A.O. Esteves, "Mariano Proc6pio", Revista do Institiitn 
Histdrico e Geografico Brasileiro. Vol.230, Jan-Mar, 1956, p.138; D.A. Giroletti, "A Companhia e a Rodovia 
Uniao e Industria e o Desenvolvimento de Juiz de Fora, 1850 a 1900", Universidade Federal de Minas 
Gerais, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1980, p.30.
43 Ibid., p.211.
44 Libby, op.cit.. p. 163.
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As shown in Table IX.6, in 1855 the company employed between 515 and 828 slaves. Slaves most 
probably represented a large proportion of the total work-force during this period, as the figures for the 
following years suggest. In 1856, the company employed 1,102 people; among them, 900 slaves who 
constituted nearly 82% of the total work-force. Of the 900 slaves, 48 were elderly or youths, some of whom 
were employed in the making of charcoal; 96 were employed as bricklayers, cooks, etc., and as their 
assistants and apprentices, in the several workshops and sections of the turnpike; and the remaining 756 
worked in the construction and maintenance of the turnpike. This demonstrates that in 1856 slaves were 
employed as both skilled and unskilled labour. The remainder 202 were non-slaves, the majority probably 
constituted of Brazilians. In 1857, there were 804 slaves working for the company, but there is no 
information about the total number of workers employed, as indicated in Table IX.6. However, on the basis 
of the number of workers employed in 1856 (1,102) - and as there is no information of any important 
alteration in the work-force -, it is realistic to suggest that the total number employed in 1857 may have 
been around 1,000 and that slave labour continued to account for a large proportion of the work-force. It 
is also reasonable to conclude that non-slaves must have constituted approximately 20% of the work-force, 
of whom a large proportion was most probably made up of Brazilians. In 1858, according to a report sent 
by the chairman of the company, Mariano Procopio Ferreira Lage, to the president of the province of Minas 
Gerais, the company employed 2,636 workers. Among them, 1,136 were employed on the section of the 
turnpike between Juiz de Fora and Paraiba. Of this number, 800 were slaves that is 70% of the 1,136. The 
other 1,500 were employed on the section between Petropolis and Paraiba do Sul, although there is no 
information about the status of these workers45. On the basis of the number of slaves working on the first 
section, it is reasonable to believe that slave labour represented a large proportion of the remaining 1,500 
workers. Furthermore, if the proportion of slaves and non-slaves employed on the first section was about 
the same on the second section, it is reasonable to conclude that approximately 500 non-slaves were 
employed by the company in 1858. In 1859, with the construction of the section between Pedro do Rio and 
the Paraibuna river, the company employed a total of 3,500 workers, as shown above in Table IX.6. 
However, there is no indication of the balance between slaves and non-slaves, nor between skilled and 
unskilled workers, nor about those employed directly by the company and those employed by contractors 
hired to build parts of the turnpike. With the completion of the construction of the turnpike in the following 
year, the number of workers employed by the company fell steadily. In 1865, for example, the company 
employed a total of 344 people, but there is no information concerning the employment of slaves or non­
slaves. However, from the 30 names listed as forming the staff of the company, 22 are without any doubt 
names of a Portuguese origin, which is strong evidence of the employment of Brazilians46. For the period 
1866 onwards, there is no information about either the total number of workers employed by the company
45 D.A. Giroletti, "A Companhia e a Rodovia Uniao e Industria e o Desenvolvimento de Juiz de 
Fora, 1850 a 1900", Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1980, p.30.
46 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1866), Annexo 12.
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nor about the employment of slaves.
Slaves employed by the Companhia Uniao e Industria (CUI) were recruited basically from three 
sources: from other companies, directly from private masters, and from the company's own shareholders. 
On 7 June 1855, for example, the CUI signed a contract with the Companhia de Cocaes to hire 305 slaves. 
Furthermore, in the company report of 1856, slave owners - to whom the company had advanced payment 
for the hire of their slaves - appeared as the company's sole sundry debtors. In the same report, the chairman 
of the company informed the shareholders that at the end of 1855 the company had increased by more than 
25% the price it had previously been offering to slave owners for the hire of slaves. Several reasons 
accounted for this change in the company's recruitment policy: the increase in the cost of labour caused by 
competition from other employers, die small supply of workers, and the increasing amount of work caused 
by the development of the construction of the turnpike Uniao e Industria47. In the report of 1857, the 
chairman thanked two shareholders for the services they had rendered to the company: Jose Antonio da Silva 
Pinto and Lino Jose Ferreira Armond. Among other things, Pinto hired out to the company more than a 
hundred slaves from his own stock who were working on the construction of the turnpike between Mathias 
and the bridge over the Parahybuna river48.
The idea that non-slave Brazilians were not a very reliable source of labour also prevailed at the 
CUI. For example, in the report of 1856, Lage justified the recruitment of foreign workers on the grounds 
of their greater skill:
"Such changes, (...), refer (...) to the recent recruitment of several craftsmen in Hamburg, 
who arrived this year. (...).
I try to employ as many nationals as I can, but unfortunately they are not reliable. 
Although there was a sufficient number of workers available for any kind of work, I am 
convinced of the advantages offered by work assisted by intelligence over routine and 
practical work. Thus, I do not hesitate to hire skilled workers who can satisfy the 
necessities of the company (...)."49
In the company report of the following year, Lage observed that the recruitment of Brazilians was irregular 
and difficult. Although the number of Brazilians recruited had increased, it lagged behind what would have 
been expected from such a large population as that of the province of Minas Gerais. Moreover, Brazilians 
lacked regular habits of work and were reluctant to leave their families, preferring to work close to home 
for a significantly smaller salary50.
Despite the complaints about their reliability, quality, and availability, non-slave Brazilians were 
nevertheless a source of skilled and unskilled labour for the CUI, as pointed out above. In 1856, for
47 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1856), pp. 14-32.
48 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), p. 38.
49 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1856), p. 13.
50 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), p.22.
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example, the company employed a total of 80 non-slave Brazilians for the gravelling of die road51. The 
report of 1857 informed the shareholders that a Brazilian engineer, Bulhoes, was hired to take the place of 
one of the French engineers whose contracts had expired. It also stated that the number of Brazilians 
recruited had increased and that the workshops established in Juiz de Fora employed both Germans and 
Brazilians52.
Finally, foreigners were also an important source of labour for the CUI. The company employed 
several foreigners in the construction and operation of the turnpike. In 1856, for example, 20 German 
workers were recruited in Hamburg to work in the company's workshops53. Rom 1853 to 1856, the company 
employed two French engineers to supervise the construction of the road: J.J. Regnier Vigouroux and 
Theodora Flagolot54. According to the report of 1857, the Rench engineers - whose contracts had expired - 
had been replaced by a German and a Brazilian engineer, as mentioned above. During the same year, the 
company also hired the two sons of the German engineer to work as his assistants55. Apart from the 
engineers already mentioned, the company also employed two foreign architects, Gambs and Lallemant, and 
a foreign surveyor, Mynssen56. In 1860, the company employed more than 50 free Africans in the 
construction of a bridge over the river Kagado and of a branch of the turnpike to Mar de Hespanha. These 
Africans workers were paid by local farmers interested in the construction of the branch57. Further evidence 
of the employment of foreigners in the operation of the turnpike is found in the list of the staff of the 
company in the report of 1866: William Morrit, inspector, Theodor Krauss, treasurer; Leon Boullid, Julien 
Audemars, Cesar Ansaldi, and Ulysse Dauphin, drivers58. Another important source of foreign labour was 
the colony of immigrants "D. Pedro II" set-up by the CUI in Juiz de Fora. According to the decree which 
granted the concession for the construction of the turnpike, the company was obliged to establish a colony 
of immigrants and settle 2,000 people there. By 1858, a total of 950 had arrived in the colony. Two years 
later, 1,144 lived there. Among the 667 adults living in the colony in 1860, approximately 196 worked for
51 A.O. Esteves, "Mariano Procopio", in Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro. 
Vol.230, Jan-Mar, 1956, p.138.
52 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), pp.21-3.
53 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1856), p. 13.
54 Esteves, op.cit.. pp. 149-52.
55 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relat6rio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1857), p.21.
56 Giroletti, A Rodovia e a Comnanhia Uniao e industria. p.27.
57 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatorio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1861), p.7.
58 Companhia Uniao e Industria, Relatdrio da Assembleia Geral dos Acionistas. (1866), Annexe
No. 12.
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the company, most of whom as skilled labour59. In 1867, there were 1,082 Germans and 117 Brazilians 
living in the colony60.
Thus, from evidence presented above, it is reasonable to conclude that slaves constituted an 
important source of both skilled and unskilled labour for the CUI, at least during the years of the 
construction of the turnpike, and that they made up a large proportion of the total work-force employed by 
the company during the period. Slaves were mainly recruited from slaves owned by other businesses, 
directly from private masters, and from the company's own shareholders. There is also evidence that non­
slaves, of whom Brazilians were probably the majority, constituted around 20% to 30% of the work-force 
during the years of the construction of the turnpike. It seems that after die completion of the turnpike the 
participation of non-slaves increased and that a large part of the staff of the company was probably made 
up of Brazilians. Finally, foreigners were employed as both skilled and unskilled labour. Foreigners were 
recruited direcdy in their country of origin or from the immigrants of the Colony "D. Pedro II" established 
by the company.
Table IX.7 - Evolution of the mineiro slave population, 1864-1887.
YEARS SLAVE POPULATION EVOLUTION 
(Base 1874)
EVOLUTION 
(Year by Year)
1864 275,000 88.3%
1874 311,304 100.0% +24.5%
1884 301,125 96.7% - 3.3%
1885 276,275 88.7% - 8.2%
1887 191,952 61.7% -30.5%
Source: Adapted from Conrad, op.cit.. pp.285. 292.
In relation to the mineiro textile industry, slaves were not an important source of labour. Basically 
this is because the first mills were established in the middle of the 1870s (see Chapter 5), a time when 
slaves were scarce, expensive, and mosdy concentrated in the coffee-growing areas. As shown in Table IX.7, 
from 1874 onwards the mineiro slave population started to decrease steadily. In 1874, there were 311,304 
slaves in Minas Gerais. A decade later the number of slaves had declined more than 3%. In 1885, the 
number of slaves reduced 8.2% in comparison with that of the previous year. In 1887, the mineiro slave 
population was just over 60% of what it had been in 1874. Furthermore, the analysis of the evolution of the 
stock of slaves within the various sub-regions of Minas Gerais shows that slaves were becoming even more 
scarce where the textile mills were situated. As shown in Table IX.8, during the period 1874-1883 the 
number of slaves in the mineiro coffee counties increased in nearly 10,000, or 13%. During the same period, 
the number of slaves in the central part of Minas Gerais, where the bulk of the textile industry was
59 Giroletti, A Rodovia e a Companhia IJniao e Industria. pp.31-8.
60 Ministerio da Agricultura, Commercio e Obras Publicas, Relatorio da Reparticao dos Negocios 
da Agriculture. Commercio e Obras Publicas. (Rio de Janeiro, 1869), Annexo L, p. 130.
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concentrated, decreased by 50,647, or 33.6%.
Yet, slaves were employed in small numbers, as in other mills all over Brazil61. They usually
worked as domestic servants, in construction work, in the carpenter and blacksmith workshops and the
sawmill, in transport, in the cleaning of mills, and in several activities related to the breeding of animals and
farming. However, there were occasions in which a few slaves were employed as operatives in the mills62.
Textile mills usually resorted to the hiring of slaves, a practice very common among industrialists in Brazil
during the nineteenth century. In the city of Rio de Janeiro, for example, workshops and industrial
establishments which did not have resources to buy slaves, or only needed their services temporarily, had
to resort to the hiring of slave workers63.
From 1873 to 1877, the Companhia Mascarenhas Irmaos, which owned the Cedro mill, consistently
employed slaves. In 1873, for example, the mill hired two slaves, Clemente and Samuel, paying their owner
140$000 Milreis and 70$000 Milreis respectively for an annual contract64. The company also hired slaves
from its own shareholders' stock. In 1878, the company paid 106$000 Milreis to Antonio Candido
Mascarenhas - one of die founders and owner of the Cedro mill - for the hiring of the slave Manoel for 212
days. In the following year, Bernardo Mascarenhas - manager of the mill - credited his brother and
shareholder, Caetano Mascarenhas, 80$000 Milreis for the hiring of his slaves65. But the Cedro mill also
possessed its own slaves. In 1873, the company bought a slave, Manoel Cabra, for 1:500$000 Conto66.
There is evidence that the Companhia Mascarenhas & Barbosa, owner of the Cahoeira mill, also
hired slaves. In 1878, the manager of the mill - Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas - wrote to Francisco de
Assis Vianna saying that:
"We believe that you made a mistake when you counted the number of days that your 
slave worked here (...)."67
Taking into account the fact that the Cedro and the Cachoeira mills were owned by members of the same
61 Although the total employment of slaves tended to decrease after the 1850s, they were still being 
employed in the Brazilian textile mills, as mentioned by S.J. Stein, Origens e Evolucao da Industria Textil 
no Brasil. 1850/1950. (Rio de Janeiro, 1979), p.64.
62 D. Giroletti, Fabrica Convento Disciplina. (Belo Horizonte, 1991), pp.61-2.
63 Soares, op.cit.. p.72.
64 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.5", "Contrato de 
Aluguel de Escravos".
65 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Copiador de Cartas, 1872-1879 - Mascarenhas & Irmaos", 
"Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas to Caetano Mascarenhas, 27 October 1879", p. 108.
66 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencia Recebida No.5", "Escritura de Compra 
e Venda de Manoel Cabra".
67 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Copiador de Cartas, 1878-1880 - Mascarenhas & Barbosa", 
"Letter from Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Francisco de Assis Vianna, 10 October 1878", p. 118.
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Table EX.8 - Registered Growth and Decline of Slave Population in Minas Gerais, 1874-1883 (Major 
Counties).
COUNTY 1874 1883 GROWTH DECLINE
Coffee Counties
(Southeastern Minas Gerais)
Juiz de Fora 14,368 21,808 7,440
Leopoldina 15,253 16,001 748
Mar de Hespanha 12,658 15,183 2,525
Pomba 7,028 6,392 636
Rio Novo 6,957 7,336 379
Rio Preto 6,313 6,120 193
Sao Paulo do Muriaf 6,938 7,775 837
Uba 7,149 6,020 1,129
76,664 86,635 11,929 1,958
Coffee Counties Net Growth 9,971
Mining Counties
(Central Minas Gerais)
Bomfim 5,824 2,919 2,905
Boro Successo 2,324 1,919 405
Caete 2,798 1,310 1,488
Curvello 1,429 3,217 1,788
Diamantina 2,036 7,510 5,474
Formiga 3,625 3,352 273
Grao Mogol 3,701 2,604 1,097
Itabira 7,464 5,305 2,159
Januaria 1,115 997 118
Lavras 8,380 6,322 2,058
Mariana 8,422 6,389 2,033
Minas Novas 4,312 3,368 944
Montes Claros 4,046 3,249 797
Oliveira 7,889 5,630 2,259
Ouro Preto 5,632 2,359 3,093
Paracatu 2,638 1,638 1,000
Pitangui 6,590 3,189 3,401
Queluz 13,998 4,322 9,676
Rio Pardo 6,722 3,667 3,055
Sahara 8,982 3,123 5,859
Santa Barbara 7,610 3,379 4,231
Santa Luzia 5,953 2,399 3,554
Santo Antonio do Monte 1,842 1,512 330
Sao Joao d'El Rei and
Sao Jose d'El Rei 10,827 10,281 546
Serro 9,420 4,473 4,947
Sete Lagoas 2,295 2,527 232
Taroandua 4,764 2,851 1,913
150,638 99,991 7,494 58,141
Mining Counties Net Decline 50,647
Source: Conrad, op.cit.. p.293
family, Mascarenhas, that the mills were close to each other, and that the Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira 
(CCC) - the company resulting from the merger of the two mills - employed and owned slaves, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the employment of slaves at the Cachoeira mill was not sporadic.
The employment of slaves by the mineiro textile mills continued until the last years of slavery. The
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only textile mill to be operated basically by slaves was the Sao Sebastiao mill, set-up in 188468. Apart from
a few non-slave operatives, the large majority of the 75 workers69 employed at die mill was made up of
slaves. According to Victor Mascarenhas, the director of the mill:
"Due to the condition of its workforce, and apart from a machinist and a few non-slave 
workers, no salary is paid at this establishment."70
In 1883, the CCC bought a slave, as shown in the following receipt:
"I have received from Mr. Thedphilo Marques Ferreira, manager of the Cedro mill, the 
amount of one conto and three hundred and fifty thousand reis, the sum for which I sold 
my slave Joaquim to the Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, (...).//?1
A year later Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas wrote to Bernardo Mascarenhas that he was sending a slave
belonging to Joao Vianna to work at the Cedro mill. If Bernardo considered the price paid for the slave
(Rs.l$500 per day) too high, Francisco asked him to return the slave to the Cachoeira mill, evidence that
the hiring of slaves continued at the CCC. In 1885, Francisco wrote again to Bernardo Mascarenhas,
concerning the employment of slaves as bricklayers in the Cachoeira mill:
"Dias needs not bring any worker because I have 3 or 4 slaves here, who work as 
bricklayers."72
In the company report of 1887 there is a note referring to the depreciation in the value of the slave 
Theodorico, who belonged to the CCC and worked at the Cachoeira mill73. During the same year, Francisco 
de Paula Mascarenhas wrote to Bernardo Mascarenhas concerning the registration of the slave Joaquim74. 
In 1886, the director and shareholder of the Cassu mill in Uberaba stated that a total of 61 people worked 
at the mill: among them, 3 slaves. During the same year, the Bom Jesus D'Agua Fria mill employed 10 
slaves75. Thus, although slaves did not represent an important source of labour for the mineiro textile 
industry, they were consistently employed in small numbers.
Concerning non-slave Brazilians, the idea that they were not a reliable source of labour also
68 Libby, op.cit.. p.229.
69 P. Tamm, Uma Dinastia de Teceloes. (Belo Horizonte, 2nd.ed. 1960), p. 110.
70 Libby, op.cit.. p.229.
71 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No. 14", "Receipt of Rs.l:350$000 
signed by Antonio Diniz Mascarenhas, 27 July 1883".
72 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 18", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 14 August 1885".
73 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Quarto Relatorio apresentado a Assemblea Geral dos Accionistas 
da Companhia Cedro & Cachoeira, em 15 de Margo de 1887".
74 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias No.21", "Letter from Francisco de 
Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 1 February 1887".
75 Libby, op.cit.. pp.234-5.
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prevailed in the mineiro textile industry, as shown in the case of the iron industry and of the CUI. As mills 
were located in the countryside, in times of planting Brazilians were not easily recruited, as shown in the 
following letter:
"It has been very difficult to find workers; it is time of clearing the land."76
In another occasion, Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, manager of die Cachoeira mill, expressed the
difficulties in finding people to work and how he was managing to overcome this problem:
"It does not matter how hard you try, the result will always be the same: more people will 
not come. The better way to hold people was studied by me and applied since the 
beginning - if one works from 30 to 40 days, he will earn 660, from 50 to 60 days, 680, 
and from 85 to 90 days, 700. The rewards will be paid for the day worked, when the job 
is finished. In this way, I have managed to hold a great number of people whose interest 
in the rewards have kept them here until the end."77
In 1885, Francisco complained about the monthly festivals when nobody wanted to work and he was 
powerless to force the work-force otherwise78. During the same year, he wrote that he was very busy having 
to supervise the work at the mill and the construction of a dam, since he did not have a reliable assistant 
He could not trust the work to the workers themselves, who required a strict, intense and personal 
supervision79.
Nevertheless, non-slave Brazilians were the most important source of unskilled labour for the 
mineiro textile industry. As mentioned above, to the exception of the Sao Sebastiao mill, which was operated 
basically by slaves, the larger part of the work-force employed by the mineiro mills was made up of non­
slave Brazilians. The Cassu mill, for example, employed a total of 61 people in 1886. Among them, there 
were 3 slaves and a foreigner machinist. The remaining 57 people were all non-slave Brazilians. In 1883, 
the Biribiry mill employed 130 people: apart from the foreigner machinist, all of them were Brazilians80. 
Although there is very little information available about the composition - in terms of nationality - of the 
work-force of other textile mills for any specific year, there is evidence of the wide employment of 
Brazilians, especially of women and children.
The large employment of women and children is not peculiar to the mineiro textile mills since in 
many different countries the bulk of the work-force employed in textile mills was made up of women and
76 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 15 September 1884".
77 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 13 June 1884".
78 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa Correspondencias Recebidas No. 17", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 22 April 1885".
79 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa Correspondencias Recebidas No. 18", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 16 September 1885".
80 Libby, op.cit.. pp.234, 236.
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children. In England, for example, between one-third and one-half of the labour force employed in the 
cotton-mills in the early 1830s were under the age of 21. In worsted the proportion of juveniles was even 
higher. Among adults, women constituted the majority. In 1834, of the 191,671 adults employed in all textile 
mills in the United Kingdom 102,812 were women81. In the middle of the century, there were almost 1.2 
million people working in all sides of the British textile industry. In almost every branch there were more 
women than men employed82. This pattern of employment can also be observed later in newly industrialized 
countries. In Japan in the early twentieth century, for instance, female operatives comprised more than 85% 
of the total work-force of the local textile industry. Moreover, most of these female operatives had been 
recruited from the rural sector and were characteristically young in age. According to a 1900 survey of eight 
large cotton-mills in Osaka, more than 70% of the female operatives aged between 14 and 24 years. In the 
weaving factories, this proportion was even higher (77.2% )83.
The reasons for the large employment of women and children in the textile industry are various. 
Engels, for example, suggests that the human labour involved in spinning and weaving consisted chiefly in 
piecing broken threads. Machines did all the rest and work did not require muscular strength, but only 
flexibility of finger. Hence, men were not only not needed, but, by reason of the greater muscular 
development of their hands, less fit for it than women and children. Women's and children's labour was also 
cheaper than men's84 and they were more docile and easier to control85.
In the case of Minas Gerais, as most mineiro mills were established in rural areas, and as the 
majority of adult men were employed on the land, the most accessible source of labour for the mills were 
women and children, especially orphans86. Orphans were usually concentrated in orphanages and were thus 
more easily recruited.
The first records of the labour force of the Companhia Cachoeira de Macacos (CCM) appeared only 
in the 1920s. Nevertheless, from the records of those workers who started to work at mill at the turn of the 
century, it is possible to observe that they were all Brazilians and locals. Furthermore, most of them were 
children and teenagers when they were first admitted. Among the 32 records found, 18 (54%) of them 
belonged to male workers. As shown in Table IX.9, among male workers, the eldest one was 23 years old 
when he was admitted at the CCM and the younger was 5. Four (22%) were aged 21 years old and over,
81 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the Working Class. (1980), p.341.
82 P. Mathias, The First Industrial Nation: The Economic History of Britain. 1700-1914. (2nd. ed. 
1983), p.242.
83 K. Odaka, "Redundancy Utilized: The Domestic Economics of Female Domestic Servants in Pre- 
War Japan", in Japanese Women Working, ed. J. Hunter (1993), p. 17.
84 Engels, op.cit.. pp. 164-5.
85 See Thompson, op.cit.. Chapter 9 and 10, part IV.
86 A.M. Vaz, Cia. Cedro e Cachoeira: Historia de uma Empress Familiar. 1883-1987. (Belo 
Horizonte, 1990), pp. 193-7.
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and one of them, Herculano Luiz Moreira, worked at the mill as bookkeeper in the 1920s. He was 22 years 
old when he was employed in 190287. Eight (45%) were between 10 and 20 years old. The remaining 6 
(33%) were under 10 years old. Among the 14 female operatives, the elder one was 20 years old and the 
younger one was 5, as indicated in Table IX. 10. Only 5 (36%) of them were aged between 10 and 20 years 
old. The remainder 9 (64%) aged between 8 and 5 years old.
Table IX.9 - Companhia Cachoeira dos Macacos: male workers admitted until the beginning of the 
twentieth century, their place of birth, age at the time of admission, and year of admission.
WORKERS PLACE OF BERTH AGE OF 
ADMISSION
YEAR OF 
ADMISSION
Antonio Ribeiro Freitas Paraopeba 23 1900
Herculano Luiz Moreira Tnhahma 22 1902
Emilio Augusto de Mello Para de Minas 21 1889
Manoel A. de Oliveira Contagem 21 1889
Carlos Luiz de Moura Sete Lagoas 20 1887
Amador Pereira Guimaraes Pitanguy 14 1890
Euclydes P. de Camargos Santa Quiteria 13 1901
Raymundo I. de Paula Sete Lagoas 12 1895
Francisco Assis Cotta Jequitiba 11 1890
Joaquim Gonsalves Cotta Jequitiba 10 1890
Gereino Fernandes Diniz Jequitiba 10 1905
Raymundo P. de Miranda Lagoa Santa 10 1906
Jose Cesario da Rocha Contagem 9 1896
Antonio Leandro Cachoeira dos Macacos 9 1893
Pedro Gonsalves Cotta Jequitiba 7 1890
Francisco Simao Faria Santa Quiteria 7 1892
Benevides D'Anmmciagao Santa Quiteria 6 1890
Joao Baptista Marques Sete Lagoas
?•?"" j -  ■ ___ ■ ,hmv-'
5 1896
_______1 __ 4 r\r\s- i n o i / /Source: Compiled from Companhia Cachoeira dos Macacos, "Livro de Registro de Empregados, 1926-1931", 
pp. 1-56 and "Livro de Registro de Empregados, 1935", pp.3-203.
Among die 32 workers employed by the CCM whose records were found, some were brothers and 
sisters such as Balbina Pires de Miranda and Raymundo Pires de Miranda - both of them were bom in 
Lagoa Santa and were 10 years old of age when they were admitted at the mill in 1891 and 1906 
respectively -, and Joana Iria Candelaria and Thereza Candelaria de Jesus - both 8 years old of age when 
they began to work at the mill in 1904 and 1910 respectively. There is also the case of 3 brothers Francisco 
Assis Cotta, Joaquim Gonsalves Cotta and Pedro Gonsalves Cotta - who started to work at the mill at the 
age of 11,10 and 7 years old respectively -, and their sisters, Rita Cotta (bom in 1886) and Augusta Ferreira
87 Companhia Cachoeira dos Macacos, "Livro de Registro de Empregados, 1926-1931".
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Cotta (bom in 1895) - who were both 8 years old when they started to work at the mill88. This seems to 
indicate that family relations were an important way of recruitment.
Table IX.10 - Companhia Cachoeira dos Macacos: female workers admitted until the beginning of the 
twentieth century, their place of birth, age at the time of admission, and year of admission.
WORKERS PLACE OF BIRTH AGE OF 
ADMISSION
YEAR OF 
ADMISSION
Perpetua de Paula Sete Lagoas 20 1895
Carlota Ferreira de Si Tres Barras 17 1889
Maria M. Gongalves Tnhaiima 11 1901
Balbina P. de Miranda Lagoa Santa 10 1891
Macrina M. de Abreu Sete Lagoas 10 1898
Joana Iria Candelaria Sete Lagoas 8 1904
Thereza C. de Jesus Sete Lagoas 8 1910
Anna Pereira Franco Jequitiba 8 1890
Rita Cotta Jequitiba 8 1894
Augusta Cotta Jequitibi 8 1903
Thomazia Ferreira Sete Lagoas 8 1892
Maria M. Fernandes Inhauma 7 1900
Dolores Moreira de Sa Sete Lagoas 5 1900
Maria Fernandes Sete Lagoas
w _______ m  »_____
5
n ________ J —  '
1905
Source: Companhia Cachoeira dos Macacos, "Livro de Registro de Empregados, 1926-1931", pp.1-56 and 
"Livro de Registro de Empregados, 1935", pp.3-203.
The analysis of the records of the labour force of the Companhia de Tecidos Santanense (CTS) 
leads to the same conclusions: most of them indicate the employment of locals, notably children, teenagers, 
or women. Of the 14 records available, 6 (43%) refer to male workers, as shown in Table IX. 11. Among 
male operatives, the eldest one was 17 when he started to work at the mill. Other three operatives were over 
10 years old and the remaining 2 were aged 9 and 8. These last two ones, Josias Alves Franco and Jose 
Alves Franco, were brothers89. Among the 8 (57%) female workers, the eldest one was Francelina Balbino, 
who was 23 when she started at the mill in 1895. Five of the female operatives were aged between 10 and 
20 years old. The younger female workers were aged 7 when they began to work at the CTS, as indicated 
in Table IX.11.
The same phenomenon can be observed in other mills in Minas Gerais. The Cedro mill, for
88 Companhia Cachoeira dos Macacos, "Livro de Registro de Empregados, 1926-1931", pp.1-56 and 
"Livro de Registro de Empregados, 1935", pp.3-203.
89 Companhia de Tecidos Santanense, "Registro de Empregados".
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example, employed a total of 130 workers in 1882,60 of whom were children90. The Cassu mill employed 
in 1886 15 women over 14 years old, 10 girls between the ages of 8 and 14 years old, and 20 boys between 
the ages of 8 and 14 years old. During the same year, the textile mill of Montes Claros employed a total 
81 people; 70 workers were orphans or abandoned youths. Among the 66 people employed by the Uniao 
Itabirana mill, 40 were boys and girls. Women made up the majority of the work-force of the Bom Jesus 
d'Agua Fria mill: of the 140 workers employed at the mill, 80 were women. The same can be observed at 
the Biribiry mill in 1883. Of the 130 workers employed at the mill during this year, 110 were female aged 
between 10 and 30 years old91.
Table IX .ll - Companhia de Tecidos Santanense: female and male workers admitted until the 
beginning of the twentieth century, their place of birth, age at the time of admission, and year of 
admission.
WORKERS PLACE OF BERTH AGE OF 
ADMISSION
YEAR OF 
ADMISSION
Female
Francelina B albino Itauna 23 1895
Maria da Costa Leite Itauna 20 1915
Maria Raymunda Leal Igaratinga 16 1910
Maria Lydia de Jesus Sao Gon^alo Para 14 1902
Augusta Alves Franco Pitanguy 14 1899
Maria G. Monteiro Sete Lagoas 13 1895
Nazareth Maria Jesus Itauna 7 1885
Augusta Nogueira Itauna 7 1914
Male
Firmino Jos6 de Faria Itauna 17 1895
Joaquim Leite Itauna 14 1903
Joao Monteiro Sao Gongalo Para 13 1900
Antonio Sudario Leroy Santa Quiteria 12 1904
Josias Alves Franco Itauna 9 1908
Jose Alves Franco Itauna 8
/ m ^  __ J .  r?__________ J l .
1899
. / /Source: Compiled from Companhia de Tecidos Santanense, "Registro de Empregados77?
The CCC also employed a large proportion of women, and children. In 1883, for example, only 
20% of the work-force was made up of men. The rest was made up of women and children, as shown in 
Table IX. 12. The composition of the work-force did not change in the following year, as women, boys, and 
girls represented 45%, 23%, and 12% of the total work-force respectively. For the years 1885 and 1886, 
there is no information about the percentage of men, women, and children employed by the company.
90 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Copiador de Cartas de 1881 - Mascarenhas & Irmaos", "Inquiry 
of the Sete Lagoas District Council on 13 March 1882", pp.488-92.
91 Libby, Transformacao e Trabalho. pp.234-6.
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Nevertheless, there is evidence of the continuing employment of children at the company in 1885, as a letter
written by Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, manager of the Cachoeira mill, suggests:
"The sooner we have the steam machine in the spinning section the better will be the 
results.
What I make with 40 children, with a great waste of cotton, I will make with 20 
without any waste, doubling the production and improving the quality of the thread."92
In the years 1887, 1888, and 1889, the percentages shown in Table IX.12 refer only to the work-force 
employed at the Cedro mill. Nevertheless, the conclusion is the same: the largest proportion of the work­
force was made up of women and children. In 1887, the Cedro mill employed a total of 233 workers, out 
of whom 21% were men, 45% women, 23% boys, and 11% girls. In the following year, the mill employed 
a total of 253 workers: 45% were women, 23% were boys, and 9% were girls. In 1889, the figures for boys 
and girls are included in the figures for men and women respectively. Nevertheless, the group of women 
made up the larger proportion of the total work-force representing 65%. There is further evidence that the 
company continued to employ women and children in large proportions. In 1893, for example, Francisco 
de Paula Mascarenhas wrote the following letter urging the recruitment of children:
"It is urgent that you find to this mill (...) as many the children as you can to work in the 
spinning machines, because it is nearly impossible to find them here."93
Table IX.12 - Composition of the work-force of the Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira for the years 1883- 
1889.
YEAR TOTAL
WORK-FORCE
MEN
%
WOMEN
%
BOYS
%
GIRLS
%
1883 264 20 24 24 14
1884 268 20 45 23 12
1885 319 - - - -
1886 378 - - - -
1887* 446 21 45 23 11
1888# 489 23 45 23 9
1889+ 485 35 65 - -
(Belo Horizonte, 1990), p. 196.
* The percentages for this year refer only to the Cedro mill which employed 233 workers.
# The percentages for this year refer only to the Cedro mill which employed 235 workers.
+ The percentages for this year refer only to the Cedro mill, which employed 253 workers, and include men 
and boys and women and girls.
In 1894, Caetano Mascarenhas wrote that he had ordered Jose Domingues Alves Barroso to recruit in
92 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 18",, "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 9 October 1885".
93 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.35"„ "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Theophilo Marques Ferreira, 8 January 1893".
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Medanha the young women needed to work in the new spinning machines being set-up at the Sao Vicente 
mill94.
As the above mentioned analysis of the records of the work-force of both the CCM and the CTS 
indicates, non-slave Brazilians were frequently recruited within the region where the mills were located. All 
of the workers listed by the records of both companies were bom in the Metalurgica zone, where both mills 
were located. Of the 32 workers listed in the records of the CCM, 76% of them were bom in the district 
where the mill was established, Inhauma, or in neighbouring districts such as Fortuna de Minas, Sete 
Lagoas, Paraopeba, Pitangui, and Jequitibd, as shown in Table IX. 13. The records of die CTS indicate a 
similar trend. Of the 14 workers listed, 8 of them were bom in the district where the mill was established 
(Itauna).
Table IX.13 - Place of birth of the 32 workers listed in the records of the Companhia Cachoeira dos 
Macacos, 1926-1935.
DISTRICTS WORKERS PERCENTAGE
Fortuna de Minas 8 25%
Jequitiba 6 19%
Inhauma 4 13%
Sete Lagoas 4 13%
Santa Quiteria 3 09%
Lagoa Santa 2 06%
Contagem 2 06%
Para de Minas 1 03%
Paraopeba 1 03%
Pitanguy 1
//t •______n _____________________J _
03%
T*__________-___J ____1A/1/ ________1 f /■.Sources: Companhia Cachoeira dos Macacos, "Livro de Registro de Empregados, 1926-1931", pp.1-56; 
Companhia Tecidos Santanense, "Livro de Registro de Empregados, 1935", pp.3-203.
The CCC also recruited mainly locals. In 1885, for example, Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas,
manager of the Cachoeira mill, wrote to Bernardo asking him:
"If you can find there [Cedro] some orphans or even if you have there some children 
available, without family, I would appreciate if you could send me 6 of them (...)//9S
In 1893, Caetano Mascarenhas recruited in the neighbourhood of his farm (located in Jequitiba, not very far
94 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Caetano Mascarenhas, 1883-1912 - 
No. 149", "Letter from Caetano Mascarenhas to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 16 July 1894".
95 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Cabra de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 18", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 30 October 1885".
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away) two families of workers and 26 women to work at the Sao Vicente mill96. Furthermore, the CCC often
recruited children in the orphanages from the neighbouring towns97.
Non-slave Brazilians were also recruited in orphanages, as mentioned above, and through relatives.
In 1884, for example, Bernardo Mascarenhas wrote to his brother, Antonio Pinto Mascarenhas, who lived
in Capim Branco, asking him:
"I am about to begin some carpenter work which I wish to be finished during this year.
As I need 20 or more carpenters and die number of carpenters available here is not 
sufficient, I would like to ask you die favour of recruiting them (...).//98
During the same year, Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, manager of the Cachoeira mill, wrote that he had 
with him a young man who had been recommended by his mother and two of his brothers (Victor and 
Antonino). Nevertheless, he did not have any place for the young man at the mill at the moment99. In 
September of 1884, Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas wrote to Caetano Mascarenhas about the workers the 
latter had recruited:
"Of the 7 workers you have sent only 3 arrived. The remaining 4 are still in Curvello, but 
are coming tomorrow."
In the same letter he asked his brother to send him, as soon as possible, as many workers as he could find100.
In 1894, Caetano Mascarenhas wrote that:
"Jose Domingues Alves Barroso has agreed to send me lots of young women and good 
workers from Medanha, (...). Barroso is Priest Pedro's brother-in-law (...)."101
During the same year, Caetano Mascarenhas wrote that he could not send the 12 weavers of die Sao Vicente 
mill that were requested by his brother Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, then general manager of the CCC 
and manager of the Cedro mill, as his mill was short of weavers102.
Suppliers, agents, and clients were also an important channel of recruitment of Brazilian workers. 
In 1878, the manager of the Cachoeira mill, Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, asked Kerr, an agent in
96 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Caetano Mascarenhas, 1883-1912 - 
No. 149", "Letter from Caetano Mascarenhas to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 24 October 1893".
97 Vaz, op.cit.. p. 193.
98 Letter from Bernardo Mascarenhas to Antonio Pinto Mascarenhas on 14 March 1884, reproduced 
in Giroletti, Fabrica Convento Disciplina. pp.64-5.
99 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 11 August 1884".
100 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Caetano Mascarenhas, 6 September 1884".
101 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Caetano Mascarenhas, 1883-1912 - 
No.149", "Letter from Caetano Mascarenhas to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 16 July 1894".
102 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Caetano Mascarenhas, 1883-1912 - 
No.149", "Letter from Caetano Mascarenhas to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 16 July 1894".
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Manchester, to recruit 3 workers for the mill103. In 1891, Theophilo Marques Ferreira, general manager of
the CCC and manager of the Cedro mill, wrote to Gontijo, Mascarenhas & Cia., an agent in Rio de Janeiro:
"The dyer of this mill has left, and (...), I will be grateful if you could inform me if it is 
possible to recruit a good master, national or foreigner, in this job there in Capital, (...).,/104
In 1896, Antonio Hygino M. do Rego, a merchant from Bagre, wrote that he had recruited a family made 
up of 5 girls, 1 boy, and widow, as had been requested by the general manager of the CCC. Two years later, 
Manoel Pimenta Figueiredo, a merchant from Capelinha, wrote to the general manager of die CCC that he 
was sending the boy the company had requested to look for the muletrain of the Sao Vicente mill105.
Although foreigners were not quantitatively important, they represented an important source of 
skilled labour for the mineiro textile industry. Until the last decades of the nineteenth century neither slaves 
nor Brazilian wage-eamers had the required mechanical skills. Mill owners needed competent technicians 
and were thus willing to hire foreigners106. First in England and later in the USA and in continental Europe, 
foreigners were recruited to set-up mills, to operate and maintain the machinery, to train the work-force, and 
to supervise production.
In 1875, the Brazil Industrial textile mill recruited five English technicians to assemble
machinery107. The CCM also hired an English technician to install the machinery of the company, but he
soon returned to England108. The Cassu mill also depended on foreign technicians, as a shareholder who was
manager of the mill stated:
"At the moment work at the mill 61 people, including the manager, the machinist George 
Gedney, (...)."1W
In 1893, the CTS requested the help of a foreign technician from the CCC to assemble and put into 
operation its machinery:
"As I needed a mechanic to assemble four spinning and carding machines in the mill that
103 Letter from Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas to Robert L. Kerr, 1 June 1878, reproduced in 
Giroletti, Fabrica Convento Disciplina. p.67.
104 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.29", "Letter from 
Theophilo Marques Ferreira to Gontijo, Mascarenhas & Cia., 1 April 1891".
105 Letters from Antonio Hygino M. do Rego to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 17 April 1896, 
and from Manoel Pimenta Figueiredo to Aristides Jose Mascarenhas, 15 July 1898, reproduced in Giroletti, 
Fabrica Convento Disciplina. p.67.
106 For the employment of foreigner technicians in the country as a whole during the last century 
see Stein, op.cit. pp.64-5.
107 Ibid., p.52.
108 N.A.M. Freitas, "Cia. Textil Cachoeira dos Macacos: Empresa que deu Origem a uma Cidade", 
Fundagao Mineira de Arte Aleijadinho/Escola Superior de Artes Plasticas, Mimeo., Belo Horizonte, 1990, 
p.27.
109 Reproduced in Libby, op.cit.. p.234.
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I am setting-up here, I wrote to Mr. John Lomas. Nevertheless, when he arrived he 
informed me that it would be difficult for him to work here since he was still an employee 
of the Companhia do Cedro.
"As the work of assembling the machines we have here will not take more than one or two 
months, I would like to ask if you could release Mr. Lomas to assemble our machines and put them 
into operation."110
At least in the first years, every master in the Cedro mill, apart from the blacksmith and carpenter 
masters, was recruited abroad. They were recruited by agents, preferably from the same country where the 
machinery had been bought111. The purchase contract for the machinery of the Cedro mill, for example, 
included the provision of a technician to assemble and operate it112. However, as the first technician sent 
from the USA as part of the contract never arrived, two other foreign technicians were recruited, Barnes and 
Nicholson. Bames left the company five months after his arrival113, but Nicholson and his wife - the latter 
being responsible for the training of the weavers -, stayed longer. In 1879, another two English technicians, 
George Jates and Nathanael Holt, were recruited to work at the mill Both of them left the Cedro mill in 
1882. During the same year, the company hired another foreign technician, John Smith, who had previously 
worked at the Fabrica do Brumado, a textile mill located in Pitanguy114. This indicates that foreigner 
technicians were also recruited from other textile mills in the province.
Before merging with the Cedro mill, the Cachoeira mill had also hired foreign technicians to 
supervise work. William Hutchinson, an Englishman, was hired in 1876 for two years to supervise the 
setting-up and operation of the mill, and to train the work-force. Three years later, two foreign machinists, 
John and William Lomas, and a foreign weaver, Andrew White, replaced William Hutchinson, who had 
returned to England. In 1882, all three technicians left the company. John Lomas did not return from a visit 
to England, and William Lomas and Andrew White ran away during the night. In the following year another 
Englishman, James Winders, was hired115. Such a high turn-over of foreign workers indicates that their 
employment was erratic, either because the conditions of employment were far from ideal or because foreign 
workers were not as reliable as many in Brazil thought, or even both.
The employment of foreign technicians continued after the merger of the Cedro and the Cachoeira
110 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.35", "Letter from 
Manoel Jose de Souza Moreira to Aristides Mascarenhas, 24 April 1893".
111 Vaz, op.cit.. p.53.
112 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.2", "Contract of 
purchase of machinery signed by Mascarenhas & Irmaos and Gme. Van Vlick Lidgerwood, 27 September 
1870".
113 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Copiador de Cartas da Fabrica do Cedro, 18/10/1872 a 
10/04/1879", "Letter from Mascarenhas & Irmaos to Meilford de Lidgerwood, 18 February 1873".
114 Giroletti, Fabrica Convento Disciplina. pp.82-6.
115 Ibid., pp.86-8.
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mills into the CCC until the last years of the century. James Winders, for example, continued to work for
the new company until 1889. In 1883, the company tried to hire William Hutchinson once again, but he
decided not to go back to Brazil116. In 1884, the company looked for an experienced and skilful dyer in
England117. In 1886, William Hutchinson agreed to consider the matter of rejoining the company, as he was
approached by the CCC once more118. At the end of this year, Kerr gave the following account of the
conditions to recruit a mechanic in England:
"With reference to looking out for another mechanic I presume I must not send any one 
until I hear from you again. I should like to know if you require a man who understand 
carding, spinning and weaving, and also the same man capable of erecting machinery and 
keeping the same in good order. It is rather difficult to find a man who is capable of doing 
all these things, but I would do my best for you."119
The above letter shows how limited the mineiro labour market was. It seems that it was easier to find a 
general technician abroad - which was not an easy task per se - than to End a more specialized local skilled 
worker. In the same letter, Kerr stated that Hutchinson was reluctant to accept the company's offer unless 
he was offered greater inducements120. It seems that the CCC did not have a better alternative and decided 
to pay what Hutchinson was requesting. In 1889, Hutchinson rejoined the company, but two years later he 
returned to England leaving his son, Hebert, and a relative, William, in his place. They had come out with 
him two years previously. Both of them worked for the company for another three years, before returning 
to England for good. William Hutchinson returned to the company in 1892 to assemble machinery of die 
Sao Vicente mill and stayed until 1894121. In the following year, as William Hutchinson again declined to 
return to die company122, Kerr tried to recruit another foreign machinist for the company123. The company 
finally decided to recruit John Lomas, who had worked at the Cachoeira and the Sao Sebastiao mills. John
116 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 14", "Letter from 
William Hutchinson to Robert L. Kerr, 7 January 1883".
117 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 16", "Letter from 
Robert L. Kerr to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 8 July 1884".
118 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.20", "Letter from 
Robert L. Kerr to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 2 August 1886".
119 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebida No.20", "Letter from 
Robert L. Kerr to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 11 December 1886".
120 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebida No.20", "Letter from 
Robert L. Kerr to Bernardo Mascarenhas, 11 December 1886".
121 Giroletti, Fabrica Convento Disciplina. pp.94-5.
122 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No.41", "Letter from 
Robert L. Kerr to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 23 May 1895".
123 Companhia Cedro e Cachoeira, "Caixa de Correspondencias Recebidas No. 18", "Letter from 
Robert L. Kerr to Francisco de Paula Mascarenhas, 8 August 1895".
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Lomas left the company months later and until the beginning of this century the company did not hire any 
other foreign technician124.
The decision of the Companhia Cedro Cachoeira not to hire any other foreign technician points to 
a trend which can be observed in other mills too. In 1883, the manager of the Uniao Itabirana mill stated 
that:
"The machinist who is supervising production for 18 months is a Brazilian, who is a local
and learned the work at die mill; (...)."125
The substitution of Brazilians for foreigners in die more technical jobs at the end of die nineteenth century 
could be the result of several factors: the emergence of a pool of local skilled labour; the result of the 
various problems faced by mineiro entrepreneurs with foreigners previously employed (see Chapter 7); a 
reluctancy of foreign workers to return to - or work - in Brazil, because conditions of employment were not 
as promised or expected; or/and the inability of mineiro entrepreneurs to pay sufficiendy high wages to 
attract foreign workers.
To sum up, slaves were consistendy employed in small numbers by the mineiro textile industry, 
but only occasionally as operatives in the mills. Mills owned slaves, but they also hired slaves from their 
sharehoders' stock and from private masters. Non-slave Brazilians were the most important source of 
unskilled labour. Mills employed large numbers of locals, mainly women and children, who were recruited 
in orphanages, by relatives, agents, clients, and suppliers. Finally, foreigners were an important source of 
skilled labour, setting-up mills, operating and maintaining the machinery, training the work-force, and 
supervising production. They were mainly recruited through agents and suppliers, and towards the end of 
the last century they were being replaced by Brazilians.
Finally, regarding the electricity generating industry, there is very little information concerning the 
work-force employed by both the Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade (CME) and the Companhia Forga e 
Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina (CFLCL). Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some conclusions. First of all, 
as the CME - the first electricity generating company to be organized in Minas Gerais - was established at 
about the same time of the abolition of slavery in Brazil (the company was established in January 1888, four 
months before the abolition of slavery) it seems very unlike that the company had employed slaves in its 
work-force. Thus, the mineiro electricity generating industry could only resort to two sources of labour non­
slave Brazilians and foreigners.
Foreigners were regularly employed at the CME. In 1889, for example, during the installation of 
the plant, the company hired two US technicians, who arrived together with the equipment ordered from the 
Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC). Moreover, in 1891, Bernardo Mascarenhas sent his electrician, 
Wan Wagenen, who was certainly a foreigner, to the USA to discuss the project of the new plant he was
124 Giroletti, Fabrica Convento Disciplina. p.96.
125 Reproduced in Libby, op.cit.. p.238.
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planning to build with the engineers of the WEC126. Thus, it seems that foreigners were employed mainly 
in those more technical positions. Furthermore, in 1893 the company informed its customers that the increase 
of the price of the domestic lighting service was due, among other things, to the increase in the salaries of 
its foreign employees127.
Non-slave Brazilians were certainly employed by the CME, as the following letter issued to the
company's customers in 1893 shows:
"The company informs its customers that due to the doubling in the prices of imported 
materials and machinery, to the increase in the salaries of the foreign employees, (...), to 
the increase in the price of national materials and the increase in the salary of national 
employees, (,..)."128
However, there is no information concerning the number of Brazilians and the composition - in terms of
sex, age, occupation, etc. - of the work-force employed by the company. Nevertheless, based on the
information about the employment of foreigners, it is reasonable to believe that, at least at the beginning,
Brazilians were mainly employed in the less skilled jobs.
The CFLCL did not employ any slaves at all, simply because the company was organized in 1905,
17 years after the abolition of slavery in Brazil. It also seems that the company employed only Brazilians,
since there is no reference of the employment of any foreigner even for the most technical jobs. The first
manager of the company, hired to supervise the construction of the plant and the installation of the
equipment, was Elpidio de Lacerda Wemeck, an electrical engineer who lived in Leopoldina and was most
probably a Brazilian129. The construction of the power station and the installation of its equipment involved
a number of engineers whose names suggest that they were all Brazilians. These engineers were hired by
Trajano de Medeiros & Company, the building company contracted to set-up the plant and assemble its
equipment. The person in charge of the setting-up work was Octavio Cameiro, the chief-engineer130. His
deputy-engineer was Ferreira Martins:
"(...) a well known professional who, during the administration of Mr. Passos in Rio de 
Janeiro, was the chief-engineer of the palace of the Mayor of this city, and who supervised 
important works in several railways (...)."131
126 P. Oliveira, Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade: Pioneira da Tlnminacao Hidreletrica na America 
do Sul. (Juiz de Fora, 1969), pp.33-9.
127 Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, "Declaragao da Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade". Letter 
issued by the Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade informing its customers the increase in the price of die 
domestic lighting service, 10 June 1893".
128 Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade, "Declaragao da Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade". "Letter 
issued by the Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade informing its customers the increase in the price of the 
domestic lighting service, 10 June 1893".
129 "Companhia Forga e Luz", in Jomal Cataeuazes. 12 March 1906.
130 "Companhia Forga e Luz", in Gazeta de Leonoldina. 24 March 1907.
131 "Companhia Forga e Luz", in Gazeta de Leopoldina. 24 March 1907.
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The hydraulic work at the power station was under the supervision of the resident-engineer, Alfredo do 
Pago. The assemblage of the power station and of the sub-stations of distribution was supervised by an 
engineer, Paulo Saboia, who had been sent to the USA in order to improve his knowledge of electricity132. 
Two years later, by the time of the inauguration of the power and lighting services, a report of the company 
stated that the board of directors decided to entrust the management to Octavio Cameiro133. Octavio Cameiro 
lived in Cataguazes, as the following newspaper report shows:
"At 2 o'clock in the afternoon the electrical engineers and their assistants went to Mrs.
Luiza Barbosa Cameiro in order to offer her a photograph of her honourable son, Octavio
Cameiro („.)."134
There is very little information about the nationality of work-force employed by the CFLCL after the 
inauguration of the power station. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the company continued to employ 
basically Brazilians, as in 1911 the company regretted the death of one of its employees, Jeronimo Duarte 
Ferreira, who was most probably a Brazilian135. Such a large employment of Brazilian skilled workers can 
only be explained by the emergence of a local pool of skilled labour, which was possible most probably due 
to the previous establishment of other electricity generating companies in the country such as the CME 
(1888), the SPTLPC (1899), the Companhia Ituana de Forga e Luz (1903), and the Empresa Luz e Forga 
de Jundiaf S/A (1904)136.
Thus, for obvious reasons, both the CME and the CFLCL did not employ slaves. Whereas the 
former company employed Brazilians and foreigners, who performed the more technical work, it seems the 
latter one employed only Brazilians.
132 "Companhia Forga e Luz", in Gazeta de leopoldina. 24 March 1907.
133 "Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina", in Jomal Cataguazes. 8 August 1908.
134 "Inauguragao da Luz Electrica", in Jomal Cataguazes. 19 July 1908.
135 Companhia Forga e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina, Relatorio da Diretoria. (1911), p.5.
136 F.A.M. Gomes, "A Eletrificagao no Brasil", in Cademo Historia & Enereia. (Sao Paulo, 1986), 
No.2, October, pp.5-12.
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Conclusion
This account of the making of the Brazilian working-class has shown that slavery represented a 
major influence on the working-relations throughout the last century. Its impact can be seen even years after 
its abolition at the end of the 1880s. In nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, which had one of the largest stocks 
of slaves, slavery also served as the reference point for most working-relations. The legacy of slavery 
influenced the way in which non-slave Brazilians, and in several occasions even foreigners, were treated. 
Therefore, the examination of the sources of labour in Minas Gerais has shown that until the abolition of 
slavery in 1888, slaves were employed - in a greater or a lesser extent - in almost all the industries 
examined in this thesis. The mineiro iron industry and the CUI employed a large number of slaves, basically 
because when these industries emerged slaves were cheap and abundant. The textile industry consistently 
employed slaves in small numbers. The bulk of the industry, located at the central part of Minas Gerais, 
emerged at a time when slaves were more scarce and mostly concentrated in the coffee areas in the southern 
parts of die province. The only industry which did not employ slaves during the nineteenth century was the 
electricity generating industry. The first electricity generating company founded in Minas Gerais, the CME, 
was established at about the same time of the abolition of slavery. Brazilians were more and more employed, 
either in skilled or in unskilled jobs, towards the end of the century, notwithstanding all the prejudice against 
them and doubts about their ability and reliability, and all complaints about their unavailability. They were 
found in small numbers in iron foundries in the first three-quarters of the century. They worked alongside 
slaves and foreigners in the construction and operation of the Uniao e Industria turnpike, either in skilled 
or in unskilled jobs. They made up the bulk of the work-force of the textile mills. Finally, they were 
certainly employed in the first electricity generating companies established in Minas Gerais, sometimes 
alongside foreign technicians. Foreigners were an important source of skilled labour for every firm 
examined. They were vital not only in the setting-up of plants and mills, but also in the operation and 
maintenance of machinery, in the supervision of production, and in the training of the native work-force.
The analysis of the sources of labour in Minas Gerais has also shown that slave labour is not 
incompatible with more modem forms of capitalist production. They were employed in several different 
economic sectors of the mineiro economy and there is no indication that their employment was less rational 
or productive. The undesirable effects of slavery upon economic development seems to be the same of those 
also observed for all other forms of compulsory labour.
Finally, this section has revealed that the differences between the business environment of latecomer 
and advanced economies were not restricted to the role played by economic agents (entrepreneurs, banks, 
and State). There were important differences in the use of the factors of production themselves. The absence 
of a developed labour market forced mineiro capitalists to adapt in the face of imperfect conditions. 
Therefore, they employed slaves when non-slave Brazilians were not reliable and available, and when 
foreigners were to risky and expensive. The combination, to a certain extent successfully, of old forms of 
labour - forced - with other more modem ones is a clear indication of the capacity of capitalism to adapt 
to different economic environments.
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CONCLUSION
This analysis of the mineiro businessman has reveals that he shared many of the characteristics of 
the entrepreneur described in the literature. He assembled factors of production. He was a capitalist, 
manager, leader, innovator, and risk-taker. The analysis has also shown that the intellectual formation of the 
mineiro entrepreneurial class was based on principles very similar to that of early European entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, the thesis shows that apart from the Mata zone where immigrants were an important source 
of entrepreneurship, the social background of the mineiro entrepreneur contrasted with that of his 
counterparts in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro where immigrants were present in larger numbers within the 
pioneering local entrepreneurial classes. In Minas Gerais, several of the most prominent entrepreneurs came 
from traditional ruling families. In addition, although trade and farming represented the main sources of 
entrepreneurship and capital as they did in Sao Paulo, in Minas Gerais these activities were of a different 
nature owing to the peculiarities of the mineiro economy. In Minas, coffee cultivation was confined to the 
southern parts of the province/state. Elsewhere a different range of activities were undertaken, notably gold 
mining, cattle-raising, and the production of food staples. Hence, the commercialization of coffee was less 
important in the mineiro economy than in the paulista and carioca. Nevertheless, coffee capital did provide - 
directly or indirectly - part of the funds invested in the industries established in the coffee-growing parts of 
Minas Gerais. In other parts of the province local trade of a more general nature and food production 
farming represented the starting point in the career of most entrepreneurs. Finally, the general social attitude 
towards entrepreneurship seems to have been positive and it was possible to observe the existence of a great 
deal of entrepreneurial initiative and the availability of local sources of capital in nineteenth-century Minas 
Gerais. Lack of direct access to international markets, inefficient means of transportation, and scattered and 
diluted consumer markets, seems to have been the main restrictions to the development of a more dynamic 
business environment.
The analysis of the organization of firms has shown that, generally speaking, most mineiro firms 
were small traditional business enterprises, operating single units, fulfilling a single economic function, 
producing a limited range of products, and restricted to local markets. Most of them also made use of 
traditional methods and sources of energy - such as wood, wind and water, man and beast - in the 
production and distribution of daily output. Furthermore, in terms of their administrative structure mineiro 
firms were even more traditional and less complex. Veiy often they were owned and/or controlled by a small 
number of people, mainly locals who managed the companies themselves: administrative structures were 
primitive. In the cases where a more structured administration existed, it consisted of a few layers of 
managers and top administration positions were filled by members of the controlling families. Managers 
were responsible for a wide range of activities, and there was little evidence of departmentalization or 
specialization. Towards the end of the century firms tended to become more bureaucratic as they grew in 
size or were replaced by larger firms. However, traditional firms continued to dominate the mineiro economy 
and from an organizational point of view the business environment in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais was 
characteristic of the first stage of capitalist industrial development - traditional and personal capitalism.
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During the nineteenth-century, most mineiro firms relied strongly on foreign technology, mainly 
British and US. In order to acquire the minimum level of technological skill required for the selection of 
a foreign technology, mineiro entrepreneurs had to spend long periods studying abroad, to visit similar 
establishments in Brazil and overseas, to establish direct and indirect contacts with foreign producers of 
machinery, to make use of technical books, and even to ask the help of foreigners living in Minas Gerais. 
The relationship between users and suppliers of foreign technologies was often disturbed by problems 
(delays in delivery, adulterated orders, inevitable misunderstandings, loss of goods, lack of sensitivity on 
the part of suppliers to die specific circumstances of foreign customers, unfulfilled promises, difficulties of 
communication, and so on) created by geographic distance and cultural, socio and economic differences. 
Moreover, mineiro firms relied heavily on foreign technicians for setting-up and operating equipment. But 
these technicians were often difficult to find, unreliable, expensive, and relationships with them usually 
proved difficult. Finally, although some capacity of adaptation and modification can be observed in 
nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, this capacity had strict limits and was too narrow to be characterized as 
a specific mineiro way of manufacturing. The existing informal and spontaneous technological innovative 
system was not developed enough to produce an indigenous technological alternatives and Minas Gerais 
proved to be in this respect an inhospitable environment for the entrepreneur. The narrowness of the capacity 
of its economy to absorb and refine imported technology was confirmed by the failure to develop an 
indigenous capital goods industry. The only industry to employ an indigenous technology - the iron foundries 
established in the first three-quarters of the last century - faced strict limits on its development and virtually 
disappeared when it had to compete against foreign products at the end of the century.
Slavery represented a major influence on the making of the Brazilian working-class during the 
nineteenth century and its impact can be seen even years after its abolition in the late 1880s. In Minas 
Gerais, slavery also served as the reference point for most working-relations, influencing the way in which 
non-slave Brazilians, and even foreigners, were treated. Therefore, until the abolition of slavery in 1888, 
slaves were employed to a greater or a lesser extent in almost all the industries examined. The only 
exception was the electricity generating industry which began to emerge at about the same time of the 
abolition of slavery. The research has shown that their employment is not totally incompatible with capitalist 
production. There is no reason to believe that their employment was less rational or productive and the 
undesirable effects of slavery upon the economy were the same of other forms of compulsory labour. 
Towards the end of the century, national labour was increasingly employed, both in skilled and unskilled 
jobs, despite all the prejudice against their ability and reliability, and all the complaints about their shortage. 
Although they were employed in small numbers, foreigners constituted an important source of skilled labour 
for every firm examined. They were crucial for the setting-up of plants and mills, the operation and 
maintenance of machinery, the supervision of production, and the training of the native labour force.
The research strongly supports the view that the economic development of backward countries does 
not necessarily follows the same path taken by advanced economies. This study of the business environment 
in nineteenth-century Minas Gerais shows that it differed from that of the more advanced countries in
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several important respects. As in the case of many backward European countries, on many occasions mineiro 
entrepreneurs failed to establish the necessary infrastructure by themselves and the intervention of the State 
was inevitable. However, this research has also shown that differences between the business environment 
of latecomer and advanced economies were not only restricted to the role played by economic agents 
(entrepreneurs, banks, and State). There were important differences in the use of factors of production 
themselves. In the absence of a developed labour market entrepreneurs resorted to whatever form of labour 
was available. Therefore, slaves where employed in every sort work whenever non-slave Brazilians were 
(perceived as) unreliable and unavailable and foreigners too risky and expensive. Moreover, the combination, 
to a certain extent successful, of compulsory forms of labour with modem forms of production is a clear 
indication of the capacity of capitalism to adapt to different economic environments. Furthermore, the lack 
of indigenous technology and capital goods industry imposed solutions to problems that entrepreneurs in 
more technologically advanced countries rarely had to worry about. Local entrepreneurs were often faced 
with the problem of making use of foreign technical packages that were not entirely suited to local 
resources, to the scale of the businesses, and to market requirements.
Finally, the research has also shown that entrepreneurial initiative was not restricted to coffee- 
growing areas. In the case of Minas Gerais, non-coffee regions were neither restricted nor dominated by 
subsistence activity as many early historians believed- Minas Gerais was without any doubt a backward 
region and its economy could not be compared in terms of dynamism with of that of Sao Paulo. 
Nevertheless, its business environment was fairly dynamic, active and diverse.
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Appendix 1 - Annual Average Exchange Rates (pence per milreis), 1845-1915.
YEAR P YEAR P YEAR P YEAR P YEAR P
1845 10.59 1859 10.43 1874 10.74 1888 10.52 1902 5.00
1846 11.21 1860 10.74 1875 11.33 1889 11.01 1903 5.05
1847 11.65 1862 10.64 1876 10.55 1890 9.40 1904 5.73
1848 10.41 1863 10.95 1877 10.23 1891 6.21 1905 6.80
1849 10.77 1864 11.34 1878 9.55 1892 5.01 1906 6.56
1850 11.97 1865 10.41 1879 8.94 1893 4.83 1907 6.35
1851 12.12 1866 10.09 1880 9.20 1894 4.20 1908 6.33
1852 11.42 1867 9.34 1881 9.12 1895 4.14 1909 6.41
1853 11.86 1868 7.07 1882 8.81 1896 3.77 1910 6.93
1854 11.63 1869 7.83 1883 8.98 1897 3.21 1911 6.77
1855 11.48 1870 9.19 1884 8.61 1898 2.99 1912 6.77
1856 11.48 1871 10.01 1885 7.74 1899 3.09 1913 6.69
1857 11.09 1872 10.40 1886 7.78 1900 3.95 1914 5.62
1858 10.64 1873 10.87 1887 9.34 1901 4.89 1915 5.10
Sources: Cauculated from C.M. Lewis. Public Policy and Private Initiative: Railway Building in Sao Paulo. 
1860-1889. (1991), p.58; S.J. Stein, Orieens e Evolucao da Industria Textil no Brasil. 1850-1950. (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1979), p.98; T.H. Holloway, The Brazilian Coffee Valorization of 1906. (Madison, 1975), p.89; and 
L.C.T.D. Prado, "Commercial Capital, Domestic Market and Manufacturing in Imperial Brazil: The Failure 
of Brazilian Economic Development in die XlXth Century", University of London, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
1991, pp.380-2.
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